8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 MISAEL VALDEZ MARTINEZ, Case No. 1:26-cv-01870-KES-EPG-HC
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO RELEASE 14 WARDEN OF THE MESA VERDE PETITIONER DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 15 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S Respondents. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 16 (ECF No. 2) 17 18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 19 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned 20 recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted and Petitioner be released 21 from custody. 22 I. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a noncitizen currently detained at the Mesa Verde Detention Facility pending 25 ongoing removal proceedings. (ECF No. 1 at 4.1) The petition alleges that on August 8, 2025, 26 Petitioner was working on a hotel renovation when several unidentified men with their faces 27 covered attacked Petitioner and prevented him from leaving. (Id. at 5–6.) 1 On March 9, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising a 2 prolonged detention due process claim. (ECF No. 1 at 6–17.) The Court “construe[d] the Petition 3 as also challenging the statutory authority for Petitioner’s detention” and ordered Respondents to 4 “address[] whether this case is distinguishable from those cases in which this Court has granted 5 habeas relief.” (ECF No. 5 at 1, 2.) On March 24, 2026, Respondents filed an answer. (ECF No. 6 9.) To date, no traverse has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed. 7 II. 8 DISCUSSION 9 A. Statutory Basis of Petitioner’s Detention 10 Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme governing the detention of noncitizens 11 during removal proceedings and following the issuance of a final order of removal. “Where an 12 alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or 13 discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the 14 necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 15 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been 16 placed in removal proceedings”: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a). Avilez v. 17 Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). Respondent asserts that Petitioner is subject to 18 mandatory detention under to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) whereas Petitioner asserts that § 1226(a) 19 is applicable. 20 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “is the default detention statute for noncitizens in removal 21 proceedings.” Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529. Detention under § 1226(a) “is discretionary” and 22 “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Id. The Supreme Court has described 8 23 U.S.C. § 1225 as follows: 24 Under § 302, 110 Stat. 3009–579, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who “arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but 25 “has not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.” § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must “be inspected by 26 immigration officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3). 27 As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two 1 § 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or 2 lack of valid documentation. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (citing §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). Section 1225(b)(1) also applies to certain 3 other aliens designated by the Attorney General in his discretion. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 1225(b)(2) is broader. It serves as 4 a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant 5 here). See §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), (B).
6 Both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) authorize the detention of certain aliens. Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally 7 ordered removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to an expedited removal process. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if a 8 § 1225(b)(1) alien “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum ... or a fear of persecution,” then that alien is referred for an 9 asylum interview. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If an immigration officer determines after that interview that the alien has a credible fear of 10 persecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Aliens who are 11 instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a different process. Those aliens “shall be detained for a [removal] 12 proceeding” if an immigration officer “determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the 13 country. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
14 Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their detention, applicants for admission may be temporarily released on 15 parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 16 (2017). Such parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when 17 the purpose of the parole has been served, “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and 18 thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United 19 States.” Ibid. 20 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–88 (2018). 21 Until this year, DHS has applied section 1226(a) and its regime of discretionary release and review of detention “to the vast majority 22 of noncitizens allegedly in this country without valid documentation”—a practice codified by regulation. Id. As early as 23 1997, in the regulations implementing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the 24 Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Executive Office for Immigration Review stated that “[d]espite being applicants for 25 admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without 26 inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. at 27 10323. The government’s briefing in this case acknowledges that its position historically was that section 1226(a) was “an available 1 paroled] placed in full removal proceedings under § 1229a.” (Dkt. No. 16 (“Opp.”) at 12.) 2 However, the government now disavows its prior position in light 3 of subsequent “legal developments,” including its 2025 designation “restor[ing] the scope of expedited removal to the fullest extent 4 authorized by Congress,” 90 Fed. Reg. at 8139. (Opp. at 12.) It contends that section 1225 is “the sole applicable detention 5 authority for all applicants for admission” and asserts that all applicants for admission are “subject to the mandatory detention 6 framework” of section 1225(b). (Opp. at 12, 14.) 7 Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (footnote omitted). 8 Although Respondents have failed to follow this Court’s order to respond to “the 9 construed challenge to the statutory authority for Petitioner’s detention and address[] whether 10 this case is distinguishable from those cases in which this Court has granted habeas relief,” (ECF 11 No. 5 at 2), “[h]ere in the Eastern District of California, recent decisions have largely rejected the 12 government’s interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2) as applicable to all “applicants for admission.” 13 Valencia v. Chestnut, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1067 (E.D. Cal. 2025). See J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, 14 No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (“The various 15 legal arguments relied upon by Respondents to support this assertion [that Petitioner’s detention 16 is mandatory under 1225(b) while his removal proceedings are pending] have been rejected by 17 this Court in other proceedings.”). 18 This Court will follow the majority approach in finding that the government’s 19 “interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) 20 disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent 21 amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory 22 interpretation and practice.” Sharan S. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01427-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 23 WL 3167826, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025). 24 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends finding that the statutory basis of 25 Petitioner’s detention is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for release on bond or conditional 26 parole, and thus, Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief on the construed claim challenging the 27 statutory authority for his detention. \\\ 1 B. Appropriate Remedy 2 The Court finds J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3 3013328 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025), instructive: 4 Moreover, the government did not comply with the express terms of section 1226 when it detained petitioner, so the Court cannot 5 conclude that he is now detained on that basis. “Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to justify discretionary detention 6 under section 1226(a).” Chogllo Chafla, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11. “Section 1226(a) plainly states: ‘On a warrant issued by the 7 Attorney General, a [noncitizen] may be arrested and detained ....” Chogllo Chafla, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 8 1226(a)). “As such, it follows that absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” Id. “To 9 put it simply, [petitioner’s] detention[ ] [is] improper because there is no evidence in the record that [he was] arrested pursuant to a 10 warrant.” Id. “Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a), [petitioner’s] immediate release is 11 justified.” Id.; Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-CV- 00479-SDN, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2025) 12 (reaching the same conclusion).
13 If the government seeks to re-detain petitioner, it must provide no less than seven (7) days’ notice to petitioner and must hold a pre- 14 deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, at which 15 petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered. 16 J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8. 17 Similarly, here, there is nothing in the record before this Court indicating that Petitioner 18 was arrested pursuant to a warrant. Further, Respondents do not contend that Petitioner was 19 arrested “based on any alleged criminal history” or that he is a danger or flight risk. (ECF No. 9 20 at 2.) Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner is entitled to immediate 21 release. 22 C. Prolonged Detention 23 Alternatively, the undersigned also finds that Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief on his 24 prolonged detention claim. Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme governing the 25 detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings and following the issuance of a final order 26 of removal. “Where an alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is 27 mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to 1 2008). 2 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to 3 prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been ordered removed by the 4 government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, but their removal could 5 not be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to accept them or the United 6 States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto–Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 7 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86). The Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) does not 8 authorize indefinite detention and “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period 9 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 10 U.S. at 689. Thus, after a presumptively reasonable detention period of six months, a noncitizen 11 was entitled to release if “it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal 12 in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. 13 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to 14 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The Supreme Court upheld its “longstanding 15 view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period 16 necessary for their removal proceedings.” Id. at 526. The Supreme Court distinguished Zadvydas 17 by emphasizing that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination point” and 18 “in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days . . . considered presumptively valid in 19 Zadvydas.” Id. at 529. However, Justice Kennedy specifically noted that “a lawful permanent 20 resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his 21 risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” 22 Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 23 “In a series of decisions, the [Ninth Circuit] . . . grappled in piece-meal fashion with 24 whether the various immigration detention statutes may authorize indefinite or prolonged 25 detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond hearing.” Rodriguez v. 26 Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). This culminated in Rodriguez v. 27 Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), in which the Ninth Circuit held that for 1 provide periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their 2 continued detention as ‘the period of . . . confinement grows.’” 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf 3 v. Napolitano (Diouf II), 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit 4 applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret these immigration detention provisions 5 as providing a statutory right to a bond hearing once detention become prolonged. See Rodriguez 6 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022). 7 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the 8 constitutional avoidance canon to find that “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) contain an implicit 6– 9 month limit on the length of detention” and “[o]nce that 6–month period elapses, respondents 10 contend, aliens previously detained under those provisions must instead be detained under the 11 authority of § 1226(a), which allows for bond hearings in certain circumstances.” 583 U.S. at 12 297–98. Jennings also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of a statutory right under 8 13 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General 14 must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” 15 Id. at 306. The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the] constitutional 16 arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit likewise remanded the case to the 17 district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance but observed that it had 18 “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process 19 is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the 20 arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255, 21 256 (9th Cir. 2018). 22 There has been a dearth of guidance regarding the point at which an immigration 23 detainee’s continued mandatory detention becomes unconstitutional. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 24 F.4th at 1203 (noting that both the Ninth Circuit “and the Supreme Court have repeatedly 25 declined to decide constitutional challenges to bond hearing procedures in the immigration 26 detention context”). The Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires 27 a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but it has recognized that 1 for noncitizens held for prolonged periods under § 1226(c)” based on due process and noted that 2 “[a]ccording to one such court order, the ‘prolonged mandatory detention pending removal 3 proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” 4 Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), vacated on other 5 grounds, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). 6 Respondents argue that “Petitioner does not possess the right to freedom from 7 immigration detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress.” (ECF No. 9 at 2 8 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).) However, Mezei 9 addressed due process rights with respect to admission, and here, Petitioner is not raising claims 10 regarding the admission process. See Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 11 1163, 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“Defendants ask the Court to extract from Thuraissigiam a 12 broad rule that any inadmissible noncitizen possesses only those due process rights afforded to 13 them by statute, regardless of the nature of their status or the relief they seek. But such a 14 conclusion is untethered to the claim in Thuraissigiam and the Court's reasoning. 15 Thuraissigiam’s discussion of due process is necessarily constrained to challenges to 16 admissibility to the United States.”), appeal filed, No. 24-2801 (9th Cir. argued May 21, 2025). 17 Courts in the Ninth Circuit have taken a variety of approaches to determine whether due 18 process requires a bond hearing in a particular immigration detention case. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 19 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (applying bright-line rule that “detention becomes prolonged after six 20 months and entitles [the petitioner] to a bond hearing” in § 1226(c) context); Banda v. 21 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (considering six factors, which 22 include: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) 23 the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) 24 delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the 25 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez v. 26 Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) 27 (considering, in addition to six factors set forth above, “whether the detention will exceed the 1 nature of the crimes the petitioner committed” in § 1226(c) context), report and recommendation 2 adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2021); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 3 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (considering “the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of 4 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the 5 government” in § 1226(c) context). 6 There are also some courts that apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 7 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL 8 1862254, at *3–4 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 9 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020). In Rodriguez Diaz, which concerned a noncitizen 10 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and whether “continued detention was unconstitutional 11 because under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to a second bond 12 hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence,” 13 the panel majority “assume[d] without deciding” that the Mathews test applied, noting that the 14 Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal 15 proceedings,” and finding “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the 16 heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 17 F.4th at 1193, 1206. Similarly, the dissent “agree[d] that the test developed in Mathews v. 18 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework 19 to determine whether there was a due process violation.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1219 20 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). See also Black, 103 F.4th at 147 (“conclud[ing] that due process 21 challenges to prolonged detention under section 1226(c) should also be reviewed under 22 Mathews”); A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal. 23 May 16, 2025) (applying Mathews test to determine whether due process entitled petitioner to a 24 bond hearing in § 1225(b) context), findings and recommendations adopted, 2025 WL 1808676 25 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025). 26 Given that the Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to 27 removal proceedings,” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, the Court will apply Mathews, in 1 generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: 2 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 3 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 4 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 5 requirements would entail. 6 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 7 1. Private Interest 8 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue here is 9 fundamental. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other 10 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause 11 protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit has held that it “is beyond dispute” an 12 immigration detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from 13 imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. 14 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 15 (1992)). See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an 16 individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably 17 substantial.’ . . . Rodriguez Diaz has a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty interest 18 under Mathews.” (quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Accordingly, the first Mathews factor 19 weighs in favor of Petitioner. 20 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 21 With respect to the second factor, the Court considers the risk of erroneous deprivation of 22 Petitioner’s liberty interest and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. “In 23 evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation in the context of noncitizen detention, the Ninth 24 Circuit has looked to whether the detainee has a statutory right to procedural protections, such as 25 individualized custody determinations and the right to seek additional bond hearings throughout 26 detention.” Jensen v. Garland, No. 5:21-cv-01195-CAS (AFM), 2023 WL 3246522, at *6 (C.D. 27 Cal. May 3, 2023) (citing Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1209–10 (finding a small risk of erroneous 1 procedural protections, including individualized custody determinations and right to seek 2 additional bond hearings)). 3 Petitioner has been detained for almost nine months and has not received any bond 4 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker bond. Accordingly, the Court finds that the risk of 5 erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest and the probable value of additional 6 procedural safeguards is high. See Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-07996-NC, 2020 WL 510347, at 7 *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of Landeros Jimenez’s 8 liberty interest is high. He has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing during 9 his one-year detention. Thus, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards—a bond 10 hearing—is high, because Respondents have provided virtually no procedural safeguards at 11 all.”). Therefore, the second Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 12 3. Government’s Interest 13 With respect to the third and final factor, the Court recognizes that “the government 14 clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in the United States in 15 violation of our law’” and “has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous 16 criminal aliens.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 518, 515). The 17 Ninth Circuit has stated that “[t]hese are interests of the highest order that only increase with the 18 passage of time,” noting that “[t]he longer detention lasts and the longer the challenges to an IJ’s 19 order of removal take, the more resources the government devotes to securing an alien’s ultimate 20 removal” and “[t]he risk of a detainee absconding also inevitably escalates as the time for 21 removal becomes more imminent.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. 22 However, it is important to stress that the “government interest at stake here is not the 23 continued detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond 24 hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7. See Zerezghi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 25 Servs., 955 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the question [under the third Mathews 26 factor] is not the government’s interest in immigration enforcement” “in general” (emphasis 27 added)); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 1 laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly executed, the 2 Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without providing an individualized bond hearing 3 is low.”). 4 Courts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively 5 minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this Court demonstrating that providing 6 Petitioner with a bond hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome. See Marroquin 7 Ambriz v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in context of a § 1226(a) 8 detention, the parties did not contest “that the cost of conducting a bond hearing, to determine 9 whether the continued detention of Petitioner is justified, is minimal”); Singh v. Barr, 400 F. 10 Supp. 3d 1005, 1021 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in the context of § 1226(a) detention that “[t]he 11 government has not offered any indication that a [ ] bond hearing would have outside effects on 12 its coffers”). Accordingly, the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 13 4. Bond Hearing 14 Based on the foregoing, all three Mathews factor weigh in favor of Petitioner. “The Court 15 finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing 16 before an immigration judge” with respect to Petitioner’s prolonged detention claim. Lopez, 631 17 F. Supp. 3d at 882. The Court now turns to the burden of proof at the bond hearing and which 18 party should bear such burden. 19 Having “previously applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret . . . 20 immigration provisions—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c), and 1231(a)(6)—as providing a statutory 21 right to a bond hearing once detention becomes prolonged,” the Ninth Circuit in Singh 22 “concluded that for these hearings to comply with due process, the government had to bear the 23 burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the alien poses a flight risk or a danger 24 to the community.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196 (citing Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203–05). 25 Although Rodriguez Diaz may have declined to impose the standard articulated in Singh, the 26 panel majority specifically stated that it was not “decid[ing] whether Singh remains good law in 27 any respect following Jennings” and even recognized that Singh was based “on general 1 substantial.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1202 n.4, 1199. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has 2 suggested post-Jennings that Singh remains good law in Martinez v. Clark, which took “no 3 position” on “[w]hether due process requires a bond hearing for aliens detained under 4 § 1226(c),” but did address “the scope of federal court review of those bond determinations” and 5 found with respect to a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c) that “the BIA 6 properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing 7 evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community.” Martinez, 36 F.4th at 1223, 1231. On 8 remand, and after Rodriguez Diaz was decided, the Martinez panel reconfirmed “that the 9 government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez is a 10 danger to the community” and “that the BIA applied the correct burden of proof.” Martinez v. 11 Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785, 786 (9th Cir. 2024). 12 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the government must justify Petitioner’s 13 continued confinement by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a 14 danger to the community. See A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 15 1808676, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025) (directing respondent “to schedule a bond hearing before 16 an immigration judge . . . wherein respondent must justify petitioner’s continued detention by 17 clear and convincing evidence” in § 1225(b) context); Sanchez-Rivera v. Matuszewski, No. 22- 18 cv-1357-MMA (JLB), 2023 WL 139801, at *7 n.5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023) (following “an 19 overwhelming majority of courts that have held that the government must justify the continued 20 confinement of a non-citizen detainee under § 1226(c) by clear and convincing evidence that the 21 non-citizen is a flight risk or a danger to the community”). 22 Further, in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the community and not 23 to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond, the IJ should consider 24 Petitioner’s financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release. See Hernandez v. 25 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their challenge 26 under the Due Process Clause to the government’s policy of allowing ICE and IJs to set 27 immigration bond amounts without considering the detainees’ financial circumstances or 1 the immigration judge (‘IJ’), in setting his bond and establishing appropriate terms for his 2 potential release, to consider his ability to pay and alternative means of assuring appearance.”). 3 D. Motion to Appoint Counsel 4 Petitioner has moved for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 2.) There currently exists no 5 absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Chaney v. Lewis, 801 6 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1958). 7 However, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) authorizes the appointment of counsel at any stage of the 8 proceeding for financially eligible persons if “the interests of justice so require.” To determine 9 whether to appoint counsel, the “court must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as 10 well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the 11 legal issues involved.” Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 12 In light of the Court’s conclusions, the undersigned finds that the interests of justice do 13 not require the appointment of counsel at the present time. 14 III. 15 RECOMMENDATION & ORDER 16 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 17 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 18 2. Respondents be directed to immediately release Petitioner and be enjoined and restrained 19 from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner unless Respondents provide no less than 20 seven (7) days’ notice to Petitioner and hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a 21 neutral arbiter pursuant to section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, at which 22 Petitioner’s eligibility for bond is considered. 23 3. Or, alternatively, Respondents be directed to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing 24 before an immigration judge to be held within thirty (30) days that complies with the 25 requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), at which 26 a. “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is 27 a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond,” Singh, 638 ] b. the IJ should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances or alternative 2 conditions of release in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the 3 community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without 4 bond. 5 Further, Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 2) is DENIED. 6 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 7 | Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 8 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 9 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 10 | written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and 11 | serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 12 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed 13 | within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District 14 | Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 15 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 16 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 17 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20| Dated: _ April 21, 2026 [spe Fey — 1 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28