Rel: June 27, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025 _________________________
CL-2024-0844 _________________________
Miranda Pilato
v.
John Samaniego, Sheriff of Shelby County
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court (CV-22-380)
PER CURIAM.
Miranda Pilato appeals from a judgment entered by the Shelby
Circuit Court ("the circuit court") affirming a decision of the Shelby
County Law Enforcement Personnel Board ("the LEPB") that affirmed
the termination by John Samaniego, the Sheriff of Shelby County, of CL-2024-0844
Pilato's employment as a Shelby County deputy sheriff. We affirm the
circuit court's judgment.
Background
Miranda Pilato began her employment with the Shelby County
Sheriff's Office ("the SCSO") on April 23, 2018. On June 2, 2022, Pilato
was informed by Sheriff Samaniego that the SCSO had initiated an
administrative investigation regarding her job performance and that,
pending the results of that investigation, Pilato would be temporarily
assigned to desk duty. On June 6, 2022, Pilato was provided written
notice that the SCSO had initiated an administrative investigation
regarding her job performance and informing Pilato of her rights and
responsibilities related to that investigation. On June 8, 2022, several
members of the SCSO met with Pilato to discuss her job performance
regarding events that occurred on January 3, 2022, May 3, 2022, and May
28, 2022. At the conclusion of that meeting, Pilato was informed that she
could either resign her employment or that her employment would be
terminated. Pilato refused to resign and, thus, Sheriff Samaniego
terminated her employment. Pilato filed a notice of appeal requesting a
hearing before the LEPB regarding the termination of her employment.
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On July 26, 2022, the LEPB conducted an evidentiary hearing. At
that hearing, Pilato denied that her actions in the three events had
violated the SCSO Policies and Procedures. Additionally, Pilato argued
that she had been denied due process because she had not been provided
a pretermination hearing and had not received 10-days' advance notice
of the charges against her before her employment was terminated. On
July 28, 2022, counsel for the LEPB notified Pilato and Sheriff
Samaniego that it had affirmed Sheriff Samaniego's termination of
Pilato's employment. On July 30, 2022, Pilato's counsel requested a
rehearing of the LEPB's decision.
On August 16, 2022, the LEPB entered an order that, among other
things, scheduled a rehearing to occur on September 20, 2022, and
instructed counsel for both parties to submit a written brief outlining
their respective arguments, positions, and supporting authority. On
September 13, 2022, Pilato's counsel filed a brief in support of rehearing
in which he argued that the evidence regarding the January 3, 2022,
incident had been insufficient; that Pilato's actions on May 3, 2022, and
May 28, 2022, had been lawful and had not violated the SCSO Policies
and Procedures; that the due-process rights to which Pilato was entitled
3 CL-2024-0844
under Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546
(1985), and Todd v. Kelly, 783 So. 2d 31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000), were
violated when she was not afforded a pretermination hearing; that the
termination of Pilato's employment violated her due-process rights under
the SCSO Policies and Procedures because she was not provided written
notice of the charges against her in advance of the termination of her
employment; and that the decision of the LEPB to uphold the termination
of Pilato's employment had not been made by an unbiased decisionmaker.
On September 20, 2022, the LEPB conducted a rehearing. Pilato's
counsel and counsel for the SCSO made arguments, but no witnesses
were called or examined. Pilato's counsel generally reasserted the
arguments that he had made in his brief in support of rehearing. The
SCSO's counsel countered that, as an elected official, Sheriff Samaniego
and his deputies, which are alter egos of the sheriff, are exempted from
the protections of the Alabama Merit System Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 36-
26-1 et seq., which require a pretermination hearing. Thus, SCSO's
counsel asserted that Pilato's reliance on Loudermill and Kelly, neither
of which involved the termination of the employment of a county sheriff's
deputy, was misplaced. On September 23, 2022, counsel for the LEPB
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again notified Pilato and Sheriff Samaniego that the LEPB had affirmed
the decision of Sheriff Samaniego terminating Pilato's employment.
On September 28, 2022, Pilato filed an appeal in the circuit court,
challenging the termination of her employment by Sheriff Samaniego
and the decision of the LEPB upholding that termination. On October 7,
2024, the circuit court entered an "Order on Appeal" affirming the
LEPB's decision upholding the termination of Pilato's employment.
Pilato did not seek postjudgment relief. On October 23, 2024, Pilato filed
a notice of appeal to this court.
Issues
On appeal to this court, Pilato first argues that the circuit court's
judgment affirming the termination of her employment is due to be
reversed because, she says, her rights to due process under the United
States Constitution were violated when she was not afforded a
pretermination hearing. She also contends that the termination of her
employment violated her due-process rights under the SCSO Policies and
Procedures because she was not provided written notice of the charges
against her in advance of the termination of her employment and that
the decision to terminate her employment was not made by an unbiased
5 CL-2024-0844
decisionmaker. Finally, she argues that the facts do not support the
termination of her employment.
Standard of Review
"Judicial review of administrative decisions like those of the LEPB [Law Enforcement Personnel Board] is generally governed by the enabling act that created the particular administrative body or by the regulations governing the particular administrative body. See, generally, Ex parte Smith, 394 So. 2d 45, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). Typically, the standard of review of administrative decisions requires that the circuit court uphold the administrative decision if it is supported by substantial and legal evidence. Ex parte Personnel Bd. of Jefferson County, 648 So. 2d 593, 594 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994), Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs [of Mobile v. Smith], 591 So. 2d [521,] 522 [(Ala. Civ. App. 1991)], and Ex parte Smith, 394 So. 2d at 47; see also LEPB Rules and Regulations § 10.07(f). This court has defined 'substantial evidence' in the context of an administrative appeal as 'relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would view as sufficient to support the determination.' Ex parte Personnel Bd. of Jefferson County, 648 So. 2d at 594. When a circuit court's judgment affirming or reversing the decision of an administrative body is appealed to this court, we apply the same standard of review to the administrative decision as was applied by the circuit court. Ex parte Personnel Bd. of Jefferson County, 648 So. 2d at 594; see also City of Mobile v. Personnel Bd. for Mobile County, 57 Ala. App. 516, 518, 329 So. 2d 570, 573 (Civ. 1976) (noting that the circuit court and the appellate court are to apply the substantial-evidence test to the administrative body's decision, not to the decision of the appointing authority)."
6 CL-2024-0844
Lawson v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 961 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2007).
Discussion
In her brief to this court, Pilato argues, just as she did in the
proceedings before the LEPB and in the circuit court, that her rights to
due process were violated. Sheriff Samaniego contends that the LEPB is
not authorized to consider federal constitutional claims and that, to
assert such claims, Pilato should have invoked the general jurisdiction of
the circuit court by way of a collateral suit. We agree.
Our supreme court has determined that county personnel boards
generally cannot consider federal statutory and federal constitutional
issues, which, the supreme court has said, are beyond their competence.
In Ex parte Boyette, 728 So. 2d 644 (1998), our supreme court held that
a discharged employee could not raise in a proceeding before the
Jefferson County Personnel Board ("the JCPB") a claim that his
employment had been terminated in violation of the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("the ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
The supreme court further held that the Jefferson Circuit Court could
not consider the ADEA claim on appeal from the decision of the JCPB,
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even though the enabling act establishing the JCPB authorized the
Jefferson Circuit Court " 'to review questions of law.' " 728 So. 2d at 645
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Act No. 1945-248, Ala. Acts 1945, § 22, as
amended by Act No. 1977-679, Ala. Acts 1977, p. 1176). In Ex parte
Avert, 487 So. 2d 912 (Ala. 1986), our supreme court held that the Mobile
County Personnel Board, and the Mobile Circuit Court upon judicial
review of the decision of that board, could not consider a federal due-
process claim, which, the supreme court said, must be filed in an
independent and collateral suit filed in the circuit court.
In this case, Pilato has not pointed this court to any provision of the
enabling act establishing the LEPB that would authorize the LEPB, or
the circuit court on appeal from the final decision of the LEPB, to address
federal statutory and constitutional claims.
"The LEPB [Law Enforcement Personnel Board] was created by Act 79-524, Ala. Acts 1979 ('the Act'), and it is governed by that Act, as amended. A dismissed, demoted, or suspended employee may appeal the disciplinary action to the LEPB. LEPB Rules and Regulations § 10.06. The LEPB is required to hold a hearing within 30 days of the employee's notice of appeal and is to determine 'whether or not the employee, by reason of his act or acts as charged and his record of service, merits retention in the service or should be dismissed or otherwise disciplined….' LEPB Rules and Regulations § 10.07(a). The Act itself permits the LEPB to 'order [a dismissed employee] reinstated with back pay …, or
8 CL-2024-0844
take or approve such disciplinary action as, in [its] judgment, is warranted by the evidence and under the law.' Act No. 79- 524, § 16(b). Likewise, the LEPB's regulations permit the LEPB to 'rescind, modify, or increase the penalty imposed by the appointing authority as warranted by the facts at the hearing.' LEPB Rules and Regulations § 10.07(d). Any party aggrieved by the decision of the LEPB may seek review of the decision in the circuit court. LEPB Rules and Regulations § 10.07(f). The LEPB's regulations further state that the circuit court is to 'review questions of law and the question of whether or not the decision or order of the [LEPB] is supported by the substantial and legal evidence.' LEPB Rules and Regulations § 10.07(f)."
Lawson v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 961 So. 2d at 160.
Like the rules of the JCPB at issue in Ex parte Boyette, the LEPB
Rules and Regulations do not specifically authorize the LEPB to consider
federal law when reviewing the employment decisions within its purview.
The LEPB Rules and Regulations do authorize a circuit court "to review
questions of law," but that language does not authorize review of
questions of federal statutory law beyond the competence of the LEPB.
Like the Mobile County Personnel Board in Ex parte Averyt, the LEPB
could not review the question whether Pilato's employment termination
violated her right to due process under federal law, which rights could
only be vindicated in an independent and collateral suit, not in an appeal
from the final decision of the LEPB.
9 CL-2024-0844
In this case, Pilato did not file a separate and collateral action to
assert her federal constitutional due-process claims; instead, she
attempted to raise those issues as a defense to the termination of her
employment before the LEPB and in her appeal to the circuit court. In
Ex parte Averyt, our supreme court held that a collateral action is not
only the proper method for raising constitutional issues but also that it
is the "only avenue available." 487 So. 2d at 913. We, thus, conclude that
the termination of Pilato's employment cannot be reversed based on any
alleged error by the LEPB or the circuit court in disregarding federal due-
process law.
We next consider Pilato's argument that the decision to terminate
her employment was not made by an unbiased decisionmaker. Pilato
primarily frames her argument in terms of the requirement espoused in
Stallworth v. City of Evergreen, 680 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 1996), that a
pretermination hearing be conducted by an unbiased decisionmaker.
Pilato's reliance on Stallworth is, however, misplaced.
In Stallworth, a former employee of the City of Evergreen
commenced an action seeking a judgment declaring the termination of
his employment from the city to be invalid. 680 So. 2d at 230. The trial
10 CL-2024-0844
court entered a judgment for the defendants. The employee appealed to
our supreme court. In reversing the trial court's judgment, our supreme
court determined that the employee's job as a personnel officer was under
the "merit system" and, thus,
"[i]n the context of the routine dismissal of a governmental employee who has a legitimate right to continued employment absent sufficient cause for termination, the United States Supreme Court has held that 'all the process that is due [to such an employee] is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative procedures.' Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1496, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)."
680 So. 2d at 233.
Generally, the Merit System Act provides that certain classified
state employees have a protectable property interest in their employment
and that those classified state employees may be terminated only for
cause following a pretermination hearing. Ala. Code 1975, § 36-26-27(b).
However, as an elected official, a sheriff and, by extension, a sheriff's
deputies, are exempted from the due-process protections provided by the
Merit System Act. Blount Cnty. Comm'n v. Sherrell, 77 So. 3d 1196 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2010); see Ala. Code 1975, § 36-26-10(a) & (b)(1) (providing that
officers elected by a vote of the people are exempt from the Merit System
11 CL-2024-0844
Act). Thus, because Pilato is exempted from the Merit System Act and
therefore not entitled to a pretermination hearing, we find no merit in
Pilato's argument that she was entitled to a pretermination hearing
conducted by an unbiased decisionmaker.
Pilato also challenges the termination of her employment on the
basis that she was not provided the process to which she was entitled
under the SCSO Policies and Procedures because, she says, she was not
provided advance written notice of the charges against her. The SCSO
Policies and Procedures provide, in pertinent part, that employees are
entitled to due process, which, in the context of an administrative
investigation, means that "the employee will be provided a written notice
of the investigation, reason for the investigation, and his/her rights
during the investigation"; however, that notice may be delayed by the
sheriff, at his or her discretion, based on the "depth of the investigation,
risk to others, coordination with other law enforcement agencies, or the
nature of the alleged violations." SCSO Policies and Procedures:
Administrative Investigations.
The record reveals that, on June 2, 2022, Pilato was informed in
writing that Sheriff Samaniego had initiated an administrative
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investigation regarding her job performance and that, pending the
results of that investigation, she would be temporarily assigned to desk
duty. On June 6, 2022, Pilato was provided written notice that the SCSO
had initiated an administrative investigation regarding her job
performance and informing Pilato of her rights and responsibilities
related to that investigation. On June 8, 2022, Major Clay Hammac,
Captain Kevin Turner, Lieutenant Kevin Brand, and Lieutenant Joey
McGee met with Pilato and discussed her job performance regarding
events that occurred on January 3, 2022, May 3, 2022, and May 28, 2022.
Because the record indicates that Pilato was informed in writing that an
administrative investigation had been initiated, the circuit court could
have reasonably concluded that Pilato had not been denied the due
process provided by the SCSO Policies and Procedures. In light of our
limited scope of review, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the
circuit court. See Lawson, supra.
To the extent that Pilato challenges the termination of her
employment on the basis that she was not advised of the disciplinary
action taken against her as required by the SCSO Policies and
Procedures, we disagree. To support her argument, Pilato cites the SCSO
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Policies and Procedures: Discipline and Accountability, which establishes
the information the SCSO is obligated to provide to employees when
disciplinary action is taken. Her reliance on that provision is, however,
misplaced.
Because Pilato's employment was terminated, the SCSO Policies
and Procedures, Discipline and Accountability policy regarding notice of
termination is implicated. The SCSO Policies and Procedures regarding
"notice of termination" provides that
"[i]f an employee's performance requires investigation, the employee may be placed on administrative leave pending outcome of the investigation. The employee may then be terminated. The terminated member will be provided with information that includes:
"1. Reasons for the termination;
"2. Effective date of the termination;
"3. Whom to contact regarding status of fringe and retirement benefits;
"4. Statement that the content of the personnel file, relating to the termination, will be made available to the member according to state public law; upon request.
"5. Statement regarding the employee's right to file an appeal, if any."
SCSO Policies and Procedures: Discipline and Accountability.
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On June 8, 2022, several members of the SCSO met with Pilato to
discuss her job performance. At that meeting, Pilato was informed that
her employment with the SCSO was being terminated, the reasons for
the termination, and the effective date of the termination. Additionally,
Pilato was informed of whom she needed to contact regarding her
employment benefits, was informed that the contents of her personnel
file would be made available upon request, according to state law, and
was informed of her right to appeal her termination. Based on that
evidence, the circuit court could have reasonably concluded that Pilato
had not been denied the due process to which she was entitled under the
SCSO Policies and Procedures. In light of our limited scope of review, we
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court. See Lawson,
supra.
Lastly, Pilato argues that the facts do not support the termination
of her employment. At the hearing conducted by the LEPB, several
witnesses testified regarding Pilato's actions on January 3, 2022, May 3,
2022, and May 28, 2022. Regarding the January 3, 2022, event, the
record reveals that the SCSO had concerns that Pilato had been the last
unit to arrive on scene at a call regarding a domestic disturbance
15 CL-2024-0844
involving weapons and that she had failed to "run code" 1 en route to that
disturbance.
Pilato admitted that she had failed to "run code" en route to the
domestic disturbance. She, however, opined that because there had been
multiple units on scene, she had properly exercised her discretion in
determining that public safety concerns weighed against "running code"
while en route to that domestic disturbance. According to Pilato, because
"running code" was not mandatory, she had properly exercised the
discretion she had been afforded under the SCSO Policies and Procedures
in deciding not to "run code" on that occasion.
Regarding the May 3, 2022, event, the record establishes that the
SCSO had concerns that Pilato had been on the scene of a call and that,
based on the statements Pilato had made in her incident report, she had
witnessed an act of domestic violence but had failed to arrest the alleged
perpetrator. Specifically, in the narrative portion of her incident report,
Pilato indicated that she had observed a male push a female that had
been attempting to respond to Pilato's questioning. Dash-camera footage
1In the minutes from the LEPB's hearing, Lieutenant Brand explained that to "run code" means to act with a sense of urgency and to activate emergency lights and sirens on a law-enforcement vehicle. 16 CL-2024-0844
of the incident revealed that Pilato had instructed the alleged perpetrator
not to touch the female again. According to Lieutenant Brand and
Sargent Smith, those facts constituted domestic violence, and Pilato was
required to arrest the perpetrator at that time.
Pilato denied that she had observed any criminal activity at the
January 3, 2022, incident but admitted that her report contained errors.
Pilato, however, excused the errors in her incident report as a poor choice
of words. Pilato also testified that she had attempted to amend her
incident report shortly following the incident but that she had been
unable to do so.
Regarding the May 28, 2022, event, the record establishes the
SCSO had concerns that Pilato had failed to assist in the pursuit of a
vehicle. According to Lieutenant Brand, a call for service to assist with
the pursuit of a vehicle had been issued by dispatch but Pilato had failed
to "attach" to the call by informing dispatch that she had been responding
to the call and had failed to assist the responding officers. According to
Lieutenant Brand, the SCSO Policies and Procedures provide that
"deputies choose" when to "run code" but that the "spirit of [the policy]
doesn't mean you can let someone else handle it, it means traffic
17 CL-2024-0844
conditions or weather conditions, doesn't mean you can let someone else
handle it." Lieutenant Brand also said that other officers that had
assisted in that pursuit had also complained about Pilato's failure to
attach to the call and to render assistance.
Pilato denied that she had not joined the vehicle pursuit on May 28,
2022. According to her, after dispatch had notified her of the pursuit, she
had attempted to identify a location to deploy "spikes" to intercept the
fleeing vehicle. Pilato said that, before she was able to identify a location
to deploy the spikes, dispatch had notified that the driver of the vehicle
being pursued had wrecked his automobile and had been taken into
custody along with a passenger in the vehicle. Pilato opined that it would
have been reckless for her to have run code since the suspects had been
apprehended. Pilato, however, admitted that she had failed to notify
dispatch that she had attached to the call and was rendering assistance.
The termination-of-employment letter that the SCSO provided to
Pilato indicated that her actions had violated certain provisions of the
LEPB Rules and Regulations as well as certain provisions of the SCSO
Policies and Procedures regarding rules of conduct. Regarding the LEPB
Rules and Regulations, Pilato's actions implicated Section 10.01, which
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provides that employment is conditioned on the "satisfactory conduct of
the employee and continued, efficient performance of assigned duties and
responsibilities." According to the termination-of-employment letter, the
SCSO had identified three separate causes for discipline under Section
10.02 of the LEPB Rules and Regulations that were sufficient for
dismissal, demotion, or suspension, i.e., incompetence or inefficiency,
neglect of duty, and "for any other reason deemed to be in the best
interest of the public service and not inconsistent with the intent of the
Act or the rules and regulations arising therein."
Regarding Pilato's violations of the SCSO Policies and Procedures
regarding rules of conduct, the termination-of-employment letter
indicated that Pilato's actions had implicated both Section One, which
generally pertains to obedience to orders, rules, and laws, and Section
Two, which generally pertains to an employee's attention to duty.
Specifically, regarding the Section One violations, the termination-of-
employment letter informed Pilato that all employees are governed by
the established rules of conduct and that a violation of those rules of
conduct is considered sufficient cause for disciplinary action, including
termination of employment, see 1.1 Obedience to Orders, Rules and
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Laws, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Rules of Conduct; that employees
are required to abide by the personnel policy and the general, special, and
tactical orders, rules of conduct, and other properly issued internal
directives of the SCSO, see 1.3 Adherence to Departmental Rules for
Employees, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Rules of Conduct; and, that
Pilato's failure to act in accordance with her duties and her willful neglect
of her duties was unbecoming conduct that had adversely affected the
efficiency of, had eroded public respect for, or had reduced confidence in
the government's service and was prohibited. See 1.11 Conduct
Unbecoming, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Rules of Conduct.
Regarding the Section Two violations, the termination-of-
employment letter informed Pilato that employees are required to be
attentive to their duties and are required to perform all duties assigned
to them even if such duties are not specifically assigned to them in any
departmental rules or procedures manual, see 2.1 Performance of Duty,
SCSO Policies and Procedures: Attention to Duty; that employees must
consider it their duty to be of service to the general public and to render
service in a kind, considerate, and patient manner, see 2.5 Responsibility
to Serve the Public, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Attention to Duty;
20 CL-2024-0844
and, that employees are required to promptly report all crimes,
emergencies, incidents, dangers, hazardous situations, and relevant
information that comes to their attention, and that employees are
prohibited from concealing, ignoring, or distorting the facts of such
crimes, emergencies, incidents, and information, see 2.11 Duty to Report
All Crimes and Incidents, SCSO Policies and Procedures: Attention to
Duty. The termination-of-employment letter concluded:
"Due to your failure to act upon the crime of Domestic Violence, when witnessed in your presence on May 3, 2022 (see case # 202202906), and due to your failure to actively engage in the renderance of assistance to your fellow deputies and appropriately render assistance to the public on January 3, 2022[,] in response to an active [d]omestic [v]iolence call, and your failure to render assistance to the public and to your fellow deputies during an active pursuit and follow-up investigation on May 28, 2022[,] to wit, your violation of said policies above, your employment with the [SCSO] is hereby terminated on this date."
The termination of Pilato's employment was predicated on the
SCSO's determination that Pilato had violated the SCSO Policies and
Procedures and the LEPB Rules and Regulations. By terminating
Pilato's employment, Sheriff Samaniego implicitly determined that
Pilato had not been operating within any discretion provided by the
LEPB Rules and Regulations and the SCSO Policies and Procedures
21 CL-2024-0844
when she failed to take action or to render support to fellow officers on
the three occasions at issue. That implicit determination was affirmed
by the LEPB when it upheld the decision of Sheriff Samaniego to
terminate Pilato's employment. In its "Order on Appeal," the circuit
court concluded, among other things, that the evidence sufficiently
supported the LEPB's decision that Pilato's termination was due to be
upheld based on her having engaged in conduct that violated the LEPB
Rules and Regulations and the SCSO Policies and Procedures.
We have previously stated:
"Neither this court nor the trial court may substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Alabama Renal Stone Inst., Inc. v. Alabama Statewide Health Coordinating Council, 628 So. 2d 821, 823 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). 'This holds true even in cases where the testimony is generalized, the evidence is meager, and reasonable minds might differ as to the correct result.' Health Care Auth. of Huntsville v. State Health Planning Agency, 549 So. 2d 973, 975 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989). Further, 'an agency's interpretation of its own rule or regulation must stand if it is reasonable, even though it may not appear as reasonable as some other interpretation.' Sylacauga Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Alabama State Health Planning Agency, 662 So. 2d 265, 268 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)."
Colonial Mgmt. Grp., L.P. v. State Health Plan. & Dev. Agency, 853 So.
2d 972, 975 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). Thus, we affirm the circuit court's
judgment to the extent that it determined that the evidence sufficiently
22 CL-2024-0844
supports the LEPB's decision to uphold Sheriff Samaniego's termination
of Pilato's employment.
Conclusion
Because Pilato has failed to raise an argument on appeal that
merits reversal of the circuit court's judgment, that judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All the judges concur.