Minor v. Adult & Family Services Division

804 P.2d 1170, 105 Or. App. 178, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 82
Court of Appeals of Oregon·Decided January 16, 1991·No. OAR 461-07-270(4)(h); CA A50251·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinions

WARREN, J.

Petitioner Minor challenges the validity of OAR 461-07-270(4)(h), which permits Adult and Family Services (AFS) to require that Aid to Families with Dependent Children (ADC) grants be reduced in order to recover overpayments in assistance. We hold that the rule does not exceed statutory authority.

AFS reduced Minor’s grant in an order dated October 10, 1988.1 Minor did not appeal the order. She brought a petition under ORS 183.400(1) as an original proceeding. AFS argues that we have no jurisdiction under ORS 183.400(1) to hear this case and that Minor’s only avenue for challenging the rule would have been as a part of a direct challenge to the order.

We granted a motion by Oulman to intervene as a petitioner. ORAP 1.160; ORCP 33. If we have no jurisdiction over Minor’s petition, then we had no jurisdiction to grant the motion to intervene and must dismiss this case.

ORS 183.400(1) provides:

“The validity of any rule may be determined upon a petition by any person to the Court of Appeals in the manner provided for review of orders in contested cases. The court shall have jurisdiction to review the validity of the rule whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in question, but not when the petitioner is a party to an order or a contested case in which the validity of the rule may be determined by a court.” (Emphasis supplied.)

No appellate court in Oregon has discussed the scope of the emphasized final clause.

Under one interpretation, this court has jurisdiction unless the petitioner is concurrently involved in a proceeding in another forum in which the rule could be challenged. AFS argues that anybody who has been a party to an order or a contested case in which the validity of the rule could have been determined is prevented from bringing a rule challenge under ORS 183.400(1). It cites Fitzgerald v. Oregon Board of Optometry, 75 Or App 390, 706 P2d 586 (1985), in which the petitioner [181] tried to challenge a rule that listed the criteria for passing the state optometry examination. We held that the letter informing the petitioner that she did not pass the examination was an “order” and that the “ ‘petitioner is a party to an order * * * in which the validity of the rule may be determined by a court,’ ORS 183.400(1) * * *.”2 75 Or App at 393. We did not say whether the petitioner was simultaneously appealing the order in another forum or still had that option available.3

ORS 183.400 was amended in 1971 by House Bill 1213, Oregon Laws 1971, chapter 734, section 9.4 Then professor and now retired Supreme Court Judge Linde proposed some amendments to HB 1213, including one which added the clause at issue to ORS 183.400(1). He explained:

“A person should not be permitted under this section to initiate judicial review of a rule while he is engaged in a pending contested case proceeding under the same rule that will lead to judicial review under sec. .480.” Memorandum to Senate Judiciary Committee regarding HB 1213, May 17, 1971, page 5. (Emphasis supplied.)

Attorney General Johnson supported the amendment,5 and it [182] was presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee without discussion6 and incorporated into the final bill.

We adhere to the author’s interpretation of the amendment, which is consistent with the use of the present tense and the word “may” in the final clause of ORS 183.400(1). Fitzgerald v. Oregon Board of Optometry, supra, does not expressly prohibit a petitioner who is not engaged in a pending proceeding involving the same rule from bringing a rule challenge. We conclude that the prohibition of an ORS 183.400(1) rule challenge only applies while the validity of the rule still may be challenged in the course of challenging the order or the result in the contested case. Any suggestion in Fitzgerald to the contrary is disapproved. We have jurisdiction to hear Minor’s rule challenge.7

The only issue in this case is whether OAR 461-07-270(4) (h) is authorized by statute, either expressly or under the agency’s rulemaking authority. OAR 461-07-270(4) (h) provides, in pertinent part:

“(4) * * * The Division shall recover overpayment amounts from the following sources, or from any other sources permitted by law:
* * * *
“(h) In ADC, a mandatory reduction of future assistance payments. The assistance payment, when added to all other income without application of the deduction in rule 461-04-890(1)(a), (b), and (c), shall not be less than 90 percent of the assistance standard for a family with no income.”

Petitioners argue that the only statutes that authorize the recovery of ADC overpayments are ORS 411.620 and ORS 411.635 and that neither authorizes a mandatory grant reduction. Petitioners also argue that to reduce grants below current ADC payment standards would create a hardship for a recipient’s family that would be contrary to public policy. AFS argues that it is not limited by the recoupment methods described in the two statutes and that, as a condition of a [183] state’s participation in the ADC program, federal law mandates prompt recovery by states of overpayments, including by grant reduction when no other prompt means of payment is available.

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Minor v. Adult & Family Services Division, 804 P.2d 1170, 105 Or. App. 178, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 82 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).

804 P.2d 1170 (Minor v. Adult & Family Services Division) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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