OPINION
STRINGER, Justice.
This matter arises out of a judicial challenge to the respondent Metropolitan Council’s (Council) approval of the 1998-2000 Transportation Improvement Program (TIP). Appellant, the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA), is concerned specifically with the Stillwater Bridge Replacement Project (Project) included in the TIP. Appellant alleges that the Project is inconsistent with the Metropolitan Development Guide/Blueprint (Blueprint) and therefore respondent’s approval of the 1998-2000 TIP is inconsistent with the requirements of section 134(h)(5) of the Federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101
et seq.
(1994) (IS-TEA). After respondent approved the 1998-2000 TIP with the Project included, appellant filed a writ of certiorari in the court of appeals seeking review of respondent’s decision pursuant to Minn.Stat. Chs. 480A and 606 (1996). The court of appeals denied the writ citing a lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that respondent’s decision was not a quasi-judicial act but rather a quasi-legislative act, and that quasi-legislative acts are not reviewable by certiorari. We agree and affirm.
We begin with a review of the interplay between federal and state agencies’ oversight responsibility for interstate transportation policy and planning — a relationship that, although complex, is critical to an efficient national and regional surface transportation system.
ISTEA governs the disbursement of federal transportation funds to the states. To be eligible for federal funds, urban areas with a population of at least 50,000 must designate a metropolitan planning organization (MPO). 23 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1994). Respondent Metropolitan Council, a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota, is the designated MPO for the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Minn.Stat. § 473.146, subd. 4 (1996). ISTEA directs the MPO to adopt a long range transportation plan establishing metropolitan
transportation policies for a 20-year forecast period. 23 U.S.C. § 134(g) (1994).
In December 1996, respondent adopted the Metropolitan Development Guide/Blueprint (Blueprint) and 1996 Transportation Policy Plan (TPP) to comply with 23 U.S.C. § 134(g). The Blueprint and TPP were also adopted to comply with Minn.Stat. § 473.146, subds.l, 3 (1996), the state counterpart to the ISTEA requirement for a long-term transportation plan.
Among many other elements, the TPP identifies potential projects to achieve these long range planning goals. From the list of potential projects in the TPP, respondent is required by ISTEA to develop a TIP identifying specific projects to propose for construction in the metropolitan area using federal transportation funds. 23 U.S.C. § 134(h)(1), (2) (1994).
The TIP is
prepared annually and covers a 3-year planning and construction period.
Id.
The TIP may only identify projects for federal funding if respondent determines that the projects are consistent with the long range plan adopted pursuant to § 134(g).
Id.
§ 134(h)(3), (5).
The Stillwater bridge project has long been a part of respondent’s complex planning process. Respondent first considered replacing the existing Stillwater bridge in 1977 because the bridge, located in downtown Stillwater, was considered inadequate to handle large trucks, buses, and recreational vehicles, as well as projected growth in traffic levels. In 1978, respondent’s Major River Crossing Task Force issued a study entitled “Major River Crossings in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area.” The study concluded that the existing Stillwater bridge was “expected to have a major deficiency in capacity by 1990.” In 1989, respondent updated its 1978 study and ranked metropolitan area bridges that needed to be built, replaced or rehabilitated by the year 2010. The study ranked the Stillwater bridge third among the top twenty bridges in need of replacement or rehabilitation. Based on the studies, the Project was included in the TPP’s from 1988 to 1996 and in the TIP’s from 1991 to 1998.
The 1998-2000 TIP, approved August 14, 1997, again includes the Stillwater Bridge Project. As proposed, the Project would include expansion of Minnesota Trunk Highway 36 and construction of a new four-lane bridge across the St. Croix River from Still-water, Minnesota to St. Joseph/Houlton, Wisconsin. Following approval, appellant, a not-for-profit environmental organization, filed a writ of certiorari in the court of appeals seeking review of respondent’s decision to approve the TIP. Appellant claimed that respondent’s decision to approve the 1998-2000 TIP with the Project included was motivated by political pressure rather than proper transportation planning.
The court of appeals dismissed the writ for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the substantive issue of appellant’s writ of certio-rari.
Order of the Court of Appeals,
No. C6-97-1694 (March 6, 1998)
(Order).
Relying heavily on our recent decision in
Meath v. Harmful Substance Compensation Bd.,
550 N.W.2d 275 (Minn.1996), the court of appeals held that respondent’s decision to approve the 1998-2000 TIP with the Project included was quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, and therefore its decision is not reviewable by writ of certiorari to the court.
Order
at 2-5.
Our decision in
Meath
sets forth a framework for determining if a decision is quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative.
Meath
involved a judicial challenge to a decision by the Harmful Substance Compensation Board which denied Meath’s claim for compensation.
Id.
at 275. Decisions by the Board were essentially unenforceable offers of compensation to a claimant.
Id.
at 279. Claimants were free to reject the Board’s offer and commence a civil action against the parties responsible for the claimant’s injuries, and the Board’s response would be inadmissible in such an action.
We took the opportunity in
Meath
to more clearly define quasi-judicial conduct:
[Q]uasi-judicial conduct is marked by an investigation into a disputed claim and a decision binding on the parties.
Even though the phrase “quasi-judicial act” has sometimes been so broadly defined that it
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OPINION
STRINGER, Justice.
This matter arises out of a judicial challenge to the respondent Metropolitan Council’s (Council) approval of the 1998-2000 Transportation Improvement Program (TIP). Appellant, the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA), is concerned specifically with the Stillwater Bridge Replacement Project (Project) included in the TIP. Appellant alleges that the Project is inconsistent with the Metropolitan Development Guide/Blueprint (Blueprint) and therefore respondent’s approval of the 1998-2000 TIP is inconsistent with the requirements of section 134(h)(5) of the Federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101
et seq.
(1994) (IS-TEA). After respondent approved the 1998-2000 TIP with the Project included, appellant filed a writ of certiorari in the court of appeals seeking review of respondent’s decision pursuant to Minn.Stat. Chs. 480A and 606 (1996). The court of appeals denied the writ citing a lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that respondent’s decision was not a quasi-judicial act but rather a quasi-legislative act, and that quasi-legislative acts are not reviewable by certiorari. We agree and affirm.
We begin with a review of the interplay between federal and state agencies’ oversight responsibility for interstate transportation policy and planning — a relationship that, although complex, is critical to an efficient national and regional surface transportation system.
ISTEA governs the disbursement of federal transportation funds to the states. To be eligible for federal funds, urban areas with a population of at least 50,000 must designate a metropolitan planning organization (MPO). 23 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1994). Respondent Metropolitan Council, a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota, is the designated MPO for the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Minn.Stat. § 473.146, subd. 4 (1996). ISTEA directs the MPO to adopt a long range transportation plan establishing metropolitan
transportation policies for a 20-year forecast period. 23 U.S.C. § 134(g) (1994).
In December 1996, respondent adopted the Metropolitan Development Guide/Blueprint (Blueprint) and 1996 Transportation Policy Plan (TPP) to comply with 23 U.S.C. § 134(g). The Blueprint and TPP were also adopted to comply with Minn.Stat. § 473.146, subds.l, 3 (1996), the state counterpart to the ISTEA requirement for a long-term transportation plan.
Among many other elements, the TPP identifies potential projects to achieve these long range planning goals. From the list of potential projects in the TPP, respondent is required by ISTEA to develop a TIP identifying specific projects to propose for construction in the metropolitan area using federal transportation funds. 23 U.S.C. § 134(h)(1), (2) (1994).
The TIP is
prepared annually and covers a 3-year planning and construction period.
Id.
The TIP may only identify projects for federal funding if respondent determines that the projects are consistent with the long range plan adopted pursuant to § 134(g).
Id.
§ 134(h)(3), (5).
The Stillwater bridge project has long been a part of respondent’s complex planning process. Respondent first considered replacing the existing Stillwater bridge in 1977 because the bridge, located in downtown Stillwater, was considered inadequate to handle large trucks, buses, and recreational vehicles, as well as projected growth in traffic levels. In 1978, respondent’s Major River Crossing Task Force issued a study entitled “Major River Crossings in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area.” The study concluded that the existing Stillwater bridge was “expected to have a major deficiency in capacity by 1990.” In 1989, respondent updated its 1978 study and ranked metropolitan area bridges that needed to be built, replaced or rehabilitated by the year 2010. The study ranked the Stillwater bridge third among the top twenty bridges in need of replacement or rehabilitation. Based on the studies, the Project was included in the TPP’s from 1988 to 1996 and in the TIP’s from 1991 to 1998.
The 1998-2000 TIP, approved August 14, 1997, again includes the Stillwater Bridge Project. As proposed, the Project would include expansion of Minnesota Trunk Highway 36 and construction of a new four-lane bridge across the St. Croix River from Still-water, Minnesota to St. Joseph/Houlton, Wisconsin. Following approval, appellant, a not-for-profit environmental organization, filed a writ of certiorari in the court of appeals seeking review of respondent’s decision to approve the TIP. Appellant claimed that respondent’s decision to approve the 1998-2000 TIP with the Project included was motivated by political pressure rather than proper transportation planning.
The court of appeals dismissed the writ for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the substantive issue of appellant’s writ of certio-rari.
Order of the Court of Appeals,
No. C6-97-1694 (March 6, 1998)
(Order).
Relying heavily on our recent decision in
Meath v. Harmful Substance Compensation Bd.,
550 N.W.2d 275 (Minn.1996), the court of appeals held that respondent’s decision to approve the 1998-2000 TIP with the Project included was quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, and therefore its decision is not reviewable by writ of certiorari to the court.
Order
at 2-5.
Our decision in
Meath
sets forth a framework for determining if a decision is quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative.
Meath
involved a judicial challenge to a decision by the Harmful Substance Compensation Board which denied Meath’s claim for compensation.
Id.
at 275. Decisions by the Board were essentially unenforceable offers of compensation to a claimant.
Id.
at 279. Claimants were free to reject the Board’s offer and commence a civil action against the parties responsible for the claimant’s injuries, and the Board’s response would be inadmissible in such an action.
We took the opportunity in
Meath
to more clearly define quasi-judicial conduct:
[Q]uasi-judicial conduct is marked by an investigation into a disputed claim and a decision binding on the parties.
Even though the phrase “quasi-judicial act” has sometimes been so broadly defined that it
can be said to include almost any administrative decision based on evidentiary facts, it seems to us that we would be well-advised today to apply the term only to those administrative decisions which are based on evidentiary facts and which resolve disputed claims of rights.
Id.
at 279 (emphasis added).
As to a quasi-judicial proceeding resolving disputed claims, we reasoned that if “every administrative decision which is based on evidentiary facts developed through investigation can for that very reason be characterized as ‘quasi-judicial,’ then almost every administrative decision is ‘quasi-judicial’ even though few such decisions adjudicate any right or obligation of contending parties.”
Id.
at 277.
A separate concurrence in
Meath
proposed an additional indicator that further sharpened the analysis.
An agency performs a quasi-judicial function when it “applies a prescribed standard to reach a conclusion that affects the legal interests of the persons before it * * *.”
Id.
at 280. Adopting the additional standard proposed by the concurrence in
Meath,
the three indicia of quasi-judicial actions can be summarized as follows: (1) investigation into a disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary facts; (2) application of those facts to a prescribed standard; and (3) a binding decision regarding the disputed claim.
With regard to the first of the indicia, the court of appeals concluded that respondent’s decision to approve the 1998-2000 TIP was “not a decision based on a hearing and the taking of evidence. To the contrary, it is a decision that was reached by a political body through ongoing discussion and debate * *
Order
at 4. Regarding the second indicator, the court found that no prescribed standard guided respondent’s decision. The court noted that “[g]iven the general nature of the TPP and the Blueprint, it is not imaginable that a project could be declared inconsistent as a matter of law.”
Id.
Finally, as to the third indicator, the court concluded that respondent’s decision was not binding on the parties but rather a “political decision that can be modified at will.”
Id.
at 5. Thus the court of appeals concluded that none of the
Meath
indicia were met, respondent’s proceedings were quasi-legislative, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction.
We review
de novo
the issue of jurisdiction without deference to the lower court.
See In re Conservatorship of Foster,
547 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn.1996). Certiorari is an “extraordinary remedy” only available to review judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and actions; conversely, it is not available to review legislative or administrative actions.
Honn v. City of Coon Rapids,
313 N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn.1981);
see also Western Area Business and Civic Chib v. Duluth School 3d. Indep. Distr. No. 709,
324 N.W.2d 361, 364 (Minn.1982).
I.
We agree with the court of appeals that our decision in
Meath
is an appropriate and helpful framework for guidance. Applying the first of the three
Meath
indicia, we begin with a consideration of whether respondent investigated and weighed evidentia-ry facts relevant to a disputed claim in approving the 1998-2000 TIP. As respondent acknowledges in its brief, its deliberative process involved researching the costs, needs, advantages, location, and size and capacity of the Project, as well as receiving comments, both in support of and in opposition to the Project from a wide range of public officials and interested parties, including appellant.
It is clear that the research and public comment aspects of respondent’s deliberative process is far more typical of a legislative proceeding than of a judicial proceeding. While the ultimate goal
of
both proceedings is to reach an informed decision on relevant and sometimes conflicting facts, the similarities end there. Respondent takes no evidence in accordance with formal or informal evidentiary rules, testimony is not given un
der oath, and there are no formally identified parties to the proceeding offering evidence to support a legal claim. Respondent’s decisions, as with other governmental agencies, are guided by both objective information and public input. We conclude that respondent’s gathering and consideration of information is vastly different from the judicial process of determining facts for the purpose of reaching a legal conclusion in resolution of adversarial claims — therefore it cannot be characterized as quasi-judicial under the first of the
Meath
three indicia.
II.
Turning to the second of
Meath’s
three indicia, we consider whether respondent used a prescribed standard in deciding to approve the 1998-2000 TIP. Appellant claims that the TPP and Blueprint, taken together, outline a vision and set of goals that serve as a standard for all metropolitan transportation projects. In support of this claim, appellant cites the following provision in ISTEA:
A transportation improvement program for a metropolitan area developed under this subsection shall include projects within the area * * * which are consistent with the long-range plan developed under subsection (g) for the trea.
28 U.S.C. § 134(h)(5) (1994). Appellant claims that this provision establishes the TPP and Blueprint as a binding prescribed standard for transportation projects and that the TIP must then be consistent with these planning documents.
While it is true that 23 U.S.C. § 134(h)(5) requires that projects identified in the TIP be consistent with “the long range plan developed under subsection (g) for the area,” it is too great a leap to conclude that the TPP and Blueprint are sufficiently specific to establish a prescribed standard. The six introductory goals of the Blueprint are just that— and nothing in ISTEA indicates that these introductory goals are intended to serve as a prescribed standard. Further, § 134(g) refers not just to the Blueprint, but it also incorporates the TPP, a comprehensive document that is required to include, among many other elements, 16 planning considerations.
Id.
§ 134(g)(2). Many of these 16 considerations are not necessarily consistent, as the considerations illustrate the many policy choices that the TPP must incorporate.
Given the broad and diverse elements required of a long range plan pursuant to § 134(g), it is clear that it is not intended to
serve as a prescribed standard. Moreover, ISTEA only requires that projects be “consistent with” the long range plan. Two federal circuit courts, interpreting the phrase “consistent with” in other planning statutes, have held that the term does not require strict compliance but rather congruity or compatibility.
See Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency,
82 F.3d 451, 457 (D.C.Cir.1996);
see also NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan,
792 F.2d 896, 898-99 (9th Cir.1986). Based on the nonspecific nature of the planning documents and the flexible compliance inherent in the language of the statute, respondent did not have a prescribed standard for its decision to approve the 1998-2000 TIP and did not make a quasi-judicial decision under the second of
Meath’s
three indicia.
III.
Finally, applying .the third of the
Meath
indicia, we must determine if respondent’s decision to approve the 1998-2000 TIP amounts to a binding decision that affected a disputed claim. Appellant claims that the decision to include the Project in the TIP and then approve the TIP amounts to a final, binding decision regarding a disputed claim. Clearly this is not so. The TIP is nothing more than a proposal for planned projects that may change from year to year both as to inclusion on the list and as to priority. Approval of the TIP is approval of a statement only and has no binding effect on the legal rights of parties. Thus, the decision to approve the 1998-2000 TIP falls far short of the type of binding decision regarding a disputed claim required by the third indicator of a quasi-judicial proceeding.
Failure to meet any of the three
Meath
indicia is fatal to petitioner’s claim that respondent’s proceedings were quasi-judicial. The order of the court of appeals denying certiorari for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.
Affirmed.