1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MILTON JOHN SELIS TINOCO, No. 1:25-cv-01762-DC-JDP (HC) 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 KRISTI NOEM, et al., (Doc. No. 3) 15 Respondents.
16 17 This matter is before the court on Petitioner Milton John Selis Tinoco’s motion for a 18 temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 3), filed in conjunction with his petition for a writ of 19 habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his ongoing immigration detention. 20 (Doc. No. 1.) Having considered the parties’ briefing (Doc. Nos. 3, 9, 12), the court will grant 21 Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order. 22 BACKGROUND 23 A. Factual Background 24 In 2021, Petitioner, a citizen of Nicaragua, fled Nicaragua based on the government’s 25 alleged threats to kill him and attempt to kidnap him in retaliation for his activities organizing and 26 protesting against the government. (Doc. Nos. 3-3 at 8; 3-4 at ¶ 10.) On or about November 23, 27 2021, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and was apprehended by United 28 States Border Patrol. (Doc. Nos. 3-4 at ¶¶ 3–4; 11 at ¶ 4.) That same day, Petitioner was placed 1 into custody by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. No. 11 at ¶ 2 4.) 3 On December 2, 2021, ICE issued a notice of custody determination, releasing Petitioner 4 from custody pursuant to the authority contained in section 236 of the Immigration and 5 Nationality Act (“INA”) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) and part 236 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal 6 Regulations.1 (Doc. No. 3-3 at 12.) The notice indicated Petitioner would be released on his own 7 recognizance, “under other conditions” and that additional documents would be provided to him. 8 (Id.) 9 That same day, ICE issued an order of release on recognizance (“OREC”) for Petitioner. 10 (Doc. No. 12-1 at 18–21.) The OREC states Petitioner had been arrested and placed in removal 11 proceedings. (Id. at 18.) The OREC further states Petitioner was being released on his own 12 recognizance provided he complied with certain conditions “[i]n accordance with section 236 of 13 the [INA] and the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” (Id.) The 14 OREC imposed several conditions, including a requirement that Petitioner not violate any local, 15 state, or federal laws or ordinances and that he report in person to the ICE office in Bakersfield, 16 California, on June 2, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 3-5 at ¶ 6; 12-1 at 18.) Following his release, Petitioner 17 moved to Bakersfield. (Doc. No. 3-5 at ¶ 2.) 18 On June 2, 2022, Petitioner arrived at the Bakersfield ICE office, and the United States 19 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed him into removal proceedings, as an alien 20 present without admission or parole, and charged him with removability under section 21 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA. (Doc. Nos. 3-3 at 8; 11 at ¶ 6.) That same day, ICE placed Petitioner 22 on the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”), for additional monitoring 23 requirements as a condition of his release. (Doc. Nos. 3-4 at ¶ 6; 11 at ¶ 5.) Under ISAP, 24 Petitioner was instructed to check-in with ICE periodically through a smartphone application, 25 home visitations, and in person. (Doc. No. 3-4 at ¶ 7.) Respondents allege Petitioner violated his 26
27 1 Respondents note ICE released Petitioner on or about December 3, 2021. (Doc. No. 11 at ¶ 5.) However, the parties’ documents indicate his release occurred on December 2, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 28 11-1 at 2; 12-1 at 18.) 1 ISAP requirements by failing to check-in with ICE on October 5, 2022, January 18, 2023, and 2 April 5, 2023. (Doc. No. 11 at ¶¶ 7–9.) 3 On or about February 25, 2024, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence. 4 (Doc. Nos. 3-4 at ¶ 11; 11 at ¶ 10.) Petitioner ultimately pled no contest to wet reckless driving 5 and was sentenced to one year of probation and one day in custody. (Doc. No. 3-4 at ¶ 11.) 6 Because of his arrest, Petitioner failed to check-in with ICE and missed reporting on time. (Doc. 7 No. 3-5 at ¶ 9.) A couple of days after his arrest, Petitioner reported in person to the Bakersfield 8 ICE office. (Doc. No. 3-4 at ¶ 12.) An ICE officer mentioned that he knew of Petitioner’s arrest 9 and noted “that things happen.” (Id.) ICE did not re-detain Petitioner, instead, Petitioner was 10 placed on an ankle monitor. (Doc. Nos. 3-4 at ¶ 12; 3-5 at ¶11.) 11 About a month and a half later, Petitioner’s ankle monitor was removed because it was 12 hurting his skin, and Petitioner was provided a wristwatch to use to check in with ICE. (Doc. No. 13 3-5 at ¶ 11.) Soon after receiving the watch, Petitioner alleges he repeatedly encountered 14 technical issues with the watch, including not receiving a notification for a check-in request on 15 October 16, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 3-4 at ¶¶ 8, 13; 3-5 at ¶ 13.) Petitioner consistently reported these 16 issues to ISAP and his case manager and was not told that there were any concerns about his 17 compliance with his check-in requirement. (Doc. No. 3-4 at ¶ 8; 3-5 at ¶ 13.) Around February 18 2025, Petitioner went to the Bakersfield ICE office, and an ICE officer did not mention that 19 Petitioner had any compliance issues. (Doc. No. 3-5 at ¶ 14.) However, Respondents allege 20 Petitioner failed to check-in with ICE on December 25, 2024, and November 2, 2025. (Doc. No. 21 11 at ¶¶ 11–12.) 22 Following his placement into removal proceedings, Petitioner submitted an application for 23 asylum within one year of his arrival to the United States and was granted work authorization. 24 (Doc. No. 3-4 at ¶ 9.) After obtaining work authorization, Petitioner first worked as a human 25 resources clerk for Grimmway Farms. (Doc. No. 3-5 at ¶ 2.) Petitioner then worked full time as a 26 patient coordinator for the Skin Cancer Institute and part time as a music teacher. (Id.) During his 27 time out of custody, Petitioner spent time with family and friends and became involved in a 28 church community. (Id. at ¶ 23.) 1 On November 5, 2025, Petitioner appeared for an in-person appointment at the ISAP 2 Bakersfield office and was arrested by ICE shortly after his arrival and taken to the ICE 3 Bakersfield office. (Doc. No. 3-4 at ¶ 14; 11 at ¶ 13.) Later that night, Petitioner was transferred 4 to the California City Detention Center, where he is currently detained. (Doc. No. 3-5 at ¶ 18.) 5 After his detainment, Petitioner requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 6 § 1236. (Doc. No. 3-3 at 6.) On November 28, 2025, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s 7 request for a bond hearing on jurisdictional grounds. (See Id. citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 8 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)). 9 B. Procedural Background 10 On December 5, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 1.) 11 Petitioner raises the following claims against Respondents Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, Todd 12 Lyons, Sergio Albarran, Christopher Chestnut, Executive Office for Immigration Review 13 (“EOIR”), ICE and DHS (“Respondents”): (1) violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); (2) violation of 14 DHS and EOIR regulations; (3) violation of the Administrative Procedures Act; and (4) violation 15 of his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at ¶¶ 57– 16 77.) 17 The next day, Petitioner filed the pending motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 18 No. 3.) In his pending motion, Petitioner asks the court to order his immediate release from 19 custody. (Doc. No. 3-2 at 6.) Petitioner also asks the court to enjoin Respondents from re- 20 detaining him unless they have provided him with a pre-deprivation hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 21 § 1226(a) at which Respondents will bear the burden of demonstrating to a neutral decisionmaker 22 by clear and convincing evidence “that material changed circumstances since Petitioner’s 2021 23 recognizance release from ICE custody justify his re-detention.” (Id.) Further, Petitioner asks the 24 court to enjoin Respondents from transferring him outside the Eastern District while this action is 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 pending to preserve the court’s jurisdiction.2 (Id.) 2 On December 8, 2025, the court issued a briefing schedule on Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. 3 No. 4.) The following day, the court directed Respondents to substantively address whether any 4 provision of law or fact in this case would distinguish it from this court’s decision in Labrador- 5 Prato v. Noem et al., 1:25-cv-01598-DC-SCR, 2025 WL 3458802 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025), and 6 other similar cases previously decided by this court, or indicate that the matter is not substantively 7 distinguishable. (Doc. No. 5.) 8 Respondents filed a timely opposition to Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. No. 9.) Therein, 9 Respondents acknowledge this case shares factual and legal similarities to Labrador-Prato. (Id. at 10 1.) However, Respondents contend the cases are different because the petitioner in Labrador- 11 Prato had “no criminal history [or] disciplinary infractions during her detention” and here, 12 “Petitioner repeatedly violated terms of his release and was arrested for driving under the 13 influence.” (Id.) On December 11, 2025, Respondents filed a declaration and exhibits in support 14 of their opposition. (Doc. No. 11.) On December 12, 2025, Petitioner filed a timely reply to 15 Respondents’ opposition. (Doc. No. 12.) 16 LEGAL STANDARDS 17 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 18 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 19 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). The standard governing the issuing of a temporary 20 restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. 21 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To 22 obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on 23 the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary 24 relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) that an injunction
25 2 Petitioner provides no authority to support his request to enjoin Respondents from transferring him outside the Eastern District while this action is pending. Because “[t]he court need not make 26 an order preserving its jurisdiction” and Petitioner is being provided immediate release, the court 27 will not address Petitioner’s request to enjoin Respondents from transferring him. Cajina v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-01566-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3251083, at *2, n. 1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) 28 (citing Y.G.H. v. Trump, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2025)). 1 | is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The likelihood of success on the merits is 2 | the most important Winter factor. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th 3 Cir. 2017). 4 A party seeking injunctive relief must make a showing on all four prongs of the Winter 5 | factors to obtain injunctive relief. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 6 | Cir. 2011); see Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A preliminary injunction 7 | is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a 8 | clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’”) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 9 | 972 (1997)). A district court may consider “the parties’ pleadings, declarations, affidavits,» and 10 | exhibits submitted in support of and in opposition to the [motion for injunctive relief].” Cal. Rifle 11 | & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 745 F.Supp.3d 1037, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2024); see 12 | also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). Any evidentiary issues “properly 13 | go to weight rather than admissibility.” Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 119 F. 14 | Supp. 3d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 15 DISCUSSION 16 | A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 17 1. Statutory Framework 18 Petitioner argues he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims because he has not 19 | received a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator and remains detained, which exceeds the 20 | government’s statutory authority under section 1226(a). (Doc. No. 3-2 at 10.) Respondents argue 21 | Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing because he is subject to mandatory detention under 22 | section 1225. (Doc. No. 9 at 4.) 23 The complex statutory framework governing the detention and removal of inadmissible 24 | noncitizens in this country is at issue here. Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of 25 | inadmissible noncitizens who have been placed in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. 26 || Section 1226(a) is the “usual removal process” for inadmissible noncitizens. Dep ’t of Homeland 27 | Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). The noncitizen’s removal commences with the 28 | filing of a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court, initiated under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Ortiz
1 Donis v. Chestnut, No. 25-cv-01228-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 2879514, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2 2025). The removal process provides for an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge to 3 allow the noncitizen to show he should not be removed. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 108. The 4 noncitizen is permitted to apply for asylum if he would be persecuted if returned to his home 5 country. Id. (citing 8 U.S. § 1229a(b)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(2020).) If asylum is not granted, 6 and the noncitizen is ordered removed, he can appeal the order to the Board of Immigration 7 Appeals. Id. (citing 8 U.S. §§ 1229a(c)(5), 1252(a)). 8 Section 1226 provides a discretionary detention scheme while removal proceedings are 9 pending. 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Specifically, during the pendency of removal proceedings, the 10 government may continue to detain the individual or may release him on bond or conditional 11 parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)-(B). When a person is apprehended under section 1226, an ICE 12 officer makes an initial custody determination, and the noncitizen will be released upon a 13 showing “to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or 14 persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” Diaz v. Garland, 15 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). If the noncitizen is detained 16 under section 1226(a), he is entitled to a bond hearing. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 17 (2018). 18 As to noncitizens seeking admission into the United States, section 1225 provides for 19 mandatory detention of certain individuals and, in some cases, expedited removal. 8 U.S.C. § 20 1225; see also Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at *4 (“While ‘§ 1226 applies to aliens already 21 present in the United States,’ U.S. immigration law also ‘authorizes the Government to detain 22 certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),’ a process that 23 provides for expedited removal.”) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.) Section 1225(b)(2)(A) 24 provides: 25 Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer 26 determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a 27 28 1 proceeding under section 1229a of this title.3 2 An applicant for admission is defined as a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not 3 been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival 4 and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in 5 international or United States waters).” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 6 Until this year, DHS has “applied [section] 1226(a) and its discretionary release and 7 review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without valid 8 documentation.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *3 9 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025). According to Petitioner, on July 8, 2025, DHS issued a memo to all 10 employees of ICE stating that it had revisited its legal position on detention and release 11 authorities and “that all noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection shall now 12 be deemed ‘applicants for admission’ and subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 13 1225(b)(2)(A).” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 38–39.) Following this development, DHS began directing 14 federal immigration officials to seek expedited removal of noncitizens pursuant to section 15 1225(b)(2). Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 16 Sept. 3, 2025); Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *4. 17 In their opposition, Respondents reiterate the government’s position that section 1225 18 applies broadly to all noncitizens, including Petitioner, who have not been lawfully admitted, 19 regardless of their physical presence in the country. (Doc. No. 9 at 4.) However, the legal 20 argument Respondents rely upon to support the government’s position that section 1225 applies 21 here has been consistently rejected by a majority of courts in this district and courts across the 22 country. See Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-07492-RFL, 2025 WL 2741654, at *10 (N.D. 23 Cal. Sep. 26, 2025) (citing Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (collecting cases). Instead, 24 those courts have generally held that section 1226 rather than section 1225 is the appropriate 25 section to apply in cases in which a noncitizen is already living in the United States. See C.A.R.V. 26
27 3 Subparagraph (B) of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) sets forth exceptions to subparagraph (A). Subparagraph (C) of the same section addresses the [treatment] of [noncitizens] arriving from 28 contiguous territory.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225 b)(2)(C). Neither subparagraph appears to apply here. 1 v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-01395-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2025) 2 (finding section 1226 applied when “petitioner ha[d] been present in the United States for 3 approximately four years and was released on his own recognizance well before Respondents 4 adopted the new interpretation of the governing statutes”); see Bernardo Aquino v. Larose, No. 5 25-cv-02904-RSH-MMP, 2025 WL 3158676, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (“The 6 overwhelming majority of courts to address the issue have agreed that Section 1226(a), rather 7 than the mandatory detention provision of Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen . . . who 8 has resided in the United States for many years.”) (citing cases). 9 The majority view rejects the government’s new interpretation of section 1225 as the 10 applicable immigration detention authority for all inadmissible noncitizens. (Doc. No. 11 at 3.) 11 Indeed, Petitioner was specifically released in accordance with section 236 of the INA [section 12 1226]. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 18.) “Having elected to proceed with full removal proceedings under § 13 1226, Respondents cannot now reverse course and institute § 1225 expedited removal 14 proceedings.” Clavijo v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15 21, 2025). Accordingly, Petitioner is likely subject to the discretionary detention scheme set forth 16 in section 1226. 17 2. Due Process 18 Respondents contend the failure to provide Petitioner a bond hearing does not constitute a 19 violation of due process because Petitioner cannot establish a statutory right to a bond hearing. 20 (Doc. No. 9 at 5.) However, as noted above, Petitioner has a statutory right to a bond hearing 21 under 1226. Moreover, Petitioner’s present detention likely violates his due process rights under 22 the Fifth Amendment. 23 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 24 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. It is firmly established that 25 these protections extend to noncitizens present in the United States. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 26 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United 27 States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 28 permanent.”); Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“It must be concluded that all 1 persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guarantied by [the 2 Fifth Amendment], and that even aliens shall not . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property 3 without due process of law.”). 4 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps. Berrios v. Albarran, No. 25- 5 cv-01544-TLN-CSK, 2025 WL 3171140, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of 6 Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The first step asks whether a protected liberty 7 interest under the Due Process Clause exists. Id. The second step “examines the procedures 8 necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 9 Constitution.” Id. 10 The Due Process clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal 11 proceedings, even if their presence is unlawful or temporary. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 12 Since Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the court must determine the procedures 13 necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 14 Constitution. To make that determination, the court applies the three-part test established in 15 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206–07 (applying the Mathews 16 test to a procedural due process challenge to a detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, explaining that 17 “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental 18 interest in the immigration detention context”); see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 19 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). The Mathews 20 test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous 21 deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest. 424 U.S. at 335. 22 Turning to the first Mathews factor, Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free from 23 detention. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 24 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 25 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner was out of custody for almost four years prior to his re-detention. 26 (Doc. No. 3-4 at ¶¶ 4, 14.) During those four years, Petitioner was gainfully employed as a human 27 resources clerk, patient coordinator, and music teacher. (Doc. No. 3-5 at ¶ 2.) Petitioner also spent 28 time with family and friends, became involved in a church community, and applied for asylum. 1 (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 23.) The length of time and the connections Petitioner made with his community 2 during that time create a powerful interest for Petitioner in his continued liberty. See Doe v 3 Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025). Thus, this factor favors a finding that 4 Petitioner’s private interest has been affected by his detention. 5 The second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation to Petitioner, also weighs in 6 Petitioner’s favor. See A.E. v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 7 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the 8 petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.”). Civil immigration 9 detention is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect” and is justified when a noncitizen presents as a 10 danger to the community or risk of flight. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & 11 Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). 12 Petitioner has been detained for over a month without being provided a bond hearing 13 before an immigration judge to evaluate his dangerousness and/or flight risk. (Doc. No. 3-4 at ¶ 14 14.) Although Respondents highlight in their opposition that Petitioner repeatedly violated the 15 terms of his release and was arrested for driving under the influence (Doc. No. 9 at 1), no neutral 16 arbiter under section 1226 has determined whether those facts show that Petitioner is a flight risk 17 or danger to the community. Cf. Rodriguez Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05071-TLT, 2025 WL 18 3011852, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025) (“If Respondents wish to establish that re-detention is 19 warranted by raising the effect of . . . Petitioner-Plaintiff’s six alleged bond violations, a hearing 20 before a neutral adjudicator provides a forum to do so.”); see also Cajina, 2025 WL 3251083, at 21 *1, 6 (ordering petitioner’s immediate release and enjoining and restraining respondents from re- 22 detaining petitioner absent a pre-detention hearing, despite petitioner being charged with driving 23 under the influence); Nolasco-Gomez v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02217-RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 3514758 24 (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 2025) (ordering petitioner’s immediate release and enjoining and restraining 25 respondents from re-detaining petitioner absent a pre-detention hearing, despite petitioner being 26 arrested for driving under the influence). Thus, the court concludes “the probable value of 27 additional procedural safeguards” including a bond hearing before Petitioner was detained is high. 28 A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5. 1 Turning to the third Mathews factor, the court acknowledges the government has an 2 interest in the steady enforcement of its immigration laws but recognizes that the government’s 3 interest in detaining Petitioner without any procedural protections is substantially “low.” Ortega 4 v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 5 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025). Custody hearings in immigration court are routine and impose a 6 “minimal” cost on the government. Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. “If the government wishes to 7 re-arrest [petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in 8 doing so without [any procedural protections] is low.” Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970. 9 On balance, the Mathews factors favoring Petitioner show a likelihood of success on the 10 merits that due process requires a bond hearing prior to his re-detention. Therefore, the court finds 11 that Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on the merits of his due process claim. 12 B. Irreparable Harm 13 It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably 14 constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 15 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Where, as here, the “alleged deprivation of a 16 constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is 17 necessary.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wright, 18 Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004)). The Ninth Circuit has 19 also noted that “unlawful detention certainly constitutes ‘extreme or very serious’ damage, and 20 that damage is not compensable in damages.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 999. 21 Therefore, the second Winter factor weighs in favor of granting Petitioner’s request for 22 injunctive relief. 23 C. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest 24 The court now turns to the last two Winter factors. The balance of the equities and public 25 interest analyses merge when the government is the opposing party, as is the case in this action. 26 See Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 27 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). 28 ///// 1 “Just as the public has an interest in the orderly and efficient administration of this 2 country’s immigration laws, [] the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections 3 against unlawful detention.” Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL 5074312, at *4 4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020) (internal quotation omitted); see also Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 5 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a 6 constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the 7 Constitution.”). Petitioner has demonstrated that he is likely unlawfully detained in violation of 8 his due process rights and is suffering irreparable harm as a result. 9 On the other hand, the burden on Respondents in releasing Petitioner from detention is 10 minimal. “[T]he only potential injury that the government faces is a ‘short delay’ in detaining 11 Petitioner[] if it ‘ultimately demonstrates to a neutral decisionmaker’ that their detention is 12 necessary to prevent flight or danger to the community.” Valencia Zapata, 2025 WL 2741654, at 13 *13 (quoting Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *14). Respondents cannot reasonably assert 14 that the public and government will be harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined 15 from violating Petitioner’s due process rights, which is the case here. See Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. 16 & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding “the INS cannot reasonably assert that it 17 is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.”). 18 Accordingly, the court finds that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in favor of 19 injunctive relief and consequently, all four Winter factors weigh in favor of Petitioner. 20 D. Bond 21 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) permits a court to grant preliminary injunctive 22 relief ‘only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the 23 costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.’” 24 Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c)). 25 “Despite the seemingly mandatory language, ‘Rule 65(c) invests the district court with discretion 26 as to the amount of security required, if any.’” Id. (quoting Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 27 919 (9th Cir. 2003)). “In particular, ‘[t]he district court may dispense with the filing of a bond 28 when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or 1 her conduct.’” Johnson, 572 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Jorgensen, 320 F.3d at 919). 2 Here, Plaintiff asks that no bond be required. (Doc. No. 3-2 at 32.) Respondents do not 3 address Petitioner’s request. (See Doc. No. 9.) The court finds that no security is required here. 4 Courts regularly waive security in cases like this one. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th 5 Cir. 2011); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2716910, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 6 Sep. 23, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RMI-RFL, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 7 Jul. 4, 2025). 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons explained above, 10 1. Petitioner Milton John Selis Tinoco’s motion for a temporary restraining order 11 (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED; 12 2. Petitioner Milton John Selis Tinoco Isabo shall be released immediately from the 13 Respondents’ custody. Respondents shall not impose any additional restriction on 14 him, such as electronic monitoring, unless that is determined to be necessary at a 15 future pre-deprivation/custody hearing; 16 3. If the government seeks to re-detain Petitioner, it must provide no less than seven 17 (7) days’ notice to Petitioner and must hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before 18 a neutral arbiter pursuant to section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, at 19 which Petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered; and 20 ///// 21 ///// 22 ///// 23 ///// 24 ///// 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 4. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE no later than December 18, 2 2025, as to why this court should not issue a preliminary injunction on the same 3 terms as this order. Petitioner may file an opposition by no later than December 4 19, 2025. Respondents may file a reply to Petitioner’s opposition by no later than 5 December 22, 2025. If the parties agree upon a less demanding briefing schedule, 6 the court will consider the parties’ proposal. 7 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. □ 10 | Dated: _ December 13, 2025 □□ □ <—_ Dena Coggins 1] United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15