Milo Burroughs v. Office of Personnel Management

764 F.2d 1300, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 20217
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 2, 1985
Docket84-4064
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 764 F.2d 1300 (Milo Burroughs v. Office of Personnel Management) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Milo Burroughs v. Office of Personnel Management, 764 F.2d 1300, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 20217 (9th Cir. 1985).

Opinion

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff is employed as a civilian Supervisory Flight Test Pilot by the Department of the Army. He seeks to have his position reclassified from a GS-12 level to a GS-13. He was successful in his first administrative review by the Northwest Regional Office of Personnel Management, but the Office of Personnel Management’s (“OPM’s”) Classification Appeals Office in Washington overturned the regional decision. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of OPM and Burroughs here contends that the district court erred when it concluded that OPM’s final classification decision was reasonable and based on substantial evidence. In this appeal, we first address the government’s challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction over the case and then address the merits of the district court’s decision.

This action was filed pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 704. The district court assumed jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act, following authority holding that employees under the Act may obtain limited review of classification decisions for purposes of prospective relief. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 403, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); Haneke v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, 535 F.2d 1291, 1295-96 (D.C. Cir.1976). See generally 14 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3655 (1985). This court has considered job classification challenges without jurisdictional question. White v. United States Civil Service Commission, 468 F.2d 1357, 1358-59 (9th Cir.1972) (per curiam).

Those cases, however, were all decided before the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), Pub.L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, and at a time when the Civil Service Commission (“CSC”) was charged with enforcement of the Classification Act. The CSRA abolished the CSC and created the OPM to monitor the classification system, which the CSRA left largely unchanged. See generally Atwell v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 670 F.2d 272, 276-278 (D.C.Cir.1981).

The government contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the CSRA, and it relies on a *1302 decision of the D.C. Circuit, Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171 (D.C.Cir.1983). Car-ducci had been demoted, and he sought judicial review under the APA. The D.C. Circuit held that the comprehensive administrative review scheme established in the CSRA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7703, precluded direct judicial review under the APA for challenged demotions. Carducci, 714 F.2d at 172-175; accord Veit v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.1984); Braun v. United States, 707 F.2d 922 (6th Cir.1983); Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982).

The CSRA review scheme, however, pertains only to review of “adverse [personnel] actions” and “prohibited personnel practices.” Carducci, 714 F.2d at 175. It does not apply to employees’ requests for job reclassifications, which are provided for under 5 U.S.C. § 5112. 1 The legislative history of the CSRA shows that it was directed at streamlining and reforming performance appraisals and disciplinary actions. See S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 17-64, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2723, 2739-86. The special review procedures of 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7703 were for such actions that negatively affected employees. Id. at 51-64, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 2773-86.

Burroughs, in contrast, is not seeking review of such an action. He is seeking a reclassification of a position. Requests for classification changes do not challenge any individual adverse actions nor any prohibited personnel practices. They are claims that particular positions are incorrectly classified and therefore violate the equal pay for substantial equal work principle of 5 U.S.C. § 5101. The CSRA’s review provisions thus would not appear to apply to classification decisions.

The D.C. Circuit before Carducci expressly held that classification decisions are judicially reviewable under the Mandamus Act. 2 Haneke, 535 F.2d 1291. The government argues that Carducci overruled Haneke, but we think not. The court in Carducci did not say it was overruling Haneke, and we find no persuasive reason to believe it intended to do so sub silentio. Haneke was a proceeding under the Mandamus Act; Carducci was a proceeding under the CSRA. Each proceeding sought a different avenue to a different remedy, and hence, the cases are not inconsistent. The D.C. Circuit seems to have acknowledged this, for it stated in Bright v. Lehman, 725 F.2d 788 (D.C.Cir.1984): “We do not interpret [Carducci ] to preclude all actions in the nature of mandamus. In fact, the court in Carducci indicated that judicial review would be available to ensure that administrative review proceedings conformed to statutory mandates.” Id. at 791 n. 5; cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, 733 F.2d 114, 117 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1984) (a statutory scheme can limit *1303

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764 F.2d 1300, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 20217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milo-burroughs-v-office-of-personnel-management-ca9-1985.