Mills v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Mills v. United States

566 A.2d 1073, 1989 D.C. App. LEXIS 278, 1989 WL 148116

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedDecember 6, 1989

DocketNos. 89-1196, 89-1197

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 566 A.2d 1073 (Mills v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mills v. United States, 566 A.2d 1073, 1989 D.C. App. LEXIS 278, 1989 WL 148116 (D.C. 1989).

Pincite

Opinion

TERRY, Associate Judge:

Appellants were indicted in the Superior Court for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it¹ and possession of drug paraphernalia.² After they were arraigned, the government extended to each of them an offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense. Some time later a dispute arose as to whether the plea offers had been rejected or withdrawn or whether they were still open. The trial court, after a hearing, found that the offers had been withdrawn, and ruled that appellants had no right to enforce them against the government. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984).

The government then moved to dismiss the indictment because it had recently obtained a new indictment against these appellants in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The charges in the federal indictment were essentially the same as in the Superior Court ease, and were based on the same facts. The court, over a defense objection, granted the government’s motion. After both defendants appealed from the order of dismissal, the government filed in this court a motion [1074]*1074to dismiss their appeals for lack of jurisdiction. We grant the government’s motion.

The Supreme Court held in Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 516-519, 76 S.Ct. 912, 915-16, 100 L.Ed. 1377 (1956), that a defendant may not appeal from a trial court order dismissing an indictment, both because the defendant is not aggrieved by the dismissal and, more fundamentally, because the dismissal is not a final order with respect to the defendant. Several circuits, relying on Parr, have likewise refused to allow appeals by defendants from orders dismissing indictments against them. E.g., United States v. Reale, 834 F.2d 281, 282 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Moller-Butcher, 723 F.2d 189, 190-191 (1st Cir.1983); United States v. Martin, 682 F.2d 506, 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088, 103 S.Ct. 573, 74 L.Ed.2d 934 (1982); United States v. Lanham, 631 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.1980). We join their company today.

To be sure, this court in the past has allowed the government to appeal from the dismissal of an indictment or information, even a dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Cummings, 301 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C.1973); United States v. Hector, 298 A.2d 504, 505 (D.C.1972). In those cases, however, an appeal by the government was expressly authorized by statute.³ No statute gives a corresponding right of appeal to a defendant.

We therefore hold, on the authority of Parr v. United States, supra, that these appellants may not appeal from the dismissal of the indictment against them because, as to them, the order of dismissal is not a final order. We need not decide, in addition, whether they have been aggrieved by the dismissal (the alternative holding of Parr; see 351 U.S. at 516-517, 76 S.Ct. at 915). If appellants’ substantive contentions have merit, they can be raised in the federal court at an appropriate time.⁴

We grant appellants’ motion for the appointment of counsel, nunc pro tunc as of October 17, 1989, as requested. We grant the government’s motion to dismiss these appeals. Other pending motions are denied as moot.

These appeals are

Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

TERRY, Associate Judge:

Appellants were indicted in the Superior Court for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it¹ and possession of drug paraphernalia.² After they were arraigned, the government extended to each of them an offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense. Some time later a dispute arose as to whether the plea offers had been rejected or withdrawn or whether they were still open. The trial court, after a hearing, found that the offers had been withdrawn, and ruled that appellants had no right to enforce them against the government. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984).

The government then moved to dismiss the indictment because it had recently obtained a new indictment against these appellants in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The charges in the federal indictment were essentially the same as in the Superior Court ease, and were based on the same facts. The court, over a defense objection, granted the government’s motion. After both defendants appealed from the order of dismissal, the government filed in this court a motion [1074]*1074to dismiss their appeals for lack of jurisdiction. We grant the government’s motion.

The Supreme Court held in Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 516-519, 76 S.Ct. 912, 915-16, 100 L.Ed. 1377 (1956), that a defendant may not appeal from a trial court order dismissing an indictment, both because the defendant is not aggrieved by the dismissal and, more fundamentally, because the dismissal is not a final order with respect to the defendant. Several circuits, relying on Parr, have likewise refused to allow appeals by defendants from orders dismissing indictments against them. E.g., United States v. Reale, 834 F.2d 281, 282 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Moller-Butcher, 723 F.2d 189, 190-191 (1st Cir.1983); United States v. Martin, 682 F.2d 506, 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088, 103 S.Ct. 573, 74 L.Ed.2d 934 (1982); United States v. Lanham, 631 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.1980). We join their company today.

To be sure, this court in the past has allowed the government to appeal from the dismissal of an indictment or information, even a dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Cummings, 301 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C.1973); United States v. Hector, 298 A.2d 504, 505 (D.C.1972). In those cases, however, an appeal by the government was expressly authorized by statute.³ No statute gives a corresponding right of appeal to a defendant.

We therefore hold, on the authority of Parr v. United States, supra, that these appellants may not appeal from the dismissal of the indictment against them because, as to them, the order of dismissal is not a final order. We need not decide, in addition, whether they have been aggrieved by the dismissal (the alternative holding of Parr; see 351 U.S. at 516-517, 76 S.Ct. at 915). If appellants’ substantive contentions have merit, they can be raised in the federal court at an appropriate time.⁴

We grant appellants’ motion for the appointment of counsel, nunc pro tunc as of October 17, 1989, as requested. We grant the government’s motion to dismiss these appeals. Other pending motions are denied as moot.

These appeals are

Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

566 A.2d 1073, 1989 D.C. App. LEXIS 278, 1989 WL 148116, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mills-v-united-states-dc-1989.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack