Mills v. Municipal Court

515 P.2d 273, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 1973 Cal. LEXIS 155
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 25, 1973
DocketDocket Nos. L.A. 30117, 30108
StatusPublished
Cited by173 cases

This text of 515 P.2d 273 (Mills v. Municipal Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mills v. Municipal Court, 515 P.2d 273, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 1973 Cal. LEXIS 155 (Cal. 1973).

Opinion

Opinion

TOBRINER, J.

It has long been recognized that under the federal Constitution a defendant’s plea of guilty to a criminal charge is only valid if it is voluntarily and knowingly made. (See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston (1942) 316 U.S. 101, 104 [86 L.Ed. 1302, 1304, 62 S.Ct. 964].) In June 1969, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on this principle in Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709], holding that an appellate court may not presume from a “silent record” that a defendant has voluntarily and intelligently waived the constitutional rights which he implicitly relinquishes by entering a plea of guilty. In Boykin the court invalidated a criminal conviction resulting from a guilty plea in a proceeding in which the record contained no adequate showing of the defendant’s waiver of his rights.

Shortly thereafter, in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 CaLRptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449], our court undertook an extensive analysis of the Boykin decision and determined that in order to satisfy Boykin’s requirements a trial court record must explicitly reveal “on its face” that before a defendant entered a plea of guilty, he was aware of the three major constitutional rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty&emdash;namely, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confrontation and the right to a jury trial&emdash; and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived such rights.

The defendants in both Boykin and Tahl had entered pleas of guilty to serious felonies, in each case punishable by death. In the past several years our court has had occasion to clarify the application of the BoykinTahl doctrine in a variety of contexts, 1 but to date each such application has involved a felony proceeding.

*292 The two cases before the court in the instant matter present the general question of the applicability of the Boykin-Tahl rule in misdemeanor proceedings. Subsumed within this general question are a number of distinct issues: (1) To which misdemeanors, if any, are the Boykin-Tahl rules applicable? (2) If the Boykin-Tahl doctrine is applicable in this context, must the identical procedures that have been required for felony proceedings be followed in misdemeanor prosecutions? (3) More specifically, if the Boykin-Tahl rule is applicable, are misdemeanor defendants precluded from entering a plea of guilty through counsel as authorized by Penal Code section 1429? and (4) Should the rulings on the above issues have retroactive or prospective effect?

All of these issues are presented by the instant cases and we briefly summarize at the outset the conclusions we have reached by virtue of the analysis set forth at length below. First, we have concluded that the rationale of the Boykin and Tahl decisions applies equally to misdemeanors as to felonies, and that the constitutional principles enunciated in those decisions govern the validity of pleas of guilty in all misdemeanor proceedings. Second, past decisions of this court indicate that in misdemeanor proceedings flexible procedures, which take into account the realities of the crowded dockets of municipal and justice courts, are permissible so long as fundamental constitutional rights are not sacrificed; accordingly, we have concluded that the application of the Boykin-Tahl doctrine in misdemeanor proceedings need not take the identical form required in felony prosecutions.

Third, we have determined that the constitutional principles embodied in Boykin and Tahl are not irreconcilable with section 1429 of the Penal Code permitting a misdemeanor defendant to plead guilty through counsel. We shall explain that the protection afforded by these decisions can be satisfied by counsel’s presentation of an adequate waiver form, personally completed and signed by the defendant, and by counsel’s affirmation that he informed his client of his rights and that his client knowingly and voluntarily waived them. Finally, we have concluded that in view of the essentially prophylactic function of the Boykin-Tahl doctrine, and the significant disruptive effect that a retroactive holding might have, our decision should be applied purely prospectively; that is, only to misdemeanor guilty pleas entered after the date of this decision.

*293 Having summarized our ultimate general legal conclusions, we turn to the specific cases before us. After reviewing the facts of the two .proceedings at bar, we shall proceed to the reasoning which has led us to the. above conclusions.

1. The facts of the instant cases.

(a) Mills v. Municipal Court.

Petitioner Mills instituted the instant proceeding, seeking to have a misdemeanor drunk driving conviction (Veh. Code, § 23102, subd. (a)), entered in the San Diego Municipal Court on April 27, 1971, set aside as constitutionally invalid under Boykin and Tahl. Attached to the petition is a certified copy of the trial court record of the challenged proceeding. The record discloses that on February 9, 1971, an attorney, Stephen Frantz, appeared for defendant Mills at arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, on April 27, 1971, Frantz again appeared for the defendant, withdrew the plea of not guilty, and entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge. Time for pronouncement of sentence was waived, and on that same date the court imposed a fine of $350, $150 of which was suspended for three years upon several conditions; 2 the record also notes that the court recommended that defendant’s driver’s license not be suspended. The record, however, contains no indication that the defendant was aware of his constitutional rights or had been advised of such rights by either his counsel or the court, nor does it reveal that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights by his guilty plea. 3

*294 One year later, on May 4, 1972, Mills was convicted a second time of misdemeanor drunk driving and, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13352, subdivision (c), the Department of Motor Vehicles suspended his driver’s license for one year. Thereafter, Mills moved in municipal court to set aside his first conviction, contending it was invalid under Boykin and Tahl; after a hearing the motion was denied. Mills then petitioned the Superior Court of San Diego County for a writ directing the municipal court to set aside the conviction, but the court denied the writ on the ground that the Boykin-Tahl

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Bluebook (online)
515 P.2d 273, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 1973 Cal. LEXIS 155, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mills-v-municipal-court-cal-1973.