[Cite as Mills v. Mills, 2025-Ohio-452.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
PAMELA M. MILLS, :
Plaintiff-Appellee/ : Cross-Appellant, No. 113819
v. :
PHILIP W. MILLS, :
Defendant-Appellant, : Cross-Appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 13, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-08-319500
Appearances:
James P. Reddy, Jr., for appellee/cross-appellant.
Zashin & Rich Co., LPA, and Jonathan A. Rich, for appellant/cross-appellee.
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
Former spouses, appellant/cross-appellee, Philip W. Mills
(“Husband”), and appellee/cross-appellant, Pamela M. Mills (“Wife”), appeal and cross-appeal the judgment entry issued by the domestic relations court granting a
modification of Husband’s spousal-support obligation, finding Husband in
contempt of court, and its award of attorney fees, raising the following assignments
of error for review:
Husband’s Assignments of Error
Assignment of Error One: The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to terminate spousal support and finding that the sum of $1,800.00 per month is a reasonable and appropriate spousal support order under [R.C. 3105.18].
Assignment of Error Two: The trial court erred in finding [Husband] in contempt of court.
Wife’s Cross-Assignments of Error
Cross-Assignment of Error One: The trial court erred in reducing the amount of the monthly spousal support obligation.
Cross-Assignment of Error Two: The trial court erred in its award of attorney fees to [Wife].
After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm. We
decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion. In the domestic relations
arena, the court is generally given broad discretion in the fashioning of equitable
relief under the specific facts and circumstances of each case. With this in mind, we
do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Husband and Wife were married in 1978, and three children were
born of this marriage, who were emancipated at the time Wife initiated the divorce
proceedings in 2008. The parties had been married for 31 years at the time their divorce was finalized in 2009. The judgment entry of divorce, which incorporated
the parties’ separation agreement, provided that Husband is to pay Wife $4,00o per
month, plus the 2% processing charge, as spousal support subject to termination
upon Wife’s death “remarriage or cohabitation with an unrelated individual, subject
to further order of court — modifiable[.]”
More than ten years later, Husband filed a motion to modify spousal-
support, requesting the court to terminate or modify his $4,000 per month spousal
support obligation to $0 because he intended on retiring from work in June 2020 to
focus on his health and family. Husband averred, “In addition to having reached a
reasonable age for retirement, I have been diagnosed with renal carcinoma and have
recently undergone a radical nephrectomy after the cancer was found to be much
more advanced than initially thought. [Wife] is aware of my diagnosis.” (Motion,
Oct. 9, 2019.) Wife opposed the motion.
During the pendency of the proceedings, Husband stopped paying the
$4,000 per month spousal-support order. As a result, Wife filed a show cause
motion, seeking to find Husband in contempt for his failure to abide by their divorce
decree. Wife averred that Husband “ceased paying spousal support in October
2020[.]” (Motion, Jan. 6, 2021.) Wife also filed a motion to compel and a motion
for attorney’s fees because of Husband’s deficient reply to Wife’s discovery requests
and the magistrate’s discovery orders. According to Wife, Husband’s response was
wholly inadequate and included completely redacted income-tax returns. The matter proceeded to a trial before the magistrate on four separate
dates, starting in March 2021 and ending in July 2021. The following relevant
evidence was presented.
During the time of trial, both Husband and Wife were 66 years old.
At the time of the divorce, Husband was employed with Ben Venue Laboratories in
Ohio as an automation manager and earned approximately $115,000 per year.
Husband was laid off by Ben Venue Laboratories in 2013 and relocated to Boston,
Massachusetts in 2014 to take a job with Shire Pharmaceuticals. He continued to
work at Shire until his retirement on August 28, 2020. At the time of retirement,
Husband earned $260,000. Husband moved back to Cleveland in December 2020
with his current wife where they bought a house for $445,000. Husband’s current
wife (“Current Wife”) is 43 years old, employed, and pays all the household
expenses. Current Wife earned $161,106 in 2020. Current Wife and Husband
married in 2016.
Husband testified that in 2018, he began to experience serious health
issues, in which he took a ten-week disability leave from work. Then in June 2019,
he was diagnosed with stage 3 renal cell carcinoma and had his left kidney removed
in September 2019. In January 2020, Husband was diagnosed with stage 3 chronic
kidney disease. Additionally, Husband had a basal cell carcinoma removed and a
skin graft performed in March 2020. Husband further testified that he decided to
retire because of his age, health, the stress of his job, and the distance from family.
Husband has the following retirement and investment accounts: Edward Jones IRA, balance on January 29, 2021 — $304,216; Takeda Savings 401(k) account, as
of December 31, 2020 — $295,346; Retirement Plan for Boehringer Ingelheim
Corporation fka Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc. 401(k), $133,500 — unknown
monthly amount of pension, anticipated $5,820 per year; Social Security monthly
benefit — amount of $2,589; and United Kingdom pension/social security
equivalent — unknown monthly amount.
Husband further testified that he elected to not receive his Social
Security retirement benefits or withdraw from his pensions, IRA, or 401(k).
Husband is waiting until age 70 to maximize his benefit. He is able to retire with no
income because his current wife is supporting him. According to Husband, he
informed Wife in October 2019 of his intent to retire so that she could prepare for
the change in financial circumstances that would result from his retirement.
Wife testified that she is a real estate agent with Howard Hanna. She
earned $6,656 in 2018 and $16,850 in 2019. Previously, Wife worked as the
Creative Programming Director for BAY arts in Bay Village, where she earned
$22,000 per year. She resigned from this position in February 2020 because she
was physically no longer able to lift and move heavy objects required by this job.
According to Wife, she elected not to receive income from her IRA, 401(k), Social
Security, or pension accounts. Wife also never remarried or cohabited with an
unrelated individual. Wife sold the marital home and downsized by purchasing her
current home. According to Wife, she paid cash for her home, which was $72,000 and does not have a mortgage. Wife also testified that she has “to do a lot of work”
on her house. (Tr. 41.)
Wife has the following retirement and investment accounts: Putnam
Investments, balance on December 31, 2019 — $6,605; Capital Group Simple IRA,
balance on December 31, 2019 — $5,481; Capital Group Rollover IRA, balance on
December 31, 2019 — $133,641; Retirement Plan for Boehringer Ingelheim
Corporation fka Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc. 401(k) — not receiving pension at this
time but anticipated around $5,000; and Social Security, potential monthly benefit
of $586. Wife also received an inheritance from her mother in the amount of
$124,000. Wife used $16,000 of her inheritance to renovate her home. Wife further
testified that Husband stopped paying his monthly spousal-support obligation so
she had to lower her monthly expenses, including gifts for their children and
grandchildren.
Certified Financial Planner William Hawke (“Hawke”) testified on
behalf of Husband. Hawke testified that he prepared a report outlining Husband’s
income sources. In preparing the report, Hawke reviewed Husband’s pension, other
retirement investments, and Social Security options. Hawke used the $45,916 figure
provided by Husband as the amount of Husband’s yearly living expenses in each of
his projections. In one scenario, Husband has $5,820 of pension income for the
year and approximately $46,000 in expenses projecting Husband with $40,000
negative cash flow. In another scenario, Husband would be receiving his Social
Security benefit, which would be approximately $28,000, in addition to his pension making his total yearly cash flow approximately $34,000. In the last scenario, if
Husband took out $12,000 per year from his investments in addition to his pension
and Social Security, Hawke testified that Husband’s cash inflow would be
approximately $54,000. Hawke testified that he was not aware of Current Wife’s
salary and did not include the additional household income provided by Current
Wife in the analysis. Hawke was also not aware that Current Wife pays all the
household expenses. Hawke further testified that Husband voluntarily chose not to
withdraw from his investments, not elect his Social Security benefits, and not
commence his retirement benefits.
Following the conclusion of the trial, the magistrate allowed the
parties to submit written closing arguments, which both parties filed. The
magistrate then issued a decision that (1) reduced the spousal support award to
$1,800 per month after finding a change in circumstances (Husband has retired and
has major health issues with his kidney) not contemplated at the time of the divorce
and considering the required statutory factors; (2) found Husband in contempt of
court for unilaterally deciding to stop paying the spousal-support order of $4,000
per month; (3) denied Wife’s request for attorney fees as it related to Husband’s
discovery issues; (4) and awarded Wife $3,000 in attorney fees for the contempt
proceedings.
Both parties filed objections to the decision. The trial court overruled
both Husband’s and Wife’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision in its
entirety, with the one modification of ordering CJFS-OCSS to calculate the arrearages and notify the parties of this arrearages in writing. The court gave
Husband 45 days to pay the arrearages in full after receiving notification from CJFS-
OCSS.
Both Husband and Wife appealed from this order in Mills v. Mills,
2022-Ohio-4639 (8th Dist.), which we dismissed for lack of final appealable order
because the arrearages amount was undetermined. Thereafter, Wife filed a motion
to determine arrearages and a judgment entry was issued by the trial court, stating
that Husband’s arrearages amount is $60,026.13 (Judgment entry, Apr. 2, 2024).
Husband and Wife now appeal again, each raising two assignments
of error for review. We will combine our discussion because their assigned errors
relate to the post-decree modification of spousal support.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review the propriety of the trial court’s determinations in a
domestic relations case under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Booth v. Booth, 44
Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises “its
judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has
discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. As the Ohio
Supreme Court has stated, “While a reviewing court in any domestic-relations
appeal must be vigilant in ensuring that a lower court’s determination is fair,
equitable, and in accordance with law, an appellate court must refrain from the
temptation of substituting its judgment for that of the trier-of-fact, unless the lower court’s decision amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Martin v. Martin, 18 Ohio St.3d
292, 295 (1985).
B. Spousal Support
1. Modification
Husband argues that the court should have terminated his spousal-
support obligation or modified it to zero. Wife argues there was no change in
circumstances and the $4,000 per month obligation should not have been modified
because Husband voluntarily retired.
R.C. 3105.18, which governs the award and modification of spousal
support, provides, in relevant part:
(E) If a continuing order for periodic payments of money as [spousal support] is entered in a divorce . . . the court . . . does not have jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of the . . . spousal support unless the court determines that the circumstances of either party have changed[.]
...
(F)(1) [A] change in the circumstances of a party includes, but is not limited to, any increase or involuntary decrease in the party’s wages, salary, bonuses, living expenses, or medical expenses, or other changed circumstances so long as both of the following apply:
(a) The change in circumstances is substantial and makes the existing award no longer reasonable and appropriate.
(b) The change in circumstances was not taken into account by the parties or the court as a basis for the existing award when it was established or last modified, whether or not the change in circumstances was foreseeable.
(2) In determining whether to modify an existing order for spousal support, the court shall consider any purpose expressed in the initial order or award and enforce any voluntary agreement of the parties. We note that the party seeking the modification of spousal support
has the burden of establishing that a modification is warranted. Brzozowski v.
Brzozowski, 2014-Ohio-4820, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.).
Husband argues that the $1,800 per month spousal support award is
unreasonable and inappropriate considering that he is retired and in poor health
and the award leaves him with less income than Wife. Husband further argues that
the court erred when it failed to enumerate the parties’ incomes used for its
determination that Husband should pay $1,800 per month in spousal support. He
also argues that the court abused its discretion by taking Current Wife’s income into
consideration when determining the spousal-support award. Whereas, Wife argues
that the trial court erred by reducing the spousal support because Husband had
ample ability to continue to pay $4,000 per month.
In the instant case, the court concluded that there was a change of
circumstances because of Husband’s retirement and health issues. Husband was
diagnosed with stage 3 renal cell carcinoma and his left kidney was removed in
September 2019. In January 2020, he was diagnosed with stage 3 chronic kidney
disease and also has basal cell carcinoma. Husband testified that he voluntarily
retired at the age of 66 years old because of his declining health. Additionally, no
evidence was presented that Husband retired to avoid his spousal-support
obligation. Rather, Husband informed Wife in November 2019 that he planned to
retire. Walpole v. Walpole, 2015-Ohio-3238, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Roach v. Roach,
61 Ohio App.3d 315 (8th Dist. 1989); Tissue v. Tissue, 2004-Ohio-5968 (8th Dist.) (“If a party is eligible to retire early and does not do so to defeat the spousal support
obligation, then retirement can be considered as a legitimate decrease in income for
purposes of modifying spousal support.”); Mlakar v. Mlakar, 2013-Ohio-100, ¶ 23
(8th Dist.), quoting Robinson v. Robinson, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1436, *2-3 (12th
Dist. Mar. 4, 1994) (“While a voluntary retirement does not necessarily preclude a
finding that an obligor spouse is voluntarily unemployed, Drummer v. Drummer,
3d Dist. No. 12-11-10, 2012-Ohio-3064, ¶ 31, a voluntary retirement ‘does not bar
consideration of [a party’s] decrease in income when determining if there was a
substantial change of circumstances.’”) We do not find that the trial court abused
its discretion by determining that this constitutes a substantial change in
circumstances that made the existing award of $4,000 per month unreasonable and
inappropriate.
“Once a trial court finds there is a change in circumstances, the court
must then determine whether spousal support is still necessary, and if so, what
amount is reasonable.” Preseren v. Preseren, 2011-Ohio-5181, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing
Calabrese v. Calabrese, 2007-Ohio-2760 (8th Dist.); Carnahan v. Carnahan, 118
Ohio App.3d 393, 398 (12th Dist.1998). R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) aids the court in deciding
whether the amount of spousal support is “appropriate and reasonable” by
providing several factors the court must consider. These factors include: (a) the
parties’ income from all sources, including income derived from the property
division made by the court; (b) the relative earning abilities of the parties; (c) the
parties’ ages and physical, mental, and emotional conditions; (d) the parties’ retirement benefits; (e) the duration of the marriage; (f) minor child; (g) the
standard of living during the marriage; (h) the parties’ education; (i) the relative
assets and liabilities of the parties; (j)the parties’ contribution to education, training,
or earning ability; (k) the time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking
spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience ; (l) the parties’ tax
consequences for a spousal support award; (m) the parties’ lost income production
capacity that resulted from that party’s marital responsibilities; and (n) any other
factor that the court finds to be relevant and equitable.
The “trial court is not required to comment on each statutory factor;
rather, the record must only show that the court considered the statutory factors
when making its award.” Comella v. Parravano, 2014-Ohio-834, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.),
citing Neumann v. Neumann, 2012-Ohio-591, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing Carman v.
Carman, 109 Ohio App.3d 698, 703 (12th Dist.1996). Moreover, when considering
a motion to modify a spousal-support order, “‘[t]he court need only consider the
factors which have actually changed since the last order.’” Id., quoting Mizenko v.
Mizenko, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2514 (8th Dist. June 7, 2001).
In the matter before us, the magistrate issued a detailed opinion,
specifically addressing all the factors that applied to the parties, and based on those
factors, it found that the spousal support should be modified to $1,800 per month.
The court noted that the parties had a long-term marriage. The court further noted
that Husband was earning $260,000 in 2019 when he filed his motion to modify
and retired in August 2020. Husband elected not to receive his Social Security retirement benefits or withdraw from his pensions, IRA, or 401(k) because Current
Wife earns $160,000 per year and pays all his expenses. We note that “[w]hile a
new spouse’s income cannot be considered in determining an obligor’s ability to pay
spousal support, the court may consider the fact that the obligor directly benefits
from sharing living expenses with his new wife.” Preseren at ¶ 16, citing Feldman v.
Feldman, 2009-Ohio-4202 (8th Dist.); Manzella v. Manzella, 2005-Ohio-4519, ¶
12 (12th Dist.), citing McNutt v. McNutt, 2005-Ohio-3752 (12th Dist.).
Although Husband chose not to apply for Social Security benefits
until age 70 to maximize his monthly benefit, the evidence revealed that he would
be entitled to $2,589 per month. He also has 401k and IRA accounts valued at over
$605,ooo, along with a pension from the United Kingdom, which is unknown. Wife
was employed as a realtor at the time of the trial and earned $16,850 in 2019. Wife
also elected not to apply for Social Security benefits. The evidence revealed that
Wife’s potential benefit would be $586 per month. Wife’s retirement accounts were
valued at approximately $150,000 in addition to an inheritance of $124,000 (which
was reduced by $16,000 to renovate her home).
In summary, the magistrate considered all factors and made findings
for each, ultimately explaining how they impacted the decision to modify Husband’s
spousal-support obligation, including the parties long-term marriage, all income
sources, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed pursuant
to R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a), Wife’s capability to produce income, Husband’s estimated
retirement income and assets, the fact that Current Wife pays all of Husband’s living expenses, the parties’ potential Social Security benefits, Wife’s estimated retirement
income and assets, and Wife’s decision to live frugally since the divorce. “Where the
record evidences the trial court’s consideration of the statutory allocation factors,
and ‘the judgment contains details sufficient for a reviewing court to determine that
the support award is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law,’ the
determination will be upheld.” La Spisa v. La Spisa, 2023-Ohio-3467, ¶ 116 (8th
Dist.), quoting Chattree v. Chattree, 2014-Ohio-489 (8th Dist.), citing Daniels v.
Daniels, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 772, 9 (10th Dist. Mar. 4, 2008), citing Schoren v.
Schoren, 2005-Ohio-2102, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.).
We are mindful that the goal of spousal support is to reach an
equitable result and there is no set mathematical formula to reach this goal. Hloska
v. Hloska, 2015-Ohio-2153, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93 (1988).
Additionally, when applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, we should not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Martin, 18 Ohio St.3d at 295.
Here, the court considered all the statutory factors and found it equitable to reduce
Husband’s spousal-support obligation to $1,800 per month. Based on the
foregoing, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion.
Accordingly, Husband’s first assignment of error and Wife’s first
cross-assignment of error are overruled.
2. Contempt Finding
In his second assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court
erred by finding him in contempt of court for failing to pay the $4,000 per month spousal-support obligation because this obligation was extinguished by virtue of the
new $1,800 per month spousal-support obligation, which was modified
retroactively to August 28, 2020. He further argues that he cannot be in contempt
of court for failing to pay $1,800 per month in spousal support because he had no
knowledge of the court order until the new judgment entry was issued. We find
Husband’s argument circular and unpersuasive.
“Contempt is defined in general terms as disobedience of a court
order. A prima facie case of contempt is established when the divorce decree is
before the court along with proof of the contemnor’s failure to comply with it.”
Calabrese v. Calabrese, 2007-Ohio-2760, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), citing Dzina v. Dzina,
2004-Ohio-4497 (8th Dist.). The party initiating the contempt proceedings must
demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the contemnor has failed to pay
support. Pugh v. Pugh, 15 Ohio St.3d 136, 139-140 (1984). The contemnor then
bears the burden of proving his inability to pay the court-ordered support. Id. at
140.
Here, Husband was obligated to pay monthly spousal support
payments of $4,000 to Wife pursuant to the terms of their separation agreement,
which was incorporated into their judgment entry of divorce in January 2009.
There is no dispute that Husband’s obligation was not stayed or reduced during the
pendency of his motion to modify spousal support. Also undisputed is the fact that
Husband unilaterally decided to stop paying spousal support in October 2020,
despite having the means to do so. In fact, Husband paid just one monthly payment of $4,000 toward his spousal-support obligation during the pendency of these post-
decree proceedings, with his last payment made in September 2020.
During trial, the magistrate stated to Husband that his payments
should not be zero while the case was pending. Specifically, the magistrate said,
“[S]ome type of payment should be made right now, Mr. Mills.” (Tr. 81.) At the
insistence of the Court, he made a payment of $4,000 after the first day of the trial.
He then continued to make no further payments even though the Court asked him
to be in substantial compliance with his obligation. The court found that Husband
had the ability to comply with the support order for the following reasons: “his
savings and retirement accounts. [Husband] incurred additional expenses to move
and purchase a house with his current wife. [Husband’s] defense is without merit
and [Husband] is in contempt of court.” (Mag. Decision, Nov. 12, 2021.) The court
determined the arrearages to be $60,026.13, which included $4,000 per month
from October 2020 through August 27, 2020, and $1,800 per month from August
28, 2020, to August 10, 2023. In total, Husband stopped paying spousal support for
nearly three years.
In light of the foregoing, we do not find that the trial court abused its
discretion when it found Husband in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s
spousal-support order. This court is troubled by Husband’s unilateral decision to
violate his court-ordered obligation, especially when he was advised by the court to
comply with the order and he was financially able to do so. Indeed, “[t]his is not the
case where the contemnor has demonstrated an inability to work, an involuntary termination, a significant medical issue, or a complete depletion of financial
resources.” Palnik v. Crane, 2019-Ohio-3364, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.), citing Herold v.
Herold, 2004-Ohio-6727 (10th Dist.); Zifer v. Huffman, 2018-Ohio-322 (10th
Dist.); Wagshul v. Wagshul, 2010-Ohio-3120, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). Rather, it appears
that Husband’s noncompliance with the order was based on a litigation strategy that
proved to be unsuccessful.
Therefore, Husband’s second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Attorney Fees
In Wife’s second cross-assignment of error, Wife challenges the trial
court’s total award of attorney’s fees. She argues that the trial court’s award of
$3,000 in attorney fees was “unreasonably low.” Wife contends that Husband
should be ordered to reimburse her $19,000 in attorney fees for the costs she
incurred regarding Husband’s motion to modify spousal support, Husband’s non-
compliance with discovery, and her motion for show cause.
1. Husband’s Motion to Modify Spousal Support and Husband’s Noncompliance with Discovery
In post-decree divorce proceedings, a court may award all or part of
reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the
award equitable. R.C. 3105.73(B). Allan v. Allan, 2019-Ohio-2111, ¶ 95 (8th Dist.).
In determining whether such an award is equitable, “the court may consider the
parties’ income, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court
deems appropriate, but it may not consider the parties’ assets.” R.C. 3105.73(B). The decision to award attorney fees under R.C. 3105.73 lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion. Allan at ¶ 95, citing Huffer v. Huffer, 2010-Ohio-1223, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.).
Wife contends that she incurred substantial attorney fees because
Husband’s motion to modify spousal support was premature, Husband did not
comply with the court’s discovery orders or her discovery requests prompting her to
file a motion to compel, and Husband did not disclose the name of his expert until
19 days before the February 2021 trial date, which caused the trial to be rescheduled
to March 2021.
Here, the court considered the R.C. 3105.73(B) factors and did not
award reasonable attorney fees for Husband’s spousal-support motion and non-
compliance with discovery because the court found that it dealt with the discovery
issues, the motion and discovery were not complex, and Husband suffered from
health issues, which delayed his retirement. The court also noted that Wife did not
update some of her accounts. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the court
abused its discretion.
2. Wife’s Motion to Show Cause
With regard to the contempt proceedings and Wife’s attorney fees,
R.C. 3105.18(G) requires the trial court to impose reasonable attorney fees on a party
who is found in contempt of court for failure to make spousal-support payments.
As discussed above, Husband was found in contempt of court for
unilaterally deciding to violate the court’s order and stop paying spousal support in October 2020. As of August 2023, the court determined Husband’s arrearage to be
$60,026.13. The court assessed the reasonableness of the attorney fees associated
with the contempt proceedings and found that an award of attorney fees of $3,000
was appropriate and reasonable. In the domestic relations arena, the trial court is
generally given broad discretion in the fashioning of equitable relief under the
specific facts and circumstances of each case. See Levy v. Levy, 2014-Ohio-2650,
¶ 42 (8th Dist.). With this in mind, even if we were to disagree with the court’s
rationale, we decline to find that it abused its discretion when it awarded Wife
$3,000 in attorney fees associated with the contempt finding.
Therefore, Wife’s second cross-assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_______________________ MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR