T.C. v. R.B.C.

2025 Ohio 1544

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 1, 2025
• Docket: 114108
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as T.C. v. R.B.C., 2025-Ohio-1544.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

T.C., :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 114108 v. :

R.B.C., :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 1, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-21-387669

Appearances:

Costanzo & Lazzaro, P.L.L., and Raymond J. Costanzo, for appellant.

Rosenthal │ Lane L.L.C., Scott S. Rosenthal, and Alarra S. Jordan, for appellee.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

Plaintiff-appellant, T.C. (hereinafter “Wife”), appeals the trial court’s

June 12, 2024 judgment entry of divorce. Wife contends that the trial court erred when it 1) adopted the magistrate’s finding that the marital residence had a fair

market value of $275,000 as of the date of the marriage; 2) failed to preclude

defendant-appellee, R.B.C. (hereinafter “Husband”), under the doctrine of res

judicata (issue preclusion), from challenging the Cuyahoga County Auditor’s

assessment of the value of the marital residence as of the date of the marriage; and

3) adopted the magistrate’s decision with respect to allocation of debt

responsibility. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

I. Procedural History and Relevant Facts

Wife and Husband were married on June 25, 2005. Two children were

born of the marriage. Wife filed a complaint for divorce on November 5, 2021. On

the same day, the trial court ordered the parties to comply with Cuyahoga CP,

Dom.Rel.Div., Loc.R. 14 and file a financial disclosure statement. The trial court

also issued a mutual restraining order pursuant to Dom.Rel.Div., Loc.R. 24.

Relevant to this appeal, the court enjoined both parties from incurring debt on

existing lines of credit. On November 8, 2021, Wife filed a motion for temporary

support. Husband filed an answer to the complaint and counterclaim on

December 8, 2021. On May 26, 2022, the magistrate issued an order for temporary

support ordering Husband to pay a monthly total to Wife of $408.

A trial was conducted before the magistrate over a period of four days:

August 1, 2023; September 27, 2023; September 28, 2023; and October 12, 2023.

Because Wife raises issues regarding the trial court’s determinations concerning marital property, credit card debt, and the division thereof, we will briefly review

the testimony germane to those issues.

Husband testified that in 2001, four years prior to the date of the

marriage, he purchased a house located on Vineland Road in Bay Village, OH

(“Vineland Road property”) for approximately $114,000. It is undisputed that on

the date of the marriage, the house was under renovation and construction. The

parties dispute the value of the Vineland Road property and the extent to which

construction of the house was complete as of the marriage date. Timothy Weber

(“Weber”) was called to testify as an expert on behalf of Husband with respect to

the retrospective value of the Vineland Road property on the date of the marriage.

Weber testified that he had been a residential real estate appraiser for 36 years. He

was certified by the State of Ohio in 1991. Weber concluded that as of July 1, 2005,

the house was 70 percent complete and that the value of the Vineland Road

property was $275,000.

Wife presented county auditor reports concerning the state of the

residence on the Vineland Road property as of January 2005 and January 2006.

These reports designated the residence 30 percent and 40 percent complete on

their respective dates.

Evidence was also presented concerning credit card debt. The parties

stipulated that Husband had the following credit card accounts in his name: a GM

credit card and a Chase Bank business credit card. Wife had the following accounts

in her name: Prime (#9709), Amazon (#3410), Discover (#2326), Kohls (#3642), and Target (#9519). Husband and Wife each presented evidence with respect to

the debt incurred on these accounts.

On January 25, 2024, the magistrate issued its decision with respect to

the complaint. The magistrate granted the complaint for divorce and made the

following findings relevant to this appeal. The magistrate adopted Weber’s

valuation of the Vineland Road property of $275,000 as of the date of the marriage.

The magistrate also ordered each party responsible for their own credit card debts

incurred in their own names.

Wife filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Relevant to this

appeal, Wife objected to the magistrate’s valuation of the Vineland Road property

as of the date of the marriage; the magistrate’s allocation of debt; and the

magistrate’s failure to preclude Husband from challenging the valuation of the

Vineland Road property as of the date of the marriage under the doctrine of res

judicata. The trial court overruled Wife’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s

decision in relevant part. Wife appeals the trial court’s judgment of divorce.

II. Law and Argument

Wife raises three assignments of error. They read the following:

1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s finding that the marital home had a fair market value of $275,000 on the date of the parties’ marriage.

2. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision refusing to find that Appellee was collaterally estopped from arguing against the 2006 Board of Revision decision.

3. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision making Appellant responsible for the entire marital debt totaling $29,411.18 as of the date she moved out of the marital home on July 1, 2022.

Assignments of error Nos. 1 and 3 each involve the trial court’s adoption of

the magistrate’s findings concerning the division of assets. Accordingly, we

review each assignment under a manifest weight standard of review to

determine whether the valuation was supported by some competent, credible

evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the

magistrate’s findings. Assignment of error No. 2 involves the applicability of

res judicata (issue preclusion/collateral estoppel) to the instant case, which

we review de novo. For ease of discussion, assignments of error Nos. 1 and 3

will be discussed together, followed by assignment of error No. 2.

Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 3

A. Standard of Review

Assignments of error Nos. 1 and 3 concern whether the trial court

erred by rejecting Wife’s objections and adopting the magistrate’s determinations

concerning division of assets. Particularly, Wife challenges the trial court’s

adoption of the magistrate’s valuation of the marital residence at the time of

marriage and the allocation of debt amongst the parties. “A trial court’s decision to

adopt a magistrate’s decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Flemco, LLC

v. 12307 St. Clair, Ltd., 2018-Ohio-588, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Kapadia v. Kapadia,

2011-Ohio-2255, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion “implies that the court’s

attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). We must be mindful that when applying the abuse-

of-discretion standard “we should not substitute our judgment for that of the trial

court.” Mills v. Mills, 2025-Ohio-452, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing Martin v. Martin, 18

Ohio St.3d 292, 295 (1985).

B. Analysis

1. The valuation of the Vineland Road property at the time of the marriage was supported by competent, credible evidence

In the first assigned error for review, Wife challenges the trial court’s

adoption of the magistrate’s $275,000 valuation of the marital residence as of the

date of the marriage, located on Vineland Road in Bay Village, OH.

Wife claims that the appraisal introduced by Husband’s expert is

flawed because the expert’s valuation was premised on the assumption that the

renovations of the premises were 70 percent complete at the time of the marriage,

rather than 35 percent as set forth in Cuyahoga County Auditor reports issued

during that time period.

We begin by recognizing that under Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), a trial court

“shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that

the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately

applied the law.” “The trial court must conduct a de novo review of the facts and an

independent analysis of the issues to reach its own conclusions about the issues in

the case.” Kapadia, 2011-Ohio-2255, at ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). “In a divorce proceeding, a trial court must divide the marital

property of the parties equitably.” Kapadia at ¶ 24, citing R.C. 3105.171(B). In

order to do so, the trial court “must place a value on each contested item of

property.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 83 Ohio App.3d 794 (1oth

Dist. 1992). “Valuing property involves factual inquiries, requiring an appellate

court to apply a manifest weight of evidence standard of review.” Id. This standard

of review is highly deferential. A.Y. v. E.Y., 2023-Ohio-1671, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). “An

appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s valuation if it is supported by some

competent, credible evidence.” Kapadia at ¶ 24, citing Seasons Coal Co. v.

Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984).

Husband called Timothy Weber to testify as an expert on his behalf

regarding the value of the Vineland Road property as of the date of the marriage.

Weber testified that he has been a residential real estate appraiser in Ohio for 36

years. He was certified by the State of Ohio in 1991. Weber determined that the

value of the property on July 1, 2005, was $275,000. As of the date of the marriage,

the renovations to the house on the property had yet to be completed. Weber

testified that the house was 70 percent complete. Had the renovations been

completed, Weber testified that the valuation of the property would have been

$100,000 greater.

Weber explained his process for arriving at his valuation. He testified

he utilized the sales comparison approach in this case. Weber reviewed multiple

listing services and county record data services of similarly sized homes dating back to one year prior to the date of the marriage in order to determine a market trend.

He also interviewed the homeowner, Husband, with respect to the state of the home

at the time, concerning its rehabilitation and construction. Weber also took into

consideration the reputation of the area at the time.

Weber testified that he had reviewed the county auditor reports while

conducting his appraisal analysis. In coming to his conclusion, Weber stated that

he utilized the information he received from Husband, rather than the information

contained in the auditor reports. In doing so, Weber testified that when conducting

these types of retrospective appraisals, he makes the “extraordinary assumption”

that a person present at the premises at the time is providing correct information.

Weber explained that Husband was able to provide him “primary data” as a person

who was present on the property in July 2005, the effective date of the appraisal.

He admitted the “primary data” the Husband provided consisted only of the

Husband’s recollection of the construction in 2005 and the Husband could not

locate his file with documentation regarding the status of the construction in 2005.

Weber also explained that auditor reports, on the other hand, are a temporary

third-party source, and that if he called the auditor’s office to ask about the

completion percentage set forth in the report, he may not be speaking to the person

that actually did the inspection. As an appraiser, Weber testified that he wants to

speak to “a primary person that was there at the time.” Weber also noted that based

on his experience, “county auditors are never on point with what a house would sell

for.” Husband also testified that the home was 70 percent complete on the

date of the marriage. Husband testified that as of the date of the marriage the home

had a furnace and heating; the frame was up; and that the exterior of the house

looked like the house was complete. The house had a roof, windows, bricks, and a

wraparound back porch. The driveway and the front porch had not been completed

though.

With respect to the interior of the home, Husband stated that the

rough-in electrical, rough-in framing for the interior of the house; and rough-in

plumbing were complete. He explained that even though these were complete on

the date of marriage, he did not call for the city to inspect the house until he was

ready to move forward with the project. As a result, he explained that even though

an inspection may have been conducted by the city on a certain date after the

marriage, the work had been completed earlier.

Wife disputes Weber’s appraisal. She did not call an expert to dispute

Weber’s valuation. Rather, Wife presented county auditor reports concerning the

extent of the construction as of January 2005 and January 2006. These reports

designated the residence 30 percent and 40 percent complete on their respective

dates. The individuals that prepared these reports did not testify at trial. Wife

testified that she recalls that the siding, porch, and framing inside the house were

not complete in 2005, and she believes the residence was 30 percent complete on

the date of marriage. The magistrate determined Weber’s testimony and his report

credible. The trial court was free to accept Weber’s appraisal of the Vineland Road

property as of July 1, 2005, as well as Husband’s sworn testimony concerning the

extent of the renovations to the premises at the time. See Harding v. Harding,

2013-Ohio-4660, ¶ 43–44 (5th Dist.) (holding that when the trier of fact is

presented with an expert’s valuation and an auditor’s tax evaluation, the trier of fact

is free to accept the valuation of the expert). Because the trial court’s determination

was based on competent, credible evidence, we cannot say that the trial court

abused its discretion by adopting the magistrate’s value of the Vineland Road

property at $275,000 at the time of the marriage. Accordingly, Wife’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion ordering both parties responsible for credit card debt incurred in their own names

In the third assigned error for review, Wife challenges the trial court’s

adoption of the magistrate’s determination concerning the allocation of credit card

debt amongst the parties. Particularly, Wife argues that the trial court

1) improperly placed the burden on her to demonstrate that the credit card debt

was marital property, and 2) failed to make a finding that an equal division of

property would be inequitable. a. The trial court did not place the burden of proof on Wife to prove that the credit card debt was marital property

First, Wife argues that the trial court erred by placing the burden on

her to demonstrate that her credit card debt was marital debt. When a trial court

divides marital property, it must also consider the marital debt of the parties.

Chattree v. Chattree, 2014-Ohio-489, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing Kehoe v. Kehoe, 2012-

Ohio-3357, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) “[W]e review the trial court’s division of debt under an

abuse of discretion standard.” Trolli v. Trolli, 2015-Ohio-4487, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.),

citing Banjoko v. Banjoko, 2013-Ohio-2566, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).

Marital debt is “any debt incurred during the marriage for the joint

benefit of the parties or for a valid marital purpose.” Victor v. Kaplan,

2020-Ohio-3116, ¶ 105 (8th Dist.), citing Stratton v. Stratton, 2019-Ohio-3279,

¶ 41 (8th Dist.). “Debt that is not for the joint benefit of the parties is considered

nonmarital and ‘equity generally requires that the burden of nonmarital debt be

placed upon the party responsible for them.’” Cross v. Cross, 2015-Ohio-5255, ¶ 30

(8th Dist.), quoting Minges v. Minges, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 660, *4 (12th Dist.

Feb. 29, 1988). As a result, “debts incurred during the marriage are presumed to

be marital unless proven otherwise.” Kaplan at ¶ 15, citing Turner v. Davis-Turner,

2018-Ohio-2194, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) “Therefore, the party seeking to have the debt

classified as a separate debt bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the debt was the separate obligation of the other spouse or was not for a valid marital purpose.” A.E. v. J.E., 2024-Ohio-1785, ¶ 77 (8th Dist.), citing

Rossi v. Rossi, 2014-Ohio-1832, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.)

There is nothing in the record to support Wife’s claim that the trial

court improperly placed the burden on her to demonstrate the debt incurred was

marital debt. Rather, the trial court’s judgment entry specifically classified and

treated the debt as marital debt. The judgment entry provides under the

subheading “MARITAL DEBT,” “[Wife] and [Husband] testified that all of the

marital debt is on credit cards. [Wife] testified to significant credit debt that was

acquired after the filing of the Complaint for Divorce. [Wife] admitted that the

majority of the credit card debt was incurred after she lost her employment as a

teacher in March, 2023, after the Complaint for Divorce was filed and the parties

were separated. [Husband] also testified that significant credit card debt was paid

off during the marriage prior to the filing of the Complaint for Divorce.” Exhibits

reflecting the credit card debt were admitted into evidence. Per the trial court’s

judgment entry, Wife had $27,016.96 in credit card debt and Husband had

$15,596.32. Since the court did not classify the debt as separate, Wife’s claim is

without merit.

With respect to the allocation of the marital debt, the trial court

ordered that “each party shall be responsible for their own credit card debts

incurred in their own names.” The trial court further held that the “division of

property, though not equal, is equitable for the following reasons: Plaintiff’s continuing incurred debt during the ongoing proceedings.” The trial court’s

division of debt is supported by competent, credible evidence.

Wife’s testimony reflects that she acquired significant credit card debt

after filing the complaint for divorce. Wife’s testimony also reflects that she used

$28,000 of tax returns deposited into her savings account to partially pay her credit

card debt as well as other bills, including root canals, at $1,600 apiece. The trial

court concluded that “[t]herefore, this Court finds that it is equitable for [Wife] to

be responsible for the credit card debts in her name.”

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

with respect to the allocation of marital debt. Wife’s third assigned error for review

is overruled.1

Assignment of Error No. 2

In the second assigned error for review, Wife claims that Husband

was barred by the doctrine of res judicata (issue preclusion/collateral estoppel)

1We note that within Wife’s third assignment of error, she claims, without elaboration,

that the trial court failed to consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 3105.171(F) or make written findings per R.C. 3105.171(G). However, App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant to include in their brief “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” “Appellate courts are not advocates. Therefore, [we] ‘will not search the record in order to make arguments on appellant’s behalf.’” Taylor-Stevens v. Rite Aid of Ohio, 2018-Ohio-4714, ¶ 121 (8th Dist.), quoting Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 139 Ohio App.3d 231, 240 (7th Dist.). Wife’s brief fails to support these extraneous statements with any arguments, does not specifically direct this court to which factors in particular the trial court failed to address, nor does she direct this court to any case law or parts in the record in support of her position. Thus, we decline to address the extraneous issues raised in Wife’s third assignment of error. from challenging the valuation of the marital home as of the date of the marriage

since the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (“BOR”) valued the home at $85,000

as of January 1, 2006. In support of this claim, Wife presented a valuation from the

BOR with a journal date of 9/28/2007, introduced as Plaintiff’s exhibit No. 25. We

find the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable.

“‘The issue of whether res judicata applies in a particular situation is

a question of law that is reviewed under a de novo standard.’” Kobal v. Kobal,

2022-Ohio-812, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), quoting Hempstead v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn.,

2008-Ohio-5350, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). “A de novo standard of review affords no

deference to the trial court’s decision, and we independently review the record to

determine whether res judicata applies.” Hempstead at ¶ 16, citing Gilchrist v.

Gonsor, 2007-Ohio-3903, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).

B. The Doctrine of Res Judicata (Issue Preclusion) Did Not Preclude Husband From Asserting That the Value of the Vineland Road Property Was $275,000 at the Time of the Marriage

1. Applicable law

Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, is incorporated

under the doctrine commonly known as res judicata. Usha Pillai IRA LLC v.

Roseman, 2023-Ohio-3480, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). Pursuant to the doctrine of res

judicata, “[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent

actions based upon any claim arising out of the transactions or occurrence that was

the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379 (1995), syllabus. Issue preclusion “prevents parties from relitigating facts and

issues in a subsequent suit that were fully litigated in a prior suit.” AJZ’s Hauling,

L.L.C. v. Trunorth Warranty Programs of N. Am., 2023-Ohio-3097, ¶ 16, citing

Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183 (1994).

The Ohio Supreme Court has recently stated that “[i]ssue preclusion

applies ‘when the fact or issue (1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior

action[ and] (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction[ ] and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted

was a party in privity with the party to the prior action.’” AJZ’s Hauling at ¶ 16,

quoting Thompson at 183. Res judicata is an affirmative defense. Jefferson v.

Bunting, 2014-Ohio-3074, ¶ 10, citing Civ.R. 8(C). Our review in this case centers

on the evidence presented by the Wife to establish the affirmative defense of res

judicata.

2. Analysis

As set forth above, the issue in this case is whether issue preclusion

applies to the value of the Vineland Road property when the parties were married

in 2005. Specifically, Wife contends that Husband contested the value of the

property with the BOR in 2006 and the BOR ultimately valued the property at

$85,000 via a journal entry dated September 28, 2007. We have examined the

evidence in the record and disagree that the documents and testimony contained

in the record establishes that Wife met her burden that Husband “actually and directly” litigated the 2005 value of the Vineland Road property and the 2005 value

was determined “by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

In support of her issue-preclusion claim, Wife relies on what purports

to be a BOR’s valuation of the Vineland Road property at $85,000, journalized on

September 28, 2007 (Plaintiff’s exhibit No. 25, page 1 (see Appendix)). We begin

our analysis by recognizing that “[r]es judicata may apply in quasi-judicial

administrative hearings.” State ex rel. Haddox v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 2013-

Ohio-794, ¶ 32. “The Cuyahoga County Board of Revision is a quasi-judicial body

charged with the responsibility of hearing complaints as to the valuation of real

property within the county.” Musarra v. Cuyahoga Cty. Aud., 2012-Ohi0-3967,

¶ 13 (8th Dist.). Thus, issues preclusion may apply to valuation issues litigated

before the BOR.

However, here, Wife failed to provide evidence that would establish

a claim for res judicata and/or collateral estoppel with respect to the valuation of

the Vineland Road property as of the date of the marriage. Page 1 of plaintiff’s

exhibit No. 25, on which Wife relies, is devoid of any indication that the Husband

filed a complaint against the valuation of the Vineland Road property, whether a

hearing was held or testimony provided regarding the complaint, whether the BOR

rendered a decision regarding the value of the Vineland Road property as of the

date of the marriage, or January 1, 2006, for that matter, or who issued the journal

entry. Rather, the journal entry references a complaint number “200703270228,”

a “Journal Number” of “372D-07,” and a “Journal Date” of September 28, 2007. The document does not indicate what tax year was appealed and appears to have

been issued more than two years after the date of the marriage. There is no

indication that the value of the property as of the date of the marriage was actually

and directly litigated before the BOR, determined by the BOR, or who each of the

parties to the action were. Without more, the record fails to support Wife’s res

judicata (issue preclusion) claim.

After a thorough review of the record, we find that the doctrine of res

judicata (issue preclusion) is inapplicable. Accordingly, Wife’s second assignment

of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion by adopting the magistrate’s value of the Vineland Road

property at $275,000 at the time of the marriage, which was based on the appraisal

of Husband’s expert. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in allocating the

credit card debt each party had incurred in their own name. Finally, we find that

the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in this case. Therefore, Husband was not

precluded from disputing the valuation of the Vineland Road property as of the date

of the marriage.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR APPENDIX