Milligan v. Georgia Power Co.

22 S.E.2d 662, 68 Ga. App. 269, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 109
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedOctober 13, 1942
Docket29566.
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 22 S.E.2d 662 (Milligan v. Georgia Power Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Milligan v. Georgia Power Co., 22 S.E.2d 662, 68 Ga. App. 269, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinion

Sutton, J.

1. The plaintiff contends that under the evidence a jury question was presented, and that the defendant power company could be held liable for the plaintiff’s injury either (1) on the theory that it had control or joint control of the current on the premises of the customer, Cedartown Textiles Inc., including the exposed wire with which the employee came in contact, even though the customer owned the wiring and the defendant had no notice of the defective and dangerous condition thereof, or (2) because, irrespective of control, the defendant had notice and yet failed to make an initial inspection before turning on the current, or (3) because, after receiving notice of such dangerous and defective condition of the wiring, it continued to send its current through the wires.

It is the general rule, deduced from the authorities, that where wiring, or other electrical or gas appliances on private property, is owned or controlled by the owner or occupant of the premises, a company which merely furnishes electricity or gas for such respective appliances is not responsible for the insulation of the electrical appliances or the condition of the wiring or electrical or gas appliances, and is’not liable for injuries,’caused by such defective condition, to the owner or occupant or to third persons, on *280 the premises. The rule is subject to the exception that, whenever such electric current or gas is supplied with actual knowledge on the part of the one supplying it of the defective and dangerous condition of the customer’s appliances, he is liable for injuries caused by the electricity or the gas thus supplied for use on such defective and dangerous appliances, but no duty of inspection rests on the one supplying the electricity or the gas from the mere fact of rendering such service to the customer owning or controlling the equipment. Where the one supplying the electricity or the gas has no control over the appliances and has no actual knowledge of the defective and dangerous condition thereof, his responsibility ends when connection is properly made under proper conditions and the current of electricity or the gas is delivered in a manner which will protect both life and property. Scott v. Rome Railway & Light Co., 22 Ga. App. 474 (96 S. E. 569); Hatcher v. Georgia Power Co., 40 Ga. App. 830 (151 S. E. 696); Georgia Power Co. v. Kinard, 47 Ga. App. 483 (170 S. E. 688); Metz v. Georgia Public Utilities Cor., 52 Ga. App. 771 (184 S. E. 629); Cornett v. Georgia Public Utilities Co., 63 Ga. App. 305 (11 S. E. 2d, 68); 18 Am. Jur. 498, § 102; 29 C. J. S. 611, § 57.

It conclusively appears from the evidence that the wiring throughout the buildings of the customer was installed and paid for by it, and there is no evidence that the power company did not make safe and proper connections for the transmission of its electrical current. The wire to the water tank was installed by Cedartown Textiles Inc. a year or more after the current was turned into the customer’s system of wiring and equipment, and there is no evidence that the power company knew of the existence of such tank wire until sometime after the plaintiff was injured. It follows that the power company did not supply the current of electricity with any actual knowledge of any defective and dangerous condition of the wire at the water tank. The contention of the plaintiff, that certain information communicated to a meter reader as to the condition of one or more wires at or near the transformer was sufficient to place the power company under a duty to inspect and become aware of the defective and dangerous condition of the wire at the tank, is without merit. Whatever notice this meter reader acquired was only constructive notice at most, and could not be said to charge the defendant with *281 actual notice of the defective and dangerous wire which injured the plaintiff. A witness, Blankenship, testified that he was a yard employee of the customer, and that several months before the injury to the plaintiff a meter reader, whom he identified at the, trial, came to read the power company’s meter, and that there was "a transformer hanging up over the door with some kind of naked wires on the side,” and he asked the meter reader "Ain’t them wires supposed to be wrapped?” and the meter reader answered "If there is anything on it, it is,” whereupon Blankenship said to him "If you will just look around, you will see a whole lot of wires that way,” but specified no place to go to. The evidence wholly fails to show by the witness or any one else that any of the wires referred to had been charged, or were then charged, with a current of electricity. So far as it appears, they may have been wires which had been abandoned as conveyors of electricity, if they had ever been so used, and it can not be presumed, as argued by the plaintiff, that they were charged with electricity.

Furthermore, the meter reader was not such a person as that notice to him of any defective and dangerous wiring would bind his employer. The plaintiff refers to certain written instructions given him by the power company in connection with his job as meter reader, and argues that such instructions show that he was under a duty to inspect and report to the company any existing defect in the wiring. Without entering into a detailed discussion of these written instructions, which are set forth in the statement of facts hereinbefore, it must be said that, properly construed, they related only to a duty to inspect and report on the equipment and wiring belonging to the power company, in connection with his duty of reading the meter at the substation, and suggest' no duty of inspecting or repairing the wires installed by the customer.

Without actual knowledge of the defective and dangerous condition of the wire at the water tank, which wire was installed after the electric current was first turned on the wiring system in the mill buildings of the customer, the defendant was under no duty to inspect the wiring and was not negligent in continuing to send the current of electricity over the wires of the customer unless it had control of the current through the customer’s wiring-system and appliances. The plaintiff contends that such control is shown to have existed. We do not think so. Neither the tes *282 timony of J. H. Smith, the mill electrician, nor that of A. P. Gilmore, district manager of the power company, particularly relied on by the plaintiff in his brief, nor that of any other witness raises any question which would require a submission of such alleged issue, to a jury. The testimony is set forth in detail in the foregoing statement of facts and need not be repeated. It shows in substance the following as to control: The power company erected a substation on the premises of the mill. This was entirely enclosed by a wire fence, and the equipment was .that of the power company. High voltage came into the substation from the wires of the power company, and by a transformer located at the substation was reduced to a lower voltage for use by Cedar-town Textiles Inc. after passing through a meter installed at its substation by the power company. At the substation was erected a switch on the high-voltage side of the line.

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Bluebook (online)
22 S.E.2d 662, 68 Ga. App. 269, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milligan-v-georgia-power-co-gactapp-1942.