FOURNET, Chief Justice.
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, 175 So.2d 326, on the application of Charles X. Miller, reversing the judgment of the trial court awarding him interest from date of judicial demand on an unpaid contract balance due him by Pittman Construction Company, and its sureties, Continental Casualty Company, Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, New Amsterdam Casualty Company, and [627]*627American Automobile Insurance Company;1 but in granting the application of Miller’s surety, Maryland Casualty Company, we limited our consideration to Miller’s claim to the aforementioned interest and its additional claim that the Court of Appeal erred in holding it liable for the tax lien filed by the United States Government on Pittman for withheld income taxes of Miller’s employees he had failed to remit. We also limited that of Pittman to the award in its favor of $120 — the cost of bonding a lien filed by one of Miller’s materialmen — for which the Court of Appeal failed 'to- render judgment against Maryland Casualty Company in solido with Miller.
Pittman, having been awarded a contract by the Housing Authority of New Orleans 2 dated March 6, 1953, to construct 81 buildings comprised of 508 dwelling units in the Desire Street Project, for which it was to receive $4,369,864, entered into two contracts with Miller on March 13, 1953, to do all the lathing and plastering; one contract for the sum of $151,000 was unbonded, the other, for $260,000 was bonded by Maryland Casualty Company. Miller’s work was substantially completed by the end of September, 1954, and it was offically accepted and approved by HANO as being satisfactory on January 1, 1955. On March 31, 1955, Miller recorded a lien against the Project for the balance allegedly due him under the contracts ($42,500) and additional compensation ($20,752.48) for extras plus costs; and on September 9, 1955, filed suit against HANO, Pittman, and its sureties seeking to recover same plus $10,400 for additional extras together with costs and interest from the dates when he completed the work or incurred the additional expenses.
Pittman is contending here, as it did in the courts below, that according to the terms of its contracts with Miller,3 it was under no obligation to pay Miller his retainage until ten days had elapsed after it had been, paid in full by HANO and Miller had furnished it evidence that all claims for labor [629]*629and material had been settled'; and that in any event, the most Miller was entitled to was $41,001.52, after deducting backcharges and payments previously made as the work progressed. It further answered by stating that not even this amount was due as (1) two duly recorded claims on the Project for materials furnished on the bonded contract had been filed by J. J. Clarke Co., Inc., in the amount of $5,408.68 and Schwartz Supply Company, Inc., for $4,139.28, plus interest and costs and (2) also of record was a levy by the United States Government in the sum of $22,646.81, which was served on Pittman for taxes owed by Miller which he had withheld as income tax deductions from earnings of his employees. It reconvened against Miller and filed a third-party petition against Maryland Casualty Company for the amount of the back-charges, the sum of $6,560 expended for bond premiums and attorney fees to have the liens cancelled and various claims against it defended, and for any other amounts owed by Miller as they became due.
Miller maintains the Court of Appeal erred in denying him interest on his claim from judicial demand as Pittman, by that same court in the case of Pittman Construction Company v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, La.App., 169 So.2d 122, (certiorari denied by this court on February 5, 1965) 'liad been awarded interest from judicial demand on the 10% retained by HANO, which includes the amount Pittman owés Miller, and also awarded Pittman’s subcontractors who intervened in that suit, interest from judicial demand on their respective claims. In that case, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, in resolving that issue, remarked : “Pittman * * * concedes that if it is allozued interest from date of default on the amounts due it by HANO, the subcontractors zvould be entitled to recover interest against it from the same date.” (Emphasis supplied.)
However, counsel for Pittman claim that “Miller is not in an ‘identical position’ with those subcontractors who were before the Court of Appeal in Pittman vs HANO, (supra) and that Court’s decrees awarding those subcontractors their claims for retainage plus legal interest from judicial demand, are not controlling here,” asserting that while Pittman was willing for those subcontractors to be paid interest from judicial demand in the event of its success in collecting interest on the amount owed it by HANO, it was not willing to make the same concession in the instant case because of Miller’s “attitude in this proceeding” evidenced, among other ways, by his filing a separate suit and being unwilling to have his claim adjudicated with the other subcontractors in Pittman’.s suit-. against HANO. •
Obviously the stipulation in the contracts on which Pittman is relying, (wliich-was included in all of-its Desire Street-Project [631]*631subcontracts) was for its own protection in. the event final payment to it would be upheld by HANO, for at the time of their execution, Pittman could not have recovered interest under the law of this state as it then existed. Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14 So.2d 627; Makofsy v. Department of Highways, 205 La. 1029, 18 So.2d 605; Hamberlin v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 210 La. 483, 27 So.2d 307; Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company, Inc. v. State, 213 La. 1, 34 So.2d 331; State v. Walker, 233 La. 687, 98 So.2d 153. However, during the protracted litigation involving this Project, the Legislature of 1960 authorized an amendment to Article 3, Section 35 of the Constitution of 1921 by Act No. 621 which was adopted by the electorate on November 8, 1960, relieving the State and its sub- ■ divisions from immunity from liability as well as interest. Pittman Construction Company v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, supra; Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So.2d 529.
That this is the construction Pittman placed on its own contracts is evidenced by the statement in its brief filed in the Court of Appeal while the case under consideration was pending there, to wit:
“In the case of Pittman Construction Company v. the Housing Authority of New Orleans, 169 So.2d 122 * * *, this Court (Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal) held that Pittman was entitled to recover from HANO legal interest on the retainage which had been due the prime contractor since June 10, 1955.
“If that judgment in favor of Pittman for interest on its retainage were to remain effective, and Pittman were to receive from HANO payment' of that interest, Pittman would have no objection to the district court’s award of interest to Miller. However, HANO’s petition for writs is pending before the Supreme Court, and even the award of interest to Pittman is not now conclusive.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We therefore conclude the Court of Appeal erred in denying Miller legal interest on the entire amount retained by Pittman from judicial demand.
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FOURNET, Chief Justice.
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, 175 So.2d 326, on the application of Charles X. Miller, reversing the judgment of the trial court awarding him interest from date of judicial demand on an unpaid contract balance due him by Pittman Construction Company, and its sureties, Continental Casualty Company, Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, New Amsterdam Casualty Company, and [627]*627American Automobile Insurance Company;1 but in granting the application of Miller’s surety, Maryland Casualty Company, we limited our consideration to Miller’s claim to the aforementioned interest and its additional claim that the Court of Appeal erred in holding it liable for the tax lien filed by the United States Government on Pittman for withheld income taxes of Miller’s employees he had failed to remit. We also limited that of Pittman to the award in its favor of $120 — the cost of bonding a lien filed by one of Miller’s materialmen — for which the Court of Appeal failed 'to- render judgment against Maryland Casualty Company in solido with Miller.
Pittman, having been awarded a contract by the Housing Authority of New Orleans 2 dated March 6, 1953, to construct 81 buildings comprised of 508 dwelling units in the Desire Street Project, for which it was to receive $4,369,864, entered into two contracts with Miller on March 13, 1953, to do all the lathing and plastering; one contract for the sum of $151,000 was unbonded, the other, for $260,000 was bonded by Maryland Casualty Company. Miller’s work was substantially completed by the end of September, 1954, and it was offically accepted and approved by HANO as being satisfactory on January 1, 1955. On March 31, 1955, Miller recorded a lien against the Project for the balance allegedly due him under the contracts ($42,500) and additional compensation ($20,752.48) for extras plus costs; and on September 9, 1955, filed suit against HANO, Pittman, and its sureties seeking to recover same plus $10,400 for additional extras together with costs and interest from the dates when he completed the work or incurred the additional expenses.
Pittman is contending here, as it did in the courts below, that according to the terms of its contracts with Miller,3 it was under no obligation to pay Miller his retainage until ten days had elapsed after it had been, paid in full by HANO and Miller had furnished it evidence that all claims for labor [629]*629and material had been settled'; and that in any event, the most Miller was entitled to was $41,001.52, after deducting backcharges and payments previously made as the work progressed. It further answered by stating that not even this amount was due as (1) two duly recorded claims on the Project for materials furnished on the bonded contract had been filed by J. J. Clarke Co., Inc., in the amount of $5,408.68 and Schwartz Supply Company, Inc., for $4,139.28, plus interest and costs and (2) also of record was a levy by the United States Government in the sum of $22,646.81, which was served on Pittman for taxes owed by Miller which he had withheld as income tax deductions from earnings of his employees. It reconvened against Miller and filed a third-party petition against Maryland Casualty Company for the amount of the back-charges, the sum of $6,560 expended for bond premiums and attorney fees to have the liens cancelled and various claims against it defended, and for any other amounts owed by Miller as they became due.
Miller maintains the Court of Appeal erred in denying him interest on his claim from judicial demand as Pittman, by that same court in the case of Pittman Construction Company v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, La.App., 169 So.2d 122, (certiorari denied by this court on February 5, 1965) 'liad been awarded interest from judicial demand on the 10% retained by HANO, which includes the amount Pittman owés Miller, and also awarded Pittman’s subcontractors who intervened in that suit, interest from judicial demand on their respective claims. In that case, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, in resolving that issue, remarked : “Pittman * * * concedes that if it is allozued interest from date of default on the amounts due it by HANO, the subcontractors zvould be entitled to recover interest against it from the same date.” (Emphasis supplied.)
However, counsel for Pittman claim that “Miller is not in an ‘identical position’ with those subcontractors who were before the Court of Appeal in Pittman vs HANO, (supra) and that Court’s decrees awarding those subcontractors their claims for retainage plus legal interest from judicial demand, are not controlling here,” asserting that while Pittman was willing for those subcontractors to be paid interest from judicial demand in the event of its success in collecting interest on the amount owed it by HANO, it was not willing to make the same concession in the instant case because of Miller’s “attitude in this proceeding” evidenced, among other ways, by his filing a separate suit and being unwilling to have his claim adjudicated with the other subcontractors in Pittman’.s suit-. against HANO. •
Obviously the stipulation in the contracts on which Pittman is relying, (wliich-was included in all of-its Desire Street-Project [631]*631subcontracts) was for its own protection in. the event final payment to it would be upheld by HANO, for at the time of their execution, Pittman could not have recovered interest under the law of this state as it then existed. Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14 So.2d 627; Makofsy v. Department of Highways, 205 La. 1029, 18 So.2d 605; Hamberlin v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 210 La. 483, 27 So.2d 307; Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company, Inc. v. State, 213 La. 1, 34 So.2d 331; State v. Walker, 233 La. 687, 98 So.2d 153. However, during the protracted litigation involving this Project, the Legislature of 1960 authorized an amendment to Article 3, Section 35 of the Constitution of 1921 by Act No. 621 which was adopted by the electorate on November 8, 1960, relieving the State and its sub- ■ divisions from immunity from liability as well as interest. Pittman Construction Company v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, supra; Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So.2d 529.
That this is the construction Pittman placed on its own contracts is evidenced by the statement in its brief filed in the Court of Appeal while the case under consideration was pending there, to wit:
“In the case of Pittman Construction Company v. the Housing Authority of New Orleans, 169 So.2d 122 * * *, this Court (Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal) held that Pittman was entitled to recover from HANO legal interest on the retainage which had been due the prime contractor since June 10, 1955.
“If that judgment in favor of Pittman for interest on its retainage were to remain effective, and Pittman were to receive from HANO payment' of that interest, Pittman would have no objection to the district court’s award of interest to Miller. However, HANO’s petition for writs is pending before the Supreme Court, and even the award of interest to Pittman is not now conclusive.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We therefore conclude the Court of Appeal erred in denying Miller legal interest on the entire amount retained by Pittman from judicial demand.
Pittman’s argument that it was not obligated to pay Miller his retainage until the two liens recorded against the Project by the latter’s materialmen had been satisfied, comes will ill grace on its part because it was paid interest from judicial demand on the entire 10% retained by HANO which includes the amount due Miller, and under the terms of its contracts with Miller it reserved the privilege of paying such amounts without notice to him.
Maryland Casualty Company, in resisting that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal rendering it solidarily liable with Miller for the amount Pittman and its sureties might be liable to the United States Government to satisfy a levy served by the [633]*633Government on Pittman for withholding taxes due by Miller on earnings of his employees, asserts Miller’s failure to remit the withheld taxes cannot be considered a default in the performance of his bonded contractual obligation which merely guaranteed that Miller would furnish and pay for all labor and material, turn the work over free and clear of all claims, encumbrances, and liens for labor or material and protect the contractor and owner from all claims, encumbrances and liens growing out of the performance of the contract.
A mere reference to the pertinent provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 19544 will readily disclose that the lien in favor of the United States is not a “lien” within the contemplation of the performance and lien bond furnished Miller by Maryland Casualty Company, hence the latter should not be liable for its satisfaction. The lien imposed for failure to pay such taxes rests upon all property and rights to property belonging to the person who is liable and failed to pay such taxes, who in this case is Miller; therefore, it is apparent that neither the prime contractor —Pittman—nor the owner of the Project— HANO — can be liable. See, United States v. Crosland Construction Company, 217 F. 2d 275; Central Bank v. United States, 345 U.S. 639, 73 S.Ct. 917, 97 L.Ed. 1312.
Pittman maintains, and properly so in our opinion, that the Court of Appeal in rendering judgment in its favor against Miller erred when it failed to make his surety, Maryland Casualty Company, solidarity liable for the sum of $120 expended by it as a premium to bond the lien recorded by Schwartz Supply Company, Inc., one of Miller’s materialmen.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, as hereinbelow detailed, is in part reversed and amended:
1. Insofar as it denied Charles X. Miller interest from judicial demand on the $41,-001.52 retained by Pittman Construction Company under the terms of their contracts, it is reversed; and, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment be amended by granting Miller legal interest on the amount retained ($41,001.52) by Pittman Construction Company from judicial demand until paid.
2. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that that part of the judgment in favor of Pittman Construction Company and its sureties against Charles X. Miller [635]*635for the sum of $120 for the cost incurred in canceling the lien recorded by Schwartz Supply Company, Inc., is hereby amended by making this amount payable by Charles X'. Miller and his surety, Maryland Casualty Company, in solido.
3. The judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it affirms the district court in casting Maryland Casualty Company in solido with Charles X. Miller for the tax levy served by the United States Government on Pittman Construction Company is reversed.
All costs in this court are to be paid by Pittman Construction Company and its sureties.
HAWTHORNE, J, absent.