Miller v. Esper

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARYTHERESE MILLER,

Plaintiff, No. 20-CV-1958 (KMK) v. ORDER OF DISMISSAL LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, et al.,

Defendants.

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge: On March 30, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 16.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice and gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies identified in the Opinion & Order. (Id.) By letter dated May 3, 2021, Plaintiff requested “an additional 3 to 4 weeks” to submit her amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 17.) On May 4, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request, extending until June 7, 2021 her deadline for submitting an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 18.) On June 15, 2021, the Court issued an Order To Show Cause, directing Plaintiff to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute by no later than July 16, 2021. (Dkt. No. 19.) Plaintiff has not shown cause, filed an Amended Complaint, or otherwise communicated with the Court. This Court has the authority to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a case may be involuntarily dismissed if a plaintiff “fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” See id. Although Rule 41(b) expressly addresses a situation in which a defendant moves to dismiss for failure to prosecute, it has long been recognized that a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute sua sponte. See LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). While dismissal under Rule 41(b) is subject to the sound discretion of the district courts, see U.S. ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second

Circuit has stated that a Rule 41(b) dismissal is a “harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations,” see LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209 (quotation mark omitted) (quoting Theilmann v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 455 F.2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1972)). The Second Circuit has further cautioned that “pro se plaintiffs should be granted special leniency regarding procedural matters.” LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209 (citing Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996)). “However, even pro se litigants must prosecute claims diligently, and dismissal with prejudice is warranted where the Court gives warning.” Jacobs v. County of Westchester, No. 99-CV-4976, 2008 WL 199469, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008). Before exercising its discretionary authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute, a district

court should consider the following factors: [1] the duration of the plaintiff’s failures, [2] whether plaintiff had received notice that further delays would result in dismissal, [3] whether the defendant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay, [4] whether the district judge has take[n] care to strik[e] the balance between alleviating court calendar congestion and protecting a party’s right to due process and a fair chance to be heard . . . and [5] whether the judge has adequately assessed the efficacy of lesser sanctions.

Wood v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-2894, 2007 WL 2049686, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007) (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting LeSane, 239 F.3d at 209); see also Hibbert v. Apfel, No. 99-CV-4246, 2000 WL 977683, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (same). No single factor is dispositive. See Nita v. Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994). The Court concludes that these factors weigh in favor of dismissing Plaintiffs case. Plaintiff was three times offered an opportunity to file an amended complaint or show cause as to why this Action should continue. (See Dkt. Nos. 16, 18, 19.) On two occasions, the Court informed Plaintiff that a failure to do so could result in dismissal. (See Dkt. Nos. 16, 19.) Plaintiff has failed to comply with these Orders. Accordingly, Plaintiffs case is dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. See Savatxath v. City of Binghamton, No. 12-CV- 1492, 2013 WL 4805767, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013) (dismissing case for failure to prosecute after the plaintiff “neglected to comply with an order . . . requiring him to notify the court... as to why th[e] action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute”); Djokovic v. U.S. Justice Dep’t, No. 07-CV-2608, 2008 WL 3200191, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2008) (dismissing case for, among other reasons, failure to prosecute where the plaintiffs were ordered to submit a letter stating “whether [they] intend[ed] to proceed with th[e] action,” but plaintiffs failed to submit such a letter); Lopez v. Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of N.Y., No. 00- CV-1247, 2001 WL 50896, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2001) (dismissing for failure to prosecute where plaintiff “ceased to prosecute [the] action at all” for three months). The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2021 iy ws White Plains, New York eens □□ KENNETH M. KARAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE