Milici v. Bratton

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedAugust 14, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-02883
StatusUnknown

This text of Milici v. Bratton (Milici v. Bratton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Milici v. Bratton, (E.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL MILICI,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER 19-CV-2883 (PKC) (ST) - against -

WILLIAM BRATTON, Former Police Commissioner; LAWRENCE BYRNE; JOHN DOES #1–5; CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendants. -------------------------------------------------------x PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Michael Milici initiated this action on May 15, 2019 against Defendants William Bratton, the former Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); Lawrence Byrne, the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner of Legal Affairs; five unidentified NYPD Officers who allegedly assisted Commissioner Bratton in deciding to terminate Plaintiff’s employment; and the City of New York (“the City”). (Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 4–5, 19–21.) Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss this matter for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and, in the alternative, to dismiss this matter as to the individual Defendants because they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defendants’ Brief (“Defs.’ Br.”), Dkt. 29, at 5, 14.) For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ motion is granted in full. BACKGROUND1 In 2016, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”)2 initiated a federal criminal probe that investigated two political bundlers for Mayor De Blasio: Jona Rechnitz and Jeremy Reichberg. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 27.) The probe revealed that the two political bundlers “were trading cash, political donations, gifts, food, and vacations to the

NYPD and other City officials in exchange for unprecedented City access,” which was comprised in part of access to the NYPD, including “private police escorts, fixing and avoiding driving violations, street closures/permits, VIP Access to parades/events, and gun licenses to unqualified applicants.” (Id.) The probe extended to a number of NYPD officers. (Id.) I. Plaintiff’s Termination At the time Plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the NYPD, he was a Second Grade Detective who had a pending application for a promotion to First Grade Detective. (Id. ¶ 25.) Prior to his termination, Plaintiff was an officer at the 66th Precinct, through which position he met Reichberg. (Id. ¶ 28.) On or about March 31, 2016, in connection with the probe, Plaintiff was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury in the SDNY.3 (Id. ¶ 29.) Upon advice of

1 For purposes of this Memorandum & Order, the Court assumes the truth of Plaintiff’s non-conclusory, factual allegations in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing, inter alia, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 2 The Court assumes that the complaint’s references to the “SDNY” refer to the United States Attorney’s Office for the SDNY. 3 While Defendants assert that the Court may take judicial notice that Plaintiff is “an unindicted co-conspirator in the criminal corruption case brought against ex-NYPD Deputy Inspector James Grant and Brooklyn businessman Jeremy Reichberg” (Defs.’ Br., Dkt. 29, at 3 n.3), Plaintiff alleges that he “was never convicted of any crime, never accepted any bribes[,] and never engaged in any illicit sex acts with prostitutes,” (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 10). The Court need not determine whether it may take notice or consider these facts, as they are not relevant to the resolution of Defendants’ motion. counsel, Plaintiff exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify before the grand jury. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff was subsequently told first that he was suspended, but then the NYPD reversed itself and placed him on modified duty. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 30 n.1.) In connection with the probe, Commissioner Bratton made public statements that the

corruption within the NYPD was “contained” and then “conspired” with Deputy Commissioner Byrne “to terminate and/or force the retirement of certain officers to show that the corruption was contained to a select group of officers.” (Id. ¶¶ 31–32.) In late April 2016, Plaintiff realized that he “would be a scapegoat for the corruption at the NYPD [and] gave his 30-day notice for retirement.” (Id. ¶ 33.) Days after Plaintiff submitted his retirement papers, Defendants ordered an internal hearing for the purpose of “interrogat[ing] Plaintiff [ ] under Patrol Guide Section ‘206-13’ (‘PG 206-13 hearing’) . . . because the commissioner knew that Plaintiff would not testify due to the ongoing criminal probe, and the refusal to testify at the PG 206-13, was in and of itself a violation of the patrol guide, which would help justify Plaintiff’s termination.” (Id. ¶¶ 35–36.) On advice of

counsel, Plaintiff did not appear at the PG 206-13 hearing “because statements from the hearing could be used by prosecutors involved in the criminal probe.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Commissioner Bratton and Deputy Commissioner Byrne “then filed trumped up internal charges and specifications against [ ] Plaintiff, which included charges related to Plaintiff’s failure to appear for the PG 206- 13, and on May 18, 2019, Plaintiff was fired.” (Id. ¶ 37.) As a result of Plaintiff’s termination, he was not issued a “Pistol License Inquiry” form, also known as a “good guy letter,” which allows a retiree to receive a pistol permit and opens up multiple avenues of employment opportunities for retired officers; Plaintiff also lost his “terminal leave.” (Id. ¶¶ 38–39.) II. “White Shirt” Immunity According to Plaintiff, “[t]he NYPD has had a long-standing culture, policy[,] and practice of ‘White Shirt Immunity,’ the so-called term for allowing more lenient discipline on higher ranked police officers versus lower ranking members for the similar misconduct.” (Id. ¶ 48; see also

id. ¶¶ 49–55 (describing examples).) In June 2018, after a number of stories were published “about the lack of uniformity in the way that the NYPD handled internal punishment and the lack of severe discipline to officers who committed serious offenses such as lying in official proceedings or documents,” the Commissioner of the NYPD, James O’Neill, organized a panel of experts to review the NYPD’s disciplinary practices. (Id. ¶ 56.) The panel concluded that there was no basis to find that higher-ranking officers consistently received better treatment in the NYPD’s disciplinary system. (Id. ¶ 58.) Plaintiff asserts that the conclusion of the panel was “flawed” for a number of reasons: (1) it only examined data from two years (id. ¶ 58); (2) the records of certain officers would not have been reviewed since they “were never charged with any internal disciplinary violations because of their political connections” (id. ¶ 59); and (3) the panel of experts

was biased because it consisted entirely of former federal prosecutors (id. ¶ 56). However, the panel did conclude that the Department Advocate who oversees the NYPD’s disciplinary process frequently receives outside input through informal communications at NYPD and other events, and that the NYPD’s “disciplinary system is susceptible to improper influences or inequities, including in making decisions not to report misconduct at all.” (Id. ¶¶ 61–62.) Plaintiff claims that he was treated differently than the “White Shirts,” numerous supervising officers within the NYPD who were similarly issued federal grand jury subpoenas as part of the probe and who declined to testify, but who were not subjected to a PG 206-13 hearing or disciplined. (Id. ¶¶ 40–42.) The “White Shirts” were allowed a “graceful exit” and retired with “good guy letters.” (Id. ¶¶ 43–44.) Their only penalty was that they “were forced to abandon their accrued compensation, vacation[,] and comp[ensation] time.” (Id.

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Milici v. Bratton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milici-v-bratton-nyed-2020.