UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
MILIANYONY SALAZAR AS NEXT FRIEND OF JESUS GABRIEL CASTILLO, Case No. 1:26-cv-1576
Petitioner, Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents. ____________________________/ OPINION Milianyony Salazar initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on behalf of Jesus Gabriel Castillo (Petitioner), a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) In an order entered on May 14, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on May 19, 2026, (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed his reply on May 29, 2026, (ECF No. 7). II. Next Friend Status As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Milianyony Salazar may proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing
and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore, is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is unable to prosecute the case on her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or
other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate her dedication to the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of his status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163. “[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if the detainee himself could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements” because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise
deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device, the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. In this action, reviewing the pleadings and attached documents, the Court concludes that Milianyony Salazar, Petitioner’s spouse, has satisfied the foregoing requirements. Accordingly, the Court will permit Milianyony Salazar to proceed as next friend to Petitioner. III. Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 1-1,
PageID.12.) On November 25, 2024, Petitioner applied for admission into the United States at the Calexico, California Port of Entry. (Id.) At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging him with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being “an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of [valid immigration and travel documents].” (Id., PageID.15.) DHS then paroled Petitioner into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) until November 24, 2026. (Form I-94, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.16 (indicating that Petitioner’s “Class of Admission” is “DT”1).) On November 17, 2025, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) On December 8, 2025, Petitioner filed his first § 2241 petition, challenging his detention without a bond hearing. Castillo Rodriguez v. Noem (Castillo Rodriguez I), No. 1:25-cv-1688
(W.D. Mich.). The Court conditionally granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered that Respondents provide Petitioner with a bond hearing or, in the alternative, release him. Op. & J., Castillo Rodriguez I, (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025) (ECF Nos. 6, 7). On December 30, 2025, a bond hearing was held and an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for bond. Bond Order, Castillo Rodriguez I, (W.D. Mich.) (ECF No. 8-1). On May 13, 2026, Petitioner filed this § 2241 petition, challenging ICE’s initial decision to detain Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) On May 8, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Venezuela. (Removal Order, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.39–42.) Petitioner filed an appeal of that decision, which
remains pending. Automated Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (“A Number,” enter 244818258, “Nationality,” enter Venezuela, select “Submit”) (last visited Jun. 12, 2026). 2
1 See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Guidance Website, https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/guidance/faqs-on-the-effect-of-changes-to- parole-and-temporary-protected-status-tps-for-save-agencies (under “Non-Categorical Parole” heading, select “What does ‘Non-Categorical Parole’ mean?”) (“Aliens who are outside of the United States may request to be paroled into the United States based on urgent humanitarian reasons or a significant public benefit. These aliens are not paroled into the United States under a categorical parole program or process. Often, the Class of Admission (COA) for these aliens is ‘DT’ though other parole related COAs may have been used.”). 2 Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, Petitioner’s order of removal is not “administratively final” for purposes of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A). Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the IV. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). V. Jurisdiction Respondents argue that § 1252 of the INA divests this Court of jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas action. For the reasons previously set forth, the Court concludes that § 1252 does not preclude the Court’s review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for the reasons set forth in the Court’s jurisdiction analysis in each of the following cases: Doe v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1779 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2026); Ocanto v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1447 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Zelaya v. Lynch, No. 1:25-CV-1355 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2025).
removal period does not begin to run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL 4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order (or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word ‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231 does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”). VI. Exhaustion Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is
appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. VII. Merits Discussion A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) until November 24, 2026.
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed ‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7 (noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply, but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of persecution.” Id. at 1132 & n.8 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then, “when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the “[t]ermination of parole,” In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[3] upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
3 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that Petitioner departed from the United officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States, parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below, the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25- cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL 3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
States and Respondents have not suggested that Petitioner’s parole expired. Additionally, the record before the Court does not indicate that Petitioner’s parole expired prior to his arrest. Petitioner submitted a second Most Recent Form I-94 which listed the “Admit Until Date” of Petitioner’s Parole as April 18, 2025. (Most Recent Form I-94, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19.) But April 18, 2025, was the effective date of “a blanket termination of parole” that DHS issued. See Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025 (citation omitted). When DHS terminates a noncitizen’s parole, it will update the information on the Form I-94. See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Guidance Website, https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/guidance/faqs-on-the-effect-of-changes-to- parole-and-temporary-protected-status-tps-for-save-agencies (under “Non-Categorical Parole” heading, select “Is DHS revising the parolee’s Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record, Admit Until Date if parole is terminated early?”) (“Yes. If DHS terminates an alien’s parole before the expiration date of the parole period, DHS will update the Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record to reflect the new parole termination date.”). Therefore, the second Most Recent Form I-94 does not establish that the original termination date of Petitioner’s parole was April 18, 2025. First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner left Venezuela, seeking asylum in the United States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry. At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
There is nothing before the Court to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies. Indeed, Respondents make no argument about whether the requirements for termination of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations have been satisfied. Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4 (same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s order to release the petitioner).4 Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made.
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there [wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022) (discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
4 But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole] program[s] on an individual basis”). The Court finds that Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the present case for the same reasons the Court found it distinguishable in Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *4 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *5 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026). omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))). As set forth in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-1965, 1969, 1978, 1982, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, this Court, and other courts throughout the country have rejected this argument.5 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge, may request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a relatively short period of time. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in
each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv- 216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
5 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026), which was issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. These non-binding cases do not change the Court’s analysis. VIII. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. IX. Proper Respondents Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent in this action. They seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes
that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding habeas relief will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred outside the area under the authority of the ICE Detroit Field Office, the Court will retain all of the remaining Respondents.
Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment.
Dated: June 12, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE