Miles v. United States

567 F.2d 979, 65 C.C.P.A. 32, 1978 CCPA LEXIS 352
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 5, 1978
DocketNo. 77-18
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 567 F.2d 979 (Miles v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miles v. United States, 567 F.2d 979, 65 C.C.P.A. 32, 1978 CCPA LEXIS 352 (ccpa 1978).

Opinion

Rich, Judge.

This appeal is from the judgment of the United States Customs Court, 78 Cust. Ct. 35, C.D. 4689, 427 F. Supp. 417 (1977), dismissing appellant’s actions for failure to establish compliance with clauses (a) and (c) of item 807.00, Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), with respect to certain Z-beams manufactured in the United States, and entitlement to the duty allowance provided in item 807.00. We reverse and remand for trial on the remaining issues.

In the four actions consolidated below, 200 railroad boxcars were classified under item 690.15, TSUS, which covers railroad and railway rolling stock. Duty was assessed under item 807.00, TSUS, upon the full appraised value of the boxcars less the cost or value of fabricated components of United States origin. Appellant challenged the refusal of an allowance for the cost or value of 400 Z-beams which were processed in Mexico into floating center sills and thereafter assembled into the imported boxcars.

[34]*34Item 807.00 (TSUS), as amended, provides (emphasis ours):

Articles assembled abroad- in whole or in part of fabricated components, the product of the United States, which (a) were exported in condition ready for assembly without further fabrication, (b) have not lost their physical identity in such articles by change in form, shape, or otherwise, and (c) have not been advanced in value or improved in condition abroad except by being assembled and except by operations incidental to the assembly process such as
cleaning, lubricating, and painting_ A duty upon the full val-lue of the imported article, less the cost or value of such products of the United States (see headnote 3 of this sub-part)

Citing E. Dillingham, Inc. v. United States, 60 CCPA 39, C.A.D. 1078, 470 F. 2d 629 (1972), the Customs Court concluded that the operations performed in Mexico, including the burning of slots and holes in the Z-beams, constituted- “further fabrication” within the meaning of clause (a) of item 807.00. Relying principally upon the incorporated case of United States v. Jovita Perez, 69 CCPA 190, C.A.D. 1065, 464 F. 2d 1043 (1972), the Customs Court also held that the burning of slots and holes and other steps toward incorporating the Z-beams in a boxcar advanced the value and improved the condition of the Z-beams abroad within the meaning of clause (c).

Summarizing the operations performed in Mexico, appellant’s witness stated that the Z-beams were first aligned in pairs on a jig. The center was located so that shock absorber stops could be positioned there and equidistant therefrom. While the beams were still aligned on the jig, a slot was burned at each end of each beam for inserting the draft key that fixes the coupler to the yoke. The pair of Z-beams was then moved to another jig where they were butt-welded along their lengths. After removal from the second jig, the center sill (as the joined Z-beams were then called) was fitted with guides to maintain it in its assemblage and with clamps to hold the brake pipe. A slot was burned in each Z-beam to allow the brake piping to pass through. Positions for thirty-one holes were determined with a gauge •and the holes were burned along the flange of each beam. The holes permitted installation of wear plates to protect the center sill from [35]*35damage and support plates to maintain parts that were placed inside the center sill. Additional apparatus was affixed to the center sill, and the completed center sill was located on the underframe of the boxcar.

Opinion

Relative to clause (a) of item 807.00, the issue is whether the burning of holes and slots in Mexico constituted “further fabrication.” The Customs Court viewed the burning of slots and holes as “steps performed on the Z-beams until their incorporation into the undercarriages.” The Court concluded that the necessity of these operations showed that the Z-beams were further fabricated.

We think the Customs Court erred in following Dillingham, which is distinguishable on its facts. That case concerned a component that was exported from the United States as raw material (wool fiber in the bulk, baled form) “on which much further labor was expended to put it into the condition required to enable it to he needled into the fabric.” The operations performed abroad — opening, oiling, and carding the wool — were processing steps that were themselves distinctly preparatory to assembly with the fabric. There was no sub-assembly involved in the case. A raw material was worked upon to change it into an altered form having new properties.

In the instant case, the Customs Court deemed the operations on the Z-beams analogous to the opening, oiling, and carding performed in Dillingham, and concluded that “the burning of the slots and holes in the Z-beams constituted fabrication of a more advanced nature than the operations performed in the Dillingham case.” We do not agree.

We were presented with a similar situation in General Instrument Corp. v. United States, 61 CCPA 89, C.A.D. 1128, 499 F. 2d 1318 (1974), in which magnet and lead wire were processed into coils and harnesses (subassemblies) that were assembled into the imported television deflection yokes. In that case, appellee urged upon us precisely the argument that the Customs Court has accepted in the present case — namely, that although an article which is subjected to a subassembly process is not necessarily precluded from qualifying for item 807.00 (General Instrument Corp. v. United States, 60 CCPA 178, C.A.D. 1106, 480 F. 2d 1402 (1973) (hereafter GI-2)), the rationale of Dillingham should be applicable.

Acceptance of the above reasoning would essentially restore, on the basis of Dillingham, the artificial smgle assembly-dual assembly distinction that we rejected in GI-2. As stated above, Dillingham involved preparatory processing of raw material prior to a single .assembly. That case is inapplicable to the present facts where non-preparatory processing is part of a dual assembly. Further, unlike Dillingham, the exported' component Z-beams do not require sig[36]*36nificant labor to enable them to be incorporated into boxcars. The evidence established that the total labor in Mexico required a maximum of 104 minutes at a cost of twelve dollars (the value of a pair of Z-beams being alleged as $395), or only 3% of the value of a beam. Clearly, the operations in the present case compare in neither kind nor degree with those in Dillingham.

Having disposed of Dillingham, we are nonetheless left with the question whether the component Z-beams were further fabricated. With regard to the requirement of clause (a), we agree with appellee that “In its present form, item 807.00 * * * basically encompasses only American merchandise returned without substantial change or improvement.” Of course, whether substantial change or improvement has occurred is to be determined from the facts of each case. After thoroughly examining the evidence in its entirety, we hold that the processing of Z-beams in Mexico, especially the burning of holes and slots, was concomitant with the assembly of center sills and was not substantial enough to preclude qualification under clause (a) of item 807.00.

Noteworthy is the GI-2 case involving the assembly of capacitors.

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Bluebook (online)
567 F.2d 979, 65 C.C.P.A. 32, 1978 CCPA LEXIS 352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miles-v-united-states-ccpa-1978.