United States v. Mast Industries, Inc.

668 F.2d 501, 69 C.C.P.A. 47, 1981 CCPA LEXIS 146
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 30, 1981
DocketAppeal No. 81-18
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 668 F.2d 501 (United States v. Mast Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Mast Industries, Inc., 668 F.2d 501, 69 C.C.P.A. 47, 1981 CCPA LEXIS 146 (ccpa 1981).

Opinion

Miller, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the United States Court of International Trade (“trial court”) 1 sustaining the claim of appellee, Mast Industries, Inc. (“Mast”), that certain fabric components (of women’s pants) manufactured in the United States and subjected to buttonholing and pocket slitting operation abroad were entitled to a duty allowance for the cost or value of the components under item 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (“TSUS”).2 We affirm.

[49]*49Background

The Merchandise

Involved are four entries of two styles of women’s pants, style 4083 and style 4086. The fabric components of the pants were cut to shape in the United States for Mast, then shipped to a factory in El Salvador together with all other necessary components, such as thread and buttons, where they were finished into completed garments. In addition to being sewn together, certain of the components were subjected to buttonholing and pocket slitting. As to those components, the Customs Service disallowed item 807.00, TSUS, treatment, and and that determination was contested by Mast.

At trial, Mast’s production manager, Salvatore Fasciana, explained how the buttonholes and slash pockets were made. When a pedal was depressed, a Reece S-2 buttonholer clamped a fabric component to the machine bed, sewed around the buttonhole area, and automatically cut the buttonhole slit. The machine cycle time for each buttonhole was approximately 2.5 hundredths of a minute (1.5 seconds). During assembly of the pockets, a Singer 112W140 sewing machine simultaneously cut a slit in the rear quarter panel component and sewed the welt piece and facing to either side of the slit. Small diagonal cuts were then made at each end of the welt; the welt, the facing, and the two parts of the pocket bag (which were previously sewn to the welt and facing) were turned through the slit to the.wrong side of the rear quarter panel. The welt seam was then top stitched, the pocket components were turned back through the slit to the right side of of the fabric, the pocket bag was stitched together, and the pocket was agam turned through the slit.

Mr. Enrique Siman, owner and manager of the El Salvadoran factories where the pants were assembled, explained the production of the two styles of pants. Styles 4083 was assembled in 35 operations by 70 employees. Style 4086 was assembled in 40 operations by 70 employees. For each style, buttonholing and pocket slitting each constituted one operation and required one employee. Approximately 35 minutes were required to assemble style 4083. Buttonholing required 8-10 seconds, and the rear pocket slit required 15-20 seconds. Assembly of style 4086 required 36 minutes with 7-8 seconds for buttonholing and about 30 seconds for the pocket slitting. The direct [50]*50labor cost was 1.36 colones for style 4083 and 1.40 colones for style 4086. For each style 0.0075 colones was for making each buttonhole and 0.025 colones was for pocket slitting.3

Witnesses also testified that the buttonholes should be made before the buttons are set (sewn on) to insure that the buttons line up, and that buttonholes and pocket slits improved the commercial value of the pants, enabling them to conform to the specifications.

Decision of Court of International Trade

The trial court held that buttonholing and pocket slitting on the precut fabric components constituted “no more than the performance of operations incidental to the assembly of the various cut pieces into the two styles of women’s pants here involved.” The court stated that it was—

unable to distinguish the instant case in principle from [Miles v. United States, 65 CCPA 32, C.A.D. 1202, 567 F. 2d 979 (1978).] There is no question in the court’s mind but that slitting the fabric for buttonholing and pocket insertion purposes were relatively minor procedures, as was the preliminary remedial sewing in the buttonhole area. And the fact that these operations were accomplished by machines is of no moment in the overall assessment of their significance. In [Miles] v. United States, supra, the object of burning holes and slots in beams with an acetylene torch was similar to the object of making buttonholes and pocket slits in ladies pants with machines. Moreover, on the circumstances detailed in this record it would appear that a judicious regard for proper alignment of the affected areas in the garments dictated the deferral of these minor operations until assembly of the garments rather than at some prior time. Said operations were not such substantial changes as to constitute further fabrication. No new portion of the pants was made, and the cost of performing these operations, in terms of both labor and expense was a small portion of the total cost of assembly.

1 CIT at 192-193, 515 F. Supp. at 46-47.

OPINION

The issue before us is whether the Court of International Trade correctly decided that: (1) the precut fabric components shipped by Mast to El Salvador and there subjected to buttonholing or pocket slitting, “were exported in condition ready for assembly without further fabrication,” item 807.00(a), TSUS; and (2) those components were not “advanced in value or improved in condition abroad except by * * * operations incidental to the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating, and painting,” item 807.00(c), TSUS.

[51]*51I. Question of Further Fabrication

The government relies on Zwicker Knitting Mills v. United States, 67 CCPA 37, C.A.D. 1240, 613 F. 2d 295 (1980), to support its position that buttonholing and pocket slitting constituted further fabrication necessary before the components could be assembled. In that case, the trial court (82 Cust. Ct. 34, 37, C.D. 4786, 469 F. Supp. 727, 729 (1979)) found that glove shells were knitted in the United States on machines which could not close the fingertips. The open-fingered glove shells, precut palms, and, in one entry, a separate piece of yarn were sent to Haiti, where a piece of yarn was passed through the top row of loops at each fingertip to lock the loops and thereby fix the knitting so that it would not unravel. The shells were paired and shaped, and the precut palms were sewn on the shells. This court held that the glove shells were not entitled to an item 807.00 duty allowance because the Haitian “tipping'’ operation constituted “further fabrication,” item 807.00(a).

The trial court distinguished Zwicker, stating:

Zwicker involved a fingertipping operation performed abroad on glove shells exported from the United States minus the fingertips. And, unlike the situation at bar which involved only a separation or removal for an opening in fabricated material, the Zwicker operation involved an addition of material to close the fingertips. It was this addition of material which influenced the courts in Zwicker to find that the tipping operation constituted a “further fabrication” of the gloves which is proscribed by item 807.00(a).

1 CIT at 193, 515 F. Supp. at 47. We are persuaded that Zwicker is distinguishable not merely because it involved an addition of material, while the present case involves a separation, but, more importantly, because in Zwicker

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668 F.2d 501, 69 C.C.P.A. 47, 1981 CCPA LEXIS 146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mast-industries-inc-ccpa-1981.