E. Dillingham, Inc. v. United States

470 F.2d 629, 60 C.C.P.A. 39, 1972 CCPA LEXIS 210
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 29, 1972
DocketNo. 5487, C.A.D. 1078
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 470 F.2d 629 (E. Dillingham, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
E. Dillingham, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 629, 60 C.C.P.A. 39, 1972 CCPA LEXIS 210 (ccpa 1972).

Opinion

Eici-i, Judge.

This appeal is from tbe decision and judgment of the Third Division of the Customs Court, 67 Cust. Ct. 226, C.D. 4278 (1971), overruling a protest against the classification of papermakers’ felts imported from Canada in 1966. There is no dispute about the rate of [41]*41duty. The sole question on appeal1 is the amount upon which duty should be assessed. Appellant maintains, pursuant to item 807.00, TSUS, that the merchandise is classifiable as an “assembly” of American components, and should have been assessed with duty upon the value of the imported articles less the cost of the components of United States origin. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

What the Customs Court said on the question whether or not the two components of the felts, fiber and fabric, meet the requirements of item 807.00 was, in its entirety, as follows:

At the time of exportation the massed fibers are not in a condition ready for assembly without further fabrication, and plaintiff’s witness MeEwan said as much (R. 26, 36). The fibers must be sorted, oiled, carded, and laid out in mats before they are ready for the assembly operation of being needled into the fabric. And these steps take place in the fpreign country. The fiber mat which was the product of the carding and not the individual fibers constitutes one of the components of the needled felt. The 'oiling and opening operations also go beyond the scope of being merely incidental operations.
As for the fabric, while it is ready for the assembly operation in its condition as exported, it is completely obscured from view after the assembly operation is completed, as the result of impregnation of the fabric with the fiber mats. The components of the assembled felts cannot be separated without considerable damage. Consequently, the assembly operation results in a loss of physical identity, otherwise, with respect to the fabric, contrary to the requirements of item 807.00

Item 807.00 reads:

Articles assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components, the product of the United States, which (a) were exported in condition ready for assembly without further fabrication, (b) have not lost their physical identity in such articles by change in form, shape, or otherwise, and (c) have not been advanced in value or improved in condition abroad except by being assembled and except by operations incidental to the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating, and
painting_ A duty upon the full value of the imported article, less the cost or value of such products of the United States.

Although the court below did not delineate the specific clauses ox item 807.00 which, were found not to be met, we will do so. With respect to the fiber component, the court below clearly found clause (a) unsatisfied because, as stated, the massed fibers were not in a “con-[42]*42clition ready for assembly without further fabrication * * The court treated, as it must, for reasons which will become apparent, the ■exported fibers as a component in the condition in which it left the United States as the starting point for analysis of the applicability of the language of clause (a). The court then shifted its analysis to the operations which must be performed on the fibers upon their arrival in Canada, finding that the required sorting, oiling, carding, and laying out of the mats shows that the original massed fibers were not originally exported in condition ready for assembly without further fabrication. Apparently to contradict appellant’s arguments that the individual fibers are the “components” which were exported to Canada for assembly abroad, the court made the statement that: “The fiber mat which was the product of the carding and not the individual fibers constitutes one of the components of the needled felt.” Finally the court focused upon the “oiling and opening operations,” finding these to “also go beyond the scope of being merely incidental operations.” The “also” suggests that possibly the court was of the belief that these two operations represented “further fabrication” within clause (a), but the use of the specific term “incidental” operations which appears in clause (c) of item 807.00 and the fact that “oiling” had previously been mentioned by the court lead us to the conclusion that the court Avas thinking of the latter, in terms of clause (c). The parties seem to have so treated the court’s opinion by briefing this issue and we will so treat it here.

Appellant maintains that the fiber component of the felts is represented by the individual fibers themselves. This would help appellant’s argument because each individual fiber does not then appear to be changed or altered by operations such as the “carding,” which then, looking only ait the fiber, appears to be a mere repositioning thereof. Appellee, on the other hand, seems to maintain that the fiber component is the exported bulk fiber which can hardly be “ready for assembly” within clause (a), since the bulk raAv material must be opened by a wool opener to make it fluffy, oil added, and the stock carded. The Customs Court, from the language of the opinion quoted, seems to have adopted an intermediate form of the fiber as the “component” of item '807.00 — “The fiber mat which was the product of the carding * * *.”

We believe that the correct starting point for the application of item 807.00 must be the components as “exported,” in the condition in which they leave the United States. The word “components” appears in the introductory clause of item 807.00 and thus a uniform treatment of the word should exist for clauses (a), (b), and (c) thereof. Clause (a) speaks of the components which ‘Svere exported” and (c) speaks [43]*43of improvement “abroad” thus indicating that the condition of a “component” is considered as of its departure from the United States.

The condition of the fiber component upon leaving the United States is best described by looking at the operations performed in the United States immediately prior to exportation. Appellant’s witness Barnes described the fiber in the following way:

This fiber was received [in the United States plant] in two conditions; one was raw wool, as purchased, and the other was raw synthetic fiber, as purchased. The raw wool had to first be sorted for grade, then scoured to remove the natural impurities on the wool. It was then blended in this desired proportion with a quantity of synthetic, in relation to the specifications for this particular blend, mixed together in a machine to blend it, and processing oil to facilitate further processing was added at this point. This material was then baled and shipped to Canada.

Appellant argues that for the purpose of applying item 807.00 to the fiber component the individual fibers are to be considered as the components of the assembled article. We believe that the fiber must be considered to be a component in the bulk, baled form, en masse, in which it left the United States.

Considering item 807.00 clause (a), we must determine whether operations performed on the exported component between its arrival abroad and the assembly, show that the component, as exported, was not “in condition ready for assembly without further fabrication.” As we said in United States v. Baylis Bros. Co., 59 CCPA 9, 451 F. 2d 643, C.A.D.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

ABB, Inc. v. United States
346 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (Court of International Trade, 2004)
Export Packers Co., Ltd. v. United States
795 F. Supp. 422 (Court of International Trade, 1992)
General Motors Corp. v. United States
770 F. Supp. 641 (Court of International Trade, 1991)
Samsonite Corp. v. United States
702 F. Supp. 908 (Court of International Trade, 1988)
Carter Footwear, Inc. v. United States
669 F. Supp. 439 (Court of International Trade, 1987)
Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co. v. United States
11 Ct. Int'l Trade 450 (Court of International Trade, 1987)
Carter Footwear v. United States
10 Ct. Int'l Trade 618 (Court of International Trade, 1986)
Sigma Instruments, Inc. v. The United States
724 F.2d 930 (Federal Circuit, 1983)
Sigma Instruments, Inc. v. United States
565 F. Supp. 1036 (Court of International Trade, 1983)
Zwicker Knitting Mills v. United States
469 F. Supp. 727 (U.S. Customs Court, 1979)
Miles v. United States
567 F.2d 979 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1978)
Green Giant Co. v. United States
79 Cust. Ct. 61 (U.S. Customs Court, 1977)
Miles v. United States
78 Cust. Ct. 35 (U.S. Customs Court, 1977)
RUBBERSET COMPANY v. United States
383 F. Supp. 1403 (U.S. Customs Court, 1974)
General Instrument Corp. v. United States
499 F.2d 1318 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1974)
F. W. Myers & Co. v. United States
72 Cust. Ct. 133 (U.S. Customs Court, 1974)
General Instrument Corp. v. United States
72 Cust. Ct. 86 (U.S. Customs Court, 1974)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
470 F.2d 629, 60 C.C.P.A. 39, 1972 CCPA LEXIS 210, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/e-dillingham-inc-v-united-states-ccpa-1972.