Mihalek Corp. v. State of Mich.

595 F. Supp. 903, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 736, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22792
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedOctober 12, 1984
DocketCiv. A. 84-CV-7202-AA
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 595 F. Supp. 903 (Mihalek Corp. v. State of Mich.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mihalek Corp. v. State of Mich., 595 F. Supp. 903, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 736, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22792 (E.D. Mich. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOINER, District Judge.

This case is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the alternative, for change in venue. For reasons stated herein, the motion to dismiss is granted in part, and the motion for change of venue is denied.

In brief summary, the action is one for infringement of copyright, violation of trademark, and violation of constitutional rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a pendent state claim for unfair competition and misappropriation of work product. Plaintiff 1 was the registered holder of certain copyrighted materials, which are collectively described as the “Michigan is Good News” campaign. Plaintiff alleges that he entered into agreements with agents of the state of Michigan for creation of these materials. He showed the materials to these people while the work was in progress, and the agents allegedly appropriated the designs for their own use, incorporating them into the “Say Yes to Michigan” and “Yes Michigan” campaigns, which are well known promotional operations designed to encourage investment and travel in this state. Plaintiff alleges that he was never paid for his efforts in developing the designs, and that the wrongful appropriation of the designs supports the various causes of action alleged in the complaint, which seeks money damages and injunctive relief.

*905 The defendants in this action are the State of Michigan, the Department of Commerce of the State, James Blanchard, the Governor, and Ralph Gerson, the Director of the Department of Commerce. DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss

All defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, despite the presence of individual state officials as parties defendant, the action is- one against the state, and therefore barred by the eleventh amendment. Plaintiff has responded to this motion with the argument that the eleventh amendment does not bar an action against the state and state officials for infringement of copyright, relying exclusively on Mills Music v. State of Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.1979). The court in Mills Music did expressly hold that, by enacting the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Copyright and Patent Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 8, Congress has specifically authorized private actions against a class of defendants that includes states, and thereby abroggated the states’ eleventh amendment immunity, id. at 1284-85.

With the exception of Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir.1962), which simply held without discussion that the eleventh amendment barred an action against a local school district, as an instrumentality of the state, for copyright infringement, Mills Music appears to be the only case directly on point. Although the opinion reflects a thorough and thoughtful discussion of recent eleventh amendment jurisprudence, this court is compelled to conclude that Mills Music was decided incorrectly, insofar as it held that an action for damages could be maintained against a state for infringement.

In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment barred an action against a state for recovery of benefits to which the plaintiffs were entitled under the Aid to Aged, Blind, and Disabled program, established by the Social Security Act. The Court concluded that, insofar as the District Court had ordered the Director of the Department of Public Aid of Illinois to make payments to the plaintiffs on the basis of benefits wrongfully denied prior to the entry of the decree by the District Court, that order constituted a form of “retroactive relief” that was barred by the eleventh amendment. The Court distinguished between this kind of retroactive relief, which was analogous to an award of money damages for injuries sustained prior to entry of the judgment, and “prospective relief” in the form of an injunction, requiring the defendant to conform its future conduct to legal requirements, id. at 678, 94 S.Ct. at 1363. The Court thereby reconciled the historic opinion of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), in which it held that an action for equitable relief, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging a state official with unconstitutional conduct in the exercise of his official duties, was not barred by the eleventh amendment, with Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945), in which it held that an action for recovery of damages from a state official, in which judgment would have to be paid from the state treasury, was subject to the sovereign immunity defense established by the amendment.

The holding in Edelman was subsequently reaffirmed in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), which arose from the same action as Edelman. The Quern Court concluded that cases decided subsequent to Edelman, particularly Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) and Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), did not undermine in any way Edelman’s conclusion that enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, currently codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, did not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment, Quern, supra, 440 U.S. at 339-41, 99 S.Ct. at 1144-45.

*906 Although neither Edelman nor Quern dealt with the precise issue presented in this motion to dismiss and answered in the affirmative by the Mills Music court, that is, did enactment of the Copyright Act abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity of the states, this court concludes that those opinions from the Supreme Court compel a different result from that reached in Mills Music.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Brink v. Ecologic, Inc.
987 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Michigan, 1997)
ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc.
765 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Illinois, 1990)
Kersavage v. University of Tennessee
731 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Tennessee, 1989)
Lane v. First National Bank of Boston
687 F. Supp. 11 (D. Massachusetts, 1988)
Crosfield Hastech, Inc. v. Harris Corp.
672 F. Supp. 580 (D. New Hampshire, 1987)
Mihalek Corporation v. The State Of Michigan
814 F.2d 290 (Sixth Circuit, 1987)
BV Engineering v. Univ. of Cal., Los Angeles
657 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. California, 1987)
Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan
814 F.2d 290 (Sixth Circuit, 1987)
Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University
633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Virginia, 1986)
Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc.
626 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Illinois, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
595 F. Supp. 903, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 736, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mihalek-corp-v-state-of-mich-mied-1984.