Miguel Francisco Gonzalez v. Charles Parra, et al.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
MIGUEL FRANCISCO GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 3:26-cv-489-JEP-LLL
CHARLES PARRA, et al.,
Respondents. ___________________________________/
ORDER
Petitioner, an immigration detainee, who is currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Baker Correctional Institute, filed a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on March 8, 2026. (Doc. 1). He alleges that he is a citizen of Cuba; he was ordered removed in 1999; and ICE re-detained him on December 16, 2025. (Id. at 3-5). Petitioner raises three counts in the petition: (1) “Petitioner may be moved to another facility without notice, in violation of his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and full evidentiary proceedings” (“Count One”); (2) Petitioner’s prolonged detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as the Supreme Court construed it in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (“Count Two”); and (3) “Respondents have provided the Petitioner no documentation or information whatsoever to indicate that a third country is willing to accept [him]” in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process (“Count Three”). (Doc. 1 at 6-9). Petitioner asks the Court to order,
inter alia, his immediate release. (Id. at 9).1 As to Count Two, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas held that indefinite detention of aliens after a final order of removal raises serious constitutional concerns. 533 U.S. at 690–99. Once an order of removal is final, the government
may continue to detain an alien only for a reasonable amount of time. See id. at 699–701. The reasonableness of the detention is to be measured “primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
held that six months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation. Id. at 700–01. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period [from section 1231(a)(1)(A)] plus 90 days thereafter.”
Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). After that six-month period has passed, if the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to
rebut that showing.” Id. at 1052 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Thus, “in
1 The petition fails to include a verification under 28 U.S.C. § 2242. order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only must show post- removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence
of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If an alien makes these showings, then the burden shifts to the government to rebut the presumption with sufficient evidence establishing that there is “a significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Notably, Zadvydas claims asserted prior to the presumptively reasonable six-month period are deemed unripe and subject to dismissal without prejudice. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052; see also Ramos Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No.
3:25-cv-1038, 2025 WL 2591830, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2025). Here, this Court finds that the presumptively reasonable six-month period has not expired. A split of authority exists as to when the six-month period begins. Some courts have determined that each period of detention
restarts the removal-period clock. See, e.g., Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-cv-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (rejecting a petitioner’s argument “that his detention should be counted in the aggregate based upon his prior detentions”); Liu v. Carter, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1207089, at
*2 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2025) (“[T]he removal-period clock restarts when an alien subject to a removal order is again detained by ICE.”); Leybinsky v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 10 CIV. 5137 RA, 2013 WL 132544, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013) (collecting cases), vacated as moot, 553 F. App’x 108 (2d Cir. 2014). Other courts have aggregated all periods of detention following an
order of removal, regardless of whether there were any intervening periods of release from custody between periods of detention. See, e.g., Jaranow v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-02396-TL, 2026 WL 35864, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2026) (collecting cases from the Ninth Circuit that “have found that the six-month
period of detention need not be consecutive to reach the limit established in Zadvydas”); Patel v. Bondi, No. CV 25-16218 (KMW), 2025 WL 3294353, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2025) (finding that the court must “consider the entire period of [the p]etitioner’s detention”—not just the length of the current detention).
This Court believes that aggregating the past period of detention is not appropriate here. Noting that the purpose of detention is to “assur[e] the alien’s presence at the moment of removal,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (emphasis added), this Court is not persuaded that Petitioner’s previous detention (which
he asserts was approximately 156 days in 1999 (Doc. 1 at 4))—more than two- and-one-half decades ago—is relevant to today’s determination. To rule otherwise would grant a permanent “get-out-of-jail-free” card to Petitioner or any other detainee who has been held for more than six months at any time in
the past. See Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of United States, No. 4:14-CV-42-CDL, 2018 WL 1321576, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018). Moreover, “adjudicating the constitutionality of every re-detention would obstruct an area that is in the discretion of the Attorney General—effectuating removals.” Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8. Thus, in this case, this Court will consider only the current
detention when determining whether the presumptively reasonable six-month period has passed. Petitioner filed this case on March 8, 2026, which is approximately two months and twenty days since the start of his current detention on December
16, 2025. Therefore, Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim is not ripe.2 With respect to Counts One and Three, the Court likewise finds he is not entitled to relief. Insofar as Petitioner attempts to raise a Sixth Amendment claim in Count One, his conclusory allegations are entirely speculative and
insufficient to state a plausible claim to relief. Nevertheless, to date, ICE has not transferred Petitioner outside of this Court’s jurisdiction, and because this case is otherwise due to be dismissed, Petitioner’s purported Sixth Amendment claim is moot.
Similarly, in Count Three, Petitioner contends that if Respondents provide him with documentation regarding potential third-country removal, then he is entitled to seek reopening of his removal proceedings. But he also contends that Respondents have not provided him with any such
2 Because the Zadvydas claim is not ripe, this Court need not inquire at this time into whether there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. documentation. This Court finds his allegations insufficient to state a plausible constitutional claim in Count Three. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
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