Midwest-Butte Development Co. v. Butte West Side Mines Co.

32 F.2d 841, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3889
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 20, 1929
DocketNo. 5599
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 32 F.2d 841 (Midwest-Butte Development Co. v. Butte West Side Mines Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Midwest-Butte Development Co. v. Butte West Side Mines Co., 32 F.2d 841, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3889 (9th Cir. 1929).

Opinion

DIETRICH, Circuit Judge.

The “Minnie Jane” is approximately a full-sized lode mining claim situated in Silver Bow county, Mont. The end lines are substantially parallel, as are the side lines. For general purposes we shall refer to the side lines as being the north and south boundaries, though from the westerly end they run a little north of east. That part of the surface area lying north of a straight line drawn from a point 7 feet south of the northwest corner to a point 230 feet south of the northeast corner • — both distances measured upon the end lines —is owned by plaintiff (appellant) and the area south of this line by defendants (appel-lees) . Proceeding easterly the discovery vein, upon its apex, enters the claim at about the center of the west end, intersects the division, line a little over 600 feet from the east end, is broken by an easterly dipping fault (called the main fault) which is nearly parallel, in its strike, with the end lines, and, with a throw of 30 feet to the north, continues until it departs from the north side line a few feet west of the northeast comer of the claim. In so far as it is identified the vein is shown to have a southerly dip of from 40 to- 50 degrees both, east and west of the fault. Asserting its continuity and identity across the part of the claim owned by it, hereinafter referred to as the deeded portion, plaintiff brought this suit to establish title, under the rule of extralateral rights, to a body of ore which defendants wore extracting from beneath the surface of their portion of the claim, but which plaintiff contends is within the vein apexing in its territory both easterly and westerly from the fault. Touching the segment of about 76 feet, between the point of intersection with the common boundary line and the fault, it was successful in the court below, and to it was also awarded all that section of the vein, apexing in its territory, east of the fault. But holding that the evidence was insufficient to show continuity or identity the court declined to decree to it extralateral rights, under such apex, west of and beneath the fault. Upon the theory that the edge of the vein westerly from and contacting with the fault constitutes a sub-apox, the court, confirmed in defendants’ title to that portion of the vein throughout its entire depth west and beneath the; fault and east of a vortical plane parallel with and 540 feet west of the east end line. Plaintiff appealed, and thereupon the defendants took a cross-appeal.

The principal question raised by the eross-appea) should first bo disposed of, for a decision thereon favorable to cross-appellants would of necessity require the dismissal of the plaintiff’s bill.

In brief, cross-appellants’ contention is that whatever may be the position of the Minnie Jane vein, plaintiff did not by virtue [842]*842of. the conveyances under which it claims title acquire anything south of the vertical plane of the common boundary line. An undivided one half interest it obtained by a deed from the patentee dated September 22, 1885, and the other half interest subsequently by prescription as established by a decree of a state court quieting its title. Of. the estate thus acquired by prescription cross-appellees say that it is no more extensive and of no greater dignity than that conveyed by the deed, and, following their course, we shall discuss only the deed. They concede the validity of the instrument, but deny that it operates to confer upon the grantee extralateral rights. Furthermore, they eoncede'that a pat-entee of a mining elaim may by deed of either the whole surface area of his elaim or any part of it transfer to the grantee just such an estate as would be conveyed by a patent for the same area, including the right to follow the-vein upon its dip. The issue therefore is of the correct construction of the language of the deed. The instrument purports to convey “all the right, title and interest, estate, elaim and demand” of the grantors “in and to that certain portion, elaim and mining right, title and property on that certain ledge, vein, lode or deposit of quartz and other rock in place containing precious metals * * * situated in the Independence Mining District * '* '* and described as follows, to wit: (here follows an accurate description of the surface area by metes and bounds) together with all the dips, spurs and angles and also all the metals ? * * and all bearing quartz, rock and earth therein and all the rights, privileges, franchises thereto incident, appendant and appurtenant or therewith usually enjoyed; and also all the estate, right, title, interest, possession, claim and demand whatsoever of the said parties of the first part in or to the premises and every part and parcel thereof.”

The more reasonable rule, we think, is that in the absence of restrictive words a deed of the whole or a part of a mining claim, though silent as to extralateral rights, operates to convey the lateral extension of any vein apexing within the deeded area. After all the vein is the important thing in a mining claim. “The doctrine of extralateral rights had its origin in the theory that it is the vein which is actually located, and that the surface is a mere incident, necessary for the convenient development of the mine.” Anaconda Copper M. Co. v. Pilot Butte M. Co., 52 Mont. 165, 178, 156 P. 409, 412. Or as was said by the court below, “So much of superior quality attaches to the apex of a vein that by reason of ownership of it accrues the title to any lateral extention and the right to follow it.” And in Montana Ore P. Co. v. B. & M. C. C. & S. M. Co., 27 Mont. 288, 70 P. 1114, the Supreme Court of Montana aptly stated the principle thus: “A deed to a patented lode mining claim, or a definite portion thereof embracing an apex or apices, as such, in the absence of words of express reservation, will be presumed to convey whatever substantial property rights are attached to that species of property, and since extralateral rights are not a mere incident or appurtenance but a • substantial part of such property itself, the grantee in such deed is vested with such rights upon vein or veins, extralaterally, as belong to the apex or apices embraced within the boundaries of the conveyed property.” We find in the deed here no words of restriction or reservation, but upon the other hand a verbose attempt to express what, under this rule, general terms of grant would imply, and by the instrument as a whole we are loft in no doubt that-both parties thereto understood that the grant was of the whole of that part of the vein which apexes within the deeded area. As possibly giving a measure of support to their position, cross-appellants draw to our attention expressions in Eureka Co. v. Richmond Co., 4 Sawy. 302, 8 Fed. Cas. page 819, No. 4548 (and on appeal 103 U. S. 839, 26 L. Ed. 557); Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co. (C. C. A.) 102 F. 430; Id. (C. C. A.) 183 F. 51; Id., 204 U. S. 204, 27 S. Ct. 254, 51 L. Ed. 444; Stinchfield v. Gillis, 96 Cal. 33, 30 P. 839; Id., 107 Cal. 84, 40 P. 98; Riley v. North Star Min. Co., 152 Cal. 549, 93 P. 194; and Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co. v. Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. (C. C.) 89 F. 529; Id., 27 Mont. 288, 70 P. 1114; Id., 27 Mont. 536, 71 P. 1005. But inasmuch as they frankly concede that no one of these eases “can be said to be directly in point upon the question at issue,” we do n-ot prolong the discussion by pointing out the features clearly distinguishing them. Of Montana M. Co. v. St. Louis M.

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Bluebook (online)
32 F.2d 841, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/midwest-butte-development-co-v-butte-west-side-mines-co-ca9-1929.