Eureka Consol. Min. Co. v. Richmond Min. Co.

8 F. Cas. 819, 4 Sawy. 302, 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 578, 1877 U.S. App. LEXIS 1939
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Nevada
DecidedAugust 22, 1877
DocketCase No. 4,548
StatusPublished
Cited by64 cases

This text of 8 F. Cas. 819 (Eureka Consol. Min. Co. v. Richmond Min. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eureka Consol. Min. Co. v. Richmond Min. Co., 8 F. Cas. 819, 4 Sawy. 302, 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 578, 1877 U.S. App. LEXIS 1939 (circtdnv 1877).

Opinion

FIELD, Circuit Justice.

This is an action for the possession of certain mining ground, particularly described .in the complaint, situated in Eureka mining district, in the county of Eureka, in the state of Nevada. The plaintiff is a corporation created under the laws of California, and the defendant, the Richmond Mining Company, is a corporation created under the laws of Nevada. The other defendants, Thomas Wren and Joseph Potts, are citizens of the latter state. The action was originally commenced in a state court of Nevada, but upon application of the plaintiff, and upon the ground of its incorporation in another state, and the presumed citizenship, from that fact, of its corporators or stockholders in that state, it was transferred to the circuit court of the United States. The complaint in the state court, in addition to the usual allegations of a declaration in ejectment set forth various grounds upon which was based a prayer for an order restraining the defendants from working the premises in controversy pending the action. The defendants, in their answer to the complaint not only denied the title of the plaintiff, but made various averments upon which., a like restraining order against the plaintiff was asked. Both orders were granted. This union of a demand in ejectment for the property in controversy, with a prayer for provisional equitable relief, is permitted by the system of procedure which obtains in the state courts, thus saving the parties the ne-' cessity of litigating in two suits what can as readily and less expensively be accomplished in one. But this union is not permitted in the federal courts; and upon the transfer of the present action, the pleadings of the plaintiff were amended, by substituting a regular complaint in ejectment on the law [822]*822side of the court; and a bill was filed for an injunction on its equity side. The defendants answered both, and also filed a cross-bill for an injunction against the plaintiff.

By arrangement of the parties, the defendants, Messrs. Wren and Potts, are dropped out of the controversy, and their names may be stricken from the pleadings. The claim for damages is also waived in this action, without prejudice to any future proceedings with respect to them. By stipulation, the case at law — the action of ejectment — is tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and the judges sit at San Francisco, instead of Carson, their finding and judgment to be entered in term time in the latter place as though the case were heard and decided there. The testimony taken in the action at law is to be received as depositions in the equity suit, and both cases are to be disposed of at the same time, to the end that the whole controversy between the parties may be settled at once.

The premises in controversy are of great value, amounting, by estimation, .to several hundred thousands of dollars, and the case has been prepared for trial with a care proportionate to this estimate of the value of the property; and the trial has been conducted by counsel on both sides with eminent ability.

Whatever could inform, instruct or enlighten the court, has been presented by them. • Practical miners have given us their testimony as to the location and working of the mine. Men of science have explained to us how it was probable that nature, in her processes, had deposited the mineral where it is found. Models of glass have made the hill, where the mining, ground lies, transparent, so that we have been able to trace the course of the veins, and see the chambers of ore found in its depths. For myself, after a somewhat extended judicial experience, covering now a period of nearly, twenty years, I can say that I have seldom, if ever, seen a ease involving the consideration of so many and varied particulars, more thoroughly prepared or more ably presented. And what has added a charm to the whole trial has been the conduct of counsel on both sides, who have appeared to assist each other in the development of the facts of the case, and have furnished an illustration of the truth that the highest courtesy is consistent with the most earnest contention.

The mining ground which forms the subject of controversy is situated in a hill known as “Ruby Hill,” a spur of Prospect mountain, distant about two miles from the town of Eureka, in Nevada. Prospect mountain is several miles in length, running in a northerly and southerly course. Adjoining its northerly end is this spur called “Ruby Hill,” which extends thence westerly, or in a southwesterly direction. Along and through this hill, for a distance slightly exceeding a mile, is a zone of limestone, in which, at different placés throughout its length, and in various forms, mineral is found, this mineral appearing sometimes in a series or succession of ore bodies more or less closely connected, sometimes in apparently isolated chambers, and at other times in what would seem to be scattered grains. And our principal inquiry is to ascertain the character of this zone, in order to determine whether it is to be treated as constituting one lode, or as embracing several lodes, as that term is used in the acts of congress of 1866 and 1872, under Which the parties have acquired whatever rights they possess. In this inquiry, the first thing to be settled is the meaning of the, term in those acts. This meaning being settled, the physical characteristics and the distinguishing features of the zone will be considered.

Those acts give no definition of the term. They use it always in connection with the term “vein.” The act of 1866 provided for the acquisition of a patent by any person or association of persons claiming “a vein or lode of quartz, or other rock in'place, bearing gold, silver, cinnabar or copper.” The act of 1872 speaks of veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in place, bearing similar metals or ores. Any definition of the term should, therefore, be sufficiently broad to embrace deposits of the several metals or ores here mentioned. In the construction of statutes, general terms must receive that interpretation which will include all the instances enumerated as comprehended by them. The definition of a “lode” given by geologists is, that of a fissure in the earth’s crust filled with mineral matter, or more accurately, as aggregations of mineral matter containing ores in fissures. Se» Yon Cotta’s Treatise on Ore Deposits, Prime’s Translation, 26. But miners used the term before geologists attempted to give it a definition. One of the witnesses in this case, Dr. Raymond, who for many years was in the service of the general government as commissioner of mining statistics, and in that capacity had occasion to examine and report upon a large number of mines in the states of Nevada and California, and the territories of Utah and Colorado, says that he has been accustomed, as a mining engineer, to attach very little importance to those cases of classification of deposits which simply involve the referring of the subject back to verbal definitions in the books. The whole subject of the classification of mineral deposits he states to be one in which the interests of the miner have entirely overridden the reasonings of the chemists and geologists. “The miners,”- to use his language, “made the definition first. As used by miners, before being defined by any authority, the term ‘lode’ simply meant that formation by which the miner could be led or guided. It is an alteration of the verb-dead;’ and whatever the miner could follow, expecting to find ore, was his lode. Some formation within which he could find ore, and out of which he could not expect to find [823]*823ore, was his lode.” • The term “lode-star," “guidingrstar,” or “north star,” he adds, is of the same origin.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hansard Mining, Inc. v. McLean
2014 MT 199 (Montana Supreme Court, 2014)
Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co.
547 P.2d 1240 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1976)
Mills v. Royse
540 P.2d 767 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1975)
Bowen v. Sil-Flo Corporation
451 P.2d 626 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1969)
Bowen v. Chemi-Cote Perlite Corporation
432 P.2d 435 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1967)
Bowen v. Chemi-Cote Perlite Corporation
423 P.2d 104 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1967)
Hennessey Funeral Home, Inc. v. Dean
395 P.2d 493 (Washington Supreme Court, 1964)
Pepperdine v. Keys
198 Cal. App. 2d 25 (California Court of Appeal, 1961)
Hecla Mining Co. v. Commissioner
35 B.T.A. 454 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1937)
Bowdler v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.
189 A. 353 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1937)
Inyo Marble Co. v. Loundagin
7 P.2d 1067 (California Court of Appeal, 1932)
Rico-Argentine Mining Co. v. Rico Consolidated Mining Co.
74 Colo. 444 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1923)
Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. Utah Apex Mining Co.
277 F. 41 (Eighth Circuit, 1921)
Vermont Marble Co. v. National Surety Co.
213 F. 429 (Third Circuit, 1914)
United States v. Lavenson
206 F. 755 (W.D. Washington, 1913)
Duffield v. San Francisco Chemical Co.
205 F. 480 (Ninth Circuit, 1913)
King Solomon Tunnel & Development Co. v. Mary Verna Mining Co.
22 Colo. App. 528 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1912)
Golden v. Murphy
31 Nev. 395 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1909)
Brookings County v. Murphy
121 N.W. 793 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1909)
Noyes v. Clifford
94 P. 842 (Montana Supreme Court, 1908)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
8 F. Cas. 819, 4 Sawy. 302, 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 578, 1877 U.S. App. LEXIS 1939, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eureka-consol-min-co-v-richmond-min-co-circtdnv-1877.