Swainson, J.
Plaintiffs filed complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated, to challenge the constitutionality of MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509. That section provides :
“During the month of December in each year, the clerk shall examine the registration records and shall suspend the registration for all electors who have not voted, continued their registration, reinstated their registration, or recorded a change of address on their registration within a period of 2 years. Each such elector shall be sent a notice through the mails substantially as follows:
“ * * * [Form]
“After the expiration of 30 days, the clerk shall cancel the registrations of all electors thus notified who have not applied for continuations. A proper entry shall be made on the registration card of each elector whose registration is canceled. Any elector whose registration has been canceled may have his registration reinstated under the same qualifications required at the time of the initial registration, in which case the clerk shall note the reinstatement date on the applicant’s former registration card, affix his signature thereto and replace both the precinct and master cards in the active files, or a new set of cards may be executed in connection with such reinstatement. A reinstated registration shall be valid for the same period as a new registration.”
Plaintiffs allege this section violates Const 1963, art 2, § 1, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States1 and Michigan2 [513]*513Constitutions. The Court of Appeals, on August 16, 1971, denied plaintiffs’ motion for an order to show cause for lack of merit on the grounds presented, and dismissed the complaint. Judge Vincent J. Brennan in dissenting would have treated the matter as an application for leave to appeal and granted same. We granted leave to appeal. 386 Mich 760.
In view of our disposition of the case, we will deal with only one issue: Whether MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, violates Const 1963, art 2, § 1, by imposing a further qualification for voting in addition to those qualifications exclusively provided therein?
Const 1963, art 2, § 1, provides:
“Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years,3 who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the requirements of local residence provided by law, shall he an elector and qualified to vote in any election except as otherwise provided in this constitution. The legislature shall define residence for voting purposes.”
[514]*514MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, by removing otherwise qualified citizens from the voter rolls clearly affects the right to vote. The right to vote has always received a preferred place in our constitutional system. The importance of this right can hardly be overemphasized. It is the basic protection that we have in insuring that our government will truly be representative of all of its citizens.4 The United States Supreme Court has held in numerous recent decisions involving the right to vote that in order that a state law prevail which impedes this fundamental constitutional right, there must be demonstrated a compelling state interest. Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23; 89 S Ct 5; 21 L Ed 2d 24 (1968); Kramer v Union Free School Dist, 395 US 621; 89 S Ct 1886; 23 L Ed 2d 583 (1969); Cipriano v Houma, 395 US 701; 89 S Ct 1897; 23 L Ed 2d 647 (1969); Evans v Cornman, 398 US 419; 90 S Ct 1752; 26 L Ed 2d 370 (1970); and Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 US 204; 90 S Ct 1990; 26 L Ed 2d 523 (1970). Our Court has recently applied this standard in Wilkins v Ann Arbor City Clerk, 385 Mich 670 (1971), a case involving the voting rights of students. Thus, in order to uphold MCLA 168-.509; MSA 6.1509, we must determine whether there is demonstrated a compelling state interest.
In Beare v Smith, 321 F Supp 1100, 1102-1103 (SD Tex, 1971), a three-judge Federal district court struck down the Texas system of annual reregistration which closed registrations some eight-months in advance of the elections. The court stated;
[515]*515“At the outset, it must be said that the right to vote is a right which is at the heart of our system of government. Parenthetically, it must be said that there is also a right not to vote. The really important aspect of this problem is that any restrictions on or impediments to this right should be legislatively imposed solely and only to protect a compelling state interest and any other restrictions on or impediments to this right cannot meet constitutional standards.” (Emphasis added.)
As plaintiffs point out, there are numerous legitimate reasons why a voter might not vote, including illness, travel, absence of babysitters, or a conscious protest against all of the candidates in a particular election. Since MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, effectively removes these voters who are otherwise qualified under Const 1963, art 2, § 1, there must be demonstrated by the defendant a compelling state interest.
The Attorney General contends that MCLA 168-.509; MSA 6.1509, is authorized under Const 1963, art 2, § 4, which provides in pertinent part:
“The legislature shall enact laws to regulate the time, place and manner of all nominations and elections, except as otherwise provided in this constitution or in the constitution and laws of the United States. The legislature shall enact laws to preserve the purity of elections, to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against abuses of the elective franchise', and to provide for a system of voter registration and absentee voting.” (Emphasis added.)
The authority of the Legislature to set up a system of voter registration is not in question.5 How[516]*516ever, any law passed pursuant to this constitutional authority does place a burden on the right to vote. Moreover, MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, is not concerned with voter registration, but, rather with removing a certain class of otherwise qualified voters under Const 1963, art 2, § 1, from the voting lists because of a failure to vote biennially or take other action required by the section. Therefore, the state still must demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify a law passed pursuant to this section. The Attorney General cites Simms v County Court of Kanawha County, 134 W Va 867; 61 SE2d 849 (1950), and In re Freeholders of Hudson County, 105 NJL 57, 143 A 536 (1928), for the authority of the legislature to set up a system of registration and to cancel registration for nonvoting. These cases all applied the “reasonableness” test rather than the compelling state interest test and, thus, are not applicable to this case.6
The Attorney General also contends that because the statute allows any elector to return an application for reregistration that, “This indeed is a small price to pay to guard against abuses of the elective franchise”. Any burden, however small, will not be permitted unless there is demonstrated a compelling state interest. Lane v Wilson, 307 US 268; 59 S Ct 872; 83 L Ed 1281 (1939); Williams v Rhodes, supra; Wilkins v Ann Arbor City Clerk, supra,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Swainson, J.
Plaintiffs filed complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated, to challenge the constitutionality of MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509. That section provides :
“During the month of December in each year, the clerk shall examine the registration records and shall suspend the registration for all electors who have not voted, continued their registration, reinstated their registration, or recorded a change of address on their registration within a period of 2 years. Each such elector shall be sent a notice through the mails substantially as follows:
“ * * * [Form]
“After the expiration of 30 days, the clerk shall cancel the registrations of all electors thus notified who have not applied for continuations. A proper entry shall be made on the registration card of each elector whose registration is canceled. Any elector whose registration has been canceled may have his registration reinstated under the same qualifications required at the time of the initial registration, in which case the clerk shall note the reinstatement date on the applicant’s former registration card, affix his signature thereto and replace both the precinct and master cards in the active files, or a new set of cards may be executed in connection with such reinstatement. A reinstated registration shall be valid for the same period as a new registration.”
Plaintiffs allege this section violates Const 1963, art 2, § 1, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States1 and Michigan2 [513]*513Constitutions. The Court of Appeals, on August 16, 1971, denied plaintiffs’ motion for an order to show cause for lack of merit on the grounds presented, and dismissed the complaint. Judge Vincent J. Brennan in dissenting would have treated the matter as an application for leave to appeal and granted same. We granted leave to appeal. 386 Mich 760.
In view of our disposition of the case, we will deal with only one issue: Whether MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, violates Const 1963, art 2, § 1, by imposing a further qualification for voting in addition to those qualifications exclusively provided therein?
Const 1963, art 2, § 1, provides:
“Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years,3 who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the requirements of local residence provided by law, shall he an elector and qualified to vote in any election except as otherwise provided in this constitution. The legislature shall define residence for voting purposes.”
[514]*514MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, by removing otherwise qualified citizens from the voter rolls clearly affects the right to vote. The right to vote has always received a preferred place in our constitutional system. The importance of this right can hardly be overemphasized. It is the basic protection that we have in insuring that our government will truly be representative of all of its citizens.4 The United States Supreme Court has held in numerous recent decisions involving the right to vote that in order that a state law prevail which impedes this fundamental constitutional right, there must be demonstrated a compelling state interest. Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23; 89 S Ct 5; 21 L Ed 2d 24 (1968); Kramer v Union Free School Dist, 395 US 621; 89 S Ct 1886; 23 L Ed 2d 583 (1969); Cipriano v Houma, 395 US 701; 89 S Ct 1897; 23 L Ed 2d 647 (1969); Evans v Cornman, 398 US 419; 90 S Ct 1752; 26 L Ed 2d 370 (1970); and Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 US 204; 90 S Ct 1990; 26 L Ed 2d 523 (1970). Our Court has recently applied this standard in Wilkins v Ann Arbor City Clerk, 385 Mich 670 (1971), a case involving the voting rights of students. Thus, in order to uphold MCLA 168-.509; MSA 6.1509, we must determine whether there is demonstrated a compelling state interest.
In Beare v Smith, 321 F Supp 1100, 1102-1103 (SD Tex, 1971), a three-judge Federal district court struck down the Texas system of annual reregistration which closed registrations some eight-months in advance of the elections. The court stated;
[515]*515“At the outset, it must be said that the right to vote is a right which is at the heart of our system of government. Parenthetically, it must be said that there is also a right not to vote. The really important aspect of this problem is that any restrictions on or impediments to this right should be legislatively imposed solely and only to protect a compelling state interest and any other restrictions on or impediments to this right cannot meet constitutional standards.” (Emphasis added.)
As plaintiffs point out, there are numerous legitimate reasons why a voter might not vote, including illness, travel, absence of babysitters, or a conscious protest against all of the candidates in a particular election. Since MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, effectively removes these voters who are otherwise qualified under Const 1963, art 2, § 1, there must be demonstrated by the defendant a compelling state interest.
The Attorney General contends that MCLA 168-.509; MSA 6.1509, is authorized under Const 1963, art 2, § 4, which provides in pertinent part:
“The legislature shall enact laws to regulate the time, place and manner of all nominations and elections, except as otherwise provided in this constitution or in the constitution and laws of the United States. The legislature shall enact laws to preserve the purity of elections, to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against abuses of the elective franchise', and to provide for a system of voter registration and absentee voting.” (Emphasis added.)
The authority of the Legislature to set up a system of voter registration is not in question.5 How[516]*516ever, any law passed pursuant to this constitutional authority does place a burden on the right to vote. Moreover, MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, is not concerned with voter registration, but, rather with removing a certain class of otherwise qualified voters under Const 1963, art 2, § 1, from the voting lists because of a failure to vote biennially or take other action required by the section. Therefore, the state still must demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify a law passed pursuant to this section. The Attorney General cites Simms v County Court of Kanawha County, 134 W Va 867; 61 SE2d 849 (1950), and In re Freeholders of Hudson County, 105 NJL 57, 143 A 536 (1928), for the authority of the legislature to set up a system of registration and to cancel registration for nonvoting. These cases all applied the “reasonableness” test rather than the compelling state interest test and, thus, are not applicable to this case.6
The Attorney General also contends that because the statute allows any elector to return an application for reregistration that, “This indeed is a small price to pay to guard against abuses of the elective franchise”. Any burden, however small, will not be permitted unless there is demonstrated a compelling state interest. Lane v Wilson, 307 US 268; 59 S Ct 872; 83 L Ed 1281 (1939); Williams v Rhodes, supra; Wilkins v Ann Arbor City Clerk, supra, pp 684-685. In addition, the fact that over 600,000 persons were purged in Detroit alone from 1960 to 1970 demonstrates that MCLA 168.509; MSA [517]*5176.1509, is indeed a serious impediment on the right to vote for a substantial number of citizens.'7
The state contends that it has a compelling interest in the prevention of voter fraud. It contends that MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, insures that the voter rolls will not contain the names of voters who no longer live at the listed addresses and further would prevent other citizens from voting from such listed addresses. It cannot be doubted that the above section does to some extent accomplish this purpose, but that is not sufficient to demonstrate a compelling interest. A statute that impinges on a preferred right in order to solve a legitimate and compelling governmental need must be precise in its regulation. United States v Robel, 389 US 258, 265; 88 S Ct 419; 19 L Ed 2d 508 (1967); NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 438; 83 S Ct 328; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). The state has the burden of demonstrating that the particular regulation is necessary and essential and not achievable by less drastic means. Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 637; 89 S Ct 1322; 22 L Ed 2d 600 (1969). As the court stated in Beare v Smith, supra, p 1106:
“It must always be kept in mind that the power of a state to determine qualifications to vote must be exercised precisely and circumspectly so as to limit the franchise no more than is necessary to effectuate the state’s interest. United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Ala. 1966).”
The Michigan Legislature has passed a comprehensive set of safeguards to prevent fraudulent voting. Under sections 493, 495 and 499 of the Michigan Election Law (MCLA 168.493, 168.495 and 168.499; MSA 6.1493, 6.1495 and 6.1499) detailed registration data is required and the registrant must declare his [518]*518qualifications under oath, the violation of. which is punishable as a misdemeanor. Under section 505 (MCLA 168.505; MSA 6.1505) when an elector applies for registration, the clerk has the duty of ascertaining if the elector is already registered elsewhere, in Michigan and if so, the clerk has the elector sign an authorization to cancel his previous registration. Specifically, this is intended to prevent the problem of dual voting.
Under section 510 (MCLA 168.510; MSA 6.1510) the county clerk is required to forward a list of the names of all persons who have died within the county to the clerk of each city or township in the county, and the respective city and township clerks are authorized to cancel the registrations of deceased electors. Specifically, this is intended to prevent fraudulent voting by the use of names of deceased electors. Section 514 (MCLA 168.514; MSA 6.1514) provides for the physical cancellation of registration cards when registrations are can-celled and the destruction of such cards by burning.
Under section 519 (MCLA 168.519; MSA 6.1519) the clerk is prohibited from registering persons known or believed by him to he unqualified, and the violation of this duty is made a misdemeanor. Under section 520 (MCLA 168.520; MSA 6.1520) the clerk is authorized and required to investigate probable illegal or fraudulent registration. Also, under this section, he is authorized to call upon the police or sheriff to aid in such investigation. Under section 521 (MCLA 168.521; MSA 6.1521) the clerk is required to remove names improperly registered. Moreover, before an elector is allowed to vote on an election day, he must identify himself by executing an application to vote showing his signature and address of residence and,
[519]*519“The election official in charge of the precinct registration file shall compare the signature upon such application with the signature upon the registration card, and if the same do not correspond the vote of such person shall be challenged and the same procedure shall be followed as provided in the election law for the challenging of electors.” MCLA 168.523; MSA 6.1523.
The cited sections of the Michigan Election Law might in themselves be sufficient to rebut defendant’s assertions that MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, is- necessary to prevent fraud.8 However, the same goal desired by MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, can be accomplished by the use of only sections 513 and 515 (MCLA 168.513 and 168.515; MSA 6.1513 and 6.1515). These sections provide:
“See. 515. The several township city and village clerks may conduct a house-to-house canvass or use such other means of checking the correctness of registration records as may seem expedient.” (Emphasis added.)
“Sec. 513. Upon receipt of reliable information that a registered elector has moved away from the municipality, the clerk shall notify such elector through the mail at his registered address, stating the source of the information, and if the elector does not apply for continuation of registration within 30 days, his registration shall be cancelled.”
Under section 515 (MCLA 168.515; MSA 6.1515), the clerk could send out letters to all persons who did not vote once in two years with a request that the mail not be forwarded if the elector no longer [520]*520resided in the municipality. Under section 513 (MCLA 168.513; MSA 6.1513), the returned letter would be “reliable information” that the voter no longer resided in the municipality and his registration could be cancelled. The asserted purpose of section 509 (MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509) would be accomplished without the disqualification of tens of thousands of otherwise qualified registered voters.
Thus, we hold that the state has failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest and that MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509, is unconstitutional under Const 1963, art 2, § 1. The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and a writ of mandamus against the purging of voters under said section 509 (MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509) shall issue. The temporary injunction entered by order of the Court on December 17, 1971, enjoining election clerks generally from applying the provisions of said section 509 (MCLA 168.509; MSA 6.1509), shall be made permanent. No costs, a public question being involved.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Adams, T. G. Kavanagh, and Williams, JJ., concurred with Swainson, J.