Michigan Alliance for Retired Americans v. Secretary of State

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 16, 2020
Docket354993
StatusPublished

This text of Michigan Alliance for Retired Americans v. Secretary of State (Michigan Alliance for Retired Americans v. Secretary of State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michigan Alliance for Retired Americans v. Secretary of State, (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED FOR PUBLICATION AMERICANS, DETROIT/DOWNRIVER October 16, 2020 CHAPTER OF THE A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, CHARLES ROBINSON, GERARD McMURRAN, and JIM PEDERSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v No. 354993 Court of Claims SECRETARY OF STATE and ATTORNEY LC No. 20-000108-MM GENERAL,

Defendants, and

SENATE and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Intervening Defendants-Appellants, and

REPUBLIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE and MICHIGAN REPUBLICAN PARTY,

Proposed Intervening Defendants.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and BOONSTRA, and GADOLA, JJ.

BOONSTRA, J. (concurring).

I fully concur in the opinion of the Court. I write separately to underscore that judicial overreach is just as pernicious as executive overreach. The judicial overreach in this case requires that we reverse the Court of Claims, vacate its order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs as well as its preliminary and permanent injunctions, and remand with instructions to immediately enter an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants.

-1- I INTRODUCTION

The genius of our Founding Fathers in establishing a system of three separate and co-equal branches of government was in recognizing that it is the checks and balances of such a system that serve to preserve our liberty. As I recently observed in Slis v State of Michigan, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2020) (Docket Nos. 351211, 351212), lv den ___ Mich ___; 948 NW2d 82 (2020) (BOONSTRA, J., concurring), that preservation of liberty “is why legislatures enact laws, and why it is up to the executive to sign them (or not). And it is why the judiciary defers to the legislature on matters of public policy.” Without question, such a system creates certain inefficiencies in government. After all, it would be much easier if a benevolent dictator could simply rule by decree without having to endure the inconvenience of others’ input. But those inefficiencies are there by design; they are the natural and intended consequence of our system of checks and balances. And those inefficiencies are therefore the price we willingly pay so that we may live under the banner of freedom in the United States of America.

The tensions between the branches of government and have existed since our nation’s founding, and the relative power of any given branch has ebbed and flowed over time. Sometimes it is the executive branch that engages in governmental overreach. See, e.g., Slis, __ Mich App at __, slip op at 23 (lead opinion) (affirming preliminary injunction of emergency rules banning the sale of flavored nicotine vapor products) and __, slip op at 32 (BOONSTRA, J., concurring) (“As the adage goes, ‘give them an inch and they’ll take a mile.’ Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, that adage has new meaning. It even applies to vaping.”). And sometimes the legislature is perhaps unwittingly complicit in executive overreach. See In re Certified Questions from the United States District Court, Western District of Michigan, Southern Division, __ Mich __, __; __ NW2d __ (2020) (issued October 2, 2020, Docket No. 161492) (holding that the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, MCL 10.31 et seq., “is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the executive branch in violation of the Michigan Constitution,” and accordingly that “the executive orders issued by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic now lack any basis under Michigan law”).

Alexander Hamilton once said that the judicial branch of government, lacking “influence over either the sword or the purse,” was “the weakest of the three” branches of government. Federalist 78. He continued:

[T]hough individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.” And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments . . ..” [Id.]

But in recent years (or decades), the judicial branch has often also overreached. Too often, those who have been unsuccessful in advancing their political agenda through the political process, i.e., through the legislative and executive branches, have turned to the judiciary to achieve their political ends. And too often they have found judges who are induced, under the cloak of a robe,

-2- to impose policy preferences by judicial fiat. But policymaking under the guise of judicial decision-making is simply tyranny by another name. See Morrison, 487 US at 712 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (stating that judicial forays into policymaking result in a government that is “not only not the government of laws that the Constitution established; it’s not a government of laws at all.”). Courts are not mini-legislatures and judges are not policymakers. See, e.g., Kyser v Township, 486 Mich 514, 536; 786 NW2d 543 (2010) (noting that “policy-making is at the core of the legislative function”); Myers v Portage, 304 Mich App 637, 644; 848 NW2d 200 (2014) (“[M]aking public policy is the province of the Legislature, not the courts.”); see also Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 697; 108 S Ct 2597; 101 L Ed 2d 569 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoting Part the First, art XXXX, Massachusetts Const 1780 (“In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

Recently, in a sister case to this one, this Court considered a complaint for mandamus, in which the plaintiffs1 alleged that the statutory requirement that absentee ballots be received by the local election clerk by 8 p.m. on election day2 (the ballot receipt deadline) violated Const. 1963, art. 2, § 4, as amended by the passage of Proposal 33 in November 2018. See League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State (League II),4 ___ Mich App ___ (2020) (Docket No. 353654), lv den ___ Mich ___; 946 NW2d 307 (2020), recon den ___ Mich ___; 948 NW2d 70 (2020).

I note that while the complaint in League II did make brief reference to the ballot receipt deadline as “facially den[ying] voters their express constitutional right ‘to choose’ to submit their absentee ballots ‘by mail’ at any time within 40 days of election day,” that complaint also cited the COVID-19 pandemic as the reason why expedited relief was necessary. It stated:

1 The plaintiffs in that case were the League of Women Voters of Michigan and three individuals who were League members and registered Michigan voters. 2 This requirement is set forth in MCL 168.764a; MCL 168.764b. 3 See Proposition No. 18-3 (2018). Proposal 3 granted all Michigan votes the constitutional right to vote by absentee ballot without stating a reason. Before the passage of Proposal 3, the right was a statutory one, provided that certain conditions were met.

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Bluebook (online)
Michigan Alliance for Retired Americans v. Secretary of State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michigan-alliance-for-retired-americans-v-secretary-of-state-michctapp-2020.