Michigan Up & Out of Poverty Now Coalition v. State

533 N.W.2d 339, 210 Mich. App. 162, 1995 Mich. App. LEXIS 250
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 21, 1995
DocketDocket 150741
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 533 N.W.2d 339 (Michigan Up & Out of Poverty Now Coalition v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michigan Up & Out of Poverty Now Coalition v. State, 533 N.W.2d 339, 210 Mich. App. 162, 1995 Mich. App. LEXIS 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

Corrigan, J.

Plaintiff Michigan Up & Out of Poverty Now Coalition appeals as of right an Ingham Circuit Court order denying it injunctive relief. Plaintiff challenged the validity of several sections of the Michigan Capitol Committee Procedures for the Use of the Public Areas of the Michigan State Capitol * 1 as prohibiting it, in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Const 1963, art 1, § 5, from continuing its tent-city protest on the State Capitol grounds. The circuit court ruled that various questioned committee procedures were valid time, place, and manner restrictions on protected expressive activity. We affirm.

Plaintiff presents fifteen issues on appeal, attacking thirteen sections of the revised procedures. We decline to rule on several issues that were not presented in the circuit court and address only those questions that were explicitly raised and evaluated in the circuit court.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In December 1991, plaintiff sought and received a series of permits to erect a "tent city” on the Michigan State Capitol grounds in its quest to dramatize the plight of the homeless. The permits *165 were issued by the Michigan Capitol Committee, 2 pursuant to committee rules then in effect for the use of the Capitol building and grounds. Those permits allowed plaintiff to erect tents on the Capitol grounds from December 5 to December 14, 1991. Although plaintiffs last permit expired on December 14, the tents remained on the Capitol grounds until December 20. Three days later, plaintiff received a permit and held a rally on the Capitol lawn between noon and 4:00 p.m. Although the permit merely permitted plaintiff to hold the rally, the executive director of the Capitol Committee allowed plaintiff to keep in place the tent it had erected in conjunction with the demonstration until the permit expired. At 4:00 p.m., Capitol security removed the tent. The same day, plaintiff requested another permit to erect a tent and to hold a prayer vigil on the Capitol grounds the following day. The executive director denied the request because no further permits could be issued without the approval of the full committee.

On an emergency basis, plaintiff obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order, preventing Capitol security from "interfering in any way with plaintiffs placement of not more than six tents on the State Capitol grounds.” Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint, requesting an order to show cause and a preliminary injunction. Before any formal hearings were held, the parties agreed to extend the temporary restraining order, pending review of the committee rules governing the use of the public areas of the State Capitol._

*166 At the direction of the circuit court, plaintiffs lead counsel fully participated in the review process by attending meetings and supplying written memoranda and comments for the committee’s consideration in redrafting the rules. After a 2 Vi- month period of review and comment, during which approximately twenty drafts of revised procedures were generated, on March 25, 1992, the committee finally approved an amended version of procedures governing the Capitol building and grounds. In its newly revised procedures, the committee succeeded in deleting all waiver requirements, all insurance requirements, all permit requirements, and all references to religious practices. Indeed, plaintiffs lead counsel wrote that the revised procedures had "succeeded in many respects.”

The day after the committee approved the revised procedures, plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the procedures, alleging that §§II(M)(5) and IV(A), (D), and (G) 3 of the new committee procedures unconstitutionally prohibited its tent-city vigil on the Capitol lawn. In a supplemental brief, plaintiff asserted that §IV(J) violated its right to erect symbolic tents on the Capitol grounds and presented a facial challenge to § IV(D). At a hearing in the circuit court, plaintiff seemed principally to object to the new restrictions on overnight camping on the Capitol lawn and on the erection of structures greater than three feet by three feet by three feet, which would preclude habitable structures, including tents. The circuit court observed that prohibitions against overnight camping or sleeping on the Capitol grounds were clearly constitutional, citing Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288; 104 S Ct 3065; 82 L Ed 2d 221 (1984). The circuit court *167 thereafter held that the contested committee procedures were valid time, place, and manner restrictions on protected expressive activity under the Michigan and federal constitutions, dissolved the temporary restraining order effective April 3, 1992, and dismissed the case.

Plaintiff appealed and also sought an emergency stay of proceedings. This Court denied plaintiffs motion for a stay of proceedings. The committee procedures thereafter became final and effective pursuant to MCL 4.1702(1); MSA 2.138(702X1).

II. ISSUE PRESERVATION

On appeal, plaintiff challenges an array of committee procedures that were not passed on in the circuit court. For the first time on appeal, plaintiff mounts challenges to §§ 11(A), (D), (E), and (P); 111(H) and (J); IV(E) and (F); and V(D). 4 Plaintiff also argues for the first time on appeal that the existence of the Capitol Committee violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine, Const 1963, art 3, §2. Finally, plaintiff contends that the court improperly denied it an evidentiary hearing, although it neither sought an evidentiary hearing nor objected to the entry of a final order by the circuit court.

Issues raised for the first time on appeal, even those relating to constitutional claims, are not ordinarily subject to appellate review. Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993), citing In re Forfeiture of Certain Personal Property, 441 Mich 77, 84; 490 NW2d 322 (1992), and Butcher v Dep’t of Treasury, 425 Mich 262, 276; 389 NW2d 412 (1986); see, also, FW/PBS, Inc v Dallas, 493 US 215, 237; 110 S Ct 596; 107 L Ed 2d 603 (1990). *168 Because plaintiff has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances, we decline to reach the host of unpreserved constitutional claims that plaintiff has presented. We are fully cognizant that political speech in this state’s Capitol lies at the heart of the free speech guarantees of the state and federal constitutions. We are also mindful that this Court functions as a court of review that is principally charged with the duty of correcting errors. We see no exigent circumstances in this case that would mandate review of constitutional arguments presented for the first time on appeal. Booth, supra.

III. STANDARDS FOR INTERPRETATION OF FREE SPEECH CLAIMS

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Bluebook (online)
533 N.W.2d 339, 210 Mich. App. 162, 1995 Mich. App. LEXIS 250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michigan-up-out-of-poverty-now-coalition-v-state-michctapp-1995.