Michael Goggin v. James Mike Williams, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: October 30, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01873
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 MICHAEL GOGGIN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01873-RBM-DEB

10 Plaintiff, ORDER: 11 v. (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12 JAMES MIKE WILLIAMS, et al., MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 13 Defendants. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [Doc. 2]; 14

15 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT ON SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 16 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [Doc. 1]; 17 (3) DENYING REQUEST FOR 18 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AS 19 MOOT [Doc. 3]; AND

20 (4) DENYING MOTION FOR 21 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [Doc. 4] 22

23 24 25 On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff Michael Goggin (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a 26 Complaint against several individuals and government agencies alleging that he has “been 27 subjected to ongoing targeted harassment, surveillance, and deprivation of liberty.” (Doc. 28 1 at 2.) At the time of filing, Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 1 requires. Instead, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 2 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“IFP Motion”). (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff also filed a Request 3 for Appointment of Counsel (“Motion to Appoint Counsel”) (Doc. 3) and a Motion for 4 Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 4). 5 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 6 2) and DISMISSES the Complaint (Doc. 1) without leave to amend. Accordingly, 7 Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3) and TRO Motion (Doc. 4) are DENIED 8 AS MOOT. 9 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 10 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a District Court of the 11 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 12 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court may authorize the commencement of a suit 13 without prepayment of the filing fee if the plaintiff submits a signed affidavit “that includes 14 a statement of all assets[,] which shows [an] inability to pay initial fees or give security.” 15 S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2(a). The facts of an affidavit of poverty must be stated “with some 16 particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 17 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). 18 The determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s 19 Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), 20 rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) (“[§] 1915 typically requires the reviewing 21 court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the 22 statute’s requirement of indigency.”). 23 It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he 24 25 26 1 Civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55 in addition to the $350 filing fee. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply 28 1 must adequately prove his indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 2 331, 339–40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “[a]n affidavit in 3 support of an IFP [motion] is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court 4 costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (citing Adkins, 5 335 U.S. at 339); see also McQuade, 647 F.2d at 940 (an adequate affidavit should state 6 supporting facts “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty”). No exact formula 7 is “set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough 8 to earn IFP status.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP 9 requests on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general 10 benchmark of “twenty percent of monthly household income”); see also Cal. Men’s 11 Colony, 939 F.2d at 858 (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based upon 12 available facts and by exercise of their “sound discretion”) (citation omitted). 13 In his IFP Motion, Plaintiff lists $5,298 as his monthly income from employment, 14 self-employment, and public assistance. (Doc. 2 at 1–2.) Plaintiff is not owed any money 15 and does not have any dependents who rely on him for financial support. (Id. at 3.) He 16 has $150 in a checking account with the financial institution One Pay and owns two 17 vehicles worth $20,000 and $5,000. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff’s estimated monthly expenses 18 are $1,690 and include: $50 on utilities, $40 on home maintenance, $500 on food, $200 on 19 clothing, $100 on laundry and dry cleaning, and $800 on transportation. (Id. at 4.) 20 Plaintiff appears to have sufficient funds to pay the filing fee. In assessing whether 21 a certain income level meets the poverty threshold under § 1915(a)(1), one of the sources 22 courts may look to is the federal poverty guidelines developed each year by the Department 23 of Health and Human Services. See, e.g., Kristine E. v. O’Malley, No. 24-CV-1182-GPC 24 (MMP), 2024 WL 4442013, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2024). Based on his affidavit of 25 assets, Plaintiff has an annual household gross income of $63,576 which is considerably 26 higher than the 2025 federal poverty guideline for a household of one person ($15,650). 27 See 2025 Poverty Guidelines, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines (last visited October 28 22, 2025). Even considering monthly expenses, Plaintiff’s gross monthly income ($5,298) 1 still significantly exceeds his combined expenses ($1,690). (Doc. 2 at 1, 4–5.) See Temple 2 v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984) (noting that courts should not grant IFP 3 to an applicant who is “financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar”); 4 see also Alvarez v. Berryhill, No. 18-cv-2133 W (BGS), 2018 WL 6265021, at *1 (S.D. 5 Cal. Oct. 1, 2018) (noting that courts often reject IFP applications when applicants “can 6 pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to other expenses”). Plaintiff therefore fails to 7 establish that he qualifies to proceed IFP. See Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Accordingly, 8 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED. 9 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 10 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP is subject to mandatory screening 11 and dismissal by the Court if the action: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a 12 claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant 13 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 14 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to 15 dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to 16 ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 17 responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler 18 v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir.2012)). 19 “A complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 20 fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (citation omitted). The definition of 21 frivolousness “embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful 22 factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolous claims whose 23 “factual contentions are clearly baseless” include “claims describing fantastic or delusional 24 scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.” Denton, 504 U.S. 25 at 32–33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–328) (cleaned up). “[A] finding of factual 26 frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the 27 wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict 28 them.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. When determining whether to dismiss a complaint as 1 “frivolous” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the Court “is not bound, as it usually is 2 when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the 3 truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. at 32. 4 Having reviewed the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court concludes that 5 his allegations are factually frivolous and do not state a plausible claim. See 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Plaintiff brings the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 7 alleged violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1 at 2.) 8 Plaintiff represents his belief that he “was wrongfully placed on a government or corporate 9 watchlist, which led to the misuse of AVL (Automatic Vehicle Location) systems to track 10 both of [his] vehicles without consent.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that since November 2024, 11 he has experienced “routine breaking and entering, vehicle tampering, stalking, 12 surveillance through unauthorized apps, [ ] direct energy weapon targeting,” and 13 “psychological abuse also known as gaslighting tactics committed by individuals known 14 to [him], including family members.” (Id. (cleaned up).) He further alleges that his “phone, 15 finances, and private communications have been remotely accessed or controlled without 16 his permission.” (Id.) 17 However, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are based on mere speculation that he was at 18 some point placed on an unspecified watchlist for unknown reasons. (See Doc. 1 at 2.) 19 The Complaint is further replete with ideations of government agencies, entities, and 20 individuals, including his family members, surveilling Plaintiff and attempting to 21 psychologically abuse him. “No matter how sincerely believed by Plaintiff, these 22 allegations are simply too fantastic to warrant the expenditure of further judicial and private 23 resources.” Meyer v. World Bank, No. 3:19-cv-00017-GPC (JLB), 2019 WL 2009873, at 24 *3 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2019) (citation omitted). The Court therefore finds Plaintiff’s factual 25 allegations are frivolous because they “rise to the level of irrational or the wholly 26 incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; see Waldrop v. Dep’t of Corr., No. CIV S-06-1260 27 DFL EFB P., 2006 WL 2926754, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) (dismissing as frivolous 28 claims that prison placed radio transmitters in plaintiff’s ears and used satellite 1 transmissions to monitor him as an experiment for a website because they “describ[ed] 2 fantastic or delusional scenarios.”); Adams v. FBI, No. C 06–07321 CRB, 2007 WL 3 627912, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2007) (finding allegations described a “delusional 4 portrait of extreme persecution” where the plaintiff alleged she was monitored through 5 hidden cameras in her home and had her blood drawn while rendered unconscious with a 6 chemical substance); Athans v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. CV-06-1841-PHX-DGC, 2007 7 WL 1673883, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 11, 2007) (dismissing as frivolous pro se litigant’s 8 complaint alleging a conspiracy of “illegal surveillance, undercover ‘sting’ operations, and 9 [the] unlawful ‘doping’ of [Starbucks] beverages.”). 10 As Plaintiff’s allegations are based on mere speculation, he also fails to present a 11 claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to § 1983. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 12 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to 13 state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”). While the 15 Court must accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, it is not “required to accept as true 16 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 17 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)); see Bell Atl. Corp. 19 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right 20 to relief above the speculative level.”). Additionally, Plaintiff does not state the alleged 21 conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law or explain how such 22 conduct deprived him of his constitutional rights, as required to state a claim under § 1983. 23 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Complaint therefore requires dismissal on 24 this additional basis. 25 Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 26 without leave to amend. See Sandoval v. Castillo, No. 08-cv-1622-WQH-NLS, 2008 WL 27 4790521, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2008) (“Plaintiff’s allegations are fanciful and delusional 28 and ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 1 amendment.’”) (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984)); 2 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 n.8 (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, 3 there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to 4 amend.”). 5 III. TRO MOTION 6 Plaintiff filed a TRO Motion seeking an order “prohibiting Mr. James Williams [or 7 his] agents” from engaging in: (1) “further harassment, intimidation, surveillance, or 8 contact” with Plaintiff; and (2) “stalking[] or use of any direct energy weapons and 9 surveillance technology against Plaintiff.” (Doc. 4 at 2–3.)2 As a preliminary matter, the 10 TRO Application has been rendered moot because Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP was 11 denied and the Complaint has been dismissed. See Jones v. Fed. Corr. Ctr. Med. Dep’t, 12 No. 20-CV-1385 JLS (BLM), 2020 WL 6942519, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2020) (denying 13 prisoner’s IFP motion and denying the TRO motion as moot); Olajide v. Brown, Case No. 14 18-cv-03991-CRB, 2018 WL 3328227, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2018) (dismissing the 15 complaint and denying the TRO motion as moot). The Court nonetheless addresses the 16 TRO Motion and finds it must be denied on the merits. 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) governs the issuance of a temporary 18 restraining order (“TRO”). Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be 19 awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. 20 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). To obtain a TRO or a 21 preliminary injunction, Plaintiff “must establish that [he] is likely to succeed on the merits, 22 that [he] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 23 balance of equities tips in [his] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Herb 24 Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 25 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (the “Winter factors”)); see Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. 26

27 2 Plaintiff’s TRO Motion is largely incomprehensible. However, the Court was able to 28 1 Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting the standards for a TRO and a 2 preliminary injunction are identical). The “[l]ikelihood of success on the merits ‘is the 3 most important’ Winter factor[.]” Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 4 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015)). 5 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal. As 6 such, Plaintiff has necessarily failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his 7 claims, or even a “serious question” as to his claims, to justify preliminary injunctive relief. 8 See Pimental v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]t an irreducible 9 minimum the moving party must demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits, or 10 questions serious enough to require litigation.”) (cleaned up). Where, as here, the moving 11 party fails to meet his burden on the threshold inquiry of likelihood of success on the merits, 12 “the court need not consider the other factors[ ] in the absence of serious questions going 13 to the merits.” Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 856 (cleaned up).3 Accordingly, the Court finds 14 the TRO Motion (Doc. 4) must be DENIED. 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: 17 1. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED. 18 2. The Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without leave to amend. 19 3. As Plaintiff’s Complaint has been dismissed, Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint 20 Counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED as moot. 21 4. Plaintiff’s TRO Motion (Doc. 4) is DENIED as moot. 22 5. The Court CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal of this Order would not be taken in 23 good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 24 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) 25

26 27 3 The Court further notes that Plaintiff did not certify in writing any efforts he made to give notice to the adverse parties or provide reasons otherwise supporting that notice should not 28 1 (noting an indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal 2 would not be frivolous). 3 6. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the file. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 ||DATE: October 30, 2025 6 Ge tiormads, Morty 7 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28