[406]*406CRICHTON, J.
|!This case arises-‘from a dispute between the City of Kenner (“Kenner”) and Kenner’s firefighters concerning the computation' of retirement benefits under La. R.S. 11:233 and 11:2252. The dispute centers around four types of compensation— educational incentive pay, seniority incentive pay, holiday pay, and acting pay — and the. res nova question presented to the Court is whether these types of compensation should be considered “earnable compensation” for purposes of calculating the firefighters’ pension contributions. ■ For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the court of appeal holding that no genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether each of the four types of pay constitutes “earnable compensation” under the requirements of the statutes.
BACKGROUND
In 1999, the Kenner merged its municipal retirement system for firefighters with the statewide Firefighters’ Retirement System (“FRS”). Under the pre-1999 municipal retirement system, Kenner calculated firefighters’ pension' contributions based on base pay and supplemental pay, but did not include in the calculation educational incentive pay, seniority incentive pay, holiday pay, and acting pay. After the systems merged, Kenner made no changes in its method of calculating pension contributions.
|Jn May 2010, Michael Dunn, on his own behalf and on behalf of the class of all similarly situated employees of the Fire Department, City of Kenner and of the members of the Kenner Fire Fighters Association Local 1427 (“Firefighters”), filed a lawsuit in the' 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, against Ken-ner, seeking retroactive adjustment to, and forward correction of, Kenner’s pension contributions.1 The Firefighters later [407]*407amended the petition to remove the class allegations, adding individual firefighters and alleging that Local 1427 was suing on behalf of its members. The Firefighters alleged that certain types of pay — educational incentive pay, seniority incentive pay, holiday pay, and acting pay — -should be included in the definition of “earnable compensation” for the purpose of calculating pension contributions pursuant to La. R.S. 11;233.2 In July 2010, Kenner began remitting pension contributions -on holiday and acting pay, but did not make retroactive adjustments to holiday pay and acting pay or begin remitting pension contributions on either educational incentive pay or seniority incentive pay.3
Kenner filed a motion for summary judgment in October 2013, arguing that these four types of compensation were, not “earned” during a “regular tour of | ¡¡duty,” and were instead either bonuses or other types of irregular, nonrecurring, or deferred payments. The Firefighters then filed a cross-ipotion for. summary judgment on the same issues, claiming Kenner was liable for failing to pay pension contributions on the four types of pay.
On December 17, .2013, after a hearing on both motions, the trial court granted Kenner’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Firefighters’ cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that educational incentive pay, seniority incentive pay, holiday pay, and acting pay “are not included as earnable compensation pursuant to La. R.S. 11:233,” and therefore should not be considered in calculating the- Firefighters’ pension contributions. The trial 'court stated that it chose to, interpret the statute in a “strict fashion,” noting that “[i]f the statute doesn’t say it, okay, I’m not inclined to include it, regardless of how any public entity may feel about voluntarily contributing anything to any pension.”
The Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, heard the Firefighters’-. appeal before a three-judge panel. Before rendering a decision, the court of appeal, en banc, requested and heard additional argument and subsequently reversed the trial court. Dunn v. City of Kenner, 14-113 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/14/15), 170 So.3d 1065. The court of appeal noted that none of the four types of compensation at issue in the case are expressly included or excluded as earnable compensation in the -language of La. R.S. 11:233, and therefore found the statute to be “inherently ambiguous.” The court of appeal then undertook a two-step analysis under the catch-all provision of La. R.S. ll;233(B)(2)(g), which excludes from the definition of earnable compensation “any [408]*408other type of irregular or nonrecurring payment.” First, the court of appeal analyzed whether each type of compensation is “earned,” and second, the court of appeal analyzed whether each type of compensation was “irregular or nonrecurring.” Under this analysis, the court of appeal found that each of the four types of compensation is earned and regular or recurring. The |4court of appeal reversed both the trial court’s grant of Kenner’s motion for summary judgment and the trial court’s denial of the Firefighters’ motion for summary judgment. The court of appeal expressly found no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the four payment types must be included as “earnable compensation,” found the Firefighters were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and rendered summary judgment in favor of the Firefighters.4
We granted the writ to determine whether each of the four types of payment at issue constitutes “earnable compensation” for purposes of pension contributions. Dunn v. City of Kenner, 15-1175 (La.10/2/15), 178 So.3d 576.
APPLICABLE LAW
Courts of this state have routinely recognized the remunerative nature of retirement contributions, which represent “an increasingly important part of an employee’s compensation for his services.” See Fishbein v. State ex rel. L.S.U. Health Sciences Center, 04-2482 (La.4/12/05), 898 So.2d 1260 (quoting Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 602 So.2d 704, 708 (La.1992)). We have described retirement contributions as “an inducement to employees to remain in the service of the company to enjoy the benefits the plan promised.” T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 841 (La.1975). An employer’s contribution to retirement is “not a purely gratuitous act, but it is in the nature of additional remuneration to the employee who meets the conditions of the plan.” Id. See also Born v. City of Slidell, 15-0136 (La.10/14/15), 180 So.Sd 1227, 2015 WL 5972534 (“[W]hen an employer promises a benefit to employees, arid employees accept that offer, or benefit, by their actions in meeting the conditions, the result is not a mere gratuity
| ^Article X, section 29(E) of the Louisiana Constitution recognizes the importance of the state retirement systems, providing that “[t]he actuarial soundness of state and statewide retirement systems shall be attained and maintained and the legislature shall establish, by law, for each state or statewide retirement system, the particular method of actuarial valuation to be employed for purposes of this Section.” In the year following the adoption of La. Const. Art. X, § 29(E), the legislature enacted Title 11 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. Title 11 was enacted “to consolidate public retirement law in order to effectively eomply with the mandate of Article X, § 29(E) of the Constitution of Louisiana to maintain public retirement systems on a sound actuarial basis.” La. R.S. 11:2. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. La. Assessors’ Retirement and Relief Fund, 05-2548 (La.10/1/07), 986 So.2d 1 (generally discussing establishment of consolidated public retirement systems).
To comply with the constitutional mandate, the legislature established employee contribution rates. See La. R.S. 11:62. [409]*409La. R.S. 11:233(B)(1) falls within Chapter 4 of Title 11, titled “Provisions "Affecting More Than One System,” which specifically applies to FRS and other public, retirement or pensions systems, funds, and plans. La. R.S. 11:233(B)(1) obligates cities and public bodies to make pension contributions on “earnings or earned or earna-ble compensation, or its equivalent,” which “shall mean the full amount earned by an employee for a given pay period.” La. R.S. 11:233(B)(2) then lists types of compensation specifically excluded from the definition of “earnable compensation.” La. R.S. 11:233 provides,, in pertinent part:
A. The provisions of this Section shall apply to the following public retirement or pension systems, funds, and plans:
(1) Firefighters’ - Retirement. System
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|fiB. (1) ... [F]or purposes of' calculation of the amount of contributions payable by an employer and employee and ' for computation of average compensation, earnings or earned or earnable compensation, or its equivalent, shall mean the full amount earned by an employee for a given pay period.
(2) Earnings or earned or earnable compensation shall not inclüdé:
(a) Overtime unless it is required to be worked in the employee’s regular tour of duty;
(b) Operating expenses;
(c) Use of automobile or motor vehicles;
(d) The cost of any insurance paid by the employer;
(e) Any allowance for expenses incurred as an incident of employment;
(f) Payments made in lieu of unused annual or sick leave; and ;
(g) Bonuses, terminal pay, severance .pay, deferred salary, or any other type of irregular or nonrecurring payment.
Id. (emphasis added).'
La. R.S. 11:233 is not the only statute relevant to our interpretation of what is included in a Firefighter’s “earned or earnable compensation.” In La. R.S. 11:2252, which falls under Chapter 9 of Title 11 and governs FRS specifically, the legislature stated: ‘“Earnable compensation’ shall mean the full amount of compensation earned by an employee on a regular tour of duty, including supplemental pay paid, by the state of Louisiana, but shall not include overtime.” La. R.S. ll:2252(9)(a). (emphasis added).
Kenner has: sought review of the court of appeal’s ruling, arguing that none of the types of compensation' at issue in this case are “earnable compensation” under La. R.S. 11:233. Specifically, Kenner argues that “earnable compensation” does not include educational incentive pay, seniority .incentive- pay, holiday pay, or acting pay, because these types .of pay are gratuitous bonuses, irregular and/or nonrecurring payments, and not earned during a regular tour of duty. The Firefighters argue that the four types of compensation at issue in this case should all be considered “earna-ble compensation” for purposes of calculating their pension contributions under La. R.S. 11:233.
| '¡ANALYSIS
Legislation is the solemn expression of the legislative will; thus, the interpretation-of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98-0601, p. 15 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198; La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 09-0023, p. 8 (La.6/26/09), 17 So.3d 350, 355-56. See also La. R.S. 24:177(B)(1) (“The text of a law is the best [410]*410evidence of legislative intent”). When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. La. R.S. 1:4. The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. See, e.g., Cat’s Meow, 98-0601, p. 15, 720 So.2d at 1198; Timbermen, 09-0023, p. 8, 17 So.3d at 356. Pension statutes, like those at issue here, are remedial in nature and must bé liberally construed in favor of the intended beneficiaries. Swift v. State, 342 So.2d 191, 196 (La.1977). Any ambiguity in such statutes must be resolved in favor of the personé intended to be benefited by those statutes. Id. ’Additionally, “all laws pertaining to the same subject matter must be interpreted in pan mate-ña, or in reference to each other.” See, e.g., State v. Williams, 10-1514 (La.3/15/11), 60 So.3d 1189, 1191; La. C.C. art. 13.
La: R.S. 11:233 and La. R.S. 11:2252(9) áre to be read in pañ mateñd-, because they both relate directly to calculation of pension benefit contributions for firefighters. These statutes make clear that there are certain kinds of compensation on which contributions are due, and certain kinds of compensation on which contributions are not due. Compensation on which contributions are due must first be “earnings or earned or earnable compensation,” which “shall mean the full amount earned by an employee for a given pay period” (Lá. R.S. 11:233(B)(1)) and “the full amount of compensation earned by an employee on a regular tour of | «duty, including supplemental pay paid by the state of Louisiana” (La. R.S. 2252(9)(a)). Additionally, under La. R.S. 11:233(B)(2), the- “earnings-' or earned or earnable compensation” must be something other than the categories excluded from the calculation, including unused sick leave, deferred salary, overtime, a bonus, or “any other type of irregular or nonrecurring payment,”
We first turn to the meaning of “earna-ble” compensation, which is defined in the statutes themselves. As noted above, La. R.S. 11:233(B)(1) states that earnable compensation “shall mean the full amount earned by an employee for a. given pay period.” Id. (emphasis added). Likewise, La. R.S. ll:2252(9)(a) defines earnable compensation as “the full amount of compensation earned by an employee on a regular tour of duty.” Id. (emphasis added). The phráse “full amount” is only limited by the terms “for a given pay period” and “oh a regular tour of duty,” and by the expressly excluded categories set forth in La. R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(a)-(g).
This Court previously analyzed the term “earnable compensation” in the context of the Teachers’ Retirement System, in a case in which the plaintiff sought a declaratory, judgment that her supplemental salary was a component of earnable compensation for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. Fishbein, 898 So.2d at 1264 (interpreting La. R.S. 11:701(10)). In that case, the controlling pension statute did not expressly .include or exclude supplemental salary as earnable compensation. Rather, the statute required that the salary be earned during the member’s “full normal forking time as a teacher.” La. R.S. 11:701(10). The Fishbein Court held that the supplemental compensation was earned during the plaintiffs “full normal working time,” and paid to the plaintiff “based upon the market conditions and the responsibilities she undertook.” See Fishbein, 04-2482, p. 18, 898 So.2d at 1271. The Court also found that supplemental pay was “not sufficiently analogous” to any of the items of pay expressly excluded in the statute, 898 So.2d at 1272. Fishbein is instructive here insofar as it examines the ^supplemental pay at [411]*411issue both.- in connection with whether it is “earnable” and whether it is “analogous” to the excluded types of pay listed in La. R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(g).
Though it is not defined in- La. R.S. 11:233 or La. R.S. 11:2252, the term “regular tour of duty” is defined in the federal context as “a firefighter’s official work schedule, as established by the employing agency on a regular and recurring basis,. The tour of duty may consist of a fixed number of. hours each week or a fixed recurring cycle of work schedules in which the number of hours per week varies in a repeating pattern.” 5 C.F.R. 550.1302. The Kenner Firefighters woi’k 212-hours over a-28-day period.5
The general pension statute also sets forth what items are not included in earnable compensation. “Overtime” is not included “unless it is required to be worked in the employee’s regular .tour of duty.” La. R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(a). ■ Additionally, certain other categories are expressly excluded, as set forth in -La. R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(b)-(g). These include operating expenses, insurance paid by. the employer, payments made in lieu of unused annual or sick leavé, and “bonuses, terminal pay, severance pay, deferred- salary, or any other type of irregular or nonrecurring payment.” La. R.S. 11:233(B)(2) (emphasis added). The terms “irregular” and “nonrecurring” are unambiguous. For purposes of statutory interpretation,dictionaries are a valuable source for determining the “common and approved usage of words.” .Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co., 02-1-138, p. 7 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 959, 964. Merriam-Webster defines “irregular” as “not-normal or usual: not following-the usual rules- about what should be done,” and “happening or done at’different times that change often”; it defines “nonrecurring”' as “unlikely to happen again.” See “irregular” and “nonrecurring,” | ipMerriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2015, available at http://www. merriam-webster.com. These terms are capable of plain language interpretation.
A straightforward reading of the statutes in pari materia makes clear that to qualify as compensation eligible for contribution calculation, the earnings are (1) “earned or earnable compensation” — specifically, the earnings are the “full amount” of compensation earned “for a given pay period” or “on a regular tour of duty”— and (2) the earnings are not expressly excluded from the calculation by the list in La. R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(a)-(g) or by the “catch all” provision of “irregular and nonrecurring” in La. U:233(B)(2)(g). We find that.these statutes are clear and unambiguous. The words in the statutes, and the statutes as a whole, can be interpreted and understood according to their plain language. Sep Fishbein, 04-2482, 898 So.2d 1260 (finding no ambiguity, in interpreting the term “earnable compensation” in connection with the Teachers’ Retirement System),6
[412]*412The motions at issue here are motions for summary judgment, and we are therefore cognizant of the standard of review for such motions. A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. It is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate; i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reynolds v. Bordelon, 14-2371 (La.6/30/15), 172 So.3d 607. We will now review each of the types of payment in turn.
| ^Educational Incentive Pay
Educational incentive pay is compensation paid to firefighters who complete certain education requirements, including college degrees or other prerequisite educational certifications determined by Kenner. See La. R.S. 33:2586 (authorizing establishment of “a plan for awarding incentive pay” and noting that the pay “shall be in addition to any other salary the classified employee is entitled to receive from the municipality, the state, or any other governmental entity”). The pay is calculated annually and paid monthly,' in 12 separate and equal installments, to qualifying Firefighters. The court of appeal found that educational incentive pay is “earned compensation” within the meaning of La. R.S. 11:233, and we agree.
First, educational incentive pay constitutes “earnings or earned or earnable compensation.” Kenner claims that the word “incentive” itself demonstrates that educational incentive pay is in the nature of a bonus, but we disagree. Accepting this argument would conflict with a guiding principle of our statutory interpretation: when a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written. La. R.S. 1:4. Kenner’s interpretation of “incentive” in this context would lead to absurd consequences, because it would permit Kenner, at its own discretion, to label types of compensation as a “bonus” in order to circumvent pension contributions.7
Here, as in Fishbein, the Firefighters “earned” the educational incentive pay, because it is based on additional education of the Firefighters. In exchange for the payments, the educational incentive pay plan provides Kenner with the benefits of an enhanced fire protection and emergency response force.8 The Firefighters |1g“eam” this pay and receive it as part of the “full amount” of compensation earned “for a given pay period” or “on a regular tour of duty.” See La. R.S. 11:233(B)(1); La. R.S. 11:2252(9)(a). Kenner cannot change the nature of the payment simply by giving it a name similar to a “bonus.”
[413]*413Further, the educational incentivé payments are not “irregular” and “nonrecurring” such that they would fall under the catch-all provision of La, R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(g). The evidence submitted by the Firefighters in support, of their motion for summary judgment makes clear that the payments were submitted monthly to qualifying Firefighters, in a routine manner that is scheduled to occur for as long as the Firefighters qualify and funds are available.9 Kenner submitted no contradictory evidence either in support of its motion for summary judgment or in opposition to the Firefighters’ motion for summary judgment that would carry its burden of demonstrating that the educational incentive pay program was anything other than an earned, regular payment. Finally, as noted by the court of appeal, the legislature’s' decision not to specifically exclude educational incentive pay from the definition of “earnable compensation” in the list of exclusions in La. R.S. 11:233(B)(2) further supports the conclusion that it is included as earnable compensation. See Fishbein, 898 So.2d at 1272.
| Seniority Incentive Pay
Kenner developed and implemented the Seniority Incentive Pay Program in 1995 to incentivize experienced firefighters to remain with the fire service. Seniority incentive pay is paid once a year in January to Firefighters who have completed an additional 12 months of service.10 An employee who separates from the fire service any time within the calendar year receives no seniority incentive pay for that year.
Kenner asserts that seniority incentive pay is “not connected in any manner whatsoever” to a Firefighter’s rank, the number of hours worked, or services rendered, and therefore argues-it is “obviously” in the nature of a bonus intended to retain experienced employees and excluded from contribution calculations • under La. R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(g). As with educational incentive pay, this argument leads to the absurd result that Kenner could label payment types with the intent of excluding them from pension contributions.' Also as with educational incentive pay, we find that the seniority incentive pay is “earned compensation.” In order to “earn” the payments, Firefighters are required to meet certain prerequisites, in the form of years of service to Kenner. As with educational incentive pay and with the supplemental pay discussed in Fishbein, seniority incentive pay is remunerative because, in [414]*414exchange for the payments, Kenner retains more experienced firefighters.11 Seniority incentive pay qualifies as a portion of the “full amount” earned by a Firefighter on his tour of duty, because even though it is paid only once a year, a Firefighter does not receive the payment unless he completes each of his required tours of duty.
|! .(Further supporting the argument that this type of compensation is “earned,” Kenner’s seniority incentive pay is similar to the state.statutory longevity statute described in La. R.S. 33:1992. , Pursuant to this statute, after the third year of service and for each additional year of service up to and including twenty years, a firefighter receives an annual two percent increase in salary. La. R.S. 33:1992(B). This statutory. increase is included as earnable compensation, because the two percent increase is part of the Firefighters’ “minimum salaries,” and is therefore included in the “full amount” the Firefighters earn, And, as with educational incentive pay, the legislature’s decision not to specifically exclude incentive pay from the definition of “earnable compensation” in the list in La. R.S. 11:233(B)(2) further supports its categorization as “earnable.”
Seniority incentive pay is not “irregular” or “nonrecurring” under Lá. R.S. 11:2252(9). Payments that Firefighters are promised, expect, and in fact receive annually are not, 'by their plain language, “irregular” or “nonrecurring.” Evidence attached to the Firefighters’ motion for summary judgment also makes clear that the payments were regularly paid by Ken-ner and received by the Firefighters, and is to continue as long as the funds are available.12
Holiday Pay
Holiday pay is compensation mandated by statute for firefighters who are required to work on holidays. La. R.S. 33:1999.13 We agree with the court of |isappeal that holiday pay qualifies as “earnable compensation,” because it is a remunerative, non-gratuitous payment made to compensate and reward, firefighters who work during holidays — a plain language understanding of the term “earned.”
We first find that holiday pay was “earned.” It comprises the “full amount” [415]*415of the compensation a Firefighter receives as part of a regular tour of duty. In fact, the Louisiana Attorney General has previously opined that holiday pay is “earned,” describing it as a “collectively bargained for benefit” that is “part of the overall compensation paid to firefighters as part of their earned compensation pursuant to reciprocal contractual obligations under the respective [bargaining] agreements.” La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 07-0280 (Dee. 14, 2007) (emphasis added).14 As the Attorney General notes, there is a “public purpose” for the payments, and cities receive “equivalent value in the form of fire protection throughout the year.” Id, We adopt the Attorney General’s rationale in this context and find that the' payments are earned by the Firefighters on a regular tour of duty and are part of the “full amount” of earned compensation.15
Second, holiday pay is not “irregular” or “nonrecurring.” Kenner argued that it is by its nature irregular, because a Firefighter’s regular tour of duty rotates over various shifts on a 28-day cycle, and a Firefighter may or may not be required to work on a specific holiday in a given year. This argument fails, because it both ignores both that these 28-day cycles are part of a Firefighter’s “regular tour of duty,” and that La. R.S. 33:1999(B) provides that firefighters “shall be entitled to | is,not less than ten holidays per year,” which reveals some amount of regularity in the scheduling of holidays among Firefighters. This is the case in practice as well, as made clear in á study attached to the Firefighters’ motion for summary judgment. The study reported that 56 out of 57 (98.2%) Firefighters over the course of a three-year study received some type of holiday pay. See 14-113, p. 18, 170 So.3d at 1075 (noting that “almost all firefighters included in the. study worked on holidays and, as mandated by statute, received holiday pay”). Finally, something “irregular” is “not normal or usual,” and something “nonrecurring” is “unlikely to happen again.” See supra at 410-12. Neither of these definitions applies to holiday pay as presented in this case and, because holiday pay is not analogous to a gratuitous bonus insofar as Kenner receives a reciprocal benefit, holiday pay is not within the exclusions of La. R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(g).16
[416]*416
Acting Pag
Every fire service employee has a permanent civil service classification. A firefighter earns “acting pay” when he or she fills in for an absent colleague who holds a higher civil service classification. The firefighter is then paid more in accordance with that higher classification. In other words, during temporary and permanent vacancies in positions, firefighters “act” in the absence of another firefighter. See La. R.S. 38:2496(2) (mandating “acting” appointments over 30 days “shall, for the duration of the temporary employment, enjoy the class title and be entitled and receive the rate of pay for the class and position'in which he is | ^employed”) (emphasis added). We agree with the court of appeal and find that acting pay is part of the “full amount” a Firefighter earns on a regular tour of duty, and is not irregular, nonrecurring, or otherwise part of the La. R.S. ll:2252(B)(2)(g) catch-all provision.
Acting pay is “earnable compensation” within the meaning of La. R.S. 11:233 and La. R.S. 11:2252(9). It meets all of the qualifications for “earnable compensation,” including that it is part of the “full amount” of compensation a Firefighter receives based on direct work he performs as part of a regular tour of duty. These additional responsibilities are non-gratuitous and paid, and therefore comprise the “full amount” of earned compensation.
Kenner focuses on the argument that acting pay is irregular and nonrecurring under La. R.S. ll:233(B)(2)(g), because, according to Kenner, employees can decline the temporary appointment, and there is no specific schedule and no guarantee of an assignment to a higher classification. This argument is incorrect. Even if “acting” pay is temporary and not guaranteed, the increased differential rate of pay constitutes the “full amount of compensation earned” by a Firefighter on a regular tour of duty during the time of the “acting” role. Moreover, evidence attached to the Firefighters’ motion for summary judgment makes clear that this type of pay is not “irregular” in any sense — it is not abnormal or unusual for a Firefighter to receive acting pay. Nearly 90 percent of Firefighters earned acting pay over a three-year period. Though the amount may vary by. appointment, rank, and time served in the “acting” role, the acting pay comprises the full amount of compensation earned on a regular tour of duty.17
^jj^DECEEE
For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the trial court erred in granting Ken-ner’s motion for summary judgment on each of the four types of compensation at issue — educational incentive pay, seniority incentive pay, holiday pay, and acting pay — and denying the Firefighters’ cross-motion for summary judgment. We further hold that the court of appeal was correct to find no genuine issues of material fact that the four payment types must be included as “earnable compensation” and that the Firefighters were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and to its rendering of summary judgment in favor of the Firefighters. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeal.
AFFIRMED