Charlie Caldwell Jr., Shreveport City Marshal and the Shreveport City Marshal's Office v. the City of Shreveport

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Charlie Caldwell Jr., Shreveport City Marshal and the Shreveport City Marshal's Office v. the City of Shreveport

Supreme Court of Louisiana·Decided November 17, 2023·No. 2023-C-00182·Published

Opinion

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #050

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 17th day of November, 2023 are as follows: BY Griffin, J.:

2023-C-00182 CHARLIE CALDWELL JR., SHREVEPORT CITY MARSHAL AND THE SHREVEPORT CITY MARSHAL'S OFFICE VS. THE CITY OF SHREVEPORT (Parish of Caddo)

REVERSED AND RENDERED. SEE OPINION.

Hughes, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

Crain, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

McCallum, J., additionally concurs.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2023-C-00182

CHARLIE CALDWELL JR., SHREVEPORT CITY MARSHAL AND THE SHREVEPORT CITY MARSHAL'S OFFICE

VS.

THE CITY OF SHREVEPORT

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo

GRIFFIN, J.

We granted this writ to clarify the statutory funding obligations of the City of Shreveport (“the City”) to the Shreveport City Marshal (“the Marshal”). Based on the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions, we find La. R.S. 13:1889 requires only that the City fund the operation and maintenance expenses of the physical offices of the Marshal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Marshal filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, damages arguing that, for over a decade, the City has failed to satisfy its obligation to fund all reasonable and necessary expenses of the Marshal’s office.1 The Marshal further avers the City has only provided housekeeping and limited maintenance services; paid for the utilities for the court building where the Marshal’s office is located;2 and paid the salaries of the Marshal and his deputies. To partially cover the alleged deficit, the Marshal made use of an account provided for under La. R.S. 13:1899(C) and funded by revenues generated by additional costs assessed in city court criminal matters.

1 The Marshal originally sought damages from 2008 through 2020; however, the trial court granted an exception of prescription and all claims prior to 2010 were dismissed. 2 Testimony adduced at trial established the City provides these services to the Marshal through Shreveport Public Assembly & Recreation (“SPAR”) rather than budgetary allocations.

The trial court ruled that, under La. R.S. 13:1889, the City owes the Marshal expenses of operation and maintenance.3 Specifically, the trial court determined that the Marshal had “unfunded expenses” in the total amount of $8,854,670.92 over the relevant time period. From this amount, the trial court made a series of deductions. It deducted $23,109.00 as expenses deemed unreasonable by the Marshal’s auditor. It deducted $3,676,414.08 for the vehicle expenses noting that the City is only statutorily required to pay for and maintain one vehicle for the Marshal. See La. R.S. 13:2084. Further, it deducted $567,574.99 for expenses associated with the Peabody Building (a training facility for new deputies) for which the City was not contractually responsible. Finally, the trial court deducted $3,060,201.27 in funds received under La. R.S. 13:1899(C) which are required to be used for defrayment of operational and equipment expenses (“Defrayment Funds”). Thus, after deductions, the trial court awarded a total amount of $1,527,371.58.

The Marshal appealed arguing the trial court erred in allocating his Defrayment Funds as a payment of the City’s obligation to fund the Marshal’s operation and maintenance expenses. The court of appeal agreed, reversed the trial court, and increased the judgment by the amount of the Defrayment Funds to a

3 In its written reasons, the trial court cited a series of attorney general opinions rendered in response to prior requests of the Marshal to clarify the City’s funding obligations under La. R.S. 13:1889. Notably, the attorney general’s “office has continually recognized that the city is primarily responsible for all obligations incurred by the city court and city marshal’s office for its operating expenses with the sole proviso that such obligations are ‘reasonable and necessary.’” La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 17-0004 (10/19/17), 2017 WL 4986214; see also La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 10-0180 (9/3/10), 2010 WL 4149386 (“[i]t is the opinion of [the attorney general’s] office that the use of the word ‘shall’ in La. R.S. 13:1889 means the City of Shreveport has a mandatory duty to provide suitable offices for the marshal, and to fund the operational expenses of the office”).

As will be discussed later in this opinion, we disagree with this interpretation to the extent it requires the City to fund “operational expenses” beyond providing and maintaining the physical offices occupied by the Marshal. See Dunn v. City of Kenner, 15-1175, p. 15 n. 14 (La. 1/27/16), 187 So.3d 404, 415 n. 14 (attorney general opinions are merely advisory and not binding on courts).

total of $4,587,572.85. Caldwell v. City of Shreveport, 54,770, pp. 10-11 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/16/22), 352 So.3d 108, 112-113.

The City’s writ application to this Court followed, which we granted.

Caldwell v. City of Shreveport, 23-0182 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So.3d 966.

DISCUSSION

The issue before this Court is the extent to which the City is statutorily obligated to fund the operation of the Marshal’s office. Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. Benjamin v. Zeichner, 12-1763, p. 5 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 197, 201.

NO CAUSE OF ACTION

At oral argument this Court raised the issue of whether a cause of action may properly exist to retroactively recover, beyond the fiscal year claimed to be inadequately funded, for budgetary allocations allegedly owed by the City. See La. C.C.P. art. 927(B) (failure to disclose a cause of action may be noticed by an appellate court on its own motion). An exception of no cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged. Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 12-2742, p. 24 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 876, 895. The parties timely submitted requested supplemental briefing on this issue.

The Louisiana Constitution authorizes local governmental subdivisions to adopt home rule charters. La. Const. art. VI, § 5(A). A home rule charter so adopted provides “the structure and organization, powers, and functions of the government of the local governmental subdivision, which may include the exercise of any power and performance of any function necessary, requisite, or proper for the management of its affairs not denied by general law or inconsistent with [the Louisiana Constitution.]” La. Const. art. VI, § 5(E). A “political subdivision shall cause to be prepared a comprehensive budget presenting a complete financial plan

for each fiscal year for the general fund and each special revenue fund.” La. R.S. 39:1305(A). “The total of proposed expenditures shall not exceed the total of estimated funds available for the ensuing fiscal year.” La. R.S. 39:1305(E). Political subdivisions operating under a home rule charter may require more extensive financial planning and budgeting practices beyond the statutory minimums set forth in the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act (“LLGBA”). See La. R.S. 39:1303(A).

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