Michael Campbell v. Township of North Brunswick

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 24, 2024
• Docket: 24-1447
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-1447 __________

MICHAEL A. CAMPBELL, Appellant

v.

TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BRUNSWICK; MAYOR FRANCIS MAC WOMACK; CHIEF JOSEPH BATTAGLIA; CAPTAIN CORDELL HARRIS; PATROLMAN JASON VALLESE; PBA LOCAL 160 ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-23-cv-01167) District Judge: Honorable Robert Kirsch ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 19, 2024 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 24, 2024) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se Appellant Michael A. Campbell was employed as a police officer with the

North Brunswick Police Department from 2002 to 2020. In December 2018, he filed a

lawsuit in the Superior Court of New Jersey in which he brought discrimination and

hostile work environment claims against a subset of the Defendants in the instant

proceeding. Judgment in that case was entered in May 2021.

In February 2023, Campbell initiated the instant proceeding in which he presented

racial discrimination (African-American), retaliation, and hostile work environment

claims. He alleged that he documented an illegal room search conducted by other

officers at the Farrington Inn in North Brunswick, and that he reported the incident

shortly thereafter. He further alleged malfeasance related to racial profiling and a ticket

quota system.

Campbell brought his claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 42

U.S.C. § 12203; the Fourteenth Amendment; the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

(“NJLAD”); the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), and the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990. He also brought a number of claims under state law, and a

conspiracy claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241. The Defendants filed a motion for judgment on

the pleadings, which the District Court granted. Campbell filed a timely notice of appeal.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review

over a district court’s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and will affirm

only if “the movant clearly establishes there are no material issues of fact, and he is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214,

219–20 (3d Cir. 2005). “We must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the

2 inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.

at 220. We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Fairview Twp. v. EPA,

773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).

We will affirm the District Court’s judgment in all respects. First, the District

Court correctly concluded that the bulk of Campbell’s claims were barred by the

applicable statutes of limitations under New Jersey law: one year for his CEPA claim and

two years for his NJLAD, Fourteenth Amendment, and ADA claims. It arrived at this

conclusion after determining that: the latest event underlying Campbell’s claims occurred

on May 1, 2020—the date of his retirement from the North Brunswick Police

Department—and he filed his initial complaint on February 28, 2023, nearly three years

later.

Similarly, the District Court rightly concluded that Campbell’s Title VII claim was

precluded by the principle of res judicata, New Jersey’s “entire controversy” rule, and his

state court case. See Hoffman v. Nordic Nats., Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2016)

(discussing the principle of res judicata); Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d

132, 139–42 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing New Jersey’s “entire controversy” rule). After

determining that Campbell could have requested his right-to-sue letter 180 days after he

filed his EEOC charge, or asked the Superior Court for a stay while he waited for the

outcome of his EEOC proceeding, the District Court found that “even though he had not

yet received his right-to-sue letter at the time the Superior Court entered its final

judgment . . . [Campbell] could have, and should have, brought his Title VII claim in

Superior Court. His failure to do so precludes his Title VII claim in the present suit.”

3 Lastly, the District Court correctly determined that Campbell lacked standing to

bring a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241 as there is no private cause of action under this

statute. It also accurately reasoned that, with respect to all of Campbell’s claims,

granting leave to amend would be futile because of the above-mentioned issues of

untimeliness, preclusion, and lack of standing.

In his brief, Campbell does not present legal arguments challenging the District

Court’s reasoning, and instead reiterates his claims while emphasizing the lower standard

to which he should be held as a pro se litigant. Campbell also filed a letter to the Court

on July 18, 2024, in which he alleges that the Defendants have committed new acts of

harassment, moral turpitude, and witness intimidation, and asks the Court to investigate

his claims. In response, the Defendants filed a letter in which they deny Campbell’s

allegations of wrongdoing and correctly state that this Court is not the appropriate forum

for Campbell to articulate these fresh concerns. To the extent Campbell seeks to

introduce new facts or add claims, we cannot consider them absent exceptional

circumstances not present here. See United States v. Anthony Dell’Aquilla, Enters. &

Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 1998).

Upon review, we concur with the District Court’s conclusions, for the reasons that

it provided related to preclusion, untimeliness, and lack of standing. Accordingly, we

will affirm its judgment. We deny Campbell’s request to investigate the allegations that

he presents in his July 18, 2024, letter to the Court.