Micah Campbell v. The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, University of North Carolina Board of Governors, Tine E. Vires, in her individual capacity, Susan Wise, in her individual capacity

• Court: District Court, M.D. North Carolina
• Decided: May 22, 2026
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00948
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MICAH CAMPBELL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH ) CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO, ) 1:24CV948 UNIVERSITY OF NORTH ) CAROLINA BOARD OF ) GOVERNORS, TINE E. VIRES, ) in her individual capacity, SUSAN ) WISE, in her individual capacity, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The plaintiff, Micah Campbell, is a violated federal and state law during Black man who attended the his time on campus. University of North Carolina at Greensboro in 2024. Campbell, who The defendants have moved to suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress dismiss the Second Amended Disorder, had a service dog named Complaint. Because the facts as pled, Aspen who accompanied him taken in the light most favorable to everywhere on campus. At various Campbell, do not support relief, the times, university employees and Court should grant the defendants’ students made comments to motion and dismiss this matter with Campbell questioning his need for prejudice, as set forth below. Aspen, or interacted directly with Aspen, both of which caused I. FACTS Campbell emotional distress. Campbell advised University Because all well-pled facts are personnel about these incidents, and accepted as true and considered in the they did not take the corrective action light most favorable to the plaintiff, he requested. Based on this, Campbell what follows are the facts as Campbell alleges that the defendants variously has alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, Docket Entry 14. See and students asked him questions Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. about Aspen. On January 5, 2024, he Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d was trying to find a bathroom in the 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Elliot University Center Building on campus. Id. ¶ 17. Aspen was with In 2019, Campbell was diagnosed Campbell and wearing a “clearly with post-traumatic stress disorder visible harness identifying her as a (“PTSD”). Second Am. Compl. ¶ 9. service animal.” Id. An employee When he experiences an episode stationed at the Information Desk related to his PTSD, he may “accosted” Campbell “and demanded experience tension in his body, to know what specific tasks Aspen, detachment from reality (including [Campbell’s] service dog, was trained time and space), inability to hear to perform.” Id. Campbell other people, and increased experienced “immediate and severe irritability or aggression. Id. ¶ 10. anxiety, rendering him temporarily Campbell’s PSTD affects his ability to unable to respond.” Id. ¶ 18. learn, read, concentrate, think, and communicate. Id. ¶ 11. Aspen is The employee continued, “‘A lot of Campbell’s service dog who is trained people pretend that they have a to detect a PTSD episode, warn disability and that their dog is a Campbell, help him cope, and assist service animal when the dog is not him in a quick and safe recovery. Id. trained, and the individual does not ¶ 12. have the need for the animal.’” Id. “‘If your dog is not actually a service Campbell was accepted to the animal, we will have to shut all the University of North Carolina at food facilities down because of your Greensboro (“UNCG” or “University”) animal.’” Id. She asked, “‘You can and began taking classes in the Spring understand why I stopped you?’” Id. of 2024. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. After his Once Campbell overcame his anxiety, acceptance, he contacted UNCG’s he responded and explained that Office of Accessibility Resources and Aspen was a service dog trained to Services (“OARS”) about his diagnosis assist him with PTSD. Id. ¶ 19. and his need for Aspen to be on campus with him. Id. ¶¶ 5, 14, 15. The University’s Animals on Campus UNCG approved Campbell’s request Policy directed students to report a and allowed Aspen to live in student concern about disability housing and accompany Campbell in discrimination or harassment. Id. and around campus. Id. ¶ 16. ¶ 22 n.2. Having experienced “significant emotional distress” from A. January 5, 2024 incident the interaction with the employee at the Information Desk, Campbell Shortly after Campbell began reported the incident that evening to attending UNCG, though, employees Susan Wise, the Assistant Director of OARS. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22. Wise Campbell a specific timeline or any “acknowledged the seriousness of Mr. further details. Id. Campbell’s concerns and agreed to investigate the matter.” Id. ¶ 22. C. January 25, 2024 incident Campbell emailed Wise additional details and requested a formal On January 25, 2024, while Campbell response from the University about and Aspen were at the “Pita Pit” on the employee’s conduct.1 Id. The campus, a University employee who University took no immediate was returning to work stopped and remedial action. Id. began talking to Aspen while Campbell was getting a drink. Id. ¶ 29. B. January 16, 2024 incident This interaction distracted Aspen from her duties and created a On January 16, 2024, while Campbell potential risk to Campbell’s health was on campus with Aspen, a and safety. Id. University employee approached and questioned him about the necessity of As he had done before, Campbell Aspen. Id. ¶ 23. Simultaneously, a reported this incident to Wise and student attempted to distract Aspen expressed concern that it was at least by calling out to her and trying to pet the third incident in the past few her. Id. ¶ 24. At the time, Aspen was weeks. Id. ¶ 30. He “explicitly wearing her “garments” identifying requested” that Wise follow up with her as a working service animal who him, “but no meaningful resolution should not be disturbed. Id. These was provided.” Id. Campbell interactions triggered Campbell’s continued to email Wise, telling her PTSD, and he immediately that “the repeated harassment about experienced “heightened anxiety, Aspen” was causing him “frustration, difficulty concentrating, and physical stress, embarrassment, and manifestations of stress.” Id. ¶ 25. emotional distress” and that he was concerned that Aspen’s ability to Campbell reported to Wise “the attend to his medical needs could be ongoing issues he was experiencing.” compromised. Id. ¶ 31. Id. ¶ 28. She told him that “UNCG would work on training school staff In response, Wise told Campbell that and students on service animal the University “was working on policies, procedures, and best retraining staff in the food areas and practices.” Id. But Wise did not give that flyers had been posted around campus to educate students about appropriate interactions with service animals.” Id. ¶ 32. But Campbell saw

1 Campbell first refers to this employee as Am. Compl. ¶ 17, but later refers to her as stationed at the Information Desk of the a bookstore employee, id. ¶ 22. Elliot University Center Building, Second “no noticeable improvement.” Id. and investigating the complaint, Wise Wise also asked Campbell to speak suggested that Campbell contact the with the manager of dining services security guard’s employer. Id. ¶ 39. about his experiences, but Campbell declined due to his coursework and E. March 27, 2024 incident exams. Id. ¶ 33. Instead, he asked Wise to share his emails with the On March 27, 2024, Campbell was appropriate people, and she agreed to ordering lunch in the Elliot University do so. Id. Campbell told her that he Center when an employee asked if would be willing to talk with Aspen was a seeing eye dog. Id. ¶ 40. individuals if the incidents continued. Aspen was “wearing garments Id. identifying her as a service animal.” Id. Campbell told the employee that D. February 16, 2024 incident Aspen was his service dog. Id. The employee continued, “‘Which type is Several weeks later, on February 16, she?’” Id. Campbell told the employee 2024, Campbell, a friend, and Aspen that Aspen assisted with his PTSD. Id. attended a baseball game on campus. Then the employee announced to his Id. ¶ 34. Upon their arrival, a security coworkers and Campbell that he guard followed them and, in a “loud, hated dogs and did not understand dismissive, and aggressive tone,” why they were allowed in the building. asked about Aspen’s status as a Id. One of those coworkers who service animal. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35, 39. He appeared embarrassed “immediately erroneously concluded that Aspen corrected his behavior.” Id. was an “‘emotional support animal’” and claimed Campbell brought Aspen Campbell contacted Justin Meadows2 so he could “‘hang out with [his] little about the incident. Id. ¶ 41. buddy.’” Id. ¶ 36 (alteration in Interrupting Campbell’s breakfast to original). Meanwhile, at least three provide his business card and contact white individuals with dogs were also information, Meadows assured at the game but no one subjected Campbell he would be treated lawfully them to the same treatment as going forward and “insisted that Mr. Campbell. Id. ¶ 37. Campbell immediately contact him if another incident occurred.” Id. ¶¶ 41, As the University’s Events 44. Meadows also suggested Accessibility Policy instructed, Campbell speak with the dining Campbell emailed Wise about “his services management. Id. ¶ 41. inability to access the baseball game free from discrimination and Campbell called Meadows, but he harassment.” Id. ¶¶ 38 n.3, 39. never answered the calls or responded Instead of following University policy to the voicemails. Id. ¶ 42. “As a

2 Campbell does not provide any he worked, his role, or why Campbell information about Meadows – for whom contacted him. result, Mr. Campbell notified Mr. employees on the two questions they Meadows that he did not want to were permitted to ask under the ADA speak to the management team.” Id. and to dispel the misconception that ¶ 43. Having to reiterate his all service animals are ‘seeing eye complaints despite following dogs.’” Id. ¶ 47. She told Campbell University policy “further “she was working to have flyers placed exacerbated his PTSD symptoms, around campus to increase anxiety, and inability to access . . . awareness,” but she took no concrete UNCG’s programs and services free actions “to address the systemic from discrimination.” Id. issues.” Id. ¶ 48. Upon Campbell’s information and belief, “UNCG took Campbell emailed Wise and Tina no further action to address” the Vires, the Director of OARS, and reported incidents. Id. ¶ 50. expressed his belief that UNCG’s efforts to address the discrimination As a result of all of these incidents, were insufficient. Id. ¶ 45. He shared Campbell “significantly reduced or his frustration that the information eliminated his use of the privileges Wise and Meadows gave him and benefits of the university.” Id. conflicted with the information dining ¶ 51.3 On campus, he only went to services employees and supervisors class and to his room. Id. He stopped were giving him. Id. The employees dining on campus. Id. He only and supervisors were telling him that attended sporting events if his father “‘there were no discussions or or girlfriend went with him. Id. He training being conducted’” associated “benched himself” from participating with his complaints. Id. in UNCG’s Esports CS2 team. Id. ¶ 52. He “took deliberate steps to minimize These were not the only employees his visibility and potential exposure” talking with Campbell. See id. ¶ 46. to additional incidents. Id. Campbell also told Wise and Vires Ultimately, he moved off campus. Id. that other employees told him the ¶ 54. He was then ineligible for University was not taking his student health insurance and could complaints seriously and was, not access his mental health provider. instead, checking security camera Id.; see also id. ¶ 53. footage first to see if Campbell was “‘fabricating another incident.’” Id. II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE This information “further exacerbated Mr. Campbell’s On November 14, 2024, Campbell emotional distress.” Id. filed suit in this District against the defendants. Compl., Docket Entry 1. Vires responded and said that “OARS He amended the Complaint twice, see was working to train university First Amended Complaint, Docket

3 Campbell does not allege when he took any of these actions. Entry 8, and filed the operative defendants collectively moved to Second Amended Complaint on dismiss the Second Amended March 28, 2025. Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. See Mot. to Dismiss, He alleges that UNCG and the Docket Entry 16. University of North Carolina Board of Governors (“Board of Governors”) III. DISCUSSION violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 504 of the Rehabilitation Act complaint must contain sufficient (“Section 504”). Second Am. Compl. factual matter, accepted as true, to ¶¶ 55-83 (ADA claim against UNCG), ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible ¶¶ 84-99 (ADA claim against the on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 Board of Governors); ¶¶ 100-26 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell (Section 504 claim against UNCG and Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, the Board of Governors). 570 (2007)). Legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” He also alleges that UNCG and the that amount to more than Board of Governors violated Title VI “unadorned, the-defendant- of the Civil Rights Act by unlawfully-harmed-me discriminating against him on the accusation[s].” Id. (citing Twombly, basis his race. Id. ¶¶ 127-37. 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the Campbell brings a claim of supervisor ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relief’ requires more than labels and against Wise and Vires. Id. ¶¶ 90- conclusions, and a formulaic 100.4 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 He also alleges Wise and Vires U.S. at 555-56. intentionally, or in the alternative negligently, inflicted emotional Courts have long recognized that a distress in violation of North Carolina plaintiff does not need to plead a common law. Id. ¶¶ 138-62.5 prima facie case of discrimination at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Finn v. Humane Soc. of the U.S., 160 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the F.4th 92, 97 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing

4 The paragraph numbering in the Second Amended Complaint is not 5 Although the supervisor liability claim always sequential. The Title VI claim ends with paragraph 100, the intentional ends with paragraph 137. But the infliction of emotional distress claim numbering of the paragraphs reverts to begins at paragraph 138. paragraph 90 at the start of the § 1983 supervisor liability claim. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. true ‘legal conclusions drawn from the 506, 510 (2002)). “That is because facts’ or any other ‘unwarranted the McDonnell Douglas6 framework’s inferences, unreasonable conclusions, prima facie case ‘is an evidentiary or arguments.’” Just Puppies, Inc. v. standard, not a pleading standard.’” Brown, 123 F.4th 652, 660 (4th Cir. Barbour v. Garland, 105 F.4th 579, 2024) (quoting Giarratano v. 590 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510). “[A] 2008)). plaintiff is nonetheless ‘required to allege facts to satisfy the elements of a A. The ADA and Section 504 cause of action created by [the claims fail as a matter of law. relevant] statute’ in compliance with Iqbal.’” Woods v. City of Greensboro, Campbell alleges that UNCG and the 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017) Board of Governors violated the ADA (quoting McCleary-Evans v. Md. and Section 504. See Second Am. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 Compl. Counts I and II. He claims (4th Cir. 2015)). that, despite his reports to “the appropriate University officials on In other words, a plaintiff is not multiple occasions,” “University required to prove his case in the employees and agents repeatedly complaint, see, e.g., Robertson v. Sea failed to permit Aspen to accompany Pines Real Est. Cos., 679 F.3d 278, [him] in areas of the University where 291 (4th Cir. 2012); Scott v. City of other students were allowed to go Durham, No. 1:20-CV-558, 2021 WL without interference or forced 3856168, at *2 (M.D.N.C. August 27, negative interactions” and “University 2021), but the complaint’s allegations staff and agents” asked “intrusive” should “allow ‘the court to draw a questions about his disability and reasonable inference that the implied that Aspen should be defendant is liable for the misconduct removed from the facilities. Id. ¶¶ 71, alleged,’” Int’l Refugee Assistance 73; see also id. ¶¶ 120-23. Project v. Trump, 961 F.3d 635, 648 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 He focuses on the “[r]epeated U.S. at 678). questions by University employees about the necessity of Aspen as a On a motion to dismiss, courts view service animal,” “comments made by the allegations in the complaint as University staff, including true, drawing all inferences in the accusations that [he] was fabricating plaintiff’s favor. See Twombly, 550 at his need for a service animal,” 555–56 (2007); Langford v. Joyner, “[f]ailure to prevent students and staff 62 F.4th 122, 124 (4th Cir. 2023). But from distracting Aspen,” and courts are not required to “accept as “[f]ailure to adequately train

6 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). University employees and students” motivating factor” in the adverse on these issues. Id. ¶ 77. As a result of action; whereas, Section 504 requires these “[p]ervasive” “discriminatory that the disability be the sole reason actions,” Campbell “was no longer for the adverse action. Baird ex rel. able to receive the full benefits of Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 468-70 being enrolled at the University, living (4th Cir. 1999). on campus, and having a meal plan.” Id. ¶ 76. “In general, a plaintiff seeking recovery for violation of either statute “To the extent possible, [courts] must allege that (1) [he] has a construe the ADA and Rehabilitation disability, (2) [he] is otherwise Act to impose similar requirements.” qualified to receive the benefits of a Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health public service, program, or activity, Sci., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012). and (3) [he] was excluded from Title II of the ADA directs that “no participation or denied the benefits of qualified individual with a disability such service, program, or activity, or shall, by reason of such disability, be otherwise discriminated against, on excluded from participation in or be the basis of [his] disability.” denied the benefits of the services, Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of programs, or activities of a public George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, entity, or be subjected to 498 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Baird, 192 discrimination by any such entity.” 42 F.3d at 467-70 and Doe v. Univ. of U.S.C. § 12132. Compare id. with 29 Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing similar 1264-65 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1995)). See protection under Section 504 of the also Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461-62. Rehabilitation Act). A “public entity” includes “any department, agency, . . . The University and the Board of or other instrumentality of a State.” Governors argue that Campbell fails 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). And a to allege facts that support the third “program of activity,” referred to in prong: that is, exclusion from Section 504, “means all of the participation or denial of benefits of operations of . . . a college, university, any program or service. Mem. in or other postsecondary institution, or Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 7, Docket a public system of higher education.” Entry 17 (“Mem. in Supp.”). They 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A). further argue that he, by his own “affirmative action,” excluded himself Although “[t]he ADA and from campus activities. Rehabilitation Act generally are construed to impose the same Campbell correctly argues that the requirements due to the similarity of law prohibits more than outright the language of the two acts,” a exclusion from public programs. violation of the ADA requires that an Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. individual’s disability be “a to Dismiss Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at 5, Docket Entry 19 (“Mem. in access. Id. at 72 (quoting Dean v. Opp’n”).7 The law also requires Univ. at Buffalo Sch. Of Med. & meaningful access to those programs. Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 189 Id. (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 (2d Cir. 2015)), cited in Koon, 50 U.S. 287, 301 (1985)). Indeed, F.4th at 406; see also Gustafson v. Bi- “Congress has told us that disability State Dev. Agency, 29 F.4th 406, 412 ‘discrimination’ includes not just (8th Cir. 2022) (“Under the ‘outright intentional exclusion’ but meaningful access standard, services also lesser injustices like ‘failure to ‘are not required to produce the make modifications to existing identical result or level of facilities and practices’ and ‘relegation achievement for handicapped and to lesser services, programs, nonhandicapped persons, but must activities, benefits, jobs, or other afford handicapped persons equal opportunities.’” Koon v. North opportunity to . . . gain the same Carolina, 50 F.4th 398, 405 (4th Cir. benefit.’”) (quoting Alexander, 469 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. U.S. at 305). § 12101(a)(5)). As is relevant here, the law generally Thus, “we ask whether a disabled requires a public entity to allow an [person] was denied ‘meaningful individual with a disability to use a access’ to the benefit.” Id. at 406 service animal, even if that requires (quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301 modification of policies, practices, or and noting that Alexander discusses procedures. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(a). “nearly identical language in § 504 of And the service animal must be able the Rehabilitation Act”). “[T]o assure to accompany the individual with a meaningful access, reasonable disability “in all areas of a public accommodations in the . . . program entity’s facilities where members of or benefit may have to be made.” the public, participants in services, Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301. An programs, or activities, or invitees . . . accommodation that “is so are allowed to go.” 28 C.F.R. inadequate that it deters the plaintiff § 35.136(g). While a public entity’s from attempting to access the services staff are not permitted to ask all otherwise available to him” is “not [a] manner of questions about the service plainly reasonable” accommodation. animal, they are permitted to ask two Wright v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corrs., questions to determine if the animal 831 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2016), cited in is, indeed, a service animal: (1) is the Koon, 50 F.4th at 406. animal required because of a disability and (2) what work or task is Meaningful access does not require perfect access, but it must be effective

7 Campbell also correctly notes that he v. N.C. Dep’t of Safety, No. 1:18CV914, does not have to plead discriminatory 2019 WL 3798457, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. animus. Mem. in Opp’n at 7 (citing Smith 12, 2019)). the animal trained to perform. 28 (acknowledging a hostile C.F.R. § 35-136(f). environment theory under the ADA)).

The University and the Board of Indeed, the University and the Board Governors contend that Campbell has of Governors contend that, at best, not sufficiently alleged discrimination Campbell’s allegations are “analogous on the basis of his disability. Mem. in to a constructive discharge claim.” Supp. at 7-9 (addressing allegations of Mem. in Supp. at 8 (citing Evans v. mere “discomfort, frustration, [and] Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 193 (4th disappointment”8 and failure to allege Cir. 2019) (providing the elements of he was treated differently than a constructive discharge claim in the similarly situated individuals because employment context). Even so, they of his disability). argue, he has not plausibly alleged such a claim. Mem. in Supp. at 8-9. Campbell concedes he has not sufficiently alleged a Section 504 Several courts have recognized the claim or disparate treatment based on concept of constructive exclusion in his disability. See Mem. in Opp’n at 4- the context of a public entity’s 5 (discussing the ADA’s requirement disability discrimination, but they that disability be only a motivating have not analyzed it robustly. See, factor in discrimination), 5 (stating e.g., Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688 that the law also prohibits F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2012); Q.C. v. “discrimination through denial of Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cnty. Schs. reasonable modifications or creation Bd. of Educ., No. 1:19CV1152, 2022 of a hostile environment”). Instead, WL 1686905 (M.D.N.C. May 26, he maintains that he has plausibly 2022). In Krist, the court affirmed alleged a hostile environment where the trial court’s finding that Krist was the University was deliberately not constructively excluded when the indifferent, resulting in constructive court assessed the frequency and discharge from the use and benefits of character (outrageous or demeaning) the University’s services, programs, of the conduct, the impact of the and activities. Id. at 6-7 (citing Rohan conduct on Krist’s behavior, and v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 whether the conduct was designed to F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2004) drive Krist from the restaurant. 688 F.3d at 96-97.

However, courts’ assessments of a hostile environment and constructive

8 Notwithstanding that emotional 546-47 (4th Cir. 2003); Mem. in Opp’n at distress may help to support the award of 7, Campbell’s alleged frustration and compensatory damages in a anxiety were responses to lawful conduct discrimination claim, see Bryant v. so they are of no help here. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, discharge based on a hostile offhand comments, jokes related to a environment in the employment protected status, [] isolated incidents context are instructive. To state a (unless extremely serious),” and claim for hostile work environment, a “mere rude or insensitive treatment” plaintiff must plausibly allege that he are insufficient to state a hostile is disabled and was subject to environment. Id. (citing Burlington unwelcome harassment based on his N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 disability that was sufficiently severe U.S. 53, 68-69 (2006); Clark Cnty. or pervasive that it altered a condition Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, or the privilege of his employment. 270-71 (2001); Faragher, 524 U.S. at Manning v. N.C. State Univ., 724 F. 788; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Supp. 3d 438, 458 (E.D.N.C. 2024) Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (quoting Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., (1998); Baqir v. Prinicipi, 434 F.3d 247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001)). 733, 746-47 (4th Cir. 2006), abrogated in part on other grounds, “The severe or pervasive element has Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 both a subjective and objective U.S. 167, 177-80 (2009)). component.” Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F3d 196, 208 (4th Cir. 2019). On the other hand, an environment of To determine if a reasonable person “constant[] berate[ment] and would find the harassment harass[ment] [of the employee with a sufficiently severe or pervasive, courts disability] and other disabled analyze “the frequency of the workers” “in vulgar and profane discriminatory conduct; its severity; language” “at least weekly” and the whether it is physically threatening or “encourage[ment] of other employees humiliating, or a mere offensive to ostracize the disabled workers,” utterance; and whether it refusal “to give them necessary unreasonably interferes with an materials” to do their job, and causing employee’s work performance.” the employee-plaintiff to suffer back Manning, 724 F. Supp. 3d at 459 pain as a result of the physical work (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., environment is a hostile environment. 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)); see also id. Fox, 247 F. 3d at 179 (affirming the (reviewing case law on the objective jury verdict in favor of the employee- assessment of the severity and plaintiff). pervasiveness of harassment). Under this standard, Campbell’s “The conduct must be extreme to be claims fail. He has not alleged a lack actionable.” Id. (citing Faragher v. of meaningful access to services, City of Boca Raton, 54 U.S. 775, 788 programs or activities, nor a hostile (1998); Boyer-Liberto v. environment resulting in constructive Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, exclusion from the same. Campbell 277-78 (4th Cir. 2015)). “Simple makes sweeping accusations against teasing, sporadic rude language, the defendants, but they are often legal conclusions without sufficient into the service he is trained to factual support or the result of provide). unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, and Campbell alleges that these arguments. See Just Puppies, Inc., 123 employees and the security guard F.4th at 660. And what remains are were rude and insensitive and that the very type of sporadic incidents students and an employee interrupted and insensitive comments that courts Aspen’s work when they tried to pet have rejected time and again as a basis and talk to her. But, as courts have for relief. long recognized, anti-discrimination laws do not impose a civility code. See, Specifically, first and foremost, the e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. law specifically permits an entity to Co., 548 U.S. at 68. And employees’ ask the very questions employees and and students’ alleged conduct towards students asked Campbell: (1) is the Campbell and Aspen did “not dog required because of a disability materially affect the actual and (2) what work or task is the dog accommodation” of Aspen trained to perform. See 28 C.F.R. § 35- accompanying him around campus. 136(f). See Davis v. Univ. of N.C. at Greensboro, No. 1:19CR661, 2020 As for the first permissible question – WL 5803238, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Sept. is the dog required because of a 29, 2020). disability, on January 5, an employee commented on the need to close food Campbell sufficiently alleged that he facilities if Aspen were not a service subjectively considered the dog (implying that Aspen must be environment hostile, but the facts as required because of a disability); on pled, even drawing all inferences in January 16, an employee asked about his favor therefrom, do not the necessity of Aspen; and on sufficiently allege that a reasonable February 16, the non-employee person faced with this conduct would security guard asked about Aspen’s plausibly find these conditions severe status as a service dog. or pervasive enough to cause constructive exclusion. As for the second permissible question – what work or task is the And, to state a claim for constructive dog trained to perform, on January 5, discharge based on a hostile work the employee demanded to know environment, a plaintiff must allege what specific tasks Aspen was trained “something more” than a hostile work to perform and, on March 27, the environment. Decoster v. Becerra, employee asked what type of service 119 F.4th 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2024). He dog Aspen was (implying an inquiry must sufficiently allege that the circumstances were “‘so intolerable that a reasonable person would resign,’” id. at 339-40 (quoting Equal bench himself, or move off campus.9 Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol See Reply Br. at 2, Docket Entry 21 Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 144-45 (stating the same and noting that (4th Cir. 2017)), “‘and that [he] Campbell “offer[ed] no reasoned actually resigned,’” id. at 340 (quoting rebuttal” to its argument that he failed Evans v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, to allege constructive exclusion and 193 (4th Cir. 2019)). Courts “assess citing Mem. in Opp’n at 3-7). intolerability ‘by the objective Therefore, his constructive exclusion standard of whether a reasonable argument fails. person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign Campbell also argues that the . . . that is, whether he would have had University’s response to his reports of no choice but to resign.’” Id. (quoting discrimination “satisf[y] the Evans, 936 F.3d at 193). “‘Difficult or ‘deliberate indifference’ standard.”10 unpleasant working conditions, Mem. in Opp’n at 6 (citing Proctor v. without more, are not so intolerable Prince George’s Hops. Ctr., 32 F. as to compel a reasonable person to Supp. 2d 820, 829 (D. Md. 1998)). In resign.’” Id. (quoting Evans, 936 f.3d Koon, the Fourth Circuit Court of at 193). Appeals recognized that “[t]he deliberate-indifference standard is a Here, Campbell has not plausibly common one in the law, though not alleged “something more” than a one [it had] applied to disability hostile environment because he has discrimination.” 50 F.4th at 404. not sufficiently alleged a hostile After assessing the standard that environment. Even had he done so, other circuits had used in the ADA he has not plausibly alleged that a context, the court held that a plaintiff reasonable person would have had no must show a violation or substantially choice but to stop eating at the dining likely violation of the ADA, knowledge facilities on campus, only attend of a substantial risk of the deprivation games with his father or girlfriend, of those rights, and a failure to act to

9 Although Campbell’s cited case, Rohan, violation of the ADA or Section 504. See, recognizes and provides the prima facie e.g., A.J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. Osseo Area elements of a hostile environment claim Schs., 605 U.S. 335, 344-45 (2025) under the ADA, the court did not analyze (noting that “courts of appeals generally whether the evidence at summary agree that a plaintiff must show judgment supported a hostile intentional discrimination” to receive environment because the plaintiff failed compensatory damages and “a majority” to show she was disabled. See Rohan, 375 of courts of appeals that “have weighed in F.3d at 275-76. on the question” find that a plaintiff can show intentional discrimination if “the 10 A plaintiff must show the defendant defendant acted with deliberate acted with deliberate indifference to indifference”) (quotations and citations receive compensatory damages for a omitted). address the risk. Id. at 405. “If there professor, the dean, and other law wasn’t any ADA violation (or any school officials. Id. substantially likely ADA violation), there was nothing to be deliberately Three months later, the dean agreed indifferent about.” Id. that Constantine could take the final exam again “sometime in June” after That is the case here. Campbell has she finished her spring courses. Id. not sufficiently alleged a violation or a However, on May 17, she received an substantially likely violation of the email notifying her that she must ADA or Section 504, for all the retake the exam on May 21. Id. She reasons described above. His notified the dean, the law school deliberate indifference argument registrar, and two other necessarily fails. And even if he had administrators that she would not be sufficiently alleged disability able to take the exam at that time discrimination, the factual allegations because she had a conflict with do not support a reasonable inference another class and the dean had told that the University or Board of her she could retake it in June. Id. at Governors failed to act. Instead, 478-79. Unmoved, the officials told Campbell alleges Wise and Vires did her she had to take the exam on May act, just not in ways he found 21 or forfeit her right to do so. Id. at sufficient. 479. Constantine declined to take the exam that day. Id. The university Campbell’s allegations thus stand in offered to give her another chance to marked contrast to other take the exam, but she believed they discrimination claims advanced in an had decided to give her an F on the academic setting. For example, the exam in retaliation for her Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ complaints. Id. She took the exam and decision in Constantine is received an F, which delayed her instructive.11 There, Constantine, a graduation and her judicial clerkship. law student at George Mason Id. University, suffered from “intractable migraine syndrome” which struck The court found that Constantine during a final exam. 411 F.3d at 478. sufficiently alleged that the university She alerted the test administrators “excluded her from meaningful and requested additional time to participation in [the professor’s] finish, but they refused. Id. She failed course or denied her the benefits of the exam and requested a grade the course, or at least discriminated appeal and to take the exam again, but university officials denied those requests. Id. She complained to the

11 Although this opinion pre-dates established. See, e.g., Davis, 2020 WL Iqbal/Twombly, the allegations meet the 5803238, at *12 (comparing to the pleading requirement those cases allegations in Constantine). against her with respect to that against him with regard to the course.” Id. at 499. prohibitive summer housing on the basis of his disability” in violation of Likewise, the student in Alexander v. Section 504. Id. at *6. University of North Carolina at Charlotte, No. 3:04CV570, 2005 WL Finally, in Alejandro v. Palm Beach 1994520, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 11, State College, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 2005), sufficiently alleged that the 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2011), college discriminated against him reconsideration denied, (S.D. Fla. because of his disability.12 Alexander 2012), the court found the student- suffered from cerebral palsy and plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated a required assistance to walk to and substantial likelihood of success on attend his daily activities. Id. at *1. the merits and granted her injunction During his freshman year, he lived in requiring the college to allow her to an accessible room with a large bring her service dog to all areas of bathroom. Id. Alexander was to campus. attend summer school and the university planned for all students to There, after permitting Alejandro’s live an on-campus housing complex service dog to accompany her on that was further from the classroom campus for three semesters, college building than Alexander’s freshman officials required voluminous year residence; the bathroom was too documentation describing her need small for Alexander, the desks were for the service animal, which she not useable, and there was no curb cut provided. Id. at 1266. But officials for him to access the sidewalk. Id. at refused to allow her to take the dog to *1-2. class and when she continued to do so, they escorted her off campus and When Alexander’s mother learned of brought disciplinary hearings against this plan, she met with university her. Id. At the end of her fourth officials about his housing needs, who semester, when officials finally agreed proposed another unsuitable room. to allow the dog to accompany her to Id. at *2. Ultimately, Alexander lived class, she had missed so many classes at home during the summer session that she had failed one of her courses and relied on his mother for and she was still questioned about the transportation. Id. at *3. dog, escorted out of the library, and prohibited from bringing the dog to The court found that Alexander the writing lab. Id. sufficiently alleged that the university “excluded him from campus housing, These allegations stand in contrast to or denied him the benefits of such those Campbell advances. His claims housing, or at least discriminated more closely track those in Davis,

12 Although this opinion pre-dates pleading standard that those cases Iqbal/Twombly, the allegations meet the established. wherein the court dismissed the time and a quiet testing student’s ADA claim. Davis, who environment.” Id. at *11. Even though suffered from ADHD, requested and she alleged that staff repeatedly received extended time and quiet interrupted her during test-taking, locations for taking exams to limit she did not allege when or how often interruptions. 2020 WL 5803238, at they interrupted her, how severely *3. However, she alleged that two they affected her quiet environment, members of the university’s staff or how it affected her performance. “repeatedly interrupted [her] during Id. at *12. “[T]he vague interruptions testing,” “frequently mocked [her] alleged [were] a far cry from the disability in front of other students[,] severity of Constantine.” Id. and yelled at [her] prior to exams over her requested accommodations.” Id. Davis “was not prevented from taking Those same individuals allegedly exams, nor was she outright denied threatened to have her dismissed extra time or quiet test-taking rooms.” from her program if she complained. Id. In sum, she failed to allege that Id. she “was excluded from the [] program or was even prevented from Davis reported these incidents to advancing within it . . . because she OARS at UNCG, and, in response, the has ADHD or because certain university’s staff claimed she was not individuals frustrated the approved fit for the program, fabricated accommodations.” Id. Her documents to look like she was not allegations suggested nothing “‘more completing her work correctly, falsely than a sheer possibility’ that accused her of insubordination, and Defendants failed to provide told her they would find a reason to reasonable accommodations.” Id. “get rid of” her. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57)).13 The court found that the mocking and threats to dismiss Davis from the Likewise, intermittent and boorish program did “not materially affect the questions from various individuals, actual accommodations of extended University and otherwise, considered

13 Although outside of the education stared and growled at the dog from context, the Second Circuit Court of behind the counter. Id. at 91-92. When Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a she took the dog out from the under the plaintiff’s ADA claim involving the use of table to show a customer, a restaurant her service dog in Krist. There, Krist was owner yelled and claimed she was a regular customer at Coopertown playing with her dog. Id. at 92. On Restaurant which was “her primary another visit, a restaurant owner yelled at social community.” 688 F.3d at 91. But her because the dog was beside her chair when she began taking her service dog to rather than under the table. Id. Krist the restaurant, employees were “very went to the restaurant less. Id. Months cool” to her and a restaurant owner later, she stopped going altogether. Id. in the light most favorable to Compl. ¶¶ 130, 132. He claims the Campbell’s claims, did not prevent actions of the University and Board of him from enjoying the benefits of Governors were “part of a broader University facilities and activities. pattern of systemic failures” and And so he has failed to allege a “reflect a willful disregard of [his] plausible claim of discrimination rights under Title VI.” Id. ¶¶ 131, 136. against UNCG or the Board of Governors under the ADA or Section Title VI provides that “[n]o person in 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.14 the United States shall, on the ground Therefore, the Court should dismiss of race, color, or national origin, be Counts I and II. excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected B. The Title VI claim fails as a to discrimination under any program matter of law. or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Campbell alleges that UNCG and the Board of Governors discriminated To state a claim for discrimination in against him on the basis of his race in violation of Title VI, a plaintiff must violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights allege that the defendant is a recipient Act of 1964, as their response (or lack of federal funds and intentionally thereof) to his report about the discriminated against him “on the February 16, 2024 baseball game basis of race, color, or national shows. He contends that the origin.” Lucas v. VHC Health, 128 University and Board of Governors F.4th 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2025) “den[ied] him equal access to its (citation omitted) (applying Title VI facilities, programs, and services” and to the plaintiff’s claim of race “failed to implement adequate discrimination in violation of the oversight, training, and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) where administrative controls to ensure Section 1557 of the ACA “forbids compliance with federal anti- excluding someone from health discrimination laws.” Second Am.

The court described the owners’ shouting persons with disabilities”) (citation incidences as isolated and directed omitted); Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa towards moving the dog out of the way. N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1999) Id. at 96-97. The employees’ behavior (“Insensitivity alone does not amount to was not outrageous or demeaning. Id. at harassment; the ADA, like Title VII, is 96. The court explained that “the ADA not in effect a ‘general civility code.’”)). does not impose a civility code.” Id. (citing Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 14 Campbell did not allege, and does not F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (agreeing argue in response to the defendants’ that “the ADA cannot regulate motion, disability discrimination based individuals’ conduct so as to ensure that on disparate treatment. they will never be rude or insensitive to programs based on the ‘ground present at the game” were not prohibited under’ Title VI”). “subjected to” having the guard follow them throughout the facility and ask To state a claim for racial harassment about their dogs, erroneously identify in violation of Title VI, a plaintiff must the dogs as emotional support dogs, allege that the defendant is an and speak to them in a loud, educational institution that receives dismissive, and aggressive tone, “the federal funds, he was subjected to treatment [he] endured.” Id. ¶¶ 34-37. harassment based on his race, the In sum, he argues that he was treated harassment was sufficiently severe or differently than similarly situated pervasive to create a hostile white attendees. And while those environment in an educational allegations may be consistent with program or activity, and there is a discrimination, they do not support a basis for imputing liability to the reasonable inference of university. See Feminist Majority discrimination. See, e.g., McCleary- Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 686 Evans, 780 F.3d at 586. (4th Cir. 2018) (determining the sufficiency of allegations of sexual In McCleary-Evans, the plaintiff had harassment in violation of Title IX); worked for the state of Maryland for Ricketts v. Wake Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., over twenty years when she applied 125 F.4th 507, 521 (4th Cir. 2025) for two open positions in a different (noting that “Title VI claims ‘are state division. Id. at 583. She alleged parallel’ to Title IX claims and that she was not chosen for either ‘operate in the same manner’” and position, “[d]espite her prior work applying the Title IX harassment experience and education.” Id. standard to assess the sufficiency of a Instead, the state hired non-Black Title VI claim for student-on-student candidates for those positions. Id. racial harassment) (citation omitted). McCleary-Evans argued this constituted gender and race To hold an institution liable for the discrimination. Id. She alleged that conduct of its employees, the plaintiff her applications were “‘subject to a “must plausibly plead that [the review panel significantly influenced institution] acted with deliberate and controlled by . . . a White male in indifference to the intentional the Office of Environmental Design discrimination of its agents.” Lucas, (‘OED’) who worked under the 128 F.4th at 221-22. supervision of . . . a non-Black woman.’” Id. (quoting the complaint). Here, the only allegations of race “During the course of her interview, discrimination involve the security and based upon the history of hires guard at the February 16, 2024 within OED, . . . both [individuals] baseball game on campus. Campbell predetermined to select for both alleges that the “three white positions a White male or female individuals with dogs [who] were also candidate.” Id. She also alleged that they “‘overlooked the African Court’s command that a complaint American candidates to select White must allege “more than a sheer male, preferably, and White female possibility that a defendant has acted candidates’” “‘for reasons of race and unlawfully.” Id. at 588 (quoting Iqbal, gender.’” Id. at 583-84 (quoting the 556 U.S. at 678). complaint). Likewise, the allegations in the The court affirmed the district court’s Complaint raise only a “sheer dismissal of the complaint. “While possibility” that anyone acted [McCleary-Evans] did allege that the unlawfully at the baseball game. Highway Administration failed to hire Compare with McCarter v. Univ. of her, she did not allege facts sufficient N.C. at Chapel Hill, No. 1:20-CV- to claim that the reason it failed to 1050, 2021 WL 4482983, at *11 (Sept. hire her was because of her race or 30, 2021) (finding sufficient sex.” Id. at 585. “[S]he repeatedly allegations of Title VI racial alleged that the Highway harassment where University Administration did not select her personnel “delayed [the plaintiff’s] because of the relevant graduation, removed him from a decisionmakers’ bias against African longstanding research project, American women,” “[b]ut those refused to publish his manuscript, ‘naked’ allegations – a ‘formulaic and plagiarized his work,” and he was recitation’ of the necessary elements – the only student in his section subject ‘are no more than conclusions’ and to this treatment and indeed, the only therefore do not suffice.” Id. (quoting African-American, raising the Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). The court “inference that Plaintiff was singled explained that McCleary-Evans’ out for mistreatment by [specified allegations were “consistent with defendants] while members of other discrimination,” but they did not races were not[]”). And even “support a reasonable inference that assuming arguendo that Campbell the decisionmakers were motivated sufficiently alleged the security guard by bias.” Id. at 586 (emphasis in intentionally discriminated against original). him based on his race, he has not sufficiently alleged that the University The court explained that the was deliberately indifferent to that “consequence” of reversing the conduct. district court “would be that any qualified member of a protected class After the game, Campbell emailed who alleges nothing more than that Wise “concerning his inability to she was denied a position or access the baseball game free from promotion in favor of someone discrimination and harassment,” and outside her protected class would be Wise suggested he “contact the able to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion[,]” despite “the Supreme security guard’s employer to express to express his concerns. Although he additional concerns[.]” Id. ¶ 39. alleges that she should have investigated his complaint “as Campbell alleges that OARS “is one of required by UNCG policy,” as noted the entities on campus responsible for above, the alleged policy covers enforcing accessibility at campus accessibility, not race. And his belief events, including sporting events.” that she should have responded Second Am. Compl. ¶ 38 (noting in differently is not sufficient to allege footnote 3 that the University’s policy deliberate indifference. Koon, 50 requires OARS to review a complaint F.4th at 406 (“It is not enough simply about accessibility at a University to point to what could or should have event and contact the event organizer) been done.”). (emphases added). Because Campbell has failed to state a There is no allegation that Wise had claim for race discrimination or racial any authority to remedy a complaint harassment in violation of Title VI, about race discrimination or racial the Court should dismiss Count III. harassment. Furthermore, there is no allegation that the University (or C. The § 1983 supervisor liability Wise) had authority over the security claim fails as a matter of law. guard who was not a University employee. Campbell asserts a claim against Wise and Vires for supervisor liability In addition, based on Campbell’s pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He allegations, he reported to Wise that alleges that they “failed to take the security guard followed him, reasonable and necessary steps to asked about Aspen in an aggressive correct, remedy, or prevent the tone, and was rude, but the security ongoing unlawful disability guard did not do the same thing to the discrimination.” Second Am. Compl. three white attendees who also had ¶ 93. dogs. The facts do not plausibly allege that Wise knew “of the facts from Section 1983 prohibits an individual which a federal-rights violation could acting under color of state law from be inferred,” much less that she made depriving a person “of any rights, a ‘deliberate or conscious choice to privileges, or immunities secured by ignore’” them. Koon, 50 F.4th at 406- the Constitution and laws.” 07 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). “In a § 1983 suit . . . the term ‘supervisor liability’ is a misnomer.” Campbell does not even allege that Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. A supervisor Wise ignored his complaint. Instead, can only be liable under § 1983 for he alleges that she suggested he “their personal wrongdoing or contact the security guard’s employer supervisory actions that violated constitutional norms.” Timpson ex to or tacit authorization of rel. Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. the alleged offensive Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 practices; and F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). The supervisor’s (3) that there was an affirmative “‘indifference or tacit authorization’” causal link between the of “a constitutional violation supervisor’s inaction and committed by a subordinate state or the particular constitutional local government official” must be “‘a [or other legal] injury causative factor’ in enabling the suffered by the plaintiff. violation.” Bolick v. Anderson, 169 F.4th 528, 541 (4th Cir. 2026) Timpson ex rel. Timpson, 31 F.4th at (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 257 (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799).15 798-99 (4th Cir. 1994)). To determine if a supervisor is liable, courts “must Wise and Vires argue that Campbell consider whether the supervisor’s did not allege that either of them own ‘deliberate indifference supervised any of the individuals who permitted the constitutional abuses to discriminated against him, or that the continue unchecked.’” Id. (quoting conduct was widespread so as to Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 provide sufficient notice, or that Wise (4th Cir. 1984)). or Vires acted with deliberate indifference, or that they were A plaintiff must plausibly allege motivated by discriminatory intent. Mem. in Supp. at 14-16. They also (1) that the supervisor had argue that neither the ADA nor actual or constructive Section 504 can be the basis for the knowledge that [her] § 1983 claim. Id. at 14-15. subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a Campbell contends that his pervasive and unreasonable allegations support Wise’s and Vires’ risk of constitutional [or “tacit authorization of the other legal] injury to citizens discriminatory practices” and they like the plaintiff; had authority to act. Mem. in Opp’n at 9. Campbell also argues that the ADA (2) that the supervisor’s and Section 504 can be the bases for response to that knowledge his § 1983 claim because the “Fourth was so inadequate as to Circuit has not categorically barred show deliberate indifference such claims” and his “§ 1983 claim

15 While the Shaw court was considering 3d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 2024); Armstrong a summary judgment motion, district v. City of Greensboro, 190 F. Supp. 3d courts in this circuit cite these elements 450, 466 (M.D.N.C. 2016); Hill v. when discussing pleading requirements. Robeson County, 733 F. Supp. 2d 676, See, e.g., Keeton v. Dudley, 753 F. Supp. 688 (E.D.N.C. 2010). also rests on equal protection reports. She “acknowledged the violations.” Id. seriousness of” and “agreed to investigate” the January 5 incident. Campbell bases his claim against Second Am. Compl. ¶ 22. She Wise and Vires on violations of the “responded [to the complaint about ADA and Section 504 (and by the January 16 incident] that conclusory reference to the Defendant UNCG would work on Fourteenth Amendment). See Second training school staff and students on Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 93, 95, 98, 99. But service animal policies, procedures, because the court recommends and best practices.” Id. ¶ 28. “Wise dismissal of the ADA and Section 504 advised that Defendant UNCG was claims, they cannot support the claim. working on retraining staff in the food See G.M. v. Va. Beach Sch. Bd., No. areas and that flyers had been posted 2:24-cv-59, 2025 WL 1819269, at *7 around campus to educate students” (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2025) (referring to after Campbell’s report about the its earlier dismissal of the § 504 claim January 25 episode. Id. ¶ 32. She also supporting the § 1983 claim). “asked [Campbell] to speak with . . . a Manager in dining services[] about Even had those claims survived, his experiences.” Id. ¶ 33. In response though, “multiple district courts in to Campbell’s report about the the Fourth Circuit, as well as February 16 incident, Wise suggested numerous courts of appeals, have that Campbell contact the security held that § 1983 cannot vindicate guard’s employers to express his rights under the ADA given the ADA’s concerns. Id. ¶ 39. comprehensive remedial scheme.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of After having reported the March 27 Gloucester Cnty., No. 3:18-cv-745, incident to Meadows, Campbell 2020 WL 2832475, at *21-22 (E.D. emailed Wise and Vires to tell them Va. May 29, 2020) (collecting cases)). “his belief that the processes See also Gatling v. Carter, No. PX 15- Defendant UNCG was purportedly 3723, 2017 WL 480756, at *6 (D. Md. utilizing to address the ongoing Feb. 6, 2017) (addressing a discrimination were insufficient.” Id. Rehabilitation Act-based § 1983 claim ¶ 45. Vires responded that “OARS was and collecting cases). working to train university employees on the two questions they were Furthermore, even though Campbell’s permitted to ask under the ADA and complaints did not evince widespread to dispel the misconception that all discrimination despite his conclusory service animals are ‘seeing eye dogs.’” allegations to the contrary, neither Id. ¶ 47. She also “indicated that she Wise nor Vires were deliberately was working to have flyers placed indifferent to or tacitly authorized around campus to increase disability discrimination against awareness.” Id. ¶ 48. Campbell, as alleged. Specifically, Wise responded to each of Campbell’s None of these allegations plausibly towards Campbell’s report of race claim that Wise or Vires made a discrimination. conscious decision to ignore Campbell has thus failed to state a Campbell’s complaints. And § 1983 claim against Wise and against Campbell did not even allege that Vires. The Court should dismiss Wise or Vires supervised any of the Count IV. alleged wrongdoers. Campbell’s belief that their responsive efforts D. Qualified immunity would were insufficient does not sufficiently apply. allege deliberate indifference. See Wise and Vires argue that, even had Koon, 50 F.4th at 406. Campbell sufficiently alleged a § 1983 Campbell states in response to Wise’s claim against them, qualified and Vires’ challenge to this claim that immunity would protect them from his “§ 1983 claim also rests on equal suit. Mem. in Supp. at 17-18 (citing protection violations.” Mem. in Opp’n Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, at 9. To state an equal protection 741 (2011)). Citing Hope v. Pelzer, claim without direct evidence of 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002), and 28 discrimination, a plaintiff must allege C.F.R. § 35.136(f), Campbell “‘that he has been treated differently disagrees. Mem. in Opp’n at 10-11. from others with whom he is similarly “Qualified immunity shields . . . state situated and that the unequal officials from money damages unless treatment was the result of a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) intentional or purposeful that the official violated a statutory or discrimination.” Lee v. Boyd, 799 F. constitutional right, and (2) that the Supp. 3d 507, 511-12 (W.D. Va. 2025) right was ‘clearly established’ at the (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 time of the challenged conduct.” F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)). Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735. Even assuming that Campbell The second prong requires that, “at sufficiently alleged these elements, he the time of the challenged conduct, has not plausibly alleged that Wise the contours of a right are sufficiently and Vires tacitly authorized or were clear that every reasonable official deliberately indifferent towards his would have understood that what he complaint about race discrimination. is doing violates that right.” Id. at 741 As set forth earlier, see supra at 23, (cleaned up). There need not be a case there are no allegations that Wise and directly on point, “but existing Vires had any role whatsoever related precedent must have placed the to addressing reports of race statutory or constitutional question discrimination, had any authority beyond debate.” Id. (citing Anderson over the security guard, tacitly v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 authorized the race discrimination, or (1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. acted with deliberate indifference 335, 341 (1986)); see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 (noting that neither cases with “fundamentally similar” facts responding as Wise and Vires did nor “materially similar” facts are violated the law. required; the question “is whether the In sum, even had Campbell plausibly state of the law [at the time of the alleged a § 1983 claim against Wise or conduct] gave [officials] fair warning Vires, each would be entitled to that their alleged treatment of [the qualified immunity. plaintiff] was unconstitutional”). E. The IIED claim fails as a matter Here, Wise and Vires frame “the of law. relevant legal question” as follows: “Was it clearly established, under the Campbell alleges that Wise’s and circumstances faced by Vires and Vires’ “failure to take affirmative Wise, that endeavoring to educate and action” to address his “numerous inform University staff and students complaints” of discrimination “was about service animal policies and best extreme and outrageous, particularly practices, and attempting to connect given their positions of authority and Plaintiff with dining services and their duty to ensure compliance with security providers was in violation of federal and state disability laws.” some federal law?” Mem. in Supp. at Second Am. Compl. ¶ 139. Despite 17-18. receiving his “increasingly anxious written communication[s] . . . asking Campbell does not dispute this for help [and] detail[ing] the description of the issue, although he emotional distress and harm” he more generally describes “repeated suffered, neither Wise nor Vires interference with a service animal and timely or meaningfully acted. Id. failure to investigate formal ¶¶ 140-41. Instead, they “acted with complaints” as precluding immunity reckless disregard” and because “[n]o reasonable official “demonstrated callous indifference” could believe” those actions “met the to Campbell’s rights and emotional requirements of the ADA and Section harm. Id. ¶ 142; see also id. ¶¶ 143-51 504.” See Mem. in Opp’n at 10-11.16 (alleging the injuries he suffered as a As already addressed, Campbell has result of the inaction of Wise and not sufficiently pled that Wise or Vires Vires). violated his statutory or To state a claim for intentional constitutional rights. Had he infliction of emotional distress in plausibly alleged a § 1983 claim, he North Carolina, a plaintiff must has not sufficiently pled that, at the allege, “‘1) extreme and outrageous time of the alleged conduct, every conduct by the defendant 2) which is reasonable official would believe that intended to and does in fact cause 3)

16 Campbell initially stated in his were clearly established.” Mem. in Opp’n response that his “right to be free from at 9. But he rests his argument on the discrimination under the ADA, Section ADA and Section 504. 504, and the Equal Protection Clause severe emotional distress.’” Sheaffer v. Rack Room Shoes, 912 F. Supp. 187, v. Cnty. of Chatham, 337 F. Supp. 2d 192 (M.D.N.C. 1996). And “mere 709, 732 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (quoting insults, indignities, and threats” fall Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 short. Guthrie v. Conroy, 567 S.E.2d (N.C. 1992)); see also Payne v. Nat’l 403, 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., No. 1:25CV24, 2026 WL 705064, at *1 (M.D.N.C. By way of contrast, though, the Feb. 18, 2026), adopted, 2026 WL following acts do constitute extreme 701391 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2026) and outrageous conduct: (stating the same). “Conduct is extreme and outrageous only when it • The commission of murder, is ‘so outrageous in character, and so Eubanks v. State Farm Fire & extreme in degree, as to go beyond all Cas. Co., 485 S.E.2d 870, 872 possible bounds of decency, and to be (N.C. Ct. App.), disc. review regarded as atrocious, and utterly denied, 493 S.E.2d 452 (N.C. intolerable in a civilized community.’” 1997); Sheaffer, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 732 • Years’ long “unending barrage (quoting Hogan v. Forsyth Country of abuse, harassment, threats, Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 123 (N.C. Ct. scorn, and derision . . . that at App. 1986)); see also Payne, 2026 WL times spilled over into physical 705064, at *1 (stating the same). The confrontation and attack,” assessment of whether conduct is Radcliff v. Avenel extreme and outrageous is a question Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 789 of law. Foster v. Crandell, 638 S.E.2d S.E.2d 893, 907-08 (N.C. Ct. 526, 537 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). App. 2016), disc. review denied, 799 S.E.2d 42 (N.C. And “North Carolina courts have set a 2017); high bar with respect to what • “[W]rongfully and publicly constitutes outrageous conduct.” Doe suggest[ing] that [the student v. Lees-McRae College, No. plaintiff] was to blame for being 1:20CV105 MR WCM, 2021 WL raped” and then “purposefully 1096285, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 4, ‘dup[ing]’ her into withdrawing 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 1093635 from school and treat[ing] a (Mar. 22, 2021). For example, request for temporary leave as a requiring a pregnant employee to mechanism to permanently rid carry heavy loads and refusing to [the school] of a student allow her leave to go to the hospital is complaining about the not extreme and outrageous conduct University’s response to her for purposes of this claim. Hogan, rape,” Rouse v. Duke Univ., 340 S.E.2d at 122-23. Neither are “poor performance evaluations,” failure to promote, exclusion from training, and termination. Pardasani 869 F. Supp. 2d 674, 681-82 670-71. In addition, three of four (M.D.N.C. 2012). professors resigned from her doctoral committee. Id. at 671. In the educational context, the court in Mandsager v. University of North These allegations supported “an Carolina at Greensboro, 269 F. Supp. inference that the defendants’ 2d 662, 683 (M.D.N.C. 2003), found response to her complaints about Dr. that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged Purkey’s conduct was extreme and the individual defendants outrageous.” Id. at 683. She had also intentionally inflicted emotional sufficiently alleged she suffered harm on her.17 severe emotional distress. Id.

There, the plaintiff’s direct supervisor In McClean v. Duke University, 376 in her Ph.D program, Dr. Purkey, F. Supp. 3d 585, 613 (M.D.N.C. 2019), sexually harassed her and directly the court found the student’s propositioned her. Id. at 669-70. allegations sufficient. McClean, a Mandsager notified her department student at the university’s medical chair, who first shrugged off the and graduate schools, reported her behavior and then “‘reminded [her] rape, but the rapist was in a that Purkey was responsible for her relationship with the school’s grade in that class.’” Id. at 670. At a Coordinator of Gender Violence planned remedial discussion, the Intervention Services. The culprit chair directed Mandsager to sit at the continued harassing McClean, table, entered the room with Dr. threatening that his girlfriend would Purkey and remained standing, and undermine her credibility and destroy permitted Dr. Purkey to read a her reputation. Id. Indeed, he and his prepared statement and leave the girlfriend made false stalking reports room. Id. After the plaintiff to the university’s police department, complained in writing, she was disclosed McClean’s “confidential subject to a host of adverse actions. sexual assault report widely within The University removed her from her the university,” caused a university teaching assistant position “for police officer “to make a false obvious reasons,” stripped her of her statement about her” at a hearing on clinical supervisor role, prevented her the rapist’s detention, and from completing her research under “compil[ed] and disseminat[ed] the terms that accommodated her negative information about [her] to learning disability, directed her to destroy her reputation” at the redo work already completed, and university and within the medical advised her to seek outside community. Id. at 595-96. The court employment the next semester. Id. at described McClean’s allegations

17 Although this case pre-dates Iqbal/Twombly, its allegations meet that pleading requirement. against the rapist as “wholly within him a duty of care but breached that the realm of ‘extreme and outrageous duty when they failed to act or failed conduct.’” Id. at 613. “to act appropriately.” Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 155-56. Their inaction or Wise and Vires argue that Campbell improper action “was particularly failed to allege their conduct was egregious” because they knew of extreme and outrageous. Mem. in Campbell’s PTSD and need for Aspen Supp. at 19 (citing Pardasani, 912 F. to mitigate his symptoms. Id. ¶ 157. Supp. at 192; Groves v. Travelers Ins. “As a direct and foreseeable result of Co., 552 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 2001); [their] negligence, [his] PTSD was Ausley v. Bishop, 515 S.E.2d 72, 80 exacerbated,” and he suffered (N.C. Ct. App. 1999), rev’d on other “heightened anxiety, difficulty grounds, 572 S.E.2d 153 (N.C. 2002)). concentrating, physical symptoms of stress, . . . [and] severe emotional Here, Campbell generally “alleges distress, requiring continued mental sustained mistreatment that health treatment and significantly exacerbated his known mental health altering his daily life and academic disability.” Mem. in Opp’n at 10 experience.” Id. ¶¶ 158, 161. (citing Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. 1992)). He does not address To state a claim for negligent the argument that his “sustained infliction of emotional distress, “a mistreatment” is not extreme and plaintiff must allege that (1) the outrageous. Although the Court could defendant negligently engaged in consider Wise’s and Vires’ argument conduct, (2) it was reasonably on this point uncontested, see foreseeable that such conduct would M.D.N.C. Civ. L.R. 7.3(k) (providing cause the plaintiff severe emotional that the court will consider and decide distress . . ., and (3) the conduct did in a motion as uncontested when “no fact cause the plaintiff severe response brief is filed”), review on the emotional distress.” Johnson v. merits confirms it. Because Campbell Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology has failed to allege that Wise or Vires Assocs., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. intentionally inflicted emotional 1990). “Although an allegation of distress, the Court should dismiss ordinary negligence will suffice, a Count Five. plaintiff must also allege that severe emotional distress was the F. The NIED claim fails as a foreseeable and proximate result of matter of law. such negligence in order to state a claim; mere temporary fright, As an alternative to his intentional disappointment or regret will not infliction of emotional distress claim, suffice.” See id. “In cases involving Campbell alleges that Wise and Vires omissions, negligence may arise negligently inflicted emotional where a ‘special relationship’ exists distress on him. He claims they owed between the parties.” Davidson v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 543 address any case law on whether the S.E.2d 920, 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), University owed him a legal duty disc. review denied, 550 S.E.2d 771 because of his status as a student. (N.C. 2001).18 And while courts have found that some circumstances do create a legal Wise and Vires advance two duty on the part of a college toward a arguments undercutting the first student, those circumstances are element of this claim. One: Campbell limited. failed to allege a legal duty. Mem. in Supp. at 21. Two: Campbell bases this The North Carolina Court of Appeals claim on the same conduct he alleged found that a university owed a student supported his ADA, Section 504, and cheerleader who was injured during Title VI claims – all of which are practice a legal duty because of their claims of “‘inherently intentional’” mutual dependence. Davidson, 543 discriminatory conduct. Id. at 22 And, S.E.2d at 927. The university at least as this court found in Thomas “depended upon the cheerleading v. N. Telecom, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d program for a variety of benefits,” and 627, 637 (M.D.N.C. 2000), “the cheerleaders received significant intentional conduct cannot be the benefits from [the university] as a basis of the negligent infliction of result of participating in the emotional distress claim. Id. cheerleading program.” Id. The court “also [found] it significant that [the Campbell provides a cursory defense, university] exerted a considerable arguing that “[t]he University-student degree of control over its relationship, paired with actual cheerleaders.” Id. knowledge of [his] condition, creates a duty under” Johnson. Mem. in Particularly relevant here, the court Opp’n at 10. But Johnson does not warned that this was a factually support this conclusion. He does not specific finding, and “should not be

18 Wise and Vires argue that Campbell is v. Carter, No. 5:24-CT-3138-FL, 2026 required to bring this claim in the North WL 820852, at *5 & n.4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. Carolina Industrial Commission, 25, 2026) (citing Carias v. N.C. Dep’t of pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291(e). Pub. Safety, No. 1:24-CV-765 Mem. in Supp. at 20-21. Not only do they (RDA/JLW), 2025 WL 2404530, at *8 fail to cite any case law supporting their (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2025) (collecting position, but this court recently cases))). Further, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143- addressed a similar argument and 291(e) is inapplicable here because recognized that “[m]ost courts have Campbell sues Wise and Vires in their concluded, to the contrary, that the individual capacities. Campbell statute does not preclude individual mistakenly includes this argument as capacity negligence claims in federal part of his opposition to Wise’s and Vires’ court.” Forero v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel arguments about his intentional Hill, No. 1:24cv930, 2026 WL 891991, at infliction of emotional distress claim. *1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2026) (citing Neal Mem. in Opp’n at 10. interpreted as finding a special “It is not clear . . . that either the relationship to exist between a Rehabilitation Act or the ADA create university, college, or other secondary an independent duty of care for educational institution, and every purposes of a negligence claim.” Doe, student attending the school, or even 2021 WL 1096285, at *7 (citing Liese every member of a student group, v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 club, intramural team, or F.3d 334, 352-53 (11th Cir. 2012); organization. . . . [T]he student- Strojnik v. Bakersfield Convention university relationship, standing Hotel I, LLC, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1332, alone, does not constitute a special 1344 (E.D. Ca. 2020). To that end, relationship giving rise to a duty of although a violation of a safety statute care.” Id. at 928; see also McFadyen may be negligence per se under North v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, Carolina law, “it is unlikely that the 996 (M.D.N.C. 2011), rev’d in part on North Carolina courts would find that other grounds, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. the ADA is a safety statute or that 2012) (citing Davidson and finding violation of the ADA constitutes that the university had no “special negligence per se[.]” James v. Peter relationship” with the lacrosse team Pan Transit Mgmt., Inc., No. 97-747, members “based on their status as 1999 WL 735173, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Jan. students”); Cash v. Lees-McRae 20, 1999). See also Cash, 2018 WL College, Inc., No. 1:18CV52, 2018 WL 7297876, at *14 (“To the extent that 7297876, at *13 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 13, Plaintiff Cash alleges that Title IX 2018), adopted, 2019 WL 276842 supplies a duty actionable in (Jan. 22, 2019), aff’d, 811 F. App’x 190 negligence, she cannot plead such a (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Davidson and claim.”)). Cf. Brockman v. T&B finding that the college “had no Concepts of Carrboro, LLC, No. special duty of care with respect to” 1:19CV622, 2020 WL 5821169, at *26 the student). (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (finding “that Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA Campbell has not alleged any type of claims cannot serve as the underlying mutual dependence between a torts for Plaintiff’s negligent hiring, university and a student, a linchpin of supervision, or retention claims”). the holdings identified above. Therefore, his status as a student does In Doe, the student alleged that the not impose a legal duty on Wise or defendants owed him a duty to keep Vires. And, to the extent that “him safe from harassment, and to Campbell argues his status as a accommodate, recognize, respect, and student with a disability creates a care for his ADHD condition and special relationship according to anxiety related needs,” and that which the University owed him a legal another defendant owed him “a duty duty, he has not cited any case law to implement policy and procedure supporting this position. creating accommodations for students suffering from disabilities similar to [his], and to take action when failures therein were damages may not be awarded in discovered.” 2021 WL 1096285, at *6. private suits brought under Title VI of Relying on the persuasive authority the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it follows above, the court dismissed his that they may not be awarded in suits negligence claim. Id. at *7.19 brought under § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”)20 This persuasive authority supports a

conclusion here that neither the ADA Therefore, even had Campbell nor Section 504 supplies a basis for sufficiently alleged the University Campbell’s negligence claim. violated the ADA, Section 504, or Title Therefore, his status as a student with VI, he still could not recover punitive a disability does not impose a legal damages. duty on Wise or Vires.

Because Campbell fails to state a IV. CONCLUSION claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the Court should This Complaint is Campbell’s third dismiss Count Six. iteration, and he has failed to state a claim against any of the defendants. G. Punitive damages cannot be And, in this Circuit, “district courts awarded against the University are not required to give plaintiffs one for violations of the ADA, without-prejudice ruling on the Section 504, or Title VI. merits before dismissing with

prejudice.” See United States ex rel. Campbell seeks punitive damages Nicholson v. MedCom Carolinas, against the defendants. See Second Inc., 42 F.4th 185, 196 (4th Cir. 2022). Am. Compl. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 3, 4. Because “[d]istrict courts have However, the Supreme Court has long inherent power to manage their recognized that punitive damages are dockets with an eye toward speedy not available in private suits alleging and efficient resolutions” such as violations of the ADA, Section 504, or dismissing “plainly insufficient” Title VI. Mem. in Supp. at 22-23 “causes of action with prejudice[,]” (citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (“Because punitive

19 Wise and Vires argue that “[i]ntentional conduct cannot form the 20 As the University recognized, see Reply basis for a negligence claim.” McClean, at 13, Campbell failed to respond at all to 376 F. Supp. 3d at 617 (dismissing the the argument that he cannot recover negligence claims against the individual punitive damages from the University. defendants who allegedly intentionally Although the court can consider the inflicted emotional distress on the University’s argument uncontested, see plaintiff). Because Campbell did not M.D.N.C. L.R. 7.3(k), the University’s sufficiently allege intentional conduct in challenge is legally correct. the first place, though, this argument is moot. id., this Court recommends the same It is therefore RECOMMENDED here. that the Court grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismiss this action with prejudice.

JoAnna Gibson McFadden United States Magistrate Judge

May 22, 2026 Durham, North Carolina