BLACKMAR, Judge.
This action involves the accumulation of surface water on land owned by the plaintiff corporation at the northeast corner of Truman Road, running east and west, and Turner Street, running north and south, in the City of Independence. The record contains only the testimony of Cedric Siegfried, a lawyer and president of the plaintiff corporation, and exhibits authenticated by him. Since the trial court sustained the defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff’s case, we state the facts on the basis that the plaintiff’s evidence is true.
The evidence does not show exactly when the plaintiff acquired the land in question, but the estimate is that it was purchased in parcels between 15 and 25 years ago. The streets were in place when the plaintiff became the owner. The evidence does not show when the streets were built, or whether they were built by the city, the county, the state, or a developer.
Siegfried became the chief executive officer of the plaintiff, a family corporation, about three years prior to the March, 1981 trial. He had not been active in the corporation in an executive capacity before then but had done legal work for it. He remembered that the grade of Truman Road was raised about 2 inches in 1967 or 1968 by blacktopping, and perhaps the grade of Turner Street was raised at the same time, but these operations did not contribute materially to the drainage problem inasmuch as the grade of the streets was already above lot level. The plaintiff’s land is at the bottom of a steep slope and receives drainage from other land to the north. Turner Street, to the west, is about 11 to 15 inches above the level of plaintiff’s lot and Truman Road, on the south, is 10 to 18 inches above the lot level. On four occasions during the past three years Siegfried saw water standing on the plaintiffs’ land after heavy rains, and he entered into correspondence with the defendant city about possibilities for drainage. He was of the opinion that culverts under Turner Street, Truman Road, or Elizabeth Street, which is to the east and about 250 feet from the east boundary of plaintiff’s tract, would suffice to carry most of the water off of the tract and into natural drainage channels.
The plaintiff undertook the construction of some houses on the tract in 1980, and claims that these are worth substantially less than they would have been if the drainage had been adequate. There was also expense in hauling in dirt to raise the foundation levels of the houses.
The amended petition complained of the interruption of natural drainage by the “improper and negligent construction and maintenance” of the streets, and sought injunction against continued interruption, a mandatory order for the installation of drainage expedients, and damages. The answer consisted of a general denial together with pleas of the statute of limitations, without specifying any statutory sections, and of laches.
The plaintiff rested its case after Siegfried testified. The trial court sustained the defendant’s motion for judgment of dismissal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 67.-02 on the grounds, first, that the statute of [895]*895limitations had run on a legal claim, thereby imposing the equitable bar of laches, and, second, that the record did not show that the defendant city was the agency responsible for the construction and maintenance of the streets. The plaintiffs appealed, claiming that the land flooded only occasionally, and that the statute of limitations therefore began anew as to each incident of flooding. See Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498, 503 (Mo.App.1972).
The Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff. It characterized the claim as one for “temporary nuisance,” which could be corrected with reasonable effort, and so held that each new manifestation of damage gave rise to a new claim. The court therefore remanded the case with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff as to liability and to hear evidence as to damage.
The defendant moved for rehearing, arguing that under Supreme Court Rule 67.02 it did not waive its right to introduce evidence by moving for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The court overruled the motion, holding that the defendant, by so moving, consented to the submission of the case on the plaintiff’s evidence. It cited Shepard v. Shepard, 353 Mo. 1057, 186 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Mo.1945) and Gates Rubber Co. v. Williford, 530 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo.App.1975), but then transferred the case to this Court on its own motion because of the importance of the procedural question of the continued authority of the cases cited in view of Rule 67.02.
Most of the argument before us dealt with this procedural question. We nevertheless stand fully possessed of the case as though the original appeal had come here. We conclude, contrary to the Court of Appeals, that the trial court reached the correct result under the pleadings and evidence and therefore affirm the judgment. This makes it unnecessary to rule on the interesting and important procedural issue. Because of the importance of the point and the publicity it has received,1 however, we believe that two comments are in order, as follows: (1) Rule 67.02 clearly states that the filing of a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff’s case “does not constitute a waiver of the defendant’s right to offer evidence,” so that any case suggesting the contrary would seem to be ill-considered, and (2) trial judges should be very hesitant in sustaining such motions, and should consider the manifest advantage of hearing all evidence that any party wants to offer, so that a complete record may be assembled and further trial proceedings avoided in the event of reversal.
With these observations we turn to the merits. We conclude that the plaintiff’s evidence does not demonstrate any act or omission on the defendant’s part such as to give rise to legal liability. We do not need to go into the issues of statute of limitations and ownership of streets, which were the bases for the trial court’s decision. We of course will affirm the judgment if we conclude that it is correct, even though our reasons are not the same as those which seemed persuasive to the court below.
The evidence shows, essentially, that someone built streets many years ago, long before the plaintiff corporation acquired its property. Siegfried testified that good engineering practice required that the streets be raised above .the level of the adjoining lots; otherwise streets would wash away. The streets have kept surface water from running off of the land, especially when the level of rainfall is high. There is no claim of interruption of a natural watercourse, and so the case of Hewitt v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, 426 S.W.2d 27 (Mo.1968), which is the only case cited by the plaintiff in support of its substantive claim, is not in point.2 We have, indeed, had minimal assistance from counsel in the substantive aspects of the problem before us. There is absolutely no evidence that the city or any other agency caused water other than that which would have flowed naturally from the land above to accumulate on the plaintiff’s land. The complaint, [896]
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BLACKMAR, Judge.
This action involves the accumulation of surface water on land owned by the plaintiff corporation at the northeast corner of Truman Road, running east and west, and Turner Street, running north and south, in the City of Independence. The record contains only the testimony of Cedric Siegfried, a lawyer and president of the plaintiff corporation, and exhibits authenticated by him. Since the trial court sustained the defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff’s case, we state the facts on the basis that the plaintiff’s evidence is true.
The evidence does not show exactly when the plaintiff acquired the land in question, but the estimate is that it was purchased in parcels between 15 and 25 years ago. The streets were in place when the plaintiff became the owner. The evidence does not show when the streets were built, or whether they were built by the city, the county, the state, or a developer.
Siegfried became the chief executive officer of the plaintiff, a family corporation, about three years prior to the March, 1981 trial. He had not been active in the corporation in an executive capacity before then but had done legal work for it. He remembered that the grade of Truman Road was raised about 2 inches in 1967 or 1968 by blacktopping, and perhaps the grade of Turner Street was raised at the same time, but these operations did not contribute materially to the drainage problem inasmuch as the grade of the streets was already above lot level. The plaintiff’s land is at the bottom of a steep slope and receives drainage from other land to the north. Turner Street, to the west, is about 11 to 15 inches above the level of plaintiff’s lot and Truman Road, on the south, is 10 to 18 inches above the lot level. On four occasions during the past three years Siegfried saw water standing on the plaintiffs’ land after heavy rains, and he entered into correspondence with the defendant city about possibilities for drainage. He was of the opinion that culverts under Turner Street, Truman Road, or Elizabeth Street, which is to the east and about 250 feet from the east boundary of plaintiff’s tract, would suffice to carry most of the water off of the tract and into natural drainage channels.
The plaintiff undertook the construction of some houses on the tract in 1980, and claims that these are worth substantially less than they would have been if the drainage had been adequate. There was also expense in hauling in dirt to raise the foundation levels of the houses.
The amended petition complained of the interruption of natural drainage by the “improper and negligent construction and maintenance” of the streets, and sought injunction against continued interruption, a mandatory order for the installation of drainage expedients, and damages. The answer consisted of a general denial together with pleas of the statute of limitations, without specifying any statutory sections, and of laches.
The plaintiff rested its case after Siegfried testified. The trial court sustained the defendant’s motion for judgment of dismissal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 67.-02 on the grounds, first, that the statute of [895]*895limitations had run on a legal claim, thereby imposing the equitable bar of laches, and, second, that the record did not show that the defendant city was the agency responsible for the construction and maintenance of the streets. The plaintiffs appealed, claiming that the land flooded only occasionally, and that the statute of limitations therefore began anew as to each incident of flooding. See Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498, 503 (Mo.App.1972).
The Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff. It characterized the claim as one for “temporary nuisance,” which could be corrected with reasonable effort, and so held that each new manifestation of damage gave rise to a new claim. The court therefore remanded the case with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff as to liability and to hear evidence as to damage.
The defendant moved for rehearing, arguing that under Supreme Court Rule 67.02 it did not waive its right to introduce evidence by moving for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The court overruled the motion, holding that the defendant, by so moving, consented to the submission of the case on the plaintiff’s evidence. It cited Shepard v. Shepard, 353 Mo. 1057, 186 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Mo.1945) and Gates Rubber Co. v. Williford, 530 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo.App.1975), but then transferred the case to this Court on its own motion because of the importance of the procedural question of the continued authority of the cases cited in view of Rule 67.02.
Most of the argument before us dealt with this procedural question. We nevertheless stand fully possessed of the case as though the original appeal had come here. We conclude, contrary to the Court of Appeals, that the trial court reached the correct result under the pleadings and evidence and therefore affirm the judgment. This makes it unnecessary to rule on the interesting and important procedural issue. Because of the importance of the point and the publicity it has received,1 however, we believe that two comments are in order, as follows: (1) Rule 67.02 clearly states that the filing of a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff’s case “does not constitute a waiver of the defendant’s right to offer evidence,” so that any case suggesting the contrary would seem to be ill-considered, and (2) trial judges should be very hesitant in sustaining such motions, and should consider the manifest advantage of hearing all evidence that any party wants to offer, so that a complete record may be assembled and further trial proceedings avoided in the event of reversal.
With these observations we turn to the merits. We conclude that the plaintiff’s evidence does not demonstrate any act or omission on the defendant’s part such as to give rise to legal liability. We do not need to go into the issues of statute of limitations and ownership of streets, which were the bases for the trial court’s decision. We of course will affirm the judgment if we conclude that it is correct, even though our reasons are not the same as those which seemed persuasive to the court below.
The evidence shows, essentially, that someone built streets many years ago, long before the plaintiff corporation acquired its property. Siegfried testified that good engineering practice required that the streets be raised above .the level of the adjoining lots; otherwise streets would wash away. The streets have kept surface water from running off of the land, especially when the level of rainfall is high. There is no claim of interruption of a natural watercourse, and so the case of Hewitt v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, 426 S.W.2d 27 (Mo.1968), which is the only case cited by the plaintiff in support of its substantive claim, is not in point.2 We have, indeed, had minimal assistance from counsel in the substantive aspects of the problem before us. There is absolutely no evidence that the city or any other agency caused water other than that which would have flowed naturally from the land above to accumulate on the plaintiff’s land. The complaint, [896]*896rather, is that whosoever had control of the lower land built that land up in the construction of streets so as to hold up water which otherwise would have flowed off of the land and that the city, in maintaining the streets, has failed to correct this situation.
The subject of surface water has concerned our Court for decades. In Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. banc 1983), we related some of the history, which need not be repeated. That case involved the rights of a lower owner with respect to an upper owner. This case involves the other side of the coin. Whoever built the streets was in the position of a lower owner. The sole complaint is that the streets keep water on the plaintiff’s land which otherwise would have had an outlet. The plaintiff had the full opportunity to present evidence such as it deemed necessary, and there is no suggestion that it could establish any additional facts which would be helpful.
Our analysis starts with the seminal case of Abbott v. Kansas City, St.J. & C.B. Railroad Company, 83 Mo. 271, 289 (1884), in which the claim in the portion of the case here pertinent was that the plaintiff had had a verdict founded in part on an instruction reading as follows:
That it was the duty of the defendant company to so construct its line of tracks as would permit the usual flow of the water, and that where, owing to embankments being constructed to dam up or stop such flow, and it fails to construct aad [sic] keep in good order the necessary culverts or other waterways as will pass through and carry off such water, it is liable to damages to all parties injured.
The court held that the instruction did not correctly state the law. It was apparently based on the decision in Shane v. Kansas City, St.J. & C.B. Railroad Company, 71 Mo. 237 (1879), a suit against a railroad which had built an embankment which diverted surface water onto the plaintiff’s land. The Shane court purported to adopt the “civil law” view of surface water, under which a lower, or servient, owner has a duty to receive the surface water which naturally flows from the land of upper, or dominant, owners. The Abbott opinion completely rejected the civil law position,3 in favor of what the court deemed to be the “common law” rule, which is often described as the “common enemy” doctrine. The instruction then was held to be erroneous.4
We have been unable to find a case since Abbott which has imposed liability on a lower owner for obstructing the flow of water from upper owners. Cases from this Court are Goll v. Chicago and A. Railroad Co., 271 Mo. 655, 197 S.W. 244 (1917) and Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage and Levee District, 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448 (Mo.1925).5 The Court of Appeals cases have also been consistent. See Schneider v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 29 Mo.App. 68 (1888); Mehonray v. Foster, 132 Mo.App. 229, 111 S.W. 882 (1908); Camden Special Road District v. Taylor, 495 S.W.2d 93 (Mo.App.1973), Schifferdecker v. Willis, 621 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.App.1981). See also Snod-grass and Davis, “The Law of Surface Water in Missouri,” 24 Mo.L.Rev. 137, 281, 283 & nn. 162-64, 295-98 (1959). The bare obstruction of the flow of surface water by a lower owner has not been found to be an [897]*897occasion for liability, even though the effect on the upper owner would be highly predictable. Nor have the courts inquired into the abstract reasonableness of the lower owners’ conduct.
The Court of Appeals cited several cases in support of its holding that the plaintiff’s evidence established a claim. In all of these the plaintiffs asserted that surface water which would not otherwise have come onto the plaintiff’s land was collected from other properties and discharged in destructive quantities, which is a recognized ground for liability. See discussion in Looney, supra. In Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 260 S.W. 801 (Mo.App.1924), 284 S.W. 521 (Mo.App.1926), and 227 Mo.App. 730, 60 S.W.2d 84 (Mo.App.1933), the plaintiff’s contention during the whole of the lengthy controversy was that the city “caused the surface waters which fell during hard rains to be gathered and cast upon the plaintiff’s lots.” Lewis v. City of Springfield, 142 Mo.App. 84, 125 S.W. 824 (1910), Sandy v. City of St. Joseph, 142 Mo.App. 330, 126 S.W. 989 (1910) and Bodam v. City of New Hampton, 290 S.W. 621 (Mo.App.1927) all involve the collection of surface water and discharge in destructive quantities. Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Mo.App.1951), involved discharge of raw sewage in addition to surface waters and thereby introduced an additional form of invasion of the plaintiff’s property. In contrast to the Court of Appeals, we believe that the case of Schifferdecker v. Willis, 621 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.App.1981), holding that a landowner may erect a dam so as to interrupt the flow of water in a drainage ditch which is not a natural watercourse, thereby keeping surface waters off of his land, is closer to the present situation than the cases that court relies on. We are aware of no Missouri case, at least following the adoption of the common enemy rule in 1884, which has sustained the imposition of liability for impeding the flow of surface water, when no water is brought upon the plaintiff’s land which would not otherwise have flowed there.
Abbott recognizes that there is a duty of due care with regard to the diversion or impeding of the flow of surface water, and this proposition is reiterated in subsequent eases. The cases give us no guidance, however, as to what acts or omissions on the part of a lower owner may be found to be negligent. Negligence possibly might be based on carelessness during construction, or on the use of a dangerous process or method when a more secure one is available, but these possibilities are foreign to the record before us. Nor is there any support in the case law for giving court or jury a roving commission to determine whether the lower owner’s conduct is “unreasonable.” Camden Special Road District v. Taylor, supra, and Schifferdecker v. Willis, supra, are the latest cases in this area, and they appear to be in line with prior holdings involving similar facts. Camden holds, emphatically, that the mere construction of a dam cannot be found to be negligent, even though flooding of the upper lands can be foreseen. The same case holds, just as Abbott does, that there is no duty to build a culvert. Nor can we find any authority for requiring a city to construct culverts when it assumes maintenance of streets built by others.6
The plaintiff had the full opportunity to present its evidence. Siegfried admitted that there was no negligence in the construction of the streets. His only complaint is that there was negligence, in his view, in maintaining the streets without culverts. We seriously question the trial judge’s conclusion that there was no proof that the city had accepted the streets in question. The testimony of the grading in 1967 and 1968 would seem to be sufficient, in the absence of an explanation which the city is in by far the best position to make. [898]*898But this circumstance does not give rise to liability for failing to install culverts.7
It is, of course, our duty to reexamine the state of the law, as cases come to us. There might be an anomaly in a rule which may place substantial restrictions on upper owners in ridding their land of surface water, while affording almost unlimited freedom to lower owners in backing the water up, but we do not perceive any general trend in Missouri or elsewhere toward abandonment of the “common enemy” rule in favor of some other concept such as a “reasonable use” doctrine. See Comment, “The Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban Areas,” 42 Mo.L.Rev. 76, 79-80 (1977), indicating that some courts which had previously adopted the civil law position, which might permit this plaintiff a recovery, have later elected to apply the common enemy doctrine, rather than their prevailing civil law rule, when urban land is involved. The parties have not asked us to undertake a reevaluation of the current state of the law in this area, and we do not believe that this case is an appropriate vehicle for doing so.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff’s evidence does not establish liability we do not need to analyze the defenses of the statute of limitations and laches. We observe, however, that the evidence indicates that this land was in substantially the same condition when the plaintiff acquired it as it is now. The state of the drainage must have been apparent to any prospective purchaser, just as it is presently apparent, according to Siegfried’s testimony, to appraisers for lending institutions. This suggests permanence, which would indicate, at most, a one-time claim belonging to the initial owner. Spain, supra at 503. There would be a serious problem if a person could purchase low-lying lands with surface waters held in by graded streets, and then demand, years later, that the public authorities provide drainage at public expense, or, alternatively, pay damages every time it rains heavily. The defenses of laches and the statute of limitations exist to inhibit claims of this kind.8 But, inasmuch the facts were not fully developed, we rest our conclusion on the elements of the plaintiff’s claim, rather than on possible defenses.
The dissent cites language from numerous cases, in arguing that there is no rational distinction between upper owners and lower owners. The cases actually involving lower owners, however, show remarkable consistency since 1884. We decide only the case before us. We do not foreclose the possibility that some future upper owner might be able to demonstrate actionable negligence or unreasonable conduct on the part of a lower owner.
We are not unmindful of the plaintiff’s problem in having land without drainage. The defendant at one time offered to make the ditches available if the plaintiff would pay for the pipe, but the offer apparently was not received with any enthusiasm. We adjudicate nothing as to whether one in the plaintiff’s position would be entitled to relief of this kind, if actively pursued. We share the trial judge’s hope that the parties will cooperate so that drainage may be made available and optimum use made of the land. On the present record, however, we are persuaded that the judgment is correct, and it is affirmed.
GUNN, J., concurs.
RENDLEN, C.J., and BILLINGS, J., concur in result.
HIGGINS, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
[899]*899WELLIVER and DONNELLY, JJ., dissent and concur in separate dissenting opinion of HIGGINS, J.