Metropolitan Life v. Hanson, et al.

2009 DNH 146

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: October 1, 2009
• Docket: CV-08-248-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

Metropolitan Life v . Hanson, et a l . CV-08-248-JL 10/1/09 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Metropolitan Life Insurance C o .

v. Civil N o . 08-cv-248-JL Opinion N o . 2009 DNH 146 Judith A . Hanson, et a l .

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This interpleader action involving the proceeds of a life

insurance policy presents a question of statutory interpretation:

whether the qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) exception

to ERISA’s pre-emption provision applies to welfare benefit plans

such as life insurance policies, or only to pension plans.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) initiated this

interpleader complaint to resolve competing claims to life

insurance benefits under an employee welfare benefit plan

established and maintained by General Electric Company for its

employee, decedent William J. Hanson. Two of the three

interpleader defendants have cross-moved for summary judgment,

each claiming entitlement to the insurance benefits as a matter

of law.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this

interpleader action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 29

U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (federal question -- ERISA), 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (interpleader defendant diversity), and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 22 (interpleader diversity). After oral argument,

summary judgment is granted in favor of interpleader defendants

Christina L . Hogan, William S . Hanson, and Jill E . Hanson, the

children from decedent William J. Hanson’s first marriage. As

explained below, the clear, unambiguous language of the relevant

ERISA provisions establishes that the QDRO exception to ERISA

pre-emption applies not only to pension plans, but also to

welfare benefit plans such as the life insurance policy at issue

here.

I. Applicable legal standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the “pleadings, the

discovery and the disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Two of the three interpleader

defendants have moved for summary judgment.1 “Cross-motions

simply require [the court] to determine whether either of the

1 A third claimant, Janet M . Clauser, neither moved for summary judgment nor objected to either of the other parties’ motions. At oral argument, M s . Clauser’s counsel conceded that Clauser had no claim to the insurance benefits and supported the legal position advanced by the children from decedent William J. Hanson’s first marriage.

2 parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are

not disputed.” Littlefield v . Acadia Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 1 , 6

(1st Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).

II. Background

William J. Hanson worked for General Electric as a jet

engine mechanic. In 1966, he enrolled in a group insurance

benefit plan provided by MetLife for the benefit of General

Electric employees. The plan included group life insurance

coverage. At the time, William and his wife Phyllis had three

children (“Phyllis’ children”). William and Phyllis divorced in

1980, and their divorce decree adopted their agreement that the

MetLife insurance policy be maintained for the benefit of Phyllis

and their children. Phyllis’ children are the first group of

interpleader claimants.

William remarried, and he and his second wife, Janet

Clauser, also had three children. William and Janet divorced in

1995, and William this time agreed that the same life insurance

policy would be maintained for the benefit of Janet and her

children. William executed a beneficiary designation form with

the General Electric “enrollment center” notifying MetLife and

naming Janet as beneficiary under the policy. Janet Clauser is

the second interpleader claimant.

3 The following year, William remarried, this time to Judith

Rideout. He again changed the beneficiary designation of the

MetLife policy, this time naming Judith. When William and Judith

divorced in 2002, the stipulation adopted in their divorce decree

awarded each of them “any and all life insurance policies owned

by that party, free and clear of any right, title or interest of

the other.” William never further modified the policy, and

Judith Rideout, the named beneficiary, is the third interpleader

claimant.

William died in 2005, survived by all three of his former

wives, and all six of his children. The MetLife insurance policy

remained in effect and unencumbered. Faced with the competing

claims of Phyllis’ children, Clauser, and Rideout, MetLife filed

this interpleader action, asking the court to resolve the

competing claims.

III. Analysis

The material facts are not in dispute. The only dispute is

one of statutory interpretation: whether the determination of

the proper beneficiaries of the Hanson insurance policy is

governed by the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),

29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., or by state law. If ERISA governs,

then state domestic relations law is pre-empted and Hanson’s

4 third wife, Judith Rideout, is the proper beneficiary as the

named beneficiary of the policy. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). But

if ERISA does not apply because the 1980 divorce decree

dissolving the William Hanson-Phyllis Hanson marriage is exempt

from ERISA’s pre-emption provision as a qualified domestic

relations order, then Phyllis’ children are the proper

beneficiaries. See id. at § 1144(b)(7).

ERISA pre-empts state laws that “relate to” employee

benefits plans. Id. at § 1144(a) (stating that “the provisions

of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall

supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or

hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in”

ERISA). This provision establishes a broad area of exclusively

federal concern pre-empting state law claims that “relate to” an

employee benefit plan. See FMC Corp. v . Holliday, 498 U.S. 5 2 ,

58 (1990).

ERISA’s “anti-alienation” provision requires that “[e]ach

pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan

may not be assigned or alienated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).

ERISA was amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), 2

however, to provide that this prohibition on alienation and

2 Pub. L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.

5 assignment of pension benefits “shall not apply if the order is

determined to be a qualified domestic relations order. Each

pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in

accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified

domestic relations order.” Id. at § 1056(d)(3)(A). The REA also

added a provision exempting qualified domestic relations orders

from the ERISA pre-emption provision. Id. at § 1144(b)(7).

Thus, qualified domestic relations orders, or QDROs, are

expressly exempted from ERISA’s pre-emption and anti-alienation

provisions.

The parties agree that Hanson’s life insurance policy,

issued by MetLife under a benefits package provided by General

Electric, is a “welfare plan” within the meaning o f , and governed

by, ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). They further agree that the

1980 divorce decree dissolving William and Phyllis Hanson’s

marriage is a qualified domestic relations order. Id. at §

1056(d)(3)(B)(i).3 What the parties dispute is whether the QDRO

3 ERISA defines “qualified domestic relations order” as “a domestic relations order ... which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right t o , or assigns to an alternate payee the right t o , receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan,” and which also meets certain other requirements -- not disputed here -- set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(3)(C) and ( D ) . Id.; see also id. at § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (defining “domestic relations order”). One of those other requirements–-specifically, that a domestic relations order may not override a prior QDRO--is what

6 exceptions to ERISA pre-emption applies to both pension plans and

welfare plans (like the Hanson insurance policy), or applies only

to pension plans. Although not yet definitively answered in this

circuit, this court agrees with the observation of the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals: “The answer to this question is clear

from the face of the statute.” Metro. Life Ins. C o . v . Bigelow,

283 F.3d 436, 440 n.3 (2d Cir. 2002).

Unlike ERISA’s anti-alienation provision, which applies only

to pension plans, see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (“Each pension plan

shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be

assigned or alienated.”) (emphasis added), the general ERISA pre-

emption provision and the specific provision that exempts QDROs

from pre-emption contain no such limitation. See id. at §

1144(a) (pre-empting “any or all State laws, insofar as they may

now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described

in” ERISA) (emphasis added); id. at § 1144(b)(7) (stating that

the pre-emption provision shall not apply to QDROs, as defined in

the anti-alienation provision). Our court of appeals has

expressly recognized this statutory distinction. See Barrs v .

Lockheed Martin Corp., 287 F.3d 2 0 2 , 209 n.7 (1st Cir. 2002)

(“Unlike the exception to the assignment ban, the exception to

disqualifies Janet Clauser’s 1995 divorce decree as a possible basis for awarding her the benefits. Id. at § 1056(3)(D)(iii)

7 the preemption provision is not literally limited to pension

plans.”). Stated conversely, the exemption of qualified domestic

relations orders from ERISA pre-emption is set forth not in the

section of the statute that defines those orders, § 1056(d), but

rather in the general pre-emption provision, § 1144. That

provision, in turn, applies to both welfare and pension plans.

Judith Rideout argues that because the provision exempting

QDROs from ERISA pre-emption, 29 U.S.C. § 1147(b)(7),

incorporates by reference the definition of a QDRO that appears

in the anti-alienation provision, id. at § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i), it

must therefore be limited, as the anti-alienation provision i s ,

to pension plans. But the plain language of the QDRO definition

refers to “a plan,” not just a pension plan. Id.; see also

Barrs, 287 F.3d at 209 n.7. The overwhelming weight of authority

supports the interpretation dictated by the statute’s plain

meaning: that the QDRO exception to ERISA pre-emption applies to

both pension plans and welfare benefit plans. See Metro. Life

Ins. C o . v . Price, 501 F.3d 2 7 1 , 275 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007); Bigelow,

283 F.3d at 440 n.3; Metro. Life Ins. C o . v . Pettit, 164 F.3d

857, 863 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998); Metro. Life Ins. C o . v . Marsh, 119

F.3d 415, 421 (6th Cir. 1997); Metro. Life Ins. Co., v . Wheaton,

42 F.3d 1080, 1083-84 (7th Cir. 1994); Carland v . Metro. Life

Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1114, 1119-20 (10th Cir. 1991); see also J.

8 Jorden, W . Pflepsen & S . Goldberg, Handbook on ERISA Litigation,

§ 5.05[D] at 5-110 n.417 (“The QDRO exception to ERISA’s

preemption provision applies to both welfare and pension

plans.”). While our court of appeals has not squarely addressed

the issue, it has cited Pettit, Marsh, Wheaton and Carland with

approval, stating that “we see no obvious reason why we would

depart from the prevailing view.” Barrs, 287 F.3d at 209 n.7.

“The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires

[courts] to presume that the legislature says in a statute what

it means and means in a statute what it says there.” BedRoc

Ltd., LLC v . United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (quotation

omitted). Thus, the court’s inquiry in a statutory

interpretation case “begins with the statutory text, and ends

there as well if the text is unambiguous.” Id.; see also Ruiz v .

Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1 , 8 (1st Cir. 2007)

(explaining that where the statutory “language is clear and

unambiguous, the inquiry is at an end”). This same reasoning

precludes the consideration of other interpretive aids, such as

the presidential signing statement issued by President Ronald

Reagan upon the Retirement Equity Act’s enactment,4 proffered by

claimant Judith Rideout at oral argument, and her argument,

4 Statement on Signing the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 20 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 35 (1984).

9 citing the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Kennedy v . Plan

Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S . C t . 865 (2009), that

application of the QDRO exception to welfare plans is

inconsistent with Congressional intent.5 Even if it were this

court’s business to ascertain Congress’ purpose in enacting

legislation, rather than the meaning of the legislation itself,

this court “cannot understand why, if a qualified domestic

relations order can override the designation of beneficiary in a

pension plan, as Congress in the Retirement Equity Act decided

that it can, Congress would not have allowed such an order to

override the designation of beneficiary in a welfare plan” such

as the Hanson insurance policy. See Wheaton, 42 F. 3d at 1083.

IV. Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment filed by Phyllis’ children6

is GRANTED, and Judith Rideout’s motion for summary judgment7 is

DENIED. The interpleader defendants other than Phyllis’ children

are ordered to show cause (if such cause exists), through the

5 The court notes that in Kennedy, “the QDRO provisions shed no light on” the issue being decided, which involved the applicability of ERISA’s anti-alienation provision to a non-QDRO waiver. Id. at 873. 6 Document n o . 2 9 . 7 Document n o . 3 2 .

10 filing of a memorandum within 14 days from the date of this order

why the entire proceeds of the Hanson insurance policy on deposit

with the court should not issue to interpleader defendants

Christina L . Hogan, William S . Hanson, and Jill E . Hanson.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph N. Laplante Uni/ted States District Judge

Dated: October 1 , 2009

cc: William D. Pandolph, Esq. Jeanne P. Herrick, Esq. Jackson W . Casey, Esq. Jonathan A . Lax, Esq. Patrick M . McAvoy, Esq.