Meredith v. Berryhill

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedSeptember 30, 2019
Docket7:18-cv-00243
StatusUnknown

This text of Meredith v. Berryhill (Meredith v. Berryhill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meredith v. Berryhill, (W.D. Va. 2019).

Opinion

CORRS ROANOKE, VA : FILED

_ IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SEP 30 2019 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA JULIA, □□□□□□□□□ GLERK ROANOKE DIVISION BY: (racks ROBERTA M..,! ) ) Plaintiff ) ) Vv. ) Civil Action No. 7:18-CV-243 : ) ANDREW SAUL, ) By: Hon. Michael F. Urbanski. Commissioner of Social Security, ) Chief United States District Judge ) Defendant ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Roberta M. (“Roberta”) has filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in denying her claim for a period of Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. In her motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 14, Roberta argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to properly analyze evidence from her treating physician and that the Appeals Council erred when it declined to consider additional evidence she submitted after the hearing. The Commissioner responded in his own motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 19, that substantial evidence supports the denial of disability benefits and that the Appeals Council ptoperly declined to consider the additional evidence.

1 Due to privacy concerns, the court adopts the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United states that courts use only the first name and last initial of the claimant in social security opinions.

As discussed more fully the below, the court finds that substantial evidence does not suppott the ALJ’s determination to accord little weight to the opinion of Roberta’s treating physician on the effects of her impairments. The coutt further finds that the additional evidence was propertly excluded by the Appeals Council. Accordingly, Roberta’s motion for summaty judgment is GRANTED; the Commissionet’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED; the ALJ’s determination is VACATED, and this case ii REMANDED for further consideration consistent with this opinion. I. Judicial Review of Social Security Determinations It is not the province of a federal court to make administrative disability decisions. Rather, judicial review of disability cases is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving disability. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). In so doing, the court may neither undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision nor te-weigh the evidence of record. Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992). Evidence is substantial when, considering the record as a whole, it might be deemed adequate to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), or when it would be sufficient to refuse a directed verdict in a jury trial. Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is not a “large or considerable amount of evidence,” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988), but is more than a mere scintilla and somewhat less than a preponderance. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. “It means—and means

only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”’ Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. Nevertheless, remand is appropriate when the ALJ’s analysis is so deficient that it “frustrate[s] meaningful review.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636-637 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that “remand is necessary” because the coutt is “left to guess [at] how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions”). See also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasizing that the ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion” and holding that remand was appropriate when the ALJ failed to make “specific findings” about whether the claimant’s limitations would cause him to experience his claimed symptoms during work and if so, how often) (citation omitted). II. Claim History Roberta was born on December 2, 1963 and graduated from high school. R. 53. Her past relevant work includes being a childcare or daycare worker and working as a general motor vehicle assembler. R. 76. Roberta filed an application for DIB on August 21, 2014, alleging an onset date of October 9, 2013. R. 17. She was last insured for purposes of DIB on December 31, 2014, giving her a narrow window in which to establish her disability—from October 9, 2013 through December 31, 2014. Roberta alleged disability based on systemic lupus erythematosus and scleroderma, Sjogten’s syndrome, Reynaud’s phenomenon, fibromyalgia, impingement of the right

shoulder-failed surgical repair, depression, anxiety, panic attacks, migraine headaches, chronic fatigue, and arthritis in her arms, hands, hips, knees, wrists, and elbows. R. 271. The application was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels of review. R. 113-117, 122-128. On April 11, 2017, ALJ Geraldine H. Page held a hearing to consider Roberta’s claim for DIB. Roberta was represented by counsel and a vocational expert also testified. R. 51-82. On July 19, 2017 the ALJ rendered an opinion finding Roberta not disabled, applying the five-step evaluation process described in the regulations.? R. 17-27. The AL] first found that Roberta last met the insured status requirements on December 31, 2014 and that she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of October 9, 2013 through December 31, 2014. The ALJ further found that Roberta had the following severe impairments--right shoulder degenerative joint disease; lumbosacral degenerative disc disease; history of injury to the bilateral knees, mixed connective tissue disease (““MCTD”) (including features of scleroderma, lupus, Sjogren’s syndrome, Reynaud’s

The ALJ makes a series of determinations: (1) Whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) Whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that is “severe” under the regulations; (3) Whether the severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment; (4) Whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work; and (5) Whether the claimant is able to do any other work in the national economy, considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404

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Meredith v. Berryhill, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meredith-v-berryhill-vawd-2019.