ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 1. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.1 The certification states: "We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) permits an insurer to exclude maternity coverage for an insured acting as a surrogate mother. The answer to this question is determined, in part, by what level of deference, if any, should be accorded the Commissioner's decision."
[117]*117¶ 2. The Commissioner concluded that Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) does not permit an insurer to exclude generally covered maternity services for surrogate mothers. Thus, the Commissioner determined that MercyCare's 2002 Contract was ambiguous, and MercyCare's attempt to exclude generally covered maternity services for surrogate mothers under its 2002 Contract contravened the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7). For the same reason, he determined that the 2005 Contract contravened Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7). Finally, the Commissioner also disapproved the 2005 Contract under Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a)l., determining that it is misleading because the benefits are too restricted to serve the purposes for which the policy is sold. On review, the circuit court accorded no deference to the Commissioner's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) and reversed the Commissioner's legal conclusions.2
¶ 3. Applying due weight deference, we conclude that an insurer may not make routine maternity services that are generally covered under the policy unavailable to a specific subgroup of insureds, surrogate mothers, based solely on the insured's reasons for becoming pregnant or the method used to achieve pregnancy. Accordingly, we determine that MercyCare's application of the 2002 Contract to exclude from coverage all maternity services for surrogate mothers contravenes Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).
¶ 4. We also conclude that the Commissioner appropriately disapproved the surrogacy provision in MercyCare's 2005 Contract because it is contrary to Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7). In addition, the definition of [118]*118"surrogate mother" set forth in the 2005 Contract is misleading because the benefits are too restricted to serve the purposes for which the policy is sold. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit court.
I
¶ 5. MercyCare Insurance Company and Mercy-Care HMO, Inc. (collectively "MercyCare") are insurance companies authorized to do business in Wisconsin and subject to the jurisdiction and control of the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance. In 2002, MercyCare offered a group disability insurance policy that provided maternity coverage for eligible persons covered under the policies.
¶ 6. J.M. and C.S. were eligible persons insured by MercyCare under MercyCare's 2002 Certificate of Coverage ("the 2002 Contract").3 C.S. was insured as a dependent, and J.M. was insured as an employee.
¶ 7. While insured under the 2002 Contract, J.M. and C.S. each agreed to act as a gestational carrier by carrying a child for other parents. The children carried by J.M. and C.S. are not genetically related to J.M. or C.S. respectively.
¶ 8. Both women received health care services in connection with their pregnancies. J.M. received medical care including laboratory tests, ultrasounds, maternity care, physician visits, inpatient hospital care, anesthesia and delivery. The total costs incurred amounted to $16,774.63. C.S. received comparable pre- and post-partum medical services, with costs totaling $18,510.84.
¶ 9. During the course of their pregnancies, MercyCare denied coverage for the maternity services re[119]*119ceived by both J.M. and C.S. It notified J.M. that benefits for lab work were being denied because the contract did not cover "surrogate mother services."4 Subsequently, MercyCare informed J.M. by letter:
MercyCare is unable to authorize coverage for all services related to this pregnancy. Services provided from 5-10-04 through 1-7-05 are not eligible for reproductive services benefits or pregnancy benefits. Any benefits paid for the services will be recouped.
C.S. was similarly denied coverage based on the 2002 Contract's identification of "surrogate mother services" as a "non-covered service" under the Contract's "Pregnancy Benefits coverage."5
¶ 10. The 2002 Contract provides that "surrogate mother services" are a "non-covered service" in two separate places — under the section titled "Pregnancy Benefits" and under the section titled "Reproductive Services." However, the term "surrogate mother services" is not defined anywhere within the 2002 Contract.6
[120]*120¶ 11. The "Pregnancy Benefits" section provides as follows:
Covered Services:
Treatment of pregnancy is covered for an employee, an employee's covered dependent spouse, or an employee's covered dependent child.
Pregnancy benefits include coverage for inpatient hospital care and pre- and post-natal care received from a participating provider.
Non-Covered Services:
• Surrogate mother services.
• Elective abortions.
• Maternity services received out of the service area in the last 30 days of pregnancy without prior authorization from the Plan except in an emergency. Prior authorization is based on medical necessity.
• Amniocentesis or chorionic villi sampling (CVS) solely for sex determination.
In addition, the "Reproductive Services" section of the 2002 Contract lists various covered services and provides that "surrogate mother services" are a "non-covered service."7
[121]*121¶ 12. After denying coverage for J.M. and C.S.'s pregnancies, MercyCare sought to recoup the money it had already paid for claims related to the pregnancies. Ultimately, the services provided to both women were paid in full by third parties.
¶ 13. C.S. filed a complaint with the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance. Her complaint triggered the agency's review of MercyCare's denial of coverage to the two women. During this review, MercyCare filed its newest group disability policy insurance form ("the 2005 Contract")8 with OCI for approval.9
¶ 14. In many respects, the 2005 Contract is identical to the 2002 Contract. However, the 2005 Contract revises the language of the surrogate mother services exclusion and provides a definition for the term "surrogate mother."
[122]*122¶ 15. Rather than simply excluding "surrogate mother services," the 2005 Contract provides that the following is a "Non-Covered Service": "Treatment, services or supplies for a surrogate mother or any pregnancy resulting from your service as a surrogate mother." Additionally, the 2005 Contract provides the following definition of the term "surrogate mother":
Surrogate mother means a woman who, through in vitro fertilization or any other means of fertilization, gives birth to a child which she may or may not have a genetic relationship to, or an individual who provides a uterus for the gestation of a fertilized ovum obtained from a donor when the child will be parented by someone other than the woman who gives birth.
¶ 16. OCI disapproved the 2005 Contract by letter dated January 11, 2006. The letter explained that the exclusion for "[treatment, services or supplies for a surrogate mother or any pregnancy resulting from your service as a surrogate mother," must be deleted because "[a] policy that provides maternity coverage may not limit the coverage based on method of conception, as such a limitation is unfairly restrictive and discriminatory."10 MercyCare requested a hearing.
¶ 17. On February 15, 2006, OCI issued a Notice of Hearing alleging that MercyCare violated Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) when it denied coverage for J.M. and C.S.'s pregnancies under the 2002 Contract. The notice fur[123]*123ther alleged that the disapproval of the 2005 Contract was appropriate because the policy exclusions violated the mandated maternity benefits of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) and were misleading under Wis. Stat. § 631.20. The case ultimately went before the Commissioner of Insurance. The parties agreed to submit the case on the basis of briefs, a stipulation of facts, and other stipulated documentation.
¶ 18. The Commissioner issued a final decision on December 8, 2006. It concluded that: (1) under the mandate of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7),11 MereyCare may not exclude maternity coverage of otherwise covered persons based on their status as surrogate mothers; (2) even if the surrogacy services could he properly excluded, the language of the 2002 Contract is ambiguous; (3) OCI appropriately disapproved MercyCare's 2005 Contract because the surrogate mother exclusion is contrary to Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) and the 2005 Contract is misleading because its benefits are too restricted to achieve the purposes for which the policy is sold.
¶ 19. The decision first addressed whether MereyCare was permitted under Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) to exclude maternity coverage on the basis that the insured was acting as a surrogate mother. The Commissioner explained that the issue required the application of "exclusions or limitations" to a set of facts unanticipated by the legislature at the time the statute was passed. According to the Commissioner's interpreta[124]*124tion, "the legislative history indicates that the statute's purpose is one of inclusiveness" and therefore, the statute ensures that if the policy provides maternity coverage, all covered persons must be treated equally. "[T]he answer to whether MercyCare's exclusion is permissible requires a determination of whether MercyCare is attempting to exclude the provision of a group of services or the exclusion of a group of insureds."
¶ 20. The Commissioner concluded that under the statute, an insurer may deny coverage of certain specific procedures, such as in vitro fertilization, to all people covered under the policy. However, an insurer may not deny coverage for all maternity services to some insureds covered under the policy based on their reasons for becoming pregnant. Therefore, the insurer may not deny coverage of generally covered maternity services because the insured is a surrogate mother. Additionally, the Commissioner concluded that the surrogacy exclusion in the 2002 Contract is ambiguous and that OCI's disapproval of the 2005 Contract was appropriate under Wis. Stat. § 631.20.
¶ 21. MercyCare filed a petition for judicial review in the Rock County Circuit Court. The circuit court accorded no deference to the Insurance Commissioner's legal conclusions because the Commissioner had not previously interpreted § 632.895(7) and because it determined that the Commissioner had no particular expertise that would assist it in determining the applicability of the statute. Rather, it stated that the case was one of "first impression."
¶ 22. The circuit court determined that "the Commissioner of Insurance exceeded its statutory authority in disapproving the certificate of insurance," and it ordered the Commissioner to approve the 2005 Contract. In reaching this decision, it concluded that Wis. [125]*125Stat. § 632.895(7) "clearly and unambiguously" permitted MercyCare to exclude maternity coverage for otherwise covered persons who were serving as surrogate mothers. It determined that the statute required only that "any exclusions or limitations must be applied uniformly to all covered persons," and that "the exclusion for surrogate parents is an exclusion which applies uniformly to all covered persons."12
¶ 23. The Commissioner appealed, and the court of appeals certified the appeal to this court. It explained that its answer to the question of the proper interpretation of the statute would be determined, in part, by the level of deference that should be accorded the Commissioner's decision. Although OCI had never before interpreted the specific statutory subsection at issue, the court implied that OCI had experience interpreting other mandatory coverage provisions. The court stated that "guidance is [] needed on this topic because it is not apparent from the case law to date what level of deference should be given to an agency's decision when the issue is particularly within the agency's area of expertise and specialized knowledge, but the agency is construing a specific statute for the first time."
¶ 24. The court of appeals commented that "[a] number of cases suggest that a question is not one of first impression. .. simply because an agency is addressing a new fact situation for the first time. We question whether the approach should be any different when an agency is addressing particular statutory language for the first time."
[126]*126II
¶ 25. On appeal, we review the decision of the Commissioner of Insurance rather than the decision of the circuit court. The parties dispute, and the court of appeals was uncertain of, the applicable standard of review. We address this question first.
¶ 26. We are asked to interpret Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) and apply it to the exclusions at issue in this case. We are also asked to interpret MercyCare's 2002 and 2005 Contracts, which are policies of insurance. Interpretation and application of statutes and insurance policies are questions of law. Volvo Trucks N Am. v. Wausau Truck Ctr., 2010 WI 15, ¶ 11, 323 Wis. 2d 294, 779 N.W.2d 423; Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 86, ¶ 18, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448. This court decides questions of law independently, but benefits from the analyses rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals. Pawlowski v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶ 16, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67.
¶ 27. Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, a court is never bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute. Hutson v. State Personnel Com'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶ 31, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212. Nevertheless, a court will under certain circumstances give deference to an agency's statutory interpretation. Id.] Racine Harley-Davidson v. State, 2006 WI 86, ¶ 11, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.
¶ 28. In Racine Harley-Davidson, we clarified the three levels of deference to be accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statute: no deference, due weight [127]*127deference, and great weight deference. 292 Wis. 2d 548, ¶¶ 12-20. These three levels take into account the comparative institutional qualifications and capabilities of the court and the administrative agency. Id., ¶¶ 13-14.
¶ 29. A reviewing court accords an agency's statutory interpretation no deference when the issue is one of first impression, when the agency has no experience or expertise in deciding the legal issue presented, or when the agency's position on the issue has been so inconsistent as to provide no real guidance. Id., ¶ 19. When no deference to the agency decision is warranted, the court interprets the statute independently and adopts the interpretation that it deems most reasonable. Id.
¶ 30. A reviewing court accords due weight deference when the agency has some experience in an area but has not developed the expertise that places it in a better position than the court to make judgments regarding the interpretation of the statute. Id., ¶ 18. When applying due weight deference, the court sustains an agency's interpretation if it is not contrary to the clear meaning of the statute — unless the court determines that a more reasonable interpretation exists. Id.
¶ 31. Finally, a reviewing court accords great weight deference when each of four requirements are met: (1) the agency is charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the statute; (2) the agency's interpretation is one of long standing; (3) the agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming its interpretation; and (4) the agency's inter[128]*128pretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the application of the statute. Id., ¶ 16. When applying great weight deference, the court will sustain an agency's reasonable statutory interpretation even if the court concludes that another interpretation is equally or more reasonable. Id., ¶ 17. The court will reverse the agency's interpretation if it is unreasonable — if it directly contravenes the statute or the state or federal constitutions, if it is contrary to the legislative intent, history, or purpose of the statute, or if it is without a rational basis. Id.
¶ 32. Whichever level of deference is granted, the reviewing court does not abdicate its own authority and responsibility to interpret the statute. Id., ¶ 14; Hutson, 263 Wis. 2d 612, ¶ 31. In assessing the agency's interpretation, the court must itself interpret the statute to determine whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶ 15. It is only under the great weight deference standard that the agency's specialization and expertise is so extensive that the court views the agency's interpretation as the one to adopt even if it is not the most reasonable one.
¶ 33. Here, the focus of our inquiry in determining whether there is great weight deference is whether the Commissioner's interpretation is one of "long standing." OCI has extensive experience interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 632.895 generally,13 but no experience interpreting the requirements of sub. (7), the specific statutory language upon which this case turns. The court of appeals inquired about the appropriate [129]*129level of deference when the issue is particularly within the agency's area of expertise and specialized knowledge, but the agency is construing specific statutory language for the first time.
¶ 34. Wisconsin courts have previously accorded great weight deference to an agency's application of a familiar statute to a novel set of facts. See, e.g., Town of Russell Volunteer Fire Dep't. v. LIRC, 223 Wis. 2d 723, 733, 589 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1998). Yet, applying statutory language to a novel set of facts is not the same as interpreting particular statutory language for the first time.
¶ 35. It cannot be said that the Commissioner's interpretation of this specific subsection is one of "long standing." In this case, the Commissioner, like this court, is interpreting the requirements of sub. (7) for the first time. Under these circumstances, it would make little sense to defer to the Commissioner's statutory interpretation even if the court concludes that an equally reasonable or a more reasonable interpretation exists. We conclude that a reviewing court should not give great weight deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute when the agency is interpreting particular statutory language for the first time.14
[130]*130¶ 36. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the Commissioner has been charged by the legislature with the administration of the mandatory coverage statutes and has the responsibility of ensuring that the insurance policies issued in Wisconsin comply with statutory regulations. Due to this legislative mandate, OCI addresses an untold number of insurance policies each year. As a result, OCI has developed experience, institutional qualifications, and specialized knowledge in the area of mandatory coverage, generally. Thus, it also makes little sense to accord no deference at all to the Commissioner's interpretation of the statutory language at issue here.
¶ 37. We conclude that due weight deference may be warranted when an agency has specialized experience with the issues regulated by the statute, but has not yet interpreted the specific statutory language at issue. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶ 51, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95. We acknowledge that in most situations, applying due weight deference will lead to the same result as would [131]*131applying no deference at all. "Under both due weight deference and no deference, the reviewing court may adopt, without regard for the agency's interpretation, what it views as the most reasonable interpretation of the statute." Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶ 20.
¶ 38. Applying the above principles here, we observe that the Commissioner has been charged by the legislature with approving group disability insurance forms, and the Commissioner may disapprove a form upon concluding that it violates a statute or is otherwise contrary to law. Wis. Stat. §§ 631.20(1); 631.20(2). The Commissioner has substantial experience interpreting mandatory coverage provisions. Nevertheless, the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance has never specifically interpreted the language of sub. (7), which addresses maternity coverage, and it therefore has not developed the expertise that places it in a better position than the court to make judgments regarding the interpretation of this statute. We conclude that due weight deference is warranted,15 and we will sustain [132]*132the Commissioner's statutory interpretation if it is not contrary to the clear meaning of the statute and no more reasonable interpretation exists. We turn now to the statute.
Ill
¶ 39. Wisconsin Stat. §§ 632.71-632.899 regulate group disability insurance contracts. Section 632.895(7) sets forth specific requirements for maternity coverage. We are asked to determine whether MercyCare's 2002 Contract, which excludes "surrogate mother services," contravenes the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).
¶ 40. We begin our examination of the statute by setting forth the relevant statutory and legislative history. Next, we turn to the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute to determine whether it is reasonable. Finally, we examine other interpretations to determine whether they are more reasonable than the interpretation advanced by the Commissioner.
¶ 41. Wisconsin Stat. Ch. 632 contains provisions applying to specific types of insurance contracts. Wisconsin Stat. § 632.895 sets forth various mandatory coverages in group disability insurance policies. Wisconsin Stat. § 632.895(7), which regulates maternity coverage, provides as follows:
[133]*133Every group disability insurance policy which provides maternity coverage shall provide maternity coverage for all persons covered under the policy. Coverage required under this subsection may not be subject to exclusions or limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage under the policy.16
¶ 42. The parties and the Commissioner agree that the first sentence of the statute prohibits an insurer from selectively offering maternity coverage to some insureds but not to others. Rather, the first sentence requires an insurer that decides to offer maternity coverage to anyone under the policy to offer that coverage to all persons under the policy. The parties agree that the mandate of the first sentence is very broad.
¶ 43. The parties' dispute centers around the meaning of the second sentence: "Coverage required under this subsection may not be subject to exclusions or limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage under the policy." From that sentence, it is clear that an insurer may exclude or limit some aspects of maternity coverage. However, no maternity coverage may "be subject to exclusions or limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage under the policy."
¶ 44. Whether this sentence permits the exclusion of all maternity services to a subgroup of insureds based on the fact that the insured is serving as a surrogate [134]*134mother is not readily apparent from the text. As the Commissioner opined, it is likely that the current understanding of surrogacy was not a factual situation contemplated by the legislature when it passed the relevant statutory language in 1981 and 1985.17 Indeed, [135]*135cases from the early 1980s demonstrate that the term "surrogate mother" was used at that time to refer to a woman who was a caregiver for another woman's child.18
¶ 45. Subsection (7) was originally added to the mandatory coverage statute in 1981. It extended maternity coverage to dependent children only:
Every group disability policy which provides coverage of dependent children and maternity coverage for any individual shall provide maternity coverage for dependent children. Coverage required under this subsection may not be subject to exclusions or limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage under the policy.
The Legislative Reference Bureau explained that "Maternity coverage for dependent children may not be subject to exclusions or limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage under the policy."
¶ 46. The scope of sub. (7) was broadened by 1985 Wisconsin Act 56, the Abortion Prevention and Family Responsibility Act of 1985. This act was drafted by the Legislative Council Special Committee on Pregnancy [136]*136Options. Among other instructions, the committee had been specifically directed to "make available health insurance coverage for childbirth in all instances." Wisconsin Legislative Council Report No. 16 to the 1985 Legislature, Legislation on Pregnancy Options, Oct. 7, 1985, at 5.
¶ 47. 1985 Wisconsin Act 56 amended the first sentence to read: "Every group disability insurance policy which provides maternity coverage shall provide maternity coverage for all persons covered under the policy." Thus, the act expanded the reach of sub. (7) from dependent children to "all persons covered under the policy." The act did not amend the second sentence of sub. (7). Thus, maternity coverage for "all persons covered under the policy" could not "be subject to exclusions or limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage under the policy."
¶ 48. In a memo to the Joint Committee on Finance, the Director of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau explained that under the previous enactment, "[mjaternity coverage [was] not specifically required for persons other than dependent children." However, the 1985 changes "would require that, if maternity coverage is provided under the policy, all persons who are generally covered under the policy must receive maternity coverage." The fiscal note accompanying the act explained that the amendments required "every group disability insurance policy which provides maternity coverage to any individual to provide the same level to all persons covered under the policy."
¶ 49. In interpreting the statute, the Commissioner recognized that the second sentence of sub. (7) permits some exclusions and limitations. However, he also recognized that the exclusion written by Mercy-Care attempts to exclude coverage of generally covered [137]*137maternity services available to other insureds on the sole basis that an insured is a surrogate mother. The question was whether an exclusion of generally covered maternity services to those insureds acting as surrogate mothers contravenes the statute.
¶ 50. The Commissioner quoted the definition of "exclusion" from a Wisconsin case that was contemporary to the drafting of the statute: "An exclusion, in insurance parlance, serves the purpose of taking out persons or events otherwise included within the defined scope of coverage." Bortz v. Merrimac Mut. Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 2d 865, 871, 286 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1979). Although an exclusion typically takes out "persons or events," the Commissioner determined that the first sentence of sub. (7) prohibits the "taking out of persons who receive maternity coverage." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 51. Thus, the Commissioner concluded that although an insurer may exclude or limit "certain services" as long as it does so uniformly, the insurer "may not discriminate against a subgroup of insureds." Accordingly, an insurer may make specific procedures — such as in vitro fertilization, elective abortion, and amniocentesis or chorionic villi sampling solely for sex determination — non-covered benefits under the policy. The insurer may exclude these procedures for all insureds. However, the Commissioner concluded that it could not exclude services that are generally covered under the policy — such as inpatient hospital care and pre- and post-natal care — for a specific subgroup of insureds, surrogate mothers, based solely on the insured's reasons for becoming pregnant or the method used to achieve pregnancy.
¶ 52. MercyCare asserts that the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute is unreasonable because it conflicts with the language of sub. (7), which permits [138]*138some exclusions. Therefore, MercyCare contends that the unambiguous statutory language permits it to exclude not only specific services, but specific subgroups of insureds as well.
¶ 53. The meaning of the statute and its application to the type of exclusion presented here are not readily apparent from the statutory text. Therefore, applying the standard for due weight deference, we cannot conclude that the Commissioner's interpretation is contrary to the clear meaning of the statute.. See, supra, ¶ 38.
¶ 54. Further, the Commissioner's interpretation is reasonable because it reconciles the broad mandate of the first sentence, which requires that coverage be granted to all members of a group, and the second sentence, which allows exclusions under certain circumstances. The Commissioner's interpretation is also consistent with the legislative history, which explains that "every group disability insurance policy" must "provide the same level to all persons covered under the policy."
¶ 55. Giving due weight deference to the Commissioner's interpretation, we will nevertheless decline to adopt the Commissioner's interpretation if there is another, more reasonable interpretation of the statute. MercyCare asserts that "the statute was enacted to end discrimination based on the insured's status as a member, spouse or child, not to end all discrimination." It advances that the second sentence requires only that any exclusion in its policy be applied uniformly. MercyCare contends that this interpretation of the statute is more reasonable.
¶ 56. The crux of MercyCare's argument is that "the statute allows an exclusion to take out a person otherwise included, as long as under the same eircum[139]*139stances all persons otherwise included would also be taken out." Thus, it asserts, the statute "allows coverage to be excluded for an insured who chooses to become a surrogate mother as long as the exclusion applies equally and uniformly to all insureds who chose to become surrogate mothers, i.e. a group member, a group member's spouse, or a group member's dependent child."
¶ 57. MercyCare's interpretation suffers from some infirmities. Initially, we observe that it does not find direct support in the text of the statute. The statute does not state that it permits an exclusion that discriminates among subgroups as long as it applies uniformly to group members, spouses, and dependent children. Rather, it states that the coverage for "all persons covered under the policy .. . may not be subject to exclusions or limitations which are not applied to other maternity coverage under the policy."
¶ 58. A second problem with MercyCare's interpretation is that it would produce unreasonable results. Taken to its logical conclusion, MercyCare's interpretation would permit an insurer to discriminate against any number of subgroups of insureds, as long as the discrimination was "uniform." For example, at oral argument, MercyCare suggested that it would be permitted to exclude an insured's fourth pregnancy — or even a second pregnancy — as long as that exclusion was applied to all policies uniformly.19 Such a result would undercut the broad mandate of the first sentence and is not reasonable.
[140]*140¶ 59. The concurrence also offers an interpretation of the statute. It concludes that Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) permits an insurer to exclude maternity coverage for "gestational carrier services." Concurrence, ¶ 83. It explains that it reaches this conclusion because maternity care for a gestational carrier is a "contract expense" that inures to the benefit of a third party. Id., ¶ 100.
¶ 60. There are three problems with the concurrence's interpretation. First, the concepts of gestational carriers and contract expenses are not found in the language of the statute. The concurrence carves out an exception that is not supported by the statute's text.
¶ 61. Second, although the concurrence's analysis is based on the existence of a contract, it relies on a definition of "gestational carrier" that makes no reference to the existence of a contract. The concurrence explains that a gestational carrier is a woman who "receives a transfer of an embryo created by ovum and sperm" and who has no genetic relationship with the baby she carries. Id., ¶ 83 n.2. Nothing in the definition of "gestational carriers" restricts the term's use to a [141]*141contract situation where the gestational carrier intends that the baby will be raised by other parents. See Id.
¶ 62. Third, the concurrence's interpretation, based on a contract analysis, raises more questions than it answers. It is not entirely clear how its interpretation of the statute would be applied. What is clear, however, is that the existence of contract expenses — the rationale adopted by the concurrence — does not appear to yield a predictable result.
¶ 63. Imagine, for instance, a situation where an insured is impregnated via embryo transfer and shares no genetic material with the child she carries. Could the insurer exclude maternity coverage for that insured, even if there was no contract and the insured became pregnant with the express purpose of parenting the child? Under the concurrence's interpretation, the answer would appear to be yes — the insured is a gestational carrier and can be excluded.
¶ 64. Alternatively, imagine the fact situation in In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), the case that raised national awareness of the social and legal issues involved with surrogacy. See supra, ¶ 44 n.17. There, the birth mother supplied the ovum and carried the baby to term, but her purpose in becoming pregnant was to fulfill a contract with third parties who intended to raise the baby. Could an insurer have excluded coverage for the delivery of Baby M? Under the concurrence's interpretation, the answer appears to be no. Despite the existence of a contract, Baby M's birth mother was not a gestational carrier because she was genetically related to the child she carried.
¶ 65. The questions raised by the concurrence's interpretation are endless. Is the basis of the concurrence's rationale really the existence of a contract, or is it status as a gestational carrier, intent to [142]*142parent, or all three? How would the concurrence's interpretation affect independent adoptions, where there is often a contract providing that the adoptive parents will pay for the birth mother's maternity expenses? See Audra Behne, Balancing the Adoption Triangle, 15 In Pub. Interest 49, 79 (1996-1997) ("[UJsually the adoptive parents pay the birth mother's maternity expenses and legal fees."). Who would pay for the maternity coverage if the parties contested the rights and obligations of parentage after the child was born? What would happen if a gestational surrogate decided mid-pregnancy to parent the child, or if the intended parents decided to divorce and refused to accept the child? What would happen if a court concluded that the surrogacy contract was unenforceable?20
¶ 66. The concurrence's interpretation writes language into the statute, relies on a definition of gestational carrier that is not consistent with the contract-based rationale it advances, and would lead to unpredictable results. Therefore, it is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
¶ 67. Having concluded that the Commissioner's interpretation is reasonable and is not contrary to the clear meaning of the statute, we determine that the [143]*143interpretations advanced by MercyCare and the concurrence are not more reasonable than the interpretation advanced by the Commissioner. Further, no more reasonable interpretation exists. Thus, we affirm the Commissioner's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).
¶ 68. We conclude that the statute permits an insurer to exclude or limit certain services and procedures, as long as the exclusion or limitation applies to all policies. However, an insurer may not make routine maternity services that are generally covered under the policy unavailable to a specific subgroup of insureds, surrogate mothers, based solely on the insured's reasons for becoming pregnant or the method used to achieve pregnancy. Accordingly, MercyCare's attempt to exclude surrogate mothers from coverage under its 2002 Contract contravenes Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7), and MercyCare wrongfully denied maternity coverage to J.M. and C.S.
IV
¶ 69. Having determined that the statute does not permit MercyCare to exclude maternity services on the basis of an insured's role as a surrogate mother, it follows that the Commissioner appropriately disapproved the surrogacy provision in the 2005 Contract as contrary to § 632.895(7). The Commissioner also offered an additional reason for disapproving the provision — that it is misleading because it is too restricted to achieve the purposes for which the policy is sold. This reason also supports our conclusion that the Commissioner appropriately disapproved the surrogacy provision in the 2005 Contract.
[144]*144¶ 70. Under Wis. Stat. § 631.20(1), MercyCare was required to file its 2005 Contract with the Commissioner for approval. Section 631.20(2) provides that the Commissioner may disapprove a form if it makes one of several findings. Disapproval is authorized if the Commissioner finds that the form "violates a statute or a rule promulgated by the commissioner, or is otherwise contrary to law." Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(d). Disapproval is also authorized if the Commissioner finds:
That it is inequitable, unfairly discriminatory, misleading, deceptive, obscure or encourages misrepresentation, including cases where the form:
1. Is misleading because its benefits are too restricted to serve the purposes for which the policy is sold.
Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a).
¶ 71. The 2005 Contract excludes "[treatment, services, or supplies for a surrogate mother or any pregnancy resulting from your service as a surrogate mother." Unlike the 2002 Contract, it defines the term "surrogate mother" as follows:
Surrogate mother means a woman who, through in vitro fertilization or any other means of fertilization, gives birth to a child which she may or may not have a genetic relationship to, or an individual who provides a uterus for the gestation of a fertilized ovum obtained from a donor when the child will be parented by someone other than the woman who gives birth.
¶ 72. The Commissioner concluded that this definition was misleading because its benefits are too restricted to achieve the purposes for which the policy was sold. Although MercyCare asserted the definition was meant to encompass expenses incurred by women who profited by carrying a child for another parent to [145]*145raise, the Commissioner concluded that there is nothing in the 2005 definition of surrogate mother that limits the exclusion to those situations. Rather, aside from being contrary to the statutory mandate, MercyCare's definition was overly broad and would have the unintended effect of excluding coverage for some insureds that MercyCare may not have intended to exclude. As a result, MercyCare would have "broad discretion in applying its exclusion to any number of women based solely on how or why they are pregnant."
¶ 73. MercyCare now asserts that the Commissioner erred in disapproving the 2005 Contract because an OCI insurance examiner testified at deposition that if the exclusion did not contravene the statute, she otherwise did not have "any objection to the definition of surrogate mother in the 2005 certificate." MercyCare explains that the Commissioner ignored this testimony, and his decision is therefore not supported by substantial evidence in the record. However, the interpretation of a definition in an insurance policy is a question of law. Thus, neither the Commissioner nor this court is bound by the legal conclusion of any witness.
¶ 74. MercyCare's definition of "surrogate mother" appears to encompass two different types of insureds: (1) an insured who through in vitro or any other means of fertilization gives birth to a child, regardless of whether she has a genetic relationship with that child; and (2) an insured who provides a uterus for the gestation of a fertilized ovum obtained from a donor when the child will be parented by someone other than the insured.
¶ 75. The first category appears to exclude all pregnancies. It would exclude insureds who do or do not have a genetic relationship to the children they give birth to when fertilization occurs "by any means." The [146]*146Commissioner is correct that even if an exclusion for surrogacy were permissible, the definition of "surrogate mother" is misleading under Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a). With such a broad exclusion, the policy's benefits are too restricted to achieve the purposes for which the policy is sold.
¶ 76. MercyCare acknowledges that the definition suffers from a drafting error, and it asserts that a comma should be inserted between "donor" and "when the child will be parented by someone other than the woman who gives birth."21 Thus, MercyCare contends, the phrase "when the child will be parented by someone other than the woman who gives birth" would modify both categories of insureds.
¶ 77. At oral argument, counsel for MercyCare explained that if a comma is added to the definition, "[t]he person who would be excluded would be the insured employee, spouse, or dependent who actually becomes pregnant, regardless of how that person became pregnant, [] if the pregnancy was for the purpose of giving that child to some other non-covered [parent]." Counsel further explained that its definition rested upon the intention of the insured at the moment the insured became pregnant:
Q: [W]hat does the phrase "any other means of fertilization" mean?
A: I don't know.
[147]*147Q: Seems fairly broad, doesn't it?
A: Yes, it is broad.
Q: So, if you become pregnant, isn't that what it says, regardless of how—
A: It does.
Q: —and whether it is genetic or not?
A: Right. And that covers traditional surrogacy versus gestational surrogacy, basically bringing us back to the point, which is whether the person is intending to be the parent, or providing the child to the intended parent.
Q: And it has to be at the time of the fertilization?
A: The time of the pregnancy, which I would interpret as the time of the fertilization.
Q: So, if I at the moment I become pregnant, plan on keeping the baby, but at some time during the pregnancy, decide to give it up for adoption or otherwise, I would be covered.
A: I believe you would.
¶ 78. Even with the addition of a comma to correct the error in draftsmanship, we conclude that MercyCare's definition of "surrogate mother" is overly broad. Nothing in the text of the definition limits the exclusion to situations where the insured knows "at the moment of fertilization" that the child will be parented by someone else. Rather, it appears that MercyCare could invoke the exclusion and deny coverage in any situation "when the child will be parented by someone other than the woman who gives birth" — regardless of when that decision was made.
[148]*148¶ 79. Further, even if the definition did turn on an insured's intention at "the moment of fertilization," the exclusion could be applied to an insured who knows that in the event of an unplanned pregnancy, she would carry the child to term and then put the child up for adoption. Nothing in the definition of "surrogate mother" limits the exclusion to a commercial relationship where an insured agrees to carry a child for a third party, expecting to be compensated for that service.
¶ 80. We conclude that the Commissioner appropriately disapproved the surrogacy provision in the 2005 Contract under Wis. Stat. § 631.20(2)(a)l. In addition to contravening Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7), MercyCare's definition of "surrogate mother" is misleading because it is too restricted to serve the purposes for which the policy is sold.
V
¶ 81. In sum, applying due weight deference, we conclude that an insurer may not make routine maternity services that are generally covered under the policy unavailable to a specific subgroup of insureds, surrogate mothers, based solely on the insured's reasons for becoming pregnant or the method used to achieve pregnancy. Accordingly, we determine that MercyCare's application of the 2002 Contract to exclude from coverage all maternity services for surrogate mothers contravenes Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7).
¶ 82. We also conclude that the Commissioner appropriately disapproved the surrogacy provision in MercyCare's 2005 Contract because it is contrary to Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7). In addition, the definition of "surrogate mother" set forth in the 2005 Contract is misleading because the benefits are too restricted to serve the purposes for which the policy is sold. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
[149]*149By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.