Mendy v. Larson

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 SANG W. MENDY, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01426-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL 12 v. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE MOTION, MOTION TO SEAL, 13 TRACY L. LARSON et al., AND MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR 14 Defendants. PRODUCTION 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on three separate but related motions: Defendant 17 American Security Programs, Inc.’s Supplemental Motion for Protective Order, Dkt. No. 98, and 18 Motion to Seal, Dkt. No. 102, as well as Plaintiff Sang Mendy’s Motion to Compel Responses to 19 Request for Production, Dkt. No. 111. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and 20 denies in part each of the three motions. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The facts of this case are set forth in the Court’s June 10, 2024 Order. Dkt. No. 121 at 1– 23 4. The Court accordingly declines to recount them here except as relevant to the motions at issue. 24 1 On March 7, 2024, American Security Programs, Inc. (“ASP”) filed a motion for summary 2 judgment, contending that it was not liable for Mendy’s Fair Housing Act claims because the 3 owners of Northwest Security Services, Inc. (“Northwest”) at the time of the October 2020 incident 4 (the Bargers) assumed all pre-November 24, 2020 liabilities by way of a stock purchase agreement

5 (“Agreement”) with SecurAmerica, LLC. Dkt. No. 67 at 1–2. ASP filed a declaration in support 6 of its motion that included an excerpted version of the Agreement. Dkt. No. 69 at 4–8. 7 On April 20, 2024, the Court ordered ASP “to produce a complete and unabridged copy” 8 of the Agreement. Dkt. No. 91. On April 26, 2024, ASP filed a copy of the Agreement under seal, 9 Dkt. No. 94, as well as an unsealed copy that redacted the Agreement’s purchase price and 10 associated financial information (e.g., net working capital target, share par value, and subordinated 11 promissory note details), Dkt. No. 93. On the same day, ASP moved for a protective order 12 concerning the production of the redacted material, contending that “[t]he amount SecurAmerica 13 paid to purchase [Northwest] is not relevant in any way to the claims in [Mendy’s] suit.” Dkt. No. 14 95 at 3. The Court denied ASP’s motion on May 8, 2024. Dkt. No. 99.

15 On May 3, 2024, ASP filed another sealed and redacted copy of the Agreement that 16 included the Agreement schedules, which ASP asserts “were previously unknown . . . but have 17 since been located.” Dkt. No. 96 at 1; Dkt. No. 97 at 1; see generally Dkt. No. 96 (unsealed and 18 redacted Agreement with schedules); Dkt. No. 97 (sealed Agreement with schedules). In the 19 unsealed copy of the complete Agreement, ASP redacted certain financial information contained 20 within the Agreement schedules (i.e., working capital, financial information from 2018 to 2020, 21 and accounts receivable), as well as litigation and claims summaries. See Dkt. No. 96 at 7–8, 12, 22 35, 38, 65, 98–103, 105–08, 110, 118, 121–22. 23 On May 7, 2024, ASP filed a supplemental motion for protective order concerning the

24 redacted material in the Agreement schedules. Dkt. No. 98. On May 13, 2024, ASP filed a motion 1 to seal all of the material it had redacted in docket entry 97. Dkt. No. 102. Mendy opposes both of 2 ASP’s motions. Dkt. No. 105. 3 On May 22, 2024, Mendy filed a motion to compel responses to his request for production 4 of ASP’s “balance sheets and income statements for the years 2021, 2021, . . . 2023, and 2024” for

5 the purpose of “assessing punitive damages[.]” Dkt. No. 112-1 at 4; see also Dkt. No. 111. ASP 6 objected to this request on March 14, 2024, maintaining that “[p]unitive damages by definition are 7 not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful 8 action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and other from similar extreme conduct,” and 9 therefore “punitive damages are not available against ASP” because “[t]here is no evidence or 10 even allegation that ASP was a tortfeasor who committed wrongful actions.” Dkt. No. 112-1 at 4– 11 5. 12 On June 10, 2024, the Court denied ASP’s motion for summary judgment and granted 13 Mendy’s motions to continue ASP’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 121 at 15. The Court 14 determined that ASP did not support its position that the Bargers assumed liability for Mendy’s

15 Fair Housing Act claims under the plain language of the Agreement. Id. at 9–11. 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 A. ASP’s Motion to Seal is Granted in Part and Denied in Part 18 ASP moves to seal the purchase price, certain financial information contained within the 19 Agreement (i.e., working capital, financial information from 2018 to 2020, and accounts 20 receivable), and litigation and claims summaries in Schedule 3.23. Dkt. No. 102 at 2, 4; see also 21 Dkt. No. 93 at 7–8, 12, 35, 38 (redacted material); Dkt. No. 96 at 7–8, 12, 35, 38, 65, 98–103, 105– 22 08, 110, 118, 121–22 (same). Mendy did not file an opposition to this request. 23 Courts have recognized a “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents,

24 including judicial records and documents.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). 2 Accordingly, when a district court considers a sealing request, “a strong presumption in favor of 3 access is the starting point.” Id. (cleaned up). This presumption, however, “is not absolute and can 4 be overridden given sufficiently compelling reasons for doing so.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

5 Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. 6 Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)). 7 The standard for determining whether to seal a record depends on the filing with which the 8 sealed record is associated and whether such filing is “more than tangentially related to the merits 9 of a case.” See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 1092, 1098–1102 (9th Cir. 2016). 10 If the filing at issue is more than tangentially related to the merits of the case, the court must apply 11 the “compelling reasons” standard to the motion to seal. See id. If the filing is only tangentially 12 related to the merits, the party seeking to seal the records need only show “good cause.” See id. 13 Additionally, in the Western District of Washington, parties moving to seal documents 14 must comply with the procedures established by Local Civil Rule 5(g). Under that rule, the party

15 who designates a document confidential must provide a “specific statement of the applicable legal 16 standard and the reasons for keeping a document under seal, including an explanation of: (i) the 17 legitimate private or public interest that warrant the relief sought; (ii) the injury that will result if 18 the relief sought is not granted; and (iii) why a less restrictive alternative to the relief sought is not 19 sufficient.” LCR 5(g)(3)(B). 20 Because the filing at issue here is only tangentially related to the merits of Mendy’s Fair 21 Housing Act claims, the Court evaluates ASP’s motion under the “good cause” standard. The 22 Court concludes that while ASP has demonstrated good cause to seal the purchase price and 23 financial information in the Agreement, it has not demonstrated good cause to seal the litigation

24 information in Schedule 3.23. 1 1. ASP Has Demonstrated Good Cause to Seal the Purchase Price and Financial Information 2 For the reasons stated in ASP’s motion, and because Mendy does not oppose the motion, 3 the Court finds good cause to grant ASP’s motion with respect to the purchase price and financial 4 information that it has redacted in the Agreement. This information may remain under seal. 5 2. ASP Has Not Demonstrated Good Cause to Seal the Litigation Information 6 ASP also seeks to seal the litigation and claims information in Schedule 3.23 of the 7 Agreement because such information “is protected work-product[.]” Dkt. No. 102 at 5 (referencing 8 Dkt. No. 98 at 4–5). ASP contends that the “summar[ies] of litigation and potential claims and 9 evaluation of such claims” in Schedule 3.23 “were prepared in order to advise the purchasing 10 company [of] potential litigation,” and therefore are “protected from disclosure” under the work 11 product doctrine. Dkt. No. 98 at 4–5. 12 Because this Court exercises federal question jurisdiction over Mendy’s federal Fair 13 Housing Act claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal common law of privilege applies. 14 Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Rosette, No. 23-55166, 2024 WL 15 1651666, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2024). The work product doctrine protects from discovery 16 “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 17 another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, 18 indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). To qualify for protection against 19 discovery under Rule 26(b)(3)(A), documents must satisfy two criteria: “(1) they must be prepared 20 in anticipation of litigation or for trial, and (2) they must be prepared by or for another party or by 21 or for that other party’s representative.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf/Torf Envt’l 22 Mgmt.), 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United 23 States v. Microsoft Corp., No. C15-102-RSM, 2020 WL 263577, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2020). 24 1 “To determine whether a document was prepared in anticipation of litigation,” courts “require 2 evidence of ‘[t]he circumstances surrounding the document’s preparation,’ including ‘the nature 3 of the document and the factual situation of the particular case.” In re Grand Jury Investigation, 4 747 F. App'x 544, 545 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d at 908).

5 When a document was not prepared exclusively for litigation, it can only qualify for work 6 product protection “if in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the 7 particular case, the document can be fairly said to have been prepared or obtained because of the 8 prospect of litigation.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 880 F.3d 473, 9 485 (9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Unless they meet this standard, documents created in the ordinary 10 course of business are not protected by the work product doctrine “because they would have been 11 created regardless of the litigation.” Sixty-01 Ass’n of Apt. Owners v. Pub. Serv. Ins. Co., No. C22- 12 1373-JCC, 2023 WL 7921091, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 16, 2023) (emphasis omitted). “More than 13 the mere possibility of litigation must be evident for materials” to qualify under the work product 14 doctrine. Slack v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, No. C11-5843-BHS, 2016 WL 11815753, at *2

15 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Here, ASP has failed to show that the litigation summaries in Schedule 3.23 of the 17 Agreement were drafted in anticipation of litigation. This disclosure schedule, like several other 18 schedules in the Agreement, was prepared as a representation and warranty of the Bargers in the 19 Agreement regarding outstanding litigation and claims against Northwest. See Dkt. No. 96 at 11, 20 17. ASP has not demonstrated that any of the claims listed in the disclosure schedule are likely to 21 be litigated; in fact, none of the listed claims indicate any pending or likely litigation that may 22 arise. Dkt. No. 97 at 121–22. Schedule 3.23 was prepared to facilitate the sale of Northwest’s stock 23 by the Bargers to SecurAmerica—i.e., an ordinary and non-litigation-related business

24 transaction—as opposed to being prepared to summarize pending and actual litigation against 1 Northwest. See Logan v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is important 2 to distinguish between an investigative report developed in the ordinary course of business as a 3 precaution for the remote prospect of litigation and materials prepared because some articulable 4 claim, likely to lead to litigation has arisen.” (cleaned up)); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80

5 F.R.D. 718, 725 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (“[W]e do not recognize a Per se rule, as defendants apparently 6 wish, that an attorney’s work product in preparing a tender offer or other form of business 7 combination is automatically entitled to work product protection”; instead, “the prospect of 8 litigation must be identifiable because of Specific claims that have already arisen.” (cleaned up)). 9 Nothing in ASP’s briefing convincingly establishes that a document created to be shared with 10 SecurAmerica, and subsequently shared with SecurAmerica, is entitled to work product 11 protections or that those protections were not waived, see United States v. Huawei Device Co., No. 12 CR19-10RSM, 2019 WL 2214673, at *2 n.4 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2019), especially considering 13 the fact that ASP did not include this schedule on its privilege log, Dkt. No. 105 at 3. Thus, the 14 schedule does not qualify for work product protection. See, e.g., Moser as Tr. of Tr. Under

15 Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation of Tango Transp., LLC v. Navistar Int’l Corp., No. 4:17-cv- 16 00598, 2019 WL 236722, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2019) (“[A]lthough the documents may contain 17 summaries of litigation prepared by attorneys for Navistar, the primary purpose behind the creation 18 of the documents was not to aid in possible future litigation, but to aid KPMG in conducting the 19 audit.”); Syron v. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, No. 1:14-mcv-359 (JEB/JMF), 2014 WL 12623047, 20 at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 2014) (finding that summaries of litigation developments “fail[ed] to satisfy 21 the work product doctrine because they lack[ed] a clear indication that they were prepared for or 22 in anticipation of litigation”). 23 Because ASP has failed to provide a basis to seal this information, the Court denies ASP’s

24 motion with respect to the litigation and claims summaries in Schedule 3.23 of the Agreement. 1 B. ASP’s Supplemental Motion for a Protective Order is Granted in Part and Denied in Part 2 ASP also moves for a protective order concerning the redacted information in the 3 Agreement’s disclosure schedules. Dkt. No. 98. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 26(c)(1), a court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 5 embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” See Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 6 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010). ASP asserts that the financial information redacted in the 7 Agreement schedules is “not relevant because no punitive damages can be entered against 8 [Northwest].” Dkt. No. 98 at 3–4. Mendy opposes ASP’s motion, contending that the financial 9 information of Northwest is relevant because punitive damages can be assessed against Northwest 10 and ASP in the event that Mendy’s action against Northwest and ASP is successful. Dkt. No. 105 11 at 4–7. 12 In a civil action to enforce the Fair Housing Act, “if the court finds that a discriminatory 13 housing practice has occurred . . . the court may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive 14 damages[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1); see also The Fair Hous. Council of San Diego v. Penasquitos 15 Casblanca Owner’s Ass’n, 381 F. App'x 674, 676–77 (9th Cir. 2010). And “[a] defendant’s net 16 worth and financial condition are relevant to the issue of punitive damages.” Tapia v. NaphCare 17 Inc., No. C22-1141-KKE, 2024 WL 184256, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2024); see also TXO 18 Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993) (noting it is “well-settled” that a 19 defendant’s “net worth” is a factor that is “typically considered in assessing punitive damages”). 20 “However, the inquiry as to how much detail is required is fact-specific, and courts have reached 21 conflicting outcomes on the extent to which this type of discovery is appropriate is appropriate in 22 a given case.” Tapia, 2024 WL 184256, at *6 (collecting cases). 23 24 1 Here, the grounds for ASP’s motion for a supplemental protective order are the same as 2 those it relies upon for its motion for summary judgment; i.e., that it did not assume the liabilities 3 of Northwest pursuant to the Retained Liabilities provision of the Agreement. Compare Dkt. No. 4 98 at 3–4, with Dkt. No. 67 at 5–7. As the Court found in its order denying ASP’s summary

5 judgment, the language in that provision did not clearly allocate Northwest’s pre-November 24, 6 2020 liabilities to the Bargers. See Dkt. No. 121 at 9–10. And because ASP assumed all of 7 Northwest’s liabilities pursuant to the October 2021 articles of merger, it still may be liable for 8 Mendy’s Fair Housing Act claims. It therefore also may be subject to punitive damages should 9 Mendy be successful in this action. 10 However, Mendy does not explain how Northwest’s financial information in the schedules 11 is relevant to his claim for punitive damages. Mendy concedes that Northwest is no longer a 12 separate entity, and that if his action is successful, the liabilities would be incurred by ASP as 13 opposed to Northwest. Dkt. No. 105 at 5–6. Thus, for the purposes of punitive damages, ASP’s 14 current net worth and financial condition are what matter (which Mendy effectively acknowledges

15 in his motion to compel, see generally Dkt. No. 111); Northwest’s financial information from 2018 16 to 2020, by contrast, is largely irrelevant. The Court therefore grants ASP’s motion for a protective 17 order with respect to the financial information at issue in the Agreement. However, because the 18 Court denied ASP’s motion to seal with respect to the claims summaries in Schedule 3.23, its 19 motion for a protective order with respect to that information is denied as moot. 20 C. Mendy’s Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production is Granted in Part 21 Last, Mendy moves to compel ASP’s balance sheets and income statements from 2020, 22 2021, 2023, and 2024. Dkt. No. 111; see Dkt. No. 112-1 at 4.1 As with the redacted financial 23 1 Mendy’s request for production did not include a request for ASP’s balance sheets and income statements from 2022. 24 Dkt. No. 112-1 at 4. 1 information in the Agreement schedules, Mendy seeks ASP’s recent balance sheets and income 2 statements for the purposes of assessing punitive damages. Dkt. No. 111 at 2–5; Dkt. No. 112-1 at 3 4. ASP objects to Mendy’s request for production, asserting that “[t]here is no evidence or even 4 allegation [in Mendy’s complaint] that ASP was a tortfeasor who committed wrongful actions”

5 under the Fair Housing Act, and therefore “punitive damages are not available against ASP and its 6 financial information is wholly irrelevant as it had no involvement in the actions giving rise to 7 [Mendy’s] suit.” Dkt. No. 112-1 at 4–5. 8 “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 9 party’s claim or defense[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information is relevant if it is “reasonably 10 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor 11 Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 12 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992)). This Court has broad discretion to decide whether to compel 13 disclosure. Id.; see also Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 14 (9th Cir. 2002).

15 ASP insists that even if it were Northwest’s successor and Northwest were liable to Mendy 16 for punitive damages, “ASP would merely be liable for the judgment as the successor” and 17 “[p]unitive damages would not be awarded directly against ASP because it was not the tortfeasor.” 18 Dkt. No. 118 at 5–6. As discussed above, “[a] defendant’s net worth and financial condition are 19 relevant to the issue of punitive damages.” Tapia, 2024 WL 184256, at *6. ASP has not 20 demonstrated that it did not assume Northwest’s liabilities for Mendy’s Fair Housing Act claims, 21 see Dkt. No. 121 at 11–12, and under the October 2021 articles of merger, “all debts, liabilities 22 and duties of the Non-Surviving Entities,” including Northwest, “shall . . . continue to be, as the 23 case may be, the debts, liabilities and duties of [ASP] by operation of law[.]” Dkt. No. 68 at 5.

24 Courts have specifically found that successors like ASP can be held liable for their predecessor’s 1 Fair Housing Act liabilities. See, e.g., Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. City of Los Angeles, 205 F. 2 Supp. 3d 1105, 1114–16 (C.D. Cal. 2016); Equal Rights Ctr. v. Equity Residential, No. CCB-06- 3 1060, 2016 WL 1258418, at *14–15 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2016); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, OH, 4 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 480 (S.D. Ohio 2007). Such liabilities can include liability for any applicable

5 punitive damages. See, e.g., Equal Rights Ctr., 2016 1258418, at *13 n.21 (observing that 6 successor defendant could be liable for punitive damages under Fair Housing Act). Given Mendy’s 7 punitive damages claim, such information would be “generally admissible at trial[.]” Coachman 8 v. Seattle Auto Mgmt., No. C17-187-RSM, 2018 WL 1640893, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2018); 9 see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981) (noting that “evidence 10 of a tortfeasor’s wealth is traditionally admissible as a measure of the amount of punitive damages 11 that should be awarded”). This is not to say that punitive damages will ultimately be appropriate 12 in this case, even if Mendy prevails on his Fair Housing Act claim; the Court holds only that ASP’s 13 financial information is discoverable at this stage of the litigation, when not all potentially pertinent 14 facts regarding the merger are available to the Court. See Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 484 A.2d

15 521, 525–26 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (discussing differing views regarding assessing punitive 16 damages against successor corporations and concluding that “each case of successor liability must 17 turn on its particular facts”). 18 For these reasons, the Court grants Mendy’s motion to compel, but only as to ASP’s 19 “current financial information.” Coachman, 2018 WL 1640893, at *4. Courts in this District have 20 generally limited such discovery to balance sheets and income statements to the last three years of 21 available data. See, e.g., id.; Dawson v. S. Corr. Entity, No. C19-1987-RSM, 2021 WL 843141, at 22 *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2021); Fish, LLC v. Harbor Marine Maint. & Supply, Inc., No. C17-0245- 23 JCC, 2018 WL 1121332, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2018). Here, ASP’s relevant financial

24 information is from after its October 2021 merger with Northwest and other entities; therefore, the 1 Court grants Mendy’s motion to compel to ASP’s balance sheets and income statements from 2 2021, 2023, and 2024.2 3 III. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS the following:

5 1. ASP’s motion for supplemental protective order, Dkt. No. 98, is GRANTED IN PART 6 and DENIED IN PART. 7 2. ASP’s motion to seal, Dkt. No. 102, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 8 The following may remain under seal: Dkt. No. 94 at 7–8, 12, 35, 38; Dkt. No. 97 at 9 7–8, 12, 35, 38, 65, 98–103, 105–08, 110, 118. ASP must file an unsealed copy of pages 10 121–22 of docket entry 97. 11 3. Mendy’s motion to compel, Dkt. No. 111, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 12 PART. ASP is ordered to provide responses within five days of this Order. 13 Dated this 14th day of June, 2024. 14 A

15 Lauren King United States District Judge 16

17 18 19 20 2 Mendy also asks the Court to order ASP to pay for Mendy’s motion to compel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) “to prevent further unilateral withholding of documents and discovery.” Dkt. No. 111 at 4. While the Court does have “great latitude in imposing sanctions” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, Lew v. 22 Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985), the Court “must not order this payment if . . . the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii); see also Spearman Corp. Marysville Div. v. Boeing Co., No. C20-13-RSM, 2020 WL 5350502, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 4, 2020). ASP’s 23 withholding of documents was based on a good faith and reasonable belief that it was precluded from liability for Mendy’s Fair Housing Act claims pursuant to the Agreement. The Court therefore exercises its discretion to deny 24 Mendy’s request for sanctions.