Mendoza v. Garrett
This text of 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (Mendoza v. Garrett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
HERNANDEZ, District Judge:
*1150Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a putative class, challenging Oregon's practice of suspending an individual's driver's license for failure to pay "traffic debt."1 More specifically, the six named Plaintiffs, each of whom lives on an extremely limited income and has had a driver's license suspended because of the inability to pay one or more traffic violation fines, contend that suspending a driver's license for failure to pay traffic debt absent an assessment of an individual's ability to pay violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants are the Director of the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), members of the Oregon Transportation Commission, and the Administrator of ODOT's Driver and Motor Vehicles Division. Collectively, they are "the DMV." Simultaneously with filing the Complaint, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and to certify the class. This Opinion addresses the preliminary injunction motion only. At oral argument on that motion, I deferred any further briefing on the class certification motion, and any other activity in the case, until resolution of the preliminary injunction motion.
Plaintiffs bring three claims, each alleging a violation of either due process, equal protection, or both. Because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to any of their claims, I deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
Oregon, like other states, has a statutory scheme in which the failure to pay a court-adjudicated traffic violation fine can result in the suspension of a driver's license. Recently, some states have addressed the practice through legislation. In California, for example, according to a Los Angeles Times article cited by Plaintiffs, the California Legislature passed a bill, signed by the Governor in June 2017, preventing the suspension of driver's licenses because of unpaid fines.2 Other *1151states are in litigation over the practice. E.g., Fowler v. Johnson , No. 17-11441,
I. Oregon's Statutory Scheme
The Oregon Vehicle Code defines "traffic violation" as "a traffic offense that is designated as a traffic violation in the statute defining the offense, or any other offense defined in the Oregon Vehicle Code that is punishable by a fine but that is not punishable by a term of imprisonment." Or. Rev. Stat. § (O.R.S). 801.557 ; see also O.R.S. 153.008(1)(a), (b) (providing generally that an "offense" is a "violation" if it is "designated as a violation by the statute defining the offense," or the "statute prescribing the penalty for the offense provides that the offense is punishable by a fine but does not provide that the offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment.").
Violations are classified into categories. O.R.S. 153.012 (designating categories as Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D, as well as "unclassified violations as described in O.R.S. 153.015," and "[s]pecific fine violations as described in O.R.S. 153.015."). "The penalty for committing a violation is a fine." O.R.S. 153.018(1). There are maximum, presumptive, and minimum fines for each category of violation. O.R.S. 153.018(2) (maximum fines); O.R.S. 153.019 (presumptive fines); O.R.S. 153.020 (increasing presumptive fines for violations committed in a highway work zone, school zone, or safety corridor); O.R.S. 153.021 (minimum fines). The Chief Justice of the *1152Oregon Supreme Court is required to establish a uniform fine schedule for violations prosecuted in circuit courts. O.R.S. 153.800(4)(b). Courts other than circuit courts are required to establish schedules of the amounts of penalties to be imposed for first, second, and subsequent violations, designating each violation specifically or by class. O.R.S. 153.800(4)(a).
When law enforcement officers issue a citation and summons to a driver for a traffic violation, certain information must be included as specified in O.R.S. 153.045 - 153.051. This includes the amount of the presumptive fine, if there is one for the violation. O.R.S. 153.051(4) (requirements of the summons). The summons must notify the person that a monetary judgment may be entered for up to the maximum amount of fines, restitution, and other costs allowed by law if the person fails to make all required appearances at proceedings. O.R.S. 153.051(5). And, the summons must notify the person that if he or she pleads no contest and pays the presumptive fine, the person may submit an explanation of the circumstances of the violation and the court may consider that explanation in establishing the amount of the fine, but the court cannot impose a fine less than the statutory minimum. O.R.S. 153.051(7). The summons must also notify the person that if the person pleads not guilty and requests a trial, the fines still cannot be less than the minimum unless the person is found not guilty. O.R.S. 153.051(8).
A person who has been issued a citation must make an appearance in person at the time indicated in the citation/summons, request a trial, or deliver payment of the presumptive fine to the court. O.R.S. 153.061(1), (3). Circuit courts, municipal courts, and justice courts adjudicate traffic violations. In cases where the defendant pleads no contest by delivering payment of the presumptive fine to the court under O.R.S. 153.061(3), the amount of the fine may not exceed the presumptive fine.
When a traffic violation fine remains unpaid, a court may use a private collection agency to seek recoupment of the debt or refer the debt to the Oregon Department of Revenue (ODOR). O.R.S. 1.197(1). In addition to these options, "[a] court may ... (a) issue a notice of suspension to the [DMV] that directs the department to implement procedures under ORS 809.416 [,] or (b) [o]rder a defendant's driving privileges restricted." O.R.S. 809.210(1).
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HERNANDEZ, District Judge:
*1150Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a putative class, challenging Oregon's practice of suspending an individual's driver's license for failure to pay "traffic debt."1 More specifically, the six named Plaintiffs, each of whom lives on an extremely limited income and has had a driver's license suspended because of the inability to pay one or more traffic violation fines, contend that suspending a driver's license for failure to pay traffic debt absent an assessment of an individual's ability to pay violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants are the Director of the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), members of the Oregon Transportation Commission, and the Administrator of ODOT's Driver and Motor Vehicles Division. Collectively, they are "the DMV." Simultaneously with filing the Complaint, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and to certify the class. This Opinion addresses the preliminary injunction motion only. At oral argument on that motion, I deferred any further briefing on the class certification motion, and any other activity in the case, until resolution of the preliminary injunction motion.
Plaintiffs bring three claims, each alleging a violation of either due process, equal protection, or both. Because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to any of their claims, I deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
Oregon, like other states, has a statutory scheme in which the failure to pay a court-adjudicated traffic violation fine can result in the suspension of a driver's license. Recently, some states have addressed the practice through legislation. In California, for example, according to a Los Angeles Times article cited by Plaintiffs, the California Legislature passed a bill, signed by the Governor in June 2017, preventing the suspension of driver's licenses because of unpaid fines.2 Other *1151states are in litigation over the practice. E.g., Fowler v. Johnson , No. 17-11441,
I. Oregon's Statutory Scheme
The Oregon Vehicle Code defines "traffic violation" as "a traffic offense that is designated as a traffic violation in the statute defining the offense, or any other offense defined in the Oregon Vehicle Code that is punishable by a fine but that is not punishable by a term of imprisonment." Or. Rev. Stat. § (O.R.S). 801.557 ; see also O.R.S. 153.008(1)(a), (b) (providing generally that an "offense" is a "violation" if it is "designated as a violation by the statute defining the offense," or the "statute prescribing the penalty for the offense provides that the offense is punishable by a fine but does not provide that the offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment.").
Violations are classified into categories. O.R.S. 153.012 (designating categories as Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D, as well as "unclassified violations as described in O.R.S. 153.015," and "[s]pecific fine violations as described in O.R.S. 153.015."). "The penalty for committing a violation is a fine." O.R.S. 153.018(1). There are maximum, presumptive, and minimum fines for each category of violation. O.R.S. 153.018(2) (maximum fines); O.R.S. 153.019 (presumptive fines); O.R.S. 153.020 (increasing presumptive fines for violations committed in a highway work zone, school zone, or safety corridor); O.R.S. 153.021 (minimum fines). The Chief Justice of the *1152Oregon Supreme Court is required to establish a uniform fine schedule for violations prosecuted in circuit courts. O.R.S. 153.800(4)(b). Courts other than circuit courts are required to establish schedules of the amounts of penalties to be imposed for first, second, and subsequent violations, designating each violation specifically or by class. O.R.S. 153.800(4)(a).
When law enforcement officers issue a citation and summons to a driver for a traffic violation, certain information must be included as specified in O.R.S. 153.045 - 153.051. This includes the amount of the presumptive fine, if there is one for the violation. O.R.S. 153.051(4) (requirements of the summons). The summons must notify the person that a monetary judgment may be entered for up to the maximum amount of fines, restitution, and other costs allowed by law if the person fails to make all required appearances at proceedings. O.R.S. 153.051(5). And, the summons must notify the person that if he or she pleads no contest and pays the presumptive fine, the person may submit an explanation of the circumstances of the violation and the court may consider that explanation in establishing the amount of the fine, but the court cannot impose a fine less than the statutory minimum. O.R.S. 153.051(7). The summons must also notify the person that if the person pleads not guilty and requests a trial, the fines still cannot be less than the minimum unless the person is found not guilty. O.R.S. 153.051(8).
A person who has been issued a citation must make an appearance in person at the time indicated in the citation/summons, request a trial, or deliver payment of the presumptive fine to the court. O.R.S. 153.061(1), (3). Circuit courts, municipal courts, and justice courts adjudicate traffic violations. In cases where the defendant pleads no contest by delivering payment of the presumptive fine to the court under O.R.S. 153.061(3), the amount of the fine may not exceed the presumptive fine.
When a traffic violation fine remains unpaid, a court may use a private collection agency to seek recoupment of the debt or refer the debt to the Oregon Department of Revenue (ODOR). O.R.S. 1.197(1). In addition to these options, "[a] court may ... (a) issue a notice of suspension to the [DMV] that directs the department to implement procedures under ORS 809.416 [,] or (b) [o]rder a defendant's driving privileges restricted." O.R.S. 809.210(1). This case concerns only (a), the issuance of the notice of suspension. Although an unpaid traffic violation fine allows a court to send a suspension notice to the DMV, a court is prohibited from sending a notice of suspension for those who have failed to pay fines for bicycle, pedestrian, or parking offenses. O.R.S. 809.210(7).
Upon receipt of the notice of suspension from a court, suspension of a driver's license by the DMV is mandatory. A person "is subject to suspension under ORS 809.415(4) if the department receives a notice of suspension from a court under ORS 809.210 indicating that the person has failed or refused to pay a fine[.]" O.R.S. 809.416(2). The "department shall suspend driving privileges when provided under ORS 809.416." O.R.S. 809.415(4) (emphasis added); see also O.R.S. 809.210(4)(b) (providing that if the court issues a notice of suspension that directs the DMV to implement procedures under O.R.S. 809.416, the DMV shall take action on the suspension as provided under O.R.S. 809.416 ).
*1153A person is subject to suspension under O.R.S. 809.416(2) until one of the following occurs: (1) the person presents the department with a notice of reinstatement issued by the court showing that the person (a) is making payments or has paid the fine; or (b) has enrolled in a preapprenticeship program as defined or is a registered apprentice as defined; or (2) twenty years has elapsed from the date of the traffic offense. O.R.S. 809.416(2) ; see also O.R.S. 809.415(4)(a) (the mandatory suspension shall continue until the earlier of (1) the person establishes that she or he has performed all acts necessary under O.R.S. 809.416 to make the person not subject to suspension; or (2) twenty years from the date the traffic offense occurred if the suspension is imposed for a reason described in O.R.S. 809.416(2) (failure or refusal to pay a fine) ). Echoing the exception in O.R.S. 809.210(7), O.R.S. 809.416(3) exempts from suspension persons who fail or refuse to pay a fine relating to any pedestrian, bicycle, or parking offense.
While mandatory unless excepted under O.R.S. 809.416(2)(a) or (b), the suspension does not take effect immediately. Instead, the department, upon receipt of a notice of suspension from a court, must send a letter by first class mail advising the person that suspension will begin sixty days from the date of the letter unless the department is presented with a notice of reinstatement by the court under O.R.S. 809.416(2)(a). O.R.S. 809.416(3) ; see also O.R.S. 809.210(4)(a) (providing that if the court issues a notice of suspension that directs the DMV to implement suspension procedures under O.R.S. 809.416, and if at any time within the period of suspension, a person pays the fine or has begun making payments according to the payment schedule established with the court, the court shall immediately send to the department a notice of reinstatement; further stating that the notice of suspension may be reissued if the person ceases making payments before the fine is paid in full).
A person whose license has been suspended under O.R.S. 809.415(4)(a) is entitled to administrative review under O.R.S. 809.440. O.R.S. 809.415(4)(b). This review is an "informal administrative process to assure prompt and careful review by the department of the documents upon which an action is based." O.R.S. 809.440(2)(a). A person may defend against the department's action by showing (1) that the conviction did not involve a motor vehicle and the department's action is permitted only if the offense involves a motor vehicle; (2) an out-of-state conviction on which the department's action is based was for an offense that is not comparable to an offense under Oregon law; or (3) the records relied on by the department identify the wrong person. O.R.S. 809.440(2)(b). Judicial review of a department order affirming a suspension is allowed. O.R.S. 809.440(2)(e).
The statutes do not appear to address the contents of the sixty-day notice sent by the DMV. However, the preliminary injunction record contains copies of such notices sent to several of the Plaintiffs. First, a sixty-day notice was sent to Plaintiff Gloria Bermudez on October 7, 2013 and makes clear that her driving privileges will be suspended beginning at 12:01 AM on December 6, 2013. Bermudez Decl., Ex. 2, ECF 4-2. The information in the notice is comprehensive and includes information indicating that the suspension can be prevented by contacting the applicable court. It states, at various places in the notice:
To prevent this suspension you must make certain the action required below is completed and received by DMV no later than 5:00 pm on the last business day prior to December 06, 2013.
* * *
*1154You can stop this suspension by contacting the court named below and completing all the requirements necessary to clear this matter. If we receive a clearance notice from the court before the date the suspension begins, this suspension will not go into effect.
Next, a notice dated October 27, 2016 was sent to Plaintiff Cekais Toni Ganuelas. Ganuelas Decl., Ex. 1, ECF 6-1. It indicates the date and reason for the suspension.
CAN I STOP THIS SUSPENSION?
To stop the suspension, DMV must receive a court clearance. Contact the court to determine how to obtain a court clearance for the docket(s) shown. You will find court contact information on DMV's website.
Even if suspension has begun, a court may still issue a notice of reinstatement and the suspension will be terminated. E.g. , Bermudez Decl., Ex. 2 ("You can stop this suspension after it begins by meeting the court's requirements and obtaining a court clearance notice."; "If we receive the clearance notice on or after the date the suspension begins, you will have to pay a reinstatement fee to DMV[.]"); Ganuelas Decl., Ex. 1 ("If DMV receives the court clearance after the suspension begins, you will have to pay a DMV reinstatement fee.").
II. Plaintiffs' Suspensions & Personal Circumstances
Each of the six named Plaintiffs currently has a suspended license for failure to pay traffic debt. Bermudez Decl. ¶ 6; Ganuelas Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 6; Heath Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6, ECF 7; Mendoza Decl. ¶ 5, ECF 8; Roberts Decl. ¶ 6, ECF 9; Chase Decl. ¶ 12, ECF 34. Some have had multiple suspensions over many years. E.g. , Bermudez Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10 (license suspended in 2003 and again in 2014); Heath Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6 (license suspended in 1995 and has received six notices of suspension since then); Mendoza Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 13 (license suspended in 2010, again in 2016, and expects another as a result of unpaid fines).
The underlying violations which resulted in fines include (1) failing to obey a traffic control device, failing to use proper child seats, driving with expired tags, driving while using a cell phone; Bermudez Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9, 10, 13; (2) failing to display plates or illegal display of plates; Ganuelas Decl. ¶ 3; Roberts Decl. ¶ 6; (3) speeding; Ganuelas Decl. ¶ 4; Mendoza Decl. ¶ 7; Chase Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8; and (4) failing to appear at *1155arraignment for misdemeanor traffic case involving a car accident with property damage only; Mendoza Decl. ¶ 12. Additionally, Plaintiffs have received citations, and thus fines, for driving with a suspended license. E.g. , Bermudez Decl. ¶¶ 10, 13; Ganuelas Decl. ¶ 5; Mendoza Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6; Roberts Decl. ¶ 6.
Some Plaintiffs have attempted to work out payment plans. Bermudez states that she was cited in 2003 for failing to obey a traffic control device. Bermudez Decl. ¶ 8;
Since 2012, Ganuelas has been cited at least three times for driving with a suspended license. Ganuelas Decl. ¶ 5. On one of those occasions, in 2015, she was offered a payment plan for the $ 485 owed. Id. ¶ 20. She made $ 50 monthly payments for a time but was unable to pay a $ 160 balance at which point the court notified the DMV which suspended her license. Id. Heath states that "various courts have forced me into payment plans that I couldn't afford." Heath Decl. ¶ 8. Most required her to make a minimum $ 50 monthly payment. Id. Most recently, the Pendleton Municipal Court imposed that requirement on her. Id. She began making $ 20 monthly payments instead, which subjected her to a show cause hearing during which the court agreed to allow her to continue making $ 20 monthly payments. Id.
Mendoza does not remember being offered a payment plan for traffic debt owed to the Beaverton or Milwaukie Municipal Courts. Mendoza Decl. ¶¶ 9. She currently is on a payment plan for traffic debt owed to Clackamas County Circuit Court, but she has missed some of the $ 100 monthly payments and that court has now sent the debt to collections. Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. She expects that the court will send a suspension notice to the DMV which will suspend her license. Id. Roberts states that at one point, he made payments to the Baker County Justice Court but since then, he has acquired more traffic tickets which he cannot pay off with his limited income. Roberts Decl. ¶ 7. It is his belief that the Baker County Justice Court will not ask the DMV to lift his suspension unless he is able to make $ 50 monthly payments to that court. Id. ¶ 10.
Chase was offered payment plans in Gilliam and Sherman County Justice Courts when he explained he could not pay the fines and fees for speeding citations. Chase Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8. However, each county told him the longest term possible was twelve months which resulted in a monthly payment more than he could afford. Id. Both of the debts were eventually sent to collections. Id. ¶ 10. He also received traffic violations in 2006 and 2008 in Beaverton. Id. ¶ 11. Consistent with what he was told by the Gilliam and Sherman County Justice *1156Courts, the Beaverton Municipal Court also told him that a payment plan was available, but it could not extend beyond twelve months. Id. This debt was also assigned to a private debt collector. Id. Chase worked out payment plans with the private collection agencies beginning in 2013 to pay off the debts to the Gilliam and Sherman County Justice Courts. Id. ¶¶ 15-17. Both of those debts have been discharged. Id. He has attempted to negotiate a payment plan with the Beaverton Municipal Court but was told that because the debt had been referred to a private collection agency, the debt was "out of house" and he could not meet with a judge. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. The private collection agency has refused to enter into a payment plan extending longer than twelve months which would result in monthly payments greater than $ 100, an amount Chase cannot afford. Id. ¶ 20. Nonetheless, in January 2018, Chase began to pay the debt collection agency $ 75 per month and then $ 50 per month beginning in April 2018. Id. ¶ 22. At $ 50 per month, it will take him more than two more years to pay the debt in full at which point he can get his license reinstated. Id.
Several Plaintiffs state that the DMV never inquired about an ability to pay the traffic debt before suspending a license. Bermudez Decl. ¶ 16 (stating that before each suspension, no one from the DMV or any court asked if she was able to pay the debt); Mendoza Decl. ¶ 10 (same); Ganuelas Decl. ¶ 24 (no one from the DMV asked about ability to pay before suspending license); Heath Decl. ¶ 7 (same); Roberts Decl. ¶ 11 (same); Chase Decl. ¶ 13 (same). Plaintiffs further state that if given the chance to avoid suspension by explaining an inability to pay, he or she would have done so. Bermudez Decl. ¶ 16; Ganuelas Decl. ¶ 24; Heath Decl. ¶ 7; Mendoza Decl. ¶ 10; Roberts Decl. ¶ 11; Chase Decl ¶ 13.
By any measurable standard, each Plaintiff is impoverished. All live on very limited incomes. Bermudez Decl. ¶¶ 3-5 (single parent of four children; works as a cook in a shopping mall restaurant earning $ 14 per hour; receives $ 420 per month in food stamps); Ganuelas Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6, 7, 8 (single parent of one child; lost job in July 2018 where she earned $ 400 per week; now earns $ 140 per month teaching yoga; has received $ 117 per week in child support but father of child stopped paying two months ago); Heath Decl. ¶ 3 (receives $ 750 per month in social security disability; four times per year receives $ 400 in casino dividends from the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation but receipt of casino dividends results in a corresponding reduction in social security payments; receives $ 189 per month in food stamps; has not maintained regular employment since 1997); Mendoza Decl. ¶¶ 2-4 (unemployed single parent of three children; recently moved to subsidized two-bedroom apartment but previously spent four months living in a motel room and in a homeless shelter; receives approximately $ 1,100 monthly in assistance, including food stamps); Roberts Decl. ¶¶ 3-4 (lives with wife and each receive $ 562 per month in social security income; has not had substantial paid work since March 2003 due to disabilities); Chase Decl. ¶ 2 (receives $ 817 per month in social security disability and approximately $ 190 per month in food stamp with no other sources of income).
Plaintiffs struggle to obtain basic life necessities such as housing and food, and some have medical issues and are on disability. Bermudez Decl. ¶ 5 (earnings not enough to support her family resulting in struggles to pay monthly electric, gas, and phone bills; often seeks free food at food pantries at end of the month); Ganuelas Decl. ¶ 10 (recently moved from apartment to renting a room from a friend because *1157the apartment rent was too high); Heath Decl. ¶ 3, 12 (on disability; homeless for seven years until December 2017); Mendoza Decl. ¶ 4 (assistance and food stamp amounts not enough to support family requiring her to find free boxes at food pantries every month); Roberts Decl. ¶¶ 3-5 (disabled for several years; social security income received by Roberts and his wife not enough for the family with no money left after paying bills and buying groceries); Chase Decl. ¶¶ 2, 14 (disabled since 2009).
Regardless of residence in an urban or rural community, each Plaintiff describes the difficulties of life without the ability to drive a car. For example, Bermudez, who lives in Portland, explains that she still drives because it cuts her work commute from one hour on the bus to twenty-five minutes by car, and given her children's needs, she cannot afford the extra time on the bus. Bermudez Decl. ¶ 20. She drives her children to school in five to ten minutes to spare them an hour-long bus ride starting at 6:45 a.m. which would cause sleep deprivation with negative health and learning impacts. Id. ¶ 21. She buys groceries by car because of the amount of food needed for a family of five. Id. ¶ 22. Each day without a driver's license makes it hard for her to shop for groceries, take her children to school, get to medical appointments, and get to work. Id. ¶ 24.
Ganuelas recently moved from Pendleton to Mission, about six miles away, because Pendleton's rent was too high. Ganuelas Decl. ¶¶ 2, 10. Before she moved, her job as a bartender was one mile away and she walked, even though she had to cross a busy four-lane highway and walking home from her late-night shift made her feel unsafe. Id. ¶ 9. After moving, she had to pay a friend to take her to work or use a taxi. Id. ¶ 10. In July 2018, she lost her bartending job because she missed a shift. Id. ¶ 7. She had gone away with friends who decided to stay longer than planned. Id. This left her with no way to return. Id. No one would lend her a car given that her license was suspended. Id. She was fired at the end of the pay period for failing to show up for her shift. Id. Ganuelas can use a tribal shuttle to get from Mission to Pendleton but it runs only six days per week from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and thus, was not an option when she still was bartending. Id. ¶ 11. Not having a license makes it difficult for her to provide for herself and her daughter. Id. ¶ 12. To buy groceries, clothes, and necessary household goods, she has to find a ride and pay $ 10 each way. Id. Her daughter has been unable to play on a youth soccer team because Ganuelas lacks a reliable way to get her to practices and games. Id. ¶ 13. Ganuelas has missed events at her daughter's school because of her inability to drive. Id. ¶ 14. It is difficult for her to visit extended family in Washington, Alaska, and other parts of Oregon without a car. Id. ¶ 15.
Heath explains that when she last worked, in 1997, she walked five and one-half miles each way because her license was suspended. Heath Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5. She lives in Pendleton, where, she states, the public transportation is slow and limited. Id. ¶ 10. There are no ride-hailing services such as Uber or Lyft. Id. Taxis are expensive. Id. Because of her suspension, she has had to pay expensive cab fares, walk long distances in hot, cold, and wet weather, and take slow public transit systems. Id. ¶ 11. She has missed funeral services for family members and tribal events. Id. Walking is difficult for her because she gets exhausted and experiences soreness in her back, legs, and feet, but without a driver's license, she has to walk long distances every day. Id. ¶ 16.
Mendoza lives in Portland and has had difficulty finding a job without a valid driver's *1158license. Mendoza Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 21. She still drives occasionally to get her children to medical appointments, to buy clothes and school supplies, and to access food pantries. Id. ¶¶ 17-19. She tries to take the bus or light rail but for groceries, food pantries, and medical appointments, she relies on her car. Id. ¶ 20. Uber and Lyft are too expensive for her. Id.
Roberts lives in Baker City where there is very little public transportation. Roberts Decl. ¶ 17. His wife also does not have a driver's license and needs transportation to frequent medical appointments required by a health condition. Id. ¶ 16. He tries to avoid driving but still does so on a limited basis because he does not see an alternative in Baker City given his and his wife's health issues. Id. ¶ 18. He has ridden his bicycle as an alternative, even through the harsh Baker City winters, to purchase groceries but as he has aged, it has become more difficult and his doctor has now advised against it for health reasons. Id. ¶ 15. It is "pretty much impossible" to fish and hunt or to visit his adult children in Idaho and Missouri without a car. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.
Finally, Chase, who lives in Vancouver, Washington, states that he uses public transportation to get around, but the inability to drive is still a hardship. Chase Decl. ¶ 25. Using public transportation in the Vancouver-Portland area typically takes ninety minutes and two transfers with trains and buses often delayed. Id. He has been stranded multiple times. Id. Having a driver's license would make it much easier to take care of basic life necessities such as buying groceries and going to medical appointments. Id. Without the ability to drive, he does not feel like a full participant in society. Id. ¶ 26.
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs' traffic debt remains unpaid only because they cannot afford to pay it, not because of a willful refusal to pay. Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs' descriptions of their economic, social, or employment circumstances or how the loss of their driver's licenses for nonpayment of traffic debt has contributed to their poverty and added challenges to their lives. Defendants do not dispute that the ability to drive a car plays a central role in one's life, whether living in a large metropolitan area, a small city, or a rural area. Thus, I rely on these facts, which are supported by Declarations and undisputed by Defendants, in this Opinion.
III. Judicial Officers' Adjudication of Traffic Violations & Fine Impositions
Three judges of municipal or justice courts submitted Declarations explaining Oregon's statutory scheme for traffic debt and how each carries forth his or her duties in that regard. Judge Jad Lemhouse, a Justice of the Peace for the Linn County Justice of the Peace District 4A, regularly conducts proceedings on traffic offenses, both misdemeanor crimes and violation offenses. Lemhouse Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 25. He states that in his experience, "most judges in Oregon are willing to work with people to get them out of the system." Lemhouse Decl. ¶ 16. But, he explains, a person must appear in court and follow the court's directions and procedures "for that to happen." Id.
When a person with a suspended license comes into Lemhouse's court for a driving while suspended violation, he talks to the person about whether the person wants to get her or his driving privileges reinstated. Id. ¶ 12. If the person does, he defers sentencing and discusses what is required for reinstatement and what kind of timeline is necessary to accomplish certain tasks such as contacting each of the courts to which the person owes a fine to try and make payment arrangements, contacting the state support enforcement division to *1159address the person's unpaid child support, if any, and contacting five or six insurance agents to ascertain the cost of obtaining insurance. Id. Lemhouse works with the person to schedule proposed payments to the courts or the support enforcement division along with the monthly insurance cost. Id. ¶ 13. At this point, the person can show each of the courts that he or she is seriously making an effort. Id. If necessary, Lemhouse writes to the judge or judges in question supporting the person's proposal. Id. ; see also id. , Attach. A. With this process, Lemhouse reports that more than half of the individuals succeed. Id. Lemhouse allows equitable relief from judgment when a person has made twenty-four consecutive payments on their payment plans and has received no new convictions in that period. Id. ¶ 15. If those requirements are successfully completed, any remaining fine balance is remitted in full. Id.
Judge Karen Brisbin is a Municipal Judge for the City of Sandy and a Justice of the Peace for Clackamas County Justice Court. Brisbin Decl. ¶ 1, ECF 26. She hears traffic violation cases and states that when a fine is imposed, the person may pay in full or set up a payment plan. Id. ¶ 2. The monthly payment may be different for each person based on the ability to pay. Id. If the person is unable to make a payment after the payment plan is set, and the person is in contact with the court, the court will work with the person to assure compliance with the court's order. Id. In such cases, the person may be allowed to skip a monthly payment or reduce the amount of the monthly payment until the person can get back to work. Id. She states: "The key is to keep in contact with the court." Id.
When individuals do not appear or do not contact the court, or fail to continue to make their payments as part of a payment plan, and when the court "cannot get the convicted person's attention for compliance," the court will issue the notice of suspension to the DMV to initiate suspension procedures. Id. ¶ 3. Once the DMV sends the sixty-day suspension notice, the person can contact the court and get into compliance by paying the fine or setting up a payment plan. Id. This allows the person to entirely avoid the license suspension and the DMV reinstatement fee. Id. Even post-suspension, the person can obtain reinstatement by working with the court to pay the fine via a payment plan. Id. According to Brisbin, "[p]ersons may provide a letter to the judge stating their financial hardship along with documentation to resolve the license suspension." Id. Brisbin observes that the notice of suspension issued by the DMV "often ... works so that the person contacts the court who then works with the person to facilitate payment of the fine. The system would not work nearly as well without the suspension provisions in the statute." Id. ¶ 4.
Finally, Judge Kathy Stinnett is a Justice of the Peace for Grant County and is the President of the Oregon Justice of the Peace Association. Stinnett Decl. ¶ 1, ECF 35. There are twenty-eight justices of the peace who preside in twenty-eight justice courts. Id. ¶ 1. They heard 125,918 traffic violation cases in the 2017-18 fiscal year. Id. She submits her Declaration on behalf of the Association. Id. After explaining how traffic violation cases come to courts and what options the individual has upon receiving a violation, she states that "[j]udges are aware that the purpose of a traffic fine is to get the attention of the driver to change or reinforce driving behavior consistent with the rules of the road in Oregon for traffic safety." Id. ¶ 4.
According to Stinnett, a person may pay the fine in full or set a payment plan with the court. Id. She observes that "[c]ourts routinely work with individuals regarding *1160payment of fines." Id. ¶ 5. When payments are missed, the court may reach out to the person by letter or telephone. Id. If the person is in contact with the court, the court will review the individual circumstances to determine how, when, and if the fine will be paid. Id. In cases where a suspension is initiated for failure to pay the fine, in "numerous cases" the person contacts the court within the sixty-day period and works with the court to pay the fine or get back on track with the payment plan. Id. ¶ 7. Courts also work with persons after suspension. Id. She states that the license suspension is an important tool used by courts when working with persons who owe traffic debt. Id. ¶ 8.
Plaintiffs argue that Judges Lemhouse and Brisbin may speak to how they personally handle collection of traffic debt but not to how every circuit, municipal, or justice court judge does so. Pls.' Reply 6, ECF 33.5 Although Judges Lemhouse and Brisbin do not expressly state how they have acquired knowledge of court practices generally, it is presumably from talking to their peers. Assuming that is the case and thus, that they rely on out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter asserted, the evidence may be inadmissible hearsay. However, "the rules of evidence do not apply strictly to preliminary injunction proceedings" given the urgency of obtaining an injunction and the limited factual development that has occurred. Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., Inc. ,
IV. Oregon's Scheme in Law & in Practice
Oregon courts adjudicate traffic violations. Punishment for a traffic violation is a fine. Citations give notice of the court date and time that the violator must appear to address the citation. Some violators do not wish to contest guilt and are willing and able to pay the assessed fine, which is the presumptive fine as set by the Oregon Legislature. This may be accomplished without a formal court appearance. Otherwise, the violator must appear. The statutes addressing the contents of citations and summonses do not require that the violator be told that even when guilt is admitted, a payment plan may be worked out in cases of indigency or that failure to pay could result in suspension of a license.
The statutes also do not require that an Oregon court assessing a fine for a traffic violation notify the violator of the possibility of a payment plan for the fine. Nonetheless, several Oregon courts, as demonstrated by the judicial officers' Declarations as well as the Declarations of several Plaintiffs, do consider a person's indigency and will offer a payment plan. Whether this occurs frequently, regularly, occasionally, or otherwise is unclear. The evidence indicates *1161that each time a Plaintiff requested an initial payment plan from a court, he or she was given one.6 It may not have been one that suited the Plaintiff's ability to pay, for example when Chase was told the fine had to be paid over twelve months making for untenable monthly payments, but a payment plan was initially offered.
While the statutes provide for a minimum fine for each type of violation, they also provide that a judge may suspend any part of the judgment, including the fine, "upon condition that the defendant pay the nonsuspended portion of a fine within a specified period of time." O.R.S. 153.090(4). This suggests that judges have flexibility to work with a violator so that the total fine paid may be less than the minimum statutory fine. In fact, Judge Lemhouse notes that he remits the unpaid portion of a fine upon completion of his requirements of consecutive payments of twenty-four months with no new violations.
The lack of consistency among the courts in whether they affirmatively account for violators' indigency and notify violators of the possibility and terms of a payment plan is troubling. What may benefit a violator in one jurisdiction may be unavailable in another. Certainly, the statutes do not prohibit a court from offering a payment plan or from accounting for an individual's financial circumstances. But, the statutes undisputably do not require a court to make an assessment of an individual violator's ability to pay a fine and structure a fine and payment plan accordingly.
It is also clear that the suspension of a driver's license is within the discretion of the court. The statute unambiguously states that when a fine is unpaid, the "court may ... issue a notice of suspension to the [DMV] that directs the department to implement procedures under ORS 809.416 [.]" O.R.S. 809.210(1)(a) (emphasis added). It is not mandatory for the court to issue the notice. However, once issued, it is mandatory for the DMV to suspend the license after issuing the sixty-day suspension notice when no reinstatement order from the court is received by the DMV before the sixty-day period expires. In contrast to the discretion afforded the court, there is no discretion for the DMV.
The sixty-day notices in the record expressly direct the recipients to the court to address the outstanding fine, but they fail to mention anything about options if one is unable to pay. While the statute contemplates that the court has the authority to work out a payment plan at that point, or even after suspension has begun, the sixty-day notices do not specifically inform the recipients that a payment plan may be an option. Instead, recipients are told that they can stop the suspension by contacting the court and "completing all the requirements necessary to clear this matter," or by "meeting the court's requirements." In the more recent version of the notices, the recipient is told to "[c]ontact the court to determine how to obtain a court clearance for the docket(s) shown." Unless one knows to ask for a payment plan, it may not occur to a person receiving the sixty-day notice that anything other than full payment is possible. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that based on the examples of the sixty-day notices in the record, notice recipients are clearly informed to contact the court to address the matter.
The judicial officers' Declarations indicate that some courts do not always exercise their discretion to send a suspension notice to the DMV without first attempting to contact the person and assess the situation.
*1162Courts may use the threatened suspension as leverage to obtain compliance with a payment plan or to at least initiate a conversation about options. And, some courts remain open to such a discussion during the sixty-day period or after suspension is effective.
Finally, it is undisputed that the statutes do not provide for the DMV to consider an individual's ability to pay before suspending a driver's license for failure to pay traffic debt.
STANDARDS
A party seeking a preliminary injunction "must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. ,
The party requesting a preliminary injunction must carry its burden of persuasion by a "clear showing " of the four required elements set forth above. Mazurek v. Armstrong ,
In considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction, courts "must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief." Winter ,
When the relief sought would "order[ ] a responsible party to take action," the injunction is viewed as mandatory rather than prohibitory. Garcia v. Google, Inc. ,
Mandatory injunctions trigger a higher standard. See Hernandez v. Sessions ,
DISCUSSION
I. Nature of the Claims and the Injunctive Relief Sought
A. First Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs bring three claims. The first relies on the "fundamental fairness" concept of substantive due process and equal protection as explained by the Supreme Court in cases such as Griffin v. Illinois ,
In their second claim, Plaintiffs rely only on the Equal Protection Clause. Id. ¶¶ 213-15. Specifically, they rely on James v. Strange ,
The third claim is a procedural due process claim. Id. ¶¶ 216-18. Plaintiffs allege that they have property and liberty interests in their driver's licenses and their ability to drive legally. Id. ¶ 217. They assert that Defendants violate their procedural due process rights by suspending their driver's licenses without affording them a pre-suspension or post-suspension hearing to determine if they are able or unable to pay their traffic debt. Id.
Plaintiffs seek both declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. § X. They seek a declaration that Defendants' practices with respect to the suspension of driver's licenses as alleged have violated and continue to violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. Id. § X(b). They seek injunctive relief in the form of an order (1) prohibiting Defendants from suspending Plaintiffs' and class members' driver's licenses for unpaid traffic debt until such time as the DMV and the State of Oregon implement a system *1164that complies with the Constitution; and (2) requiring Defendants to remove Plaintiffs' and class members' suspensions for nonpayment of traffic debt that were effected before the date of judgment, and as part of that removal, prohibiting Defendants from requiring Plaintiffs and class members to pay reinstatement fees as a condition of reinstatement. Id. ; see also X(c), (d).
B. Preliminary Injunction Motion
In the preliminary injunction motion, Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction (1) compelling Defendants to remove the license suspensions on Plaintiffs' licenses for nonpayment of their traffic debt under O.R.S. 809.416 and, if Plaintiffs are then eligible for reinstatement of their licenses, compelling Defendants to waive the reinstatement and issuance fees under O.R.S. 870.370; and (2) ordering Defendants to refrain from suspending Plaintiffs' licenses for failure to pay their traffic debt unless and until Plaintiffs have had the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay, entitling them to be exempt from suspension, through a procedure that comports with due process.
As I understand the injunctive relief sought in the motion, Plaintiffs do not seek only the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay the outstanding traffic debt. They seek as well an order from this Court requiring the DMV to exempt them from paying the outstanding debt upon a determination that they are indigent and cannot pay the debt. Additionally, they seek an order requiring the DMV to reinstate their driver's licenses at this point, notwithstanding the outstanding debt, and without a reinstatement fee.
Defendants argue that the injunctive relief sought is mandatory because Plaintiffs seek to alter rather than preserve the status quo. Plaintiffs contend the requested relief is prohibitory but even if any portion of it is considered mandatory, they have demonstrated the strength of their claims.
An injunction preventing future unconstitutional conduct is "a classic form of prohibitory injunction." Hernandez ,
In this case, the relevant status quo at the inception of the case is that Plaintiffs' licenses are suspended. I agree with Plaintiffs that the portion of their requested relief seeking to prevent Defendants from suspending their licenses without giving Plaintiffs the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay and entitling them to an exemption consistent with procedural due process, is prohibitory. But, I agree with Defendants that the requested relief requiring Defendants to revoke Plaintiffs' suspensions and reinstate their licenses without any additional fee, is mandatory because it orders Defendants to take action instead of prohibiting them from future allegedly unconstitutional conduct. And, in this case, the requested injunctive relief that is prohibitory is unavailable to Plaintiffs unless the mandatory injunctive relief is granted. Because the status quo is one of current suspensions, it is only if Defendants first rescind Plaintiffs' suspensions and restore their driving *1165privileges that a future prohibition on suspending Plaintiffs' licenses without an exemption upon demonstrated inability to pay would matter. Thus, in this case, I analyze the motion as one seeking a mandatory injunction.
II. Younger Abstention
Defendants argue that this Court should abstain from considering this case under the principles of Younger v. Harris ,
Because I resolve the preliminary injunction motion in favor of Defendants, I decline to address the Younger abstention issue at this time.
III. First Claim for Relief - Griffin / Bearden Fundamental Fairness
Plaintiffs contend that under the Griffin / Bearden line of cases, due process and equal protection principles combine to prohibit penalizing people simply because they are poor. Plaintiffs suggest that under these cases, the appropriate inquiry is not based solely on either substantive due process or equal protection. Instead substantive due process and equal protection considerations converge into considerations of "fundamental fairness." Thus, in cases involving the treatment of indigent criminal defendants, the court must engage in a "more searching inquiry," Pls.' Mot. 23, which requires analyzing factors such as "the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose." Bearden ,
Under this analysis, Plaintiffs argue that the nature of the individual interest involved is the "right to basic self-sufficiency" and the constitutional right to travel. Pls.' Mot. 25-28. Next, they argue that the interests involved are greatly affected as demonstrated by Plaintiffs' unchallenged Declarations detailing the burdens they experience when deprived of their driver's licenses. Third, Plaintiffs contend that there is no rational connection between suspending a license for failure to pay traffic debt and the challenged means of doing so without an inquiry into the debtor's ability to pay before or during suspension. Plaintiffs concede that O.R.S. 809.416 may be a rational means for coercing payment of traffic debt for those who can afford to pay it. But, that is not the case for those low-income individuals who cannot afford to make payments on the debt. "Visiting a harsh consequence on 'someone who through no fault of his own is unable to make' the payment sought 'will not make [payment] suddenly forthcoming.' " Thomas I , 303 F.Supp.3d at 614 (quoting Bearden ,
Defendants argue that the Griffin / Bearden cases have a more limited application than Plaintiffs suggest, that driving is not a fundamental right, that poverty is not a protected class, and that the statutory scheme has a rational basis. Based on these arguments, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to establish substantive due process or equal protection claims.
Griffin addressed the constitutionality of requiring criminal defendants to pay for transcripts in order to appeal.
Cases following Griffin also addressed rights implicated when one is a criminal defendant. Like Griffin , which ultimately concerned the right to be free of wrongful imprisonment/right to liberty, the right at issue in Williams v. Illinois concerned the imprisonment of an indigent criminal defendant when a non-indigent criminal defendant in the same circumstances would not have faced that punishment.
The next year, the Court struck down a Texas law which allowed conversion of the defendant's fine into a jail term even though the traffic offense violation limited punishment to a fine and even though the fine was unpaid due to the defendant's indigency. Tate v. Short ,
Finally, in Bearden , the Court once again was concerned with the imprisonment of a criminal defendant solely because the defendant could not pay a fine.
The Bearden Court explained that "[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis in these cases." Id. at 665,
Continuing, the Court enunciated the four-part test Plaintiffs rely on here:
Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as "the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose."
Following Williams and Tate , the Court concluded in Bearden that if a state determines that a fine or restitution is the appropriate sentence for the crime, it is unconstitutional for the state to thereafter imprison the defendant solely because she or he lacks the resources to pay. Id. at 667-68,
The Griffin / Bearden line of cases firmly establishes that the government may not imprison a criminal defendant solely due to the person's non-willful inability to pay a fee or a fine. Grounded in concepts of due process and equal protection, the Court has found such statutes to be "fundamentally unfair." The Ninth Circuit has applied this line of reasoning, including in a case challenging a federal sentencing guideline provision which imposed additional criminal history points at sentencing, and thus increased the defendant's period of incarceration, because of the defendant's failure to pay a fine imposed in a prior state-court conviction. United States v. Parks ,
These cases have all arisen in the context of the criminal justice system where fundamental rights of liberty are implicated. Few cases have extended these principles beyond that context. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in M.L.B. v. S.L.J , a case in which the state court had terminated a mother's parental rights and then dismissed her appeal because of her financial inability to comply with statutes requiring her to pay more than $ 2,000 in record and transcript preparation fees.
One of those cases was Mayer v. Chicago ,
As discussed by Justice Ginsburg in M.L.B. , the Mayer Court was concerned with access to the courts. M.L.B. ,
Next, Justice Ginsburg discussed the "narrow category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees."
The Court turned to the specific issue presented in the case and noted the state's argument that the case belonged with "the generality of civil cases, in which indigent persons have no constitutional right to proceed" in forma pauperis and the mother's contrary argument that the "accusatory" state action she was trying to "fend off" was "barely distinguishable from criminal condemnation in view of the magnitude and permanence" of the loss she faced.
Seeking to allay concerns that its holding would open "floodgates" if Griffin was not restricted to criminal cases,
The Ninth Circuit discussed M.L.B. in Hernandez which involved the detention of non-citizens in removal proceedings who were eligible for release on bond but who could not afford to pay the bond. Hernandez ,
What all of these cases teach is that the "fundamental fairness" principles of due process and equal protection originating in Griffin have been applied when either incarceration or access to the courts, or both, is at stake. The incarceration cases clearly implicate the fundamental right to be free from wrongful detention, meaning the fundamental right to liberty. The access to courts cases have arisen in either (1) the criminal context where the rights to both a fair trial and a conviction only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt are implicated by effectively denying an appeal to an indigent defendant, or (2) the narrow circumstance of a parental termination where the state's "awesome" authority to permanently destroy what the Supreme Court had already recognized as "the most fundamental family relationship" was at stake. M.L.B. ,
None of those rights or interests are present here. As the Fowler I court recognized, the Griffin / Bearden line of cases does not establish "that it is fundamentally unfair in a constitutional sense (i.e. in violation of the Due Process Clause) for a state to deprive a person of a property interest-such as a driver's license-because of the person's inability to pay a fine associated with that interest."
The judge in the Robinson and Thomas cases reached the opposite conclusion. The discussion in those cases is extensive, but even under a rational basis review which the court felt bound to apply by Johnson v. Bredesen ,
The Robinson / Thomas court believed that the Griffin line of cases required it to consider the suspension of driver's licenses for nonpayment of traffic debt absent an exception for those willing but unable to pay, as "the equivalent of a statute that imposes a harsher sanction on indigent debtors than their non-indigent peers." Thomas I , 303 F.Supp.3d at 614. Then, the court explained, if the statutory scheme affords no adequate exception for indigence, Griffin and the cases following it "instruct this court to consider that scheme as the constitutional equivalent of the state's using, as the sole justification for its action, the poverty of the defendant." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court's discussion of the issue in these cases emphasized the impact of the law on the indigent debtor's right to self-sufficiency. Thomas I , 303 F.Supp.3d at 613, 615 ; Robinson II , 326 F.R.D. at 154 (noting that the Sixth Circuit recognized that the right to self sufficiency justified "an at least somewhat more searching standard of review") (citing Johnson ); but see id. at 153 (noting that self-sufficiency and self-respect had not been recognized by the Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court as fundamental rights in a constitutional sense). It also discussed the impact on the right to travel, and while acknowledging that the right does not generally prohibit the state from denying a single mode of transportation, the court noted that the law may still impact driving in a way that potentially triggers a heightened level of scrutiny. Thomas I , 303 F.Supp.3d at 613 ; Robinson II , 326 F.R.D. at 153-54.
I respectfully disagree with Robinson and Thomas and believe that the Fowler court made the correct ruling. Although Robinson and Thomas purported to apply a rational basis review, the conclusions reached suggest that the court in those cases applied a more stringent level of scrutiny. As a result, I find these decisions somewhat internally inconsistent.
I find no support in the caselaw for Plaintiffs' assertions of a constitutional right to self-sufficiency. Additionally, wealth/poverty is not a suspect class. E.g. , Harris v. McRae ,
As for the right to travel, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has recognized a constitutional right to intrastate travel. Nunez ex rel. Nunez v. City of San Diego ,
A burden on a single mode of transportation does not implicate the constitutional right to interstate travel. Miller v. Reed ,
I agree with Plaintiffs that the loss of their driver's licenses causes serious problems in many areas of their lives from employment to health care to recreation. There is no doubt that for most Americans, driving makes life easier, whether one lives in a large city, a small city, or in the country. It is also true that some parts of Oregon are better served by alternative public transportation systems than others. But, as the Fowler I court explained, appropriately in my opinion, "[f]undamental rights are not identified by looking so narrowly or locally[.]"
*1174My reading of the Robinson and Thomas cases indicates that the court there inappropriately found or implied fundamental rights which have not been recognized as having constitutional protection. The court inappropriately applied a heightened level of scrutiny to the statutory scheme. This in turn, prompted the court to extend the Griffin / Bearden cases beyond the parameters of criminal justice or quasi-criminal justice cases where incarceration or equal access to the courts was at stake, and beyond that rare civil case such as M.L.B. where the state wields its "awesome" power to potentially deprive a parent of her or his most fundamental of family relationships. I do not believe the Griffin / Bearden "more searching" or "more careful" inquiry or "close examination" of the government's interest is required in this case.
In Franceschi , a recent Ninth Circuit case, the court considered a statutory scheme which suspended the driver's licenses of individuals who appeared on the state's "top 500" list of delinquent taxpayers who owed at least $ 100,000.
Oregon's challenged statutes are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.7 Defendants argue that the state has a strong interest in enforcing traffic laws to deter future misdeeds. Defs.' Mem. 12, ECF 24; see also id. at 9 ("the suspension of driving privileges is effective in obtaining compliance through payment of traffic fines"). Certainly, traffic laws exist as a basic manifestation of the state's undisputed interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. ,
Methods by which the state can enforce compliance with the fine requirement, therefore, are rationally related to the safety goal. Without a compliance mechanism, the fine is toothless and without deterrent effect. Accordingly, fines are reduced to a judgment, subject to payment or collection by a number of methods, and eventually or additionally, can result in the violator's license suspension if the fine is unpaid. Nonetheless, as the judicial officers explain, the threat of suspension is an effective tool to coerce payment. Of course, compliance efforts may be ineffective as to those whose life circumstances leave them on the edge of economic survival every day. But, the evidence in the record shows that even as to those individuals, the threat of suspension, or an actual suspension, has motivated the individual to return to the court to attempt to establish a payment plan or to obtain a reduction in the traffic debt. While not always successful, the threat of suspension has resulted in compliance in some occasions.
Under rational basis review, the law will be upheld "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Franceschi ,
Based on my determinations that the challenged statute, either facially or in its application, does not implicate a fundamental constitutional right, does not implicate a suspect classification, and is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on a "fundamental *1176fairness" claim under Griffin / Bearden .
IV. Second Claim for Relief - Strange Equal Protection
Plaintiffs' second claim addresses the distinction between indigent traffic debtors subject to driver's license suspensions and indigent debtors who are exempted from such suspensions. Plaintiffs argue that there are three kinds of similarly-situated indigent debtors who, unlike Plaintiffs, are not subject to license suspension for unpaid debt, or are given the ability to demonstrate inability to pay: (1) traffic debtors who committed bicycle, pedestrian, or parking offenses; (2) private debtors generally; and (c) child support debtors.
Plaintiffs base this claim on Strange , which held that a Kansas recoupment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by permitting the state to recoup court-appointed attorney's fees from indigent criminal defendants without permitting them to raise any of the defenses available to other civil judgment debtors.
Two years after Strange , the Court revisited the issue in Fuller v. Oregon ,
"[N]o such infirmity" was present in the Oregon statute.
Plaintiffs argue that the central holding of Strange requires "striking down statutes that provide more of a safety net to indigent private debtors than to indigent criminal debtors, and upholding statutes relating to debt collection that do provide for an indigency determination and exception." Pls.' Mot. 32-33. Because Oregon's license suspension scheme singles out indigent traffic debtors for "uniquely worse treatment relative to other kinds of indigent debtors," Plaintiffs argue that the statute violates equal protection under Strange. Defendants argue that Strange does not apply "because the challenged statutory scheme does not expressly eliminate any exemptions that would ordinarily be available to judgment debtors with respect to the collection of government debt." Defs.' Mem. 8.
Defendants' argument is taken directly from the Fowler I decision which concluded that the plaintiffs' Strange claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Fowler I ,
I agree with the Fowler I case. The issue presented in Strange and considered again in Fuller is not present here. Nothing in the Oregon statutory scheme regarding the collection of a judgment for unpaid traffic debt provides for treatment different from any civil judgment debtor by creating exemptions from ordinary collection methods. And, under my reading of Strange , it was the explicit exemption from the wage garnishment protections available to other civil judgment debtors that the Court found unconstitutional. Thus, I disagree with the Robinson court's determination that the Robinson plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits or stated a claim under Strange because Tennessee "heaped on additional tools of coercion." Robinson II , 326 F.R.D. at 160-61 (acknowledging that the Kansas statute in Strange removed protections but concluding that Tennessee's additional "tools of coercion" were analogous). As a result, Plaintiffs fail to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of the Strange claim.
Even if I were to consider Plaintiffs' argument to properly arise under Strange , I would still determine that Plaintiffs had not met their preliminary injunction burden on this claim. In a 1987 case, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Strange Court struck down the Kansas statute because it found the " 'requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out' not to have been met." United States v. Smith ,
Here, fines imposed for traffic safety violations committed by those in a car, are, as explained above, rationally related to the state's interest in modifying driving conduct to comply with traffic laws. The fine is a behavior modification tool and the driver's license suspension assists in obtaining compliance with fine payment. Private debt does not originate in the same way. Violations of pedestrian, bicycle, and parking laws do not trigger the same need to address violation of traffic laws such as speeding, failure to obey a traffic control device, etc. Moreover, a driver's license is not even needed to cross a street or ride a bicycle. Child support obligations also do not originate in the same context. Thus, for each of the categories of distinguishable indigent debtors, there is a rational basis for the classification. No Strange equal protection claim is likely to succeed here.
V. Third Claim for Relief - Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs argue that Oregon's license suspension statutes for traffic debtors violate procedural due process because the statutes fail to provide an ability-to-pay hearing before suspension is effective. See Pls.' Reply 19 ("The absence of an ability-to-pay determination is the due process that plaintiffs assert is missing[.]"). They contend that the private interests at stake are fundamental, the risk of an erroneous deprivation is high, and any government interest in collecting traffic debt is actually harmed by the absence of an indigency determination given that indigent debtors cannot pay and the suspension actually interferes with the debtors' means of obtaining income to repay the debt. Plaintiffs argue that an assessment of these factors establishes that only a pre-deprivation notice and pre-deprivation hearing on the ability to pay satisfies due process. In response, Defendants contend that no fundamental rights are at issue, Plaintiffs received substantial process before suspension, and the government has a significant interest in enforcing traffic laws.
Mathews v. Eldridge is the foundational Supreme Court procedural due process case.
Under Mathews , the court weighs three factors to evaluate the sufficiency of procedural protections: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action," (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
A driver's license is a significant enough property interest to warrant procedural due process protections. Dixon v. Love ,
There is little risk of erroneous deprivation given that the suspensions are triggered by the objective fact of nonpayment of the fines. Mackey v. Montrym ,
*1180The second Mathews factor also looks at the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Here, the fine is imposed only after a violation has been adjudicated by a court. See Franceschi ,
Finally, the government has a strong interest in enforcing traffic fines to deter continuing traffic violations. E.g., Crawford ,
When weighing all of these factors, I conclude that the Oregon scheme complies with procedural due process. The nature of the private interest, the nature of the government interest, and the low risk of erroneous deprivation support a determination that the opportunity to initially contest the violation and the pre-deprivation notice with its instructions to return to court and information regarding the right to administrative review, sufficiently protect an individual's property interest in his or her driver's license.
VI. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Considerations
Having found that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of any of their claims, I do not need to consider the remaining preliminary injunction factors of the likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, balancing of the equities, and whether an injunction is in the public interest. Garcia ,
A. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs argue that any constitutional violation is, by definition, irreparable harm. Hernandez ,
Defendants note that under the heightened standard for a mandatory injunction, Plaintiffs must show that serious and extreme damage will occur absent preliminary injunctive relief. Defendants argue that the harm here is speculative. They acknowledge that Plaintiffs have described difficult lives in their Declarations. But, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not proven that without an immediate injunction some specific factors will cause an additional and irreparable harm. They note that any injunctive relief will not address past harm and the future harms are only speculative.
Defendants' evidence establishes that there is no irreparable harm because even if I granted the requested relief, Plaintiffs' licenses would remain suspended. According to Mary Garcia, a Driver Control Operations and Policy Analyst for the DMV, the DMV driving records for each Plaintiff9 show that each one would need to resolve additional suspensions and satisfy other requirements, separate from the suspensions for failure to comply and related reinstatement fees which they challenge here, before they could drive with an Oregon driver's license. Garcia Supp'l Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3, ECF 36. Some Plaintiffs are unable to reinstate his or her driver's license without submitting an insurance certificate. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7, 8 (Mendoza, Roberts, Bermudez, Ganuelas). All but Heath have additional suspensions for failure to appear. Id. Some need to take a new driver's test. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 7 (Roberts, Heath, Bermudez, Ganuelas). I agree with Defendants that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the standard required to show serious and extreme damage which will be relieved by the injunctive relief sought. See Robinson I ,
B. Balance of Equities
This factor requires the court to "balance the competing claims of injury" and "consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief." Winter ,
Defendants rely on the administrative burden it would take to process about 90,000 license suspensions each year if it were required to assess a driver's ability to pay each time. At this point, absent certification of a class, the relief is restricted to only the six named Plaintiffs. Thus, the balance of equities goes to Plaintiffs.
C. Public Interest
"The public interest inquiry primarily addresses impact on non-parties rather than parties." League of Wilderness Defs/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton ,
Defendants make no separate "public interest" argument other than to state that their administrative burden argument supports a conclusion that Plaintiffs cannot show that an injunction would be in the public interest.
Given that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their constitutional claims and that their' argument relies on the class certification motion being granted, which it has not, at this point, I find the public interest to be a neutral factor.
SUMMARY
For the reasons explained above, I conclude that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to any of their three claims. Plaintiffs may be correct that suspending driver's licenses for indigent traffic debtors is an exercise in futility. While the record shows that the threat of suspension, or the actual suspension, of a driver's license has prompted some Plaintiffs to make payments on traffic debt from time to time, I assume that for the majority of indigent traffic debtors, suspension is misguided and counterproductive. I recognize that Plaintiffs' economic situations are marginal and the loss of their driver's licenses for their inability to pay their traffic debt burdens their lives with little chance that the state will actually collect full payment. Nonetheless, their predicaments, as desperate as they may be, do not raise constitutional claims. Absent constitutional implications, it is not the court's position to determine if the statutory scheme is "unwise," whether it "best fulfills the relevant social and economic objections" that the state "might ideally espouse," or if "a more just and humane system could not be devised." Dandridge ,
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction [2] is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mendoza-v-garrett-ord-2018.