ALAN E. NORRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court. DAVID A. NELSON, J. (pp. 467-68), delivered a separate concurring opinion. KEITH, J. (pp. 468-97), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.
Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc., (“MPP”) petitioned the district court for a preliminary injunction preventing the State of Tennessee from enforcing its Parental Consent for Abortion by Minors Act (“Consent Act” or “Act”). The district court granted the injunction, and the state appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1995, the Tennessee General Assembly passed the Consent Act, making it illegal for a physician to perform an abortion on an unemancipated minor, unless the minor obtains the consent of one parent or receives a waiver of the consent requirement through a judicial bypass procedure. Tenn.Code Ann. (“TCA”) §§ 37-10-301 through 37-10-307 (1998). MPP sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act. The district court granted the injunction, ruling that the ju7 dicial bypass procedure was not sufficiently expeditious and did not provide sufficient anonymity. The state appealed. Rule 24 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee (“Rule 24”) elaborates on the procedures to be followed in pursuing a judicial bypass. During the pendency of the state’s appeal from the original grant of the preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court amended Rule 24. This court thereafter vacated the injunction as moot and remanded the case. Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, No. 96-6104, 1997 WL 436566 (6th Cir.1997) (unpublished opinion). The district court subsequently determined that despite the amendments to Rule 24, a preliminary injunction should issue. That decision is the subject of the instant appeal. MPP challenged the following five provisions of the judicial bypass procedure found in either the Consent Act or Rule 24:
(1). The twenty-four hour time to appeal: A minor seeking to bypass the consent requirement must petition the juvenile court. TCA § 37-10-303(b). So long as the juvenile court rules within forty-eight hours of the filing of the minor’s petition, a notice of appeal must be filed within twenty-four hours of the decision of the juvenile court. TCA § 37-10-304(g). If the juvenile court does not rule within forty-eight hours, the petition is deemed denied and the minor may file an appeal at any time. TCA § 37-10-304(d), (g).
(2). The statement of mental capacity: Rule 24(5)(a)(iv) requires the minor seeking to judicially bypass the consent requirement to state in her petition “whether the applicant is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity to consent to the abortion.”
(3). The venue restriction: Although TCA § 37-10-303(b) allows the minor seeking a judicial bypass to petition “the juvenile court of any county of this state,” Rule 24(4) requires the minor to file her petition in either the county in which she resides or the county in which the abortion is sought.
(4). De novo hearing by circuit court: If the juvenile court denies the petition, the minor may appeal to the circuit court. TCA § 37-10-304(g) provides that review of the juvenile court decision shall be de novo, and Rule 24(12)(d) allows the circuit court to call witnesses.
(5). The pre-petition physician consultation: The model petition appended to Rule 24 would have the minor swear that she “has consulted with the physician who is to perform the abortion, or [460]*460with a referring physician,” concerning the abortion.
According to MPP, minors who feel they cannot involve their parents in their abortion decision face logistical problems in obtaining an abortion. MPP points to a number of reasons why a minor might choose not to involve her parent in her decision, such as: fear that her parents will not consent because of pro-life or strongly held religious views; fear of physical abuse if a parent learns of the pregnancy; worry over causing her parent stress; inability to involve a parent where the pregnancy resulted from incest; and inability to notify unavailable parents. The provisions in the bypass procedure set out above, MPP asserts, unnecessarily require the minor to make phone calls, to travel to court and to a physician, to secure absences from home and school, and to incur additional expense. MPP claims that a minor will face great difficulty in meeting these logistical demands while keeping her parents unaware of her pursuit of a judicial bypass.
II. DISCUSSION
“This court reviews a challenge to the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard and accords great deference to the decision of the district court. The district court’s determination will be disturbed only if the district court relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard.”1 Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). “When ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, a district court must consider and balance four factors: (1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the mov-ant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.” Id. (citations omitted).
The district court determined that MPP had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits and that the other preliminary injunction factors weighed in favor of granting the injunction. The district court also ruled that, under Tennessee law, the provisions it found likely unconstitutional should not be severed from the rest of the judicial bypass procedure. We hold that the district court abused its discretion in finding that MPP had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Alternatively, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in not severing the provisions it found offensive.
A. Likelihood of success on the merits
The Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include a woman’s right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), and affirmed the central holding of Roe in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). A plurality of the justices in Casey recognized the weighty concerns of the state in “the protection of potential life” and reasoned that, although “the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue [461]*461her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the state is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed.” Id. at 871-72, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The plurality determined that regulations the state places on abortion prior to viability should be analyzed under the “undue burden” standard.
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.
Id. at 877,112 S.Ct. 2791. Although only a plurality of the justices employed the undue burden test, the courts of appeals, including this court, have used it in evaluating abortion regulations. See Women’s Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir.1997) (employing undue burden standard), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 1347, 140 L.Ed.2d 496 (1998).
The undue burden test is directed at two principles. First, a state may impose restrictions on the woman’s access to an abortion that are designed to help her make the most informed decision or that serve some other valid state interest; however, a state may not erect procedural hurdles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion simply to make it more difficult for her to obtain an abortion. Second, any procedural restriction must not be substantial.
The Constitution extends substantive due process protections to minors as well as adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979). However, the constitutional rights of children are not co-extensive with those of adults because of “the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.” Id. at 634, 99 S.Ct. 3035. In reconciling these principles, the Supreme Court in Bellotti II held that while a state may require the consent of one or both parents before allowing a minor to obtain an abortion, it must provide a way for the minor to bypass the consent requirement and obtain the abortion. Id. at 643, 99 S.Ct. 3035. The Court established the following guidelines for determining whether a state’s bypass procedure violated the minor’s right to an abortion:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests. The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.
Id. at 643-44, 99 S.Ct. 3035.
Moreover, Bellotti II indicated that a pregnant minor has the right to seek judicial bypass without parental involvement. The Massachusetts statute at issue in Bel-lotti II provided for limited judicial bypass, yet it also required that any available parent be notified of the minor’s attempt to obtain judicial bypass. Id. at 646, 99 S.Ct. 3035. The Court ruled that because there were parents who would obstruct a minor’s access to an abortion when she is sufficiently mature to make the decision on her own or when the abortion is in her best [462]*462interests, notifying the parents of the pending bypass proceedings “would impose an undue burden upon the exercise of minors of the right to seek an abortion.” Id. at 647, 99 S.Ct. 3035.
1. The twenty-four hour appeal provision
Under the Act, if the juvenile court rules within forty-eight hours of the filing of the minor’s bypass petition, a notice of appeal must be filed within twenty-four hours of the decision of the juvenile court. If the juvenile court does not rule within forty-eight hours, the petition is deemed denied, and the minor may appeal at any time. TCA § 37-10-304(d), (g). The twenty-four hours begins to run from the time of the juvenile court’s decision, not from the time the minor receives notice of the ruling. TCA § 37-10-304.(g). The district court concluded that MPP likely could prove that the notice of appeal provision imposes an undue burden on the minor seeking an abortion because it impermissibly shifts to the pregnant minor the burden of acting expeditiously. MPP argues that the twenty-four hour provision burdens a minor seeking judicial bypass because it creates logistical problems for her in the form of making telephone calls during a particular time and forcing her to return to the courthouse to file the notice of appeal within a short time-frame.
We believe that the twenty-four hour appeal provision does not place an undue burden upon a minor’s ability to pursue a judicial bypass. First, Tenn.R.App.Proc. 4(d) allows civil litigants to file notices of appeal in advance.2 Thus, a minor may file a notice of appeal at the conclusion of the hearing on her petition while already at the courthouse. See Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 n. 4 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) (notice filed prematurely provides adequate notice to adverse party under Tenn.R.App.Proc. 4(d)). Additionally, if she has a lawyer, Tennessee’s Notice of Appeal form does not exclude advance authorization of an appeal. Tenn.RApp. Proc., app. A., Form 1 (Michie 1999). She may authorize an appeal, leaving the date of the decision blank, and instruct her lawyer to file the notice when the decision is rendered. The ability to arrange for an appeal in advance of a decision by the court, either through her lawyer or by filing a notice of appeal prematurely, greatly alleviates the need to be in contact with and return to the court.
Second, should the minor not arrange for an appeal in advance of the juvenile court’s decision, the window of time within which the minor must remain in contact with the court is only forty-eight hours. If within forty-eight hours of filing her petition she has not heard otherwise, she knows her petition has been denied and may appeal at any time. Although we recognize that making phone calls may raise some difficulties for a minor attempting to act in secret, such a burden cannot be characterized as substantial, particularly where the phone calls need only be made over a forty-eight hour period.
Third, the juvenile court is required to advise the minor that she has the right to court-appointed counsel, and the state is required to “provide a court-appointed advocate in each judicial district to give information regarding the legal process to the minor and to coordinate with the court-appointed counsel.” TCA § 37-10-304(c)(1). These provisions assure a minor access to assistance in navigating the appeals process. Also, the clerk of the court has the responsibility of notifying the minor of the court’s decision by delivering a copy of the order to the minor’s attorney. Rule 24(10). Court-appointed counsel would have a professional obligation to [463]*463stay in touch with the juvenile court during the brief forty-eight hour time period during which it could render a decision to insure that a notice of appeal is timely. Furthermore, since the lawyer would be attending the hearing with the minor, in order to expedite the process she could be asked then whether she wanted to appeal if she lost. Lastly, the appeal provision expedites the judicial bypass process and thereby serves the significant state interest in protecting the health of the minor because, as MPP itself notes, the longer the minor must wait to have an abortion, the greater her health risks become.
A similar twenty-four hour appeal provision was upheld in Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254 (4th Cir.1997). There the court ruled that a twenty-four hour appeal provision found in a North Carolina bypass procedure was not an undue burden, in part because that statute, like the Tennessee Consent Act, required the state to provide court-appointed counsel at the minor’s request. Id. at 2.75. Although the statute in Manning, unlike the Tennessee Consent Act, required the North Carolina district courts to make a decision at the conclusion of the initial hearing, thereby foreclosing any logistical problems in learning of the court’s decision, this difference does not tip the scales in favor of unconstitutionality in view of the safeguards provided by the Tennessee procedure. In addition, Rule 24(ll)(d) states that the “court should endeavor to rule at the conclusion of the hearing,” thus making any difference between the Tennessee and the North Carolina bypass procedures even less significant. See also Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491-92 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (quoting portions of a Missouri statute containing a twenty-four-hour notice of appeal and stating that “this section provides the framework for a constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings”) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring with Powell, J.).3
2. The statement of mental capacity
Rule 24(5)(a)(iv) requires the minor seeking to judicially bypass the consent requirement to state in her petition “whether the applicant is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity to consent to the abortion.” The district court held that this provision was likely unconstitutional because it deterred minors who were not of sound mind and sufficient intellectual capacity from pursuing the judicial bypass procedure and therefore subverted the Bellotti II requirement that a judicial bypass be available for those minors in whose best interests it is to have an abortion.
Such a holding is unwarranted. Rule 24 requires only that the minor state “whether [she] is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity”; it does not foreclose her from seeking an abortion if she does not have that capacity. The Rule thus asks for one form of proof for determining whether the minor satisfies the maturity prong of Bellotti II. Although item six of the model application contained in the appendix to the Rule requires the [464]*464minor to state affirmatively that she is of “sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity,” according to Rule 24(6) a minor’s application need only be in substantial conformity with the model application. See also Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 479 n. 4, 493, 103 S.Ct. 2517 (1983) (quoting portions of the Missouri parental consent statute requiring the minor or her next friend to state that the minor is of sound mind and sufficient intellectual capacity and stating that the statute “avoids any constitutional infirmities”) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring with Powell, J.).4
3. The venue restriction
Although TCA § 37-10-303(b) permits the minor seeking judicial bypass to petition “the juvenile court of any county of this state,” Rule 24(4) requires the minor to file her petition in either the county in which she resides or the county in which the abortion is sought. The district court found that the Rule “affirmatively creates a substantial risk that a young woman’s confidentiality will be compromised, either by direct discovery in her home county or because of her prolonged absence traveling to the county where the abortion will be performed.” In coming to this conclusion the district court incorrectly assumed that the Rule trumps the Act.
When a rule of court conflicts with a legislative act, the general rule is that the act controls. See, e.g., Amsler v. United States, 381 F.2d 37, 42-43 (9th Cir.1967); Nichols v. King, 190 Tenn. 573, 584, 230 S.W.2d 1006, 1011 (1950). Tennessee has a mechanism by which procedural rules promulgated by the Tennessee Supreme Court may be approved by resolution of both houses of the Tennessee General Assembly. TCA §§ 16-3-401, 16-3-404. After such approval, the rules control despite conflicting provisions of the Tennessee Code. See Mid-South Pavers, Inc. v. Arnco Const, Inc., 771 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the Tennessee Supreme Court and approved by joint resolution of the Tennessee General Assembly, trump conflicting provisions of the Tennessee Code). However, neither party has presented evidence to this court that Rule 24 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee has been approved by joint resolution, nor has our independent research discovered any such evidence.
We are confident that under Tennessee law the venue provision found in the Consent Act prevails over that found in Rule 24(4). The venue provision in the Consent Act does not burden a minor seeking a judicial bypass. Indeed, it does not appear that a greater choice of venue could be provided.
4. De novo hearing requirement
TCA § 37-10-304(g) provides that review of an adverse decision by the juvenile court of a minor’s bypass petition shall be de novo by the state’s circuit court, and Rule 24(12)(d) allows that court to call witnesses. The district court held that the de novo hearing provision was likely unconstitutional because of the added burden of a second trip to the courthouse. The state argues that de novo review actually benefits a minor as it increases her chances of overturning an adverse ruling by the juvenile court. The Fourth Circuit considered an identical provision in Manning v. Hunt, supra, and held that it was likely constitutional.
While it may be that a second hearing could add stress and logistical difficulty, a minor whose initial petition is denied [465]*465would surely prefer the expanded opportunities afforded her by de novo review. The issues raised by the bypass petition— whether the minor is of sound mind and sufficient intellectual capacity to make a decision about abortion or the abortion is in her best interests — are particularly fact sensitive, and an appellate court reviewing only the factual record made in the trial court would be expected to accord great deference to the trial court’s view of the consequences of that record. See Collins v. Howmet Corp., 970 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tenn.1998) (“When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded to the trial court’s factual findings.”); In the matter of Michael Lee Parsons, 914 S.W.2d 889, 895 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995) (where “trial judge as the trier of fact had the opportunity to observe [the] parties and their manner and demeanor on the witness stand, ... the weight, faith and credit accorded to their testimony by the trial judge is entitled to great weight in this Court”).
The district court reasoned that de novo review would not amount to an undue burden if it were triggered at the minor’s option, rather than permitting the circuit court to control the proceedings. We are at a loss to understand how it can be seriously contended that by affording a reviewing court additional tools to carry out its responsibility of protecting the interests of a petitioning minor, the Tennessee General Assembly has placed a substantial obstacle in her path that hinders her choice in any meaningful way. One could just as unconvincingly argue that the initial hearing in juvenile court is more burdensome than allowing the minor to make her case entirely in writing. Whatever burden is placed upon the minors by a hearing requirement at both the juvenile and circuit court levels best serves the purpose of assuring that those minors who qualify for judicial bypass receive it and that those who do not qualify must obtain parental consent.
5. The pre-petition physician consultation
The model petition appended to Rule 24 would have the minor swear that she “has consulted with the physician who is to perform the abortion, or with a referring physician” concerning the abortion. The district court held that this requirement likely places an unconstitutional burden on the minor. According to the district court, arranging for and going to the consultation, all the while keeping it secret, would create many difficulties for minors seeking abortions. Recognizing that the minor must consult with a physician sometime before the abortion is performed, MPP argues on appeal that the requirement is unduly burdensome in that it forces the minor to consult with a physician prior to filing her petition, whereas absent the requirement she could consult with a physician at any time, including the day the procedure is to be performed.
However, as the state notes, nothing in the Consent Act demands that the consultation be face-to-face, and telephone consultation would decrease the logistical problems. In addition, this requirement of a pre-petition consultation with a physician seems designed to assist the juvenile court in its determination of whether the minor is capable of making the decision or whether the abortion is in her best interests. Accordingly, requiring an early, as opposed to later, consultation does not amount to an undue burden, especially as it is aimed at “inform[ing] the woman’s free choice, not hinder[ing] it.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The Court in Casey held that a state can require that a doctor give a woman certain information before she may have an abortion. 505 U.S. at 884, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Due to “the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make crucial decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing,” Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634, 99 S.Ct. 3035, the [466]*466requirement is particularly justified where the person seeking an abortion is a minor. Therefore, MPP did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, as regards the pre-petition physician consultation requirement.
Because our determination that MPP did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits regarding any of the challenged provisions is sufficient to reverse the district court’s grant of the injunction, we decline to address the district court’s ruling on the other three injunction factors.
B. Severability
The district court ruled that the provisions of the Consent Act and Rule 24 it found objectionable should not be severed. State law governs the question of severability. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139, 116 S.Ct. 2068, 135 L.Ed.2d 443 (1996). Tennessee law permits severance only when “it is made to appear from the face of the statute that the legislature would have enacted it with the objectionable features omitted.” State v. Harmon, 882 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tenn.1994) (citations omitted). Both parties agree that the approach to severability should be the same when the provision at issue is found in Rule 24 rather than the Consent Act itself. We hold that the district court abused its discretion in enjoining the state from implementing the Consent Act and Rule 24 rather than severing the provisions it found offensive and leaving the remainder of these Tennessee laws intact.
In determining whether a provision should be severed, the proper inquiry is whether the Tennessee General Assembly or the Tennessee Supreme Court would choose, on the one hand, having no Consent Act or Rule 24 at all and, on the other, passing the Consent Act or promulgating Rule 24 without the offensive provisions. The question is not whether the judicial bypass procedure without the severed provisions is the procedure either the Tennessee General Assembly or the Tennessee Supreme Court would have established had either known certain provisions were unconstitutional.
If the challenged provisions are severed from the judicial bypass procedure, the remaining portions of the Consent Act are “capable of enforcement and fairly answer[ ] the object of its passage.” State v. Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823, 830 (Tenn.1994). First, the twenty-four hour appeal, if severed, would be replaced by TCA § 37-1-159(g), which provides that “appeals in all other civil matters heard by the juvenile court shall be governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Tenn. R.App. Proc. 4 allows for an appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment. Second, the statement of mental capacity requirement could be severed without impairing the juvenile court’s ability to process applications for judicial bypass. Whether the minor is of sound mind and sufficient mental capacity is information that can be gathered at the juvenile court proceeding. Third, should the venue restriction in Rule 24(4) be enjoined, TCA § 37-10-303(b) — the venue provision found in the Consent Act itself — would step back in to allow the minor to file her petition in “the juvenile court of any county of this state.” Fourth, without the de novo hearing provision, the Tennessee circuit courts could still review the decision of the juvenile court on the record in the usual manner. Fifth, if the state is enjoined from enforcing the pre-petition physician consultation requirement, the juvenile court may still make a determination as to the minor’s need for an abortion or her mental capacity to make the abortion decision on her own by calling witnesses.
Certainly the Tennessee General Assembly and the Tennessee Supreme Court would prefer the judicial bypass system as presently established in the Consent Act and Rule 24. However, TCA § 37-10-301(a) sets out the legislative intent, and all three state interests listed — protecting minors, fostering the family structure, and protecting the rights of parents — would be [467]*467better served by a Consent Act with a judicial bypass procedure less the challenged provisions than no Consent Act at all. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in failing to sever the portions of the Consent Act and Rule 24 that it found objectionable.
III.
For all the reasons set out above, the order of the district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.