Melara-Martinez v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 23, 2025
Docket24-2187
StatusUnpublished

This text of Melara-Martinez v. Bondi (Melara-Martinez v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Melara-Martinez v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIC DANIEL MELARA- No. 24-2187 MARTINEZ; EVELYN CAROLINA Agency Nos. RAMOS RUIZ; STEVEN MISAEL A201-667-812 MARTINEZ RAMOS; ERICK ALEXIS A203-461-200 MELARA-RAMOS, A203-461-201 A201-667-813 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 21, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, WARDLAW, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Eric Daniel Melara-Martinez, Evelyn Carolina Ramos Ruiz, and their minor

children Erick Melara Ramos and Steven Martinez Ramos (“Petitioners”) are natives

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). and citizens of El Salvador. They appeal a decision of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the order of an immigration judge (“IJ”), which denied

their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “[O]ur review ‘is limited to the BIA’s

decision, except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.’” Shrestha

v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471

F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and

factual findings for substantial evidence. Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th

Cir. 2020) (citing Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000)). We

deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Petitioners’ asylum and

withholding-of-removal claims on the ground that they failed to show the

Salvadoran government is “unable or unwilling” to protect them from harm.1 See

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

Petitioners argue that the BIA improperly based its decision on their failure to report

the threats they received in El Salvador to the police. See id. at 1069 (holding that

“the failure to report to authorities” alone is not “outcome determinative”). But the

1 Contrary to the Government’s contention, this issue was exhausted, as the BIA addressed it on the merits. See Arsdi v. Holder, 659 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that exhaustion is met if the BIA chooses to consider an issue on the merits despite a procedural default).

2 24-2187 BIA appropriately “examine[d] ‘all relevant evidence in the record,’” id. (citation

omitted), including the State Department’s country report and news articles. As the

BIA explained, those sources “show[] that the Salvadoran government takes steps to

prosecute corruption and gang violence, even if it is sometimes not successful in

doing so.” A reasonable adjudicator could thus conclude that Petitioners failed to

show that Salvadoran authorities would likely be unable or unwilling to protect

them. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021). Petitioners’

subjective fears of police corruption, for which they offer no concrete basis, do not

compel the opposite conclusion. See Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062,

1064–65 (9th Cir. 2020).

2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. In

deciding whether a petitioner has satisfied their burden of demonstrating that it is

more likely than not that they will be tortured if removed, the BIA “must consider

all relevant evidence, including but not limited to the possibility of relocation within

the country of removal.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir.

2022) (quoting Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)).

Here, Melara-Martinez and Ramos Ruiz testified that gang members threatened

them near their home in Isla La Pirraya. But Ramos Ruiz’s parents live thirty minutes

away from Isla La Pirraya by boat, in the town of San Sebastian. After Melara-

Martinez and Erick fled El Salvador, Ramos Ruiz and Steven stayed with her parents

3 24-2187 in San Sebastian, and Ramos Ruiz testified that she never received any threats there.

The BIA thus reasonably concluded that Petitioners could more likely than not avoid

torture by relocating within El Salvador to live with Ramos Ruiz’s parents. See

Gutierrez v. Garland, 106 F.4th 866, 880 (9th Cir. 2024).

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-2187

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Related

Arsdi v. Holder
659 F.3d 925 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Shrestha v. Holder
590 F.3d 1034 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Roberto Maldonado v. Eric Holder, Jr.
786 F.3d 1155 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Carlos Bringas-Rodriguez v. Jefferson Sessions
850 F.3d 1051 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

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