MARTIN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff was granted a divorce from defendant on the grounds of extreme cruelty. Defendant appealed from the judgment regarding the division of the property and debts and the award of alimony. We affirm.
[405]*405The parties were married on December 27,1974. A divorce was granted on February 15, 1980. The duration of the marriage was therefore approximately five years. At the time of trial, plaintiff was thirty-eight years of age; the record does not reflect defendant’s age. Plaintiff had two children by a previous marriage, ages seventeen and fifteen.
When plaintiff and defendant were married, plaintiff owned some land in Elko, Nevada; a lot in Florida; an interest in some partnership property in California; a car; part interest in her former home in Hawaii; and a savings account of approximately $7,700. Defendant brought into the marriage some furniture and a car.
The health of the parties apparently was good. Regarding the parties’ competency to earn a living, plaintiff graduated from Sioux Falls College with a degree in social work and psychology. However, she did not work during the course of the marriage at the request of defendant, who did not want her to work as it would put him in a higher tax bracket. Defendant is a stockbroker and is presently employed as manager of the Sioux Falls office of an investment banking firm. In 1978 and again in 1979, defendant earned in excess of $50,000. Further, defendant was expected to earn for the year 1980 the sum of $38,000.
The parties had accumulated, during the course of the marriage, a home in Brandon, South Dakota, a 1975 Dodge van camper, furniture and fixtures and household goods and two certificates of deposit, the latter to be held for the benefit of plaintiff’s children. Excluding the mortgage on the home, the parties had incurred debts in excess of $35,000.
Regarding the contribution of each party to the accumulation of the said property, plaintiff, in addition to keeping house, making meals and doing the normal housewife chores, contributed $15,000 towards a down-payment on the purchase of the home and for some initial improvements on the home. Defendant basically contributed his earnings.
The record reflects several other relevant factors. As part of the divorce decree in Hawaii concerning her first marriage, plaintiff was awarded the home. The decree provided that if she did not sell the Hawaii home prior to September 1980, her two children would be awarded 100% of the net profit. If the house was sold prior to September 1980, plaintiff’s former husband was to receive 40% of the net proceeds, with plaintiff to receive the balance. In 1976, defendant insisted that plaintiff sell the house in Hawaii and retain all of the proceeds in violation of the Hawaii court order and purchase a residence in Sioux Falls with the money. At defendant’s insistence, the house was sold and plaintiff received $29,000 in net proceeds, giving her former husband none of that amount. Plaintiff’s former husband learned of the sale and started legal proceedings in Hawaii. The court in Hawaii has since entered a judgment against plaintiff in favor of the former husband for approximately $16,000. From the $29,000 realized from the Hawaii property sale, plaintiff purchased two certificates of deposit for the children in the total sum of $10,000. As stated, $15,000 of the proceeds was used towards a downpayment on the purchase of a house in Brandon and on initial improvements. Plaintiff also gave $3,000 of the proceeds to defendant to invest in the stock market. Plaintiff had earlier given defendant her $7,700 in savings to invest in the stock market. The record reflects that defendant made various purchases and transfers of stock, mainly in the high risk area, and at the timé of the trial the stocks were worthless.
After the parties purchased the home in Brandon, defendant wanted to borrow more money for improvements and talked plaintiff into borrowing more funds and using the children’s certificates of deposit as security. Plaintiff was reluctant to do this but was advised by defendant that if she loved him and trusted him, she would let him manage the money. Defendant further threatened to leave plaintiff if she refused to mortgage the certificates of deposit. In addition to this, plaintiff discovered that defendant was using construction [406]*406loans for living expenses and to facilitate his excessive bar life and late night activities. Further, defendant refused to go to counseling.
The parties separated and then resumed living together in the summer of 1978 but again started experiencing financial problems, due mainly to defendant’s after-hours activities. Defendant refused to tell plaintiff about the finances and demanded that he be left in charge of the finances. Defendant’s conduct drove plaintiff to an attempted suicide. In November 1979, defendant advised plaintiff that he did not love her anymore and for her to go get herself an attorney and that he was not coming home.
The parties’ home in Brandon has been foreclosed upon. The trial judge ordered it to be sold. The record reflects that the home was worth approximately $80,000; deductions from that figure include a mortgage of $54,900, late charges and taxes of $2,250, a lien of $3,000, real estate fees of $6,000, and a construction loan in the amount of $12,300 secured by the children’s certificates of deposit, leaving a net profit of around $1,550. If the home should be sold for less than $80,000, there may very well be a net loss; in any event, plaintiff would not be able to recover her $15,000 investment. Regarding the other properties, plaintiff was awarded furniture and household goods and other items amounting to approximately $2,500. Defendant was awarded certain furniture and household goods as well as the 1975 Dodge van camper for a total value of $3,975. It must be stated, however, that the camper was mortgaged in the approximate sum of its value. The trial court also awarded to plaintiff the land in Port Malibar, Florida; the land in Elko, Nevada; and her interest in the California partnership property, all of which properties plaintiff brought into the marriage. Plaintiff also received the two certificates of deposit which were taken out for the benefit of her children.
The trial court also ruled that plaintiff should incur and be responsible for debts in excess of $11,000, and that defendant incur and be responsible for debts in excess of $24,000. The trial court also required defendant to pay attorney fees of $750.
In addition to the above, the trial court awarded plaintiff alimony of $750 a month, the first monthly installment to be due for the month of February 1980, and to continue until her youngest child reaches the age of eighteen or is emancipated, if that is earlier. At the time of the termination of the alimony as above indicated, the trial court will reassess the alimony situation on motion of plaintiff and as the needs and abilities of the parties dictate. As stated, plaintiff’s youngest child was fifteen at the time of the divorce.
In reviewing the division of property and the award of alimony, the trial court has broad discretion in making such provision and granting such award, and we will not modify or set them aside unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion. Hansen v. Hansen, 273 N.W.2d 749 (S.D.1979). Although a trial court has broad discretion, we have enumerated further factors which should be considered in the division of marital assets.
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MARTIN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff was granted a divorce from defendant on the grounds of extreme cruelty. Defendant appealed from the judgment regarding the division of the property and debts and the award of alimony. We affirm.
[405]*405The parties were married on December 27,1974. A divorce was granted on February 15, 1980. The duration of the marriage was therefore approximately five years. At the time of trial, plaintiff was thirty-eight years of age; the record does not reflect defendant’s age. Plaintiff had two children by a previous marriage, ages seventeen and fifteen.
When plaintiff and defendant were married, plaintiff owned some land in Elko, Nevada; a lot in Florida; an interest in some partnership property in California; a car; part interest in her former home in Hawaii; and a savings account of approximately $7,700. Defendant brought into the marriage some furniture and a car.
The health of the parties apparently was good. Regarding the parties’ competency to earn a living, plaintiff graduated from Sioux Falls College with a degree in social work and psychology. However, she did not work during the course of the marriage at the request of defendant, who did not want her to work as it would put him in a higher tax bracket. Defendant is a stockbroker and is presently employed as manager of the Sioux Falls office of an investment banking firm. In 1978 and again in 1979, defendant earned in excess of $50,000. Further, defendant was expected to earn for the year 1980 the sum of $38,000.
The parties had accumulated, during the course of the marriage, a home in Brandon, South Dakota, a 1975 Dodge van camper, furniture and fixtures and household goods and two certificates of deposit, the latter to be held for the benefit of plaintiff’s children. Excluding the mortgage on the home, the parties had incurred debts in excess of $35,000.
Regarding the contribution of each party to the accumulation of the said property, plaintiff, in addition to keeping house, making meals and doing the normal housewife chores, contributed $15,000 towards a down-payment on the purchase of the home and for some initial improvements on the home. Defendant basically contributed his earnings.
The record reflects several other relevant factors. As part of the divorce decree in Hawaii concerning her first marriage, plaintiff was awarded the home. The decree provided that if she did not sell the Hawaii home prior to September 1980, her two children would be awarded 100% of the net profit. If the house was sold prior to September 1980, plaintiff’s former husband was to receive 40% of the net proceeds, with plaintiff to receive the balance. In 1976, defendant insisted that plaintiff sell the house in Hawaii and retain all of the proceeds in violation of the Hawaii court order and purchase a residence in Sioux Falls with the money. At defendant’s insistence, the house was sold and plaintiff received $29,000 in net proceeds, giving her former husband none of that amount. Plaintiff’s former husband learned of the sale and started legal proceedings in Hawaii. The court in Hawaii has since entered a judgment against plaintiff in favor of the former husband for approximately $16,000. From the $29,000 realized from the Hawaii property sale, plaintiff purchased two certificates of deposit for the children in the total sum of $10,000. As stated, $15,000 of the proceeds was used towards a downpayment on the purchase of a house in Brandon and on initial improvements. Plaintiff also gave $3,000 of the proceeds to defendant to invest in the stock market. Plaintiff had earlier given defendant her $7,700 in savings to invest in the stock market. The record reflects that defendant made various purchases and transfers of stock, mainly in the high risk area, and at the timé of the trial the stocks were worthless.
After the parties purchased the home in Brandon, defendant wanted to borrow more money for improvements and talked plaintiff into borrowing more funds and using the children’s certificates of deposit as security. Plaintiff was reluctant to do this but was advised by defendant that if she loved him and trusted him, she would let him manage the money. Defendant further threatened to leave plaintiff if she refused to mortgage the certificates of deposit. In addition to this, plaintiff discovered that defendant was using construction [406]*406loans for living expenses and to facilitate his excessive bar life and late night activities. Further, defendant refused to go to counseling.
The parties separated and then resumed living together in the summer of 1978 but again started experiencing financial problems, due mainly to defendant’s after-hours activities. Defendant refused to tell plaintiff about the finances and demanded that he be left in charge of the finances. Defendant’s conduct drove plaintiff to an attempted suicide. In November 1979, defendant advised plaintiff that he did not love her anymore and for her to go get herself an attorney and that he was not coming home.
The parties’ home in Brandon has been foreclosed upon. The trial judge ordered it to be sold. The record reflects that the home was worth approximately $80,000; deductions from that figure include a mortgage of $54,900, late charges and taxes of $2,250, a lien of $3,000, real estate fees of $6,000, and a construction loan in the amount of $12,300 secured by the children’s certificates of deposit, leaving a net profit of around $1,550. If the home should be sold for less than $80,000, there may very well be a net loss; in any event, plaintiff would not be able to recover her $15,000 investment. Regarding the other properties, plaintiff was awarded furniture and household goods and other items amounting to approximately $2,500. Defendant was awarded certain furniture and household goods as well as the 1975 Dodge van camper for a total value of $3,975. It must be stated, however, that the camper was mortgaged in the approximate sum of its value. The trial court also awarded to plaintiff the land in Port Malibar, Florida; the land in Elko, Nevada; and her interest in the California partnership property, all of which properties plaintiff brought into the marriage. Plaintiff also received the two certificates of deposit which were taken out for the benefit of her children.
The trial court also ruled that plaintiff should incur and be responsible for debts in excess of $11,000, and that defendant incur and be responsible for debts in excess of $24,000. The trial court also required defendant to pay attorney fees of $750.
In addition to the above, the trial court awarded plaintiff alimony of $750 a month, the first monthly installment to be due for the month of February 1980, and to continue until her youngest child reaches the age of eighteen or is emancipated, if that is earlier. At the time of the termination of the alimony as above indicated, the trial court will reassess the alimony situation on motion of plaintiff and as the needs and abilities of the parties dictate. As stated, plaintiff’s youngest child was fifteen at the time of the divorce.
In reviewing the division of property and the award of alimony, the trial court has broad discretion in making such provision and granting such award, and we will not modify or set them aside unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion. Hansen v. Hansen, 273 N.W.2d 749 (S.D.1979). Although a trial court has broad discretion, we have enumerated further factors which should be considered in the division of marital assets. These factors are;
[T]he duration of the marriage, value of the property, the ages of the parties, the parties’ state of health and competency to earn a living, the contribution of each party to the accumulation of the property, and the income-producing capacity of the parties’ assets. Hansen, supra, at p. 751.
Other cases holding for the same proposition include Johnson v. Johnson, 300 N.W.2d 865 (S.D.1980); Buseman v. Buseman, 299 N.W.2d 807 (S.D.1980); Cooper v. Cooper, 299 N.W.2d 798 (S.D.1980); Clement v. Clement, 292 N.W.2d 799 (S.D.1980); Michael v. Michael, 287 N.W.2d 98 (S.D.1980); and Wall v. Wall, 260 N.W.2d 644 (S.D.1977).
In addition to the above factors, fault' continues to be a consideration in making an award of alimony. Hanks v. Hanks, 296 N.W.2d 523 (S.D.1980).
[407]*407Without enumerating each, we find the record is replete with evidence that all these factors were properly presented to and considered by the trial court. We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in entering its judgment regarding property division or alimony award. In making an equitable division of property, a trial court is not bound by any mathematical formula but is to make the award on the basis of the material factors in the case, having due regard for equity and the circumstances of the party. Further, and specifically regarding alimony, fault is a consideration, and one which is amply shown in this case.
Plaintiff has requested that defendant be required to pay additional attorney fees for the defense, of this appeal. We find this to be a reasonable request and require that defendant pay the additional sum of $500 for attorney fees.
The judgment of the trial court is modified to include an award of $500 to plaintiff for attorney fees on appeal. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
WOLLMAN, C. J., and MORGAN, J., concur.
DUNN, J., concurs specially.
HENDERSON, J., dissents.
MARTIN, Circuit Judge, sitting for FOSHEIM, J., disqualified.