MORGAN, Justice.
This appeal and cross-appeal goes to every facet of the decree of divorce entered herein in favor of Curtis W. Hanks (appellant) and against Margaret Hanks (appel-lee), which decree also awarded custody of their minor children to appellee and set child support payments, divided the property of the parties, and awarded appellee alimony payments for life. Appellant contests the custody, support, property division, and alimony provisions. Appellee contests the award of the decree to appellant, the support, property division, and alimony provisions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The parties were married in 1958 while both were students at the University of South Dakota in Vermillion. Upon graduation from law school in January of 1962, appellant returned to his home town of Lemmon, South Dakota, and set up a law practice. Appellee remained in Vermillion to complete her degree, which she did by August of 1962 whereupon she, too, moved to Lemmon. Four children were born as issue of the marriage, the oldest being eighteen and the youngest eight at the time of the divorce trial.1 The award of the decree to appellant was based on the trial court’s finding that appellee was guilty of an adulterous relationship with one Robert Seeley. The problems that led to the divorce court will be discussed where appropriate to our disposition of the various issues.
Upon this court’s review of the trial court’s findings, due regard must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony, and the court’s findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. SDCL 15-6-52(a); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 278 N.W.2d 639 (S.D.1979); Isaak v. Isaak, 278 N.W.2d 445 (S.D.1979); Holforty v. Holforty, 272 N.W.2d 810 (S.D.1978). This court will also “accept the evidence including any reasonable inferences which are favorable to the trial court’s determination.” Isaak v. Isaak, 278 N.W.2d at 446.
The first issue we deal with, raised by appellee in her cross-appeal, is the propriety of the decree on the grounds of her adulterous conduct. The record discloses that within a few months after entry of the [525]*525decree appellee remarried. To reverse the trial court and remand with directions to vacate the decree would automatically make appellee a bigamist. We would hesitate to do so even if her contentions were correct. As this court stated in Brockel v. Brockel, 80 S.D. 547, 553, 128 N.W.2d 558, 561 (1964):
The defendant could only have contracted a second marriage under authority of the divorce granted to the plaintiff. He does not come into court with clean hands when the relief he requests, if granted, would make him a bigamist. One in his position cannot accept the benefit of a judgment and then be heard to assert its nullity and invalidity.
We therefore hold that appellee is estopped from attacking the decree of divorce granted to appellant on the grounds of her adulterous conduct.
We next consider the award of custody of the three children, then ages thirteen, ten, and eight, to appellee. In awarding the custody of minor children the trial court has broad discretionary powers and this court will not interfere with that discretion unless there is a clear case of abuse presented by the record. Spaulding v. Spaulding, supra; Isaak v. Isaak, supra; Holforty v. Holforty, supra; Kester v. Kester, 257 N.W.2d 731 (S.D.1977).
In deciding the issue of child custody, the trial court must give primary consideration to the best interests of the children based on all the facts and circumstances. This decision is to be made relative to their temporal, mental, and moral welfare. Isaak v. Isaak, supra; Miller v. Miller, 245 N.W.2d 501 (S.D.1976); Masek v. Masek, 89 S.D. 62, 228 N.W.2d 334 (1975).
Appellant points out that during the period that appellee had in effect abandoned her family and moved to Minneapolis he, with the aid of a housekeeper, had afforded the children a good home environment, and that the arrangement would continue if he were awarded custody. The trial court met with the children individually in camera. While its findings of fact state that the children expressed a desire to live with their mother, the transcript of that session does not support that finding. We would view the children’s responses as inconclusive, as one might expect from children of that age in that setting.
Appellant argues strenuously that appel-lee’s marital misconduct is one of the reasons that she should not have received custody. Yet this court has held that marital misconduct does not necessarily make one an unfit parent so as to preclude that person from having custody of his children, when no evidence has been introduced to show that such conduct had a demonstrable effect upon the children. Kester v. Kester, supra; Hershey v. Hershey, 85 S.D. 85, 177 N.W.2d 267 (1970); Wiesner v. Wiesner, 80 S.D. 114, 119 N.W.2d 920 (1963).
In Kester this court went on to say that “we feel that one seeking to take custody from a mother has a burden of showing a harmful effect on the children caused by the mother’s conduct.” 257 N.W.2d at 734. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the children in this case were harmed in any way by appellee’s marital misconduct, nor can we say that in reviewing the entire record the trial court erred in its decision to award custody to appellee. It is an exceedingly difficult issue in every contested case. The trial judge was in a far better position to assess the situation than we are in reviewing the cold record.
Subsequent to the entry of the decree and prior to oral argument the sixteen-year-old daughter (thirteen at the time of trial), by agreement, went to live with appellant. Upon remand we direct that the appropriate steps be taken to formalize the transfer of the custody of the sixteen-year-old and adjust the support payments accordingly.
With respect to the issue of property division, neither party is satisfied. Appellant argues that he has a negative net worth, or at best, a maximum of $20,000. He argues that he received property that was of less value than the encumbrances on it and additionally was saddled with $20,000 of unsecured debts accumulated by the par[526]*526ties. He argues that he is simply incapable of supporting the financial burden imposed by the decree. Appellee on the other hand asserts that she was not awarded enough because appellant has a net worth of $80,-000 to $90,000, and a gross income of $50,-000 per annum.
As to the trial court’s determination of valuation, granted there is some difference between the valuations placed on the property by the parties; however, the trial court is not bound to accept either as correct. The evidence was in conflict.
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MORGAN, Justice.
This appeal and cross-appeal goes to every facet of the decree of divorce entered herein in favor of Curtis W. Hanks (appellant) and against Margaret Hanks (appel-lee), which decree also awarded custody of their minor children to appellee and set child support payments, divided the property of the parties, and awarded appellee alimony payments for life. Appellant contests the custody, support, property division, and alimony provisions. Appellee contests the award of the decree to appellant, the support, property division, and alimony provisions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The parties were married in 1958 while both were students at the University of South Dakota in Vermillion. Upon graduation from law school in January of 1962, appellant returned to his home town of Lemmon, South Dakota, and set up a law practice. Appellee remained in Vermillion to complete her degree, which she did by August of 1962 whereupon she, too, moved to Lemmon. Four children were born as issue of the marriage, the oldest being eighteen and the youngest eight at the time of the divorce trial.1 The award of the decree to appellant was based on the trial court’s finding that appellee was guilty of an adulterous relationship with one Robert Seeley. The problems that led to the divorce court will be discussed where appropriate to our disposition of the various issues.
Upon this court’s review of the trial court’s findings, due regard must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony, and the court’s findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. SDCL 15-6-52(a); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 278 N.W.2d 639 (S.D.1979); Isaak v. Isaak, 278 N.W.2d 445 (S.D.1979); Holforty v. Holforty, 272 N.W.2d 810 (S.D.1978). This court will also “accept the evidence including any reasonable inferences which are favorable to the trial court’s determination.” Isaak v. Isaak, 278 N.W.2d at 446.
The first issue we deal with, raised by appellee in her cross-appeal, is the propriety of the decree on the grounds of her adulterous conduct. The record discloses that within a few months after entry of the [525]*525decree appellee remarried. To reverse the trial court and remand with directions to vacate the decree would automatically make appellee a bigamist. We would hesitate to do so even if her contentions were correct. As this court stated in Brockel v. Brockel, 80 S.D. 547, 553, 128 N.W.2d 558, 561 (1964):
The defendant could only have contracted a second marriage under authority of the divorce granted to the plaintiff. He does not come into court with clean hands when the relief he requests, if granted, would make him a bigamist. One in his position cannot accept the benefit of a judgment and then be heard to assert its nullity and invalidity.
We therefore hold that appellee is estopped from attacking the decree of divorce granted to appellant on the grounds of her adulterous conduct.
We next consider the award of custody of the three children, then ages thirteen, ten, and eight, to appellee. In awarding the custody of minor children the trial court has broad discretionary powers and this court will not interfere with that discretion unless there is a clear case of abuse presented by the record. Spaulding v. Spaulding, supra; Isaak v. Isaak, supra; Holforty v. Holforty, supra; Kester v. Kester, 257 N.W.2d 731 (S.D.1977).
In deciding the issue of child custody, the trial court must give primary consideration to the best interests of the children based on all the facts and circumstances. This decision is to be made relative to their temporal, mental, and moral welfare. Isaak v. Isaak, supra; Miller v. Miller, 245 N.W.2d 501 (S.D.1976); Masek v. Masek, 89 S.D. 62, 228 N.W.2d 334 (1975).
Appellant points out that during the period that appellee had in effect abandoned her family and moved to Minneapolis he, with the aid of a housekeeper, had afforded the children a good home environment, and that the arrangement would continue if he were awarded custody. The trial court met with the children individually in camera. While its findings of fact state that the children expressed a desire to live with their mother, the transcript of that session does not support that finding. We would view the children’s responses as inconclusive, as one might expect from children of that age in that setting.
Appellant argues strenuously that appel-lee’s marital misconduct is one of the reasons that she should not have received custody. Yet this court has held that marital misconduct does not necessarily make one an unfit parent so as to preclude that person from having custody of his children, when no evidence has been introduced to show that such conduct had a demonstrable effect upon the children. Kester v. Kester, supra; Hershey v. Hershey, 85 S.D. 85, 177 N.W.2d 267 (1970); Wiesner v. Wiesner, 80 S.D. 114, 119 N.W.2d 920 (1963).
In Kester this court went on to say that “we feel that one seeking to take custody from a mother has a burden of showing a harmful effect on the children caused by the mother’s conduct.” 257 N.W.2d at 734. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the children in this case were harmed in any way by appellee’s marital misconduct, nor can we say that in reviewing the entire record the trial court erred in its decision to award custody to appellee. It is an exceedingly difficult issue in every contested case. The trial judge was in a far better position to assess the situation than we are in reviewing the cold record.
Subsequent to the entry of the decree and prior to oral argument the sixteen-year-old daughter (thirteen at the time of trial), by agreement, went to live with appellant. Upon remand we direct that the appropriate steps be taken to formalize the transfer of the custody of the sixteen-year-old and adjust the support payments accordingly.
With respect to the issue of property division, neither party is satisfied. Appellant argues that he has a negative net worth, or at best, a maximum of $20,000. He argues that he received property that was of less value than the encumbrances on it and additionally was saddled with $20,000 of unsecured debts accumulated by the par[526]*526ties. He argues that he is simply incapable of supporting the financial burden imposed by the decree. Appellee on the other hand asserts that she was not awarded enough because appellant has a net worth of $80,-000 to $90,000, and a gross income of $50,-000 per annum.
As to the trial court’s determination of valuation, granted there is some difference between the valuations placed on the property by the parties; however, the trial court is not bound to accept either as correct. The evidence was in conflict. Appellant had testified in deposition that the home should be worth $130,000, but he conditioned that on its being in a larger town than Lemmon. While the trial court’s valuation was above appellant’s trial valuation of $80,000, it was considerably below the $130,000 valuation claimed by appellee.
The only evidence regarding valuation of the property came from the parties themselves.2 The principal difference was with respect to the value of the family home and the value of the law practice. We have said: “[W]e will not attempt to place a valuation on the assets because that task is within the province of the trier of fact.” Kittelson v. Kittelson, 272 N.W.2d 86, 88 (S.D.1978). Where the parties come into the trial court without even a stipulation as to the values, then they had better be prepared to produce hard evidence as to those values other than their own personal opinions. Based upon the lack of such evidence in this record, we are not going to say that the trial court was in error in the valuations that it set. “Exactitude is not required of the trial court in the valuation of assets in a dissolution proceeding; it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures.” Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn.1979).
As to the trial court’s allocation of assets and debts, in Kittelson, supra, we said: “In reviewing the division of property . we take cognizance of the fact that the trial court has broad discretion in making such division . . . and we will not modify or set them aside unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion.” 272 N.W.2d at 88.
In dividing the property herein the trial court awarded appellee a 1976 automobile, $10,000 cash payable over three years, the personal property in her possession, and such household furnishings as were necessary to furnish a comfortable home for herself and the children. It also required that she assume an indebtedness of $5,000 which she had incurred in her quest to further her education after she had left the home. The trial court awarded appellant the family home, three lots in Lemmon, the law practice, a 1971 pickup, a 1977 automobile, the personal property in his possession, and the balance of the home furnishings after ap-pellee had selected what she needed. The trial court also made appellant liable for all the debts accumulated by the parties except the $5,000 debt of appellee, which indebtedness apparently amounts to about $20,000 over and above the secured debts. In addition to the valuation problems, the division was further complicated by the nature and location of the assets that had been accumulated. The law practice was necessarily personal to appellant, and it does not seem appropriate to award heavily encumbered real property in Lemmon to appellee, who had apparently permanently departed from the town.
From our review it does not appear that the trial court was clearly erroneous in giving appellant the bulk of the property, because it also saddled him with the bulk of the debt. Thus, we dispose of appellee’s contention. As for appellant’s complaint regarding the property division, all appellee received was a 1976 Vega, some household furnishings, and $10,000 cash payable over a three-year period. Appellant referred to the $10,000 cash award as alimony; how[527]*527ever, as we view the record we agree with appellee that it was part of the property settlement.
“When dividing the money or property of the parties the trial court must make a fair and just award considering all of the material factors.” Wall v. Wall, 260 N.W.2d 644, 646 (S.D.1977); Kressly v. Kressly, 77 S.D. 143, 87 N.W.2d 601 (1958). It appears to us that when the value of the assets is balanced against the indebtedness, coupled with the nature and location of the assets, the trial court did as well as humanly possible. We therefore affirm the trial court’s property division.
With respect to the alimony provision, however, we do hold that the trial court abused its discretion. The award was for payment of $200 per month with no provision for cutoff. Considering the relative positions of the parties, we hold this award to be excessive. SDCL 25-4-41 provides that:
Where a divorce is granted, the court may compel one party to make such suitable allowance to the other party for support during the life of that other party or for a shorter period, as the court may deem just, having regard to the circumstances of the parties represented; and the court may from time to time modify its orders in these respects.
As we said in Guindon v. Guindon, 256 N.W.2d 894, 898 (S.D.1977):
The amount and length of alimony payments is therefore left to the discretion of the trial court. SDCL 25-4 — 41. The factors for consideration in exercising that discretion are similar to those used in the property division, i. e., (1) the length of the marriage; (2) their respective earning capacity; (3) their respective financial condition after the property division; (4) their respective age, health and physical condition; (5) their station in life or social standing; and (6) the relative fault of the parties in the termination of the marriage.
We note that relative fault of the parties has generally been removed as consideration with respect to property division and child custody, but the statute3 makes no reference to alimony or support after divorce. We therefore hold that fault continues to be a consideration in such awards.
In Guindon the trial court limited the alimony to a two-year period, at the .end of which time the wife presumably would have completed her education so as to be able to go on to secure employment as a teacher. We held that under the circumstances there the trial court abused its discretion in terminating all alimony two years after the divorce decree because there was no credible evidence that she would he able to obtain employment.
The facts in the instant case are distinguishable from Guindon, inasmuch as appellee has been employed as a teacher over a considerable period of time, and she had nearly completed her master’s degree to qualify her for a position as a counselor. The trial court found that upon obtaining her master’s degree appellee would anticipate earning an income of $15,000 per year. This finding was supported by appellee’s own testimony. This income is compared to the trial court’s finding that appellant had a yearly net income of $20,000 a year. In setting an award equalling $2,400 per year, perhaps the trial court was attempting to strike a balance between the $15,000 and $20,000 figures. Were that the only question as to the propriety of the award we would probably hold that figure excessive under the Guindon criteria, especially (2), (3), and (5).
Our principal and strongest objection to the award is the failure of the trial court to provide for termination of the payments upon appellee’s remarriage.. Her adulterous relationship was the grounds for the divorce even though she testified at trial [528]*528that that particular relationship had ended and that she no longer loved or was involved with Seeley. The trial court should have anticipated that a woman of appellee’s age and education would enter into another marriage. The fact that she married Seeley is of no import; that she did so within a few months, however, proves our point.
We hold, therefore, that.under the circumstances of this case the trial court erred in its failure to limit the alimony provision until the remarriage of appellee,4 and as we did in Gaindon under the provisions of SDCL 15-30-2, we modify the alimony provision to provide for its continuation only until the remarriage of appellee, and we remand to the trial court for the purpose of determining the amount accrued within that limitation.
WOLLMAN, C. J., and DUNN and FOSHEIM, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.