IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MEHRAN TAVAKOLI, No. 88030-6-I
Appellant, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SREYA VUTH,
Respondent.
FELDMAN, J.— Mehran Tavakoli appeals the trial court’s orders distributing
property, awarding spousal support, and awarding attorney fees in this dissolution
proceeding. Because Tavakoli fails to establish that the trial court abused its broad
discretion with respect to any of its rulings, we affirm.
I
Sreya Vuth and Mehran Tavakoli met in Cambodia, where Vuth is from. Vuth,
23 years old at the time, was “selling lotions” and singing in a restaurant, and Tavakoli,
then 50 years old and a physician for decades, frequently travelled to Cambodia on
“medical mission” trips. Although Vuth spoke “almost no English” at the time, the two
began “dating” and Tavakoli eventually proposed marriage, in part, because he “felt
really sorry for her” and “wanted to give her a better life.” Tavakoli arranged for Vuth
to obtain a “fiancé visa” and brought her to his Vancouver, Washington home in April No. 88030-6-I
2019. Days before the parties’ July 3, 2019 wedding in California, the parties signed
a prenuptial agreement drafted by an attorney retained by Tavakoli because he felt he
had “amassed too much” and “didn’t want to lose it for one indiscretion.”
Eleven months later, on June 1, 2020, the parties separated after Tavakoli was
arrested and charged with domestic violence offenses. The parties had no children
together. The Clark County Superior Court entered a 10-year no contact order
protecting Vuth. In July 2020, Tavakoli filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. Over
a year later, Vuth received authorization to work and a social security card. Shortly
before trial, Tavakoli resolved the criminal charges against him by entering an
Alford/Newton 1 plea to assault in the third degree, designated as a crime of domestic
violence. 2
At the three-day trial on Tavakoli’s petition, the court considered the testimony
of nine witnesses, including the parties, and more than 50 exhibits. Tavakoli argued
that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was “fully enforceable” and, in accordance with
that agreement, there should be no award of spousal support and all assets he owned
at the time of the marriage should be allocated to him as his separate property. The
court determined that the prenuptial agreement was both procedurally and
substantively unfair and unenforceable.
Having so ruled, the court identified and distributed the parties’ assets.
Tavakoli’s separate assets included real property, a medical practice, and multiple
1 State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 552 P.2d 682 (1976) (adopting the holding of North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), which allows a plea whereby an accused does not technically acknowledge guilt, but concedes the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction). 2 In exchange for his plea, the State dismissed charges of rape in the second degree, intimidating a
witness, assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the fourth degree (two counts), and harassment—all designated as crimes of domestic violence.
2 No. 88030-6-I
investment and financial accounts whereas Vuth’s primary separate assets were a
residential property and bank account in Cambodia. While the court did not allocate
any of Tavakoli’s separate assets to Vuth, the court noted a “huge disparity between
the separate property available to each party post-dissolution” and that Vuth is in a
“new country with little formal education.”
Based on the foregoing evidence, the court concluded that a transfer payment
of $30,000 was required to achieve a fair and equitable distribution of property. The
trial court also ordered spousal support of $18,000 to be paid in installments over three
months to enable Vuth to attend cosmetology school and secure employment
commensurate with her prior work history, skills, and interests. The court granted
Vuth’s request for a lifetime restraining order against Tavakoli.
Tavakoli filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion
and granted Vuth’s request for $2,640 in attorney fees incurred in responding to the
motion. Tavakoli appeals.
II
A. Distribution of Property
Tavakoli claims the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the distribution
of $30,000 to Vuth by failing to (1) identify, assign value, and allocate community
property, (2) assign value to each separate property asset and determine the overall
value of each party’s separate property, (3) determine his ownership interest in real
property designated as separate property and awarded to him, (4) include jewelry
received before marriage as Vuth’s separate property, (5) consider appreciation of
assets, (6) consider Tavakoli’s future financial needs in retirement, the support
3 No. 88030-6-I
awarded to Vuth in pretrial orders, and his expenditures on attorney fees in the criminal
and family law matters, (7) consider that Vuth has “35 years of earning capacity,” work
experience, “valuable” English language skills, and could generate income from her
property in Cambodia or on TikTok, and (8) account for Vuth’s conversion of property
that he left at the marital residence. We disagree with these arguments.
The trial court has broad discretion in distributing marital property. In re
Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242, 170 P.3d 572 (2007). RCW 26.09.080
guides the trial court’s distribution of property and provides that a trial court must
dispose of property in a manner that is “just and equitable” after considering (1) the
nature and extent of the community property, (2) the nature and extent of the separate
property, (3) the duration of the marriage, and (4) the economic circumstances of each
spouse. On review of dissolution proceedings, our supreme court has observed that
“[t]he emotional and financial interests affected by such decisions are best served by
finality.” In re Marriage of Landry, 103 Wn.2d 807, 809, 699 P.2d 214 (1985).
Accordingly, “[t]he spouse who challenges such decisions bears the heavy burden of
showing a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.” Id. “A court’s
decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices,
given the facts and the applicable legal standard; it is based on untenable grounds if
the factual findings are unsupported by the record; [and] it is based on untenable
reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the
requirements of the correct standard.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47,
940 P.2d 1362 (1997). “‘We will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s, weigh
the evidence, or adjudge witness credibility.’” DeVogel v. Padilla, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39,
4 No. 88030-6-I
48, 509 P.3d 832 (2022) (quoting In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714,
986 P.2d 144 (1999)).
Tavakoli’s arguments regarding the distribution of property are unpersuasive
for a number of reasons. Contrary to Tavakoli’s argument that the trial court failed to
properly identify, assign value, and allocate community property, the court did not
conclude that community property of any significant value remained at the time of trial,
more than three years after the parties separated. Tavakoli consistently maintained
that any such community property had no significant value at the time of trial, and Vuth
did not argue otherwise. The court’s findings merely recognize that the marital
community acquired income and some personal property between July 2019 and May
2020. But consistent with the evidence and the parties’ positions, as there was no
community property available to distribute, the decree does not list or allocate such
assets to either party. 3 The trial court did not thereby abuse its discretion. See In re
Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn.2d 649, 656-57, 565 P.2d 790 (1977) (no error in failure to
value assets of insignificant value not taken into account in the property division).
Tavakoli’s claim of error related to the failure to assign specific values to all
assets also fails because he did not propose a date for valuation, nor does it appear
that he presented evidence to establish the value of all assets as of a specific date.
Contrary to Tavakoli’s suggestion, valuation of assets at the time of dissolution trial
is not “dictated” by RCW 26.09.080. Trial courts have wide discretion under the statute
to value assets as of the date of separation, the date of trial, or somewhere in between.
3 Likewise, the trial court’s failure to identify as an asset and assign value to Vuth’s wedding ring does
not undermine the property distribution where there was no dispute as to characterization or purchase price and nothing to suggest that the asset impacted the court’s evaluation of the parties’ relative financial positions. See Hadley, 88 Wn.2d at 656-57.
5 No. 88030-6-I
See, e.g., Lucker v. Lucker, 71 Wn.2d 165, 168, 426 P.2d 981 (1967) (“If the property
is to be valued as of the date of trial rather than the date of separation, appreciation
as well as depreciation in value should be considered in making an equitable
division.”); Koher v. Morgan, 93 Wn. App. 398, 404-05, 968 P.2d 920 (1998) (no abuse
of discretion to value assets following the end of a committed intimate relationship “at
the time of trial, rather than at the time of separation”). Moreover, Tavakoli’s testimony
primarily concerned the circumstances surrounding the prenuptial agreement and
allegations of domestic violence against him. He provided no details about his medical
business and did not retain an expert to value the business. The record designated
for appellate review, including a limited number of trial exhibits, does not include any
evidence from which the trial court could have determined the value of Tavakoli’s
accounts, real property, or business assets at the time of separation or trial. 4
Tavakoli appears to suggest that, absent assigned values to all assets, the
court had no basis to conclude that the parties’ relative economic positions warranted
a transfer of $30,000 to Vuth. That is incorrect, as the record amply supports the
court’s finding of a patent disparity in wealth and prospects. Evidence in the record
supports the finding that Vuth had significant barriers to obtaining employment that
paid higher than minimum wage and no ability to access or liquidate her primary
assets in Cambodia. Vuth’s only other listed asset was a bank account established
after the parties separated. The evidence in the record supports the conclusion that
4 To the extent that Tavakoli’s challenge to the finding of a disparity in the separate assets available to
each party relies on trial exhibits not designated as part of the appellate record, we do not consider those aspects of his argument. See Rhinevault v. Rhinevault, 91 Wn. App. 688, 692, 959 P.2d 687 (1998) (appellant bears the burden to perfect the record on appeal “so the reviewing court has before it all the evidence relevant to deciding the issues”).
6 No. 88030-6-I
this account had no significant positive balance since Vuth used the funds deposited
in that account to secure and furnish her housing and her expenses exceeded her
income.
In contrast, the assets Tavakoli listed as his separate property in an attachment
to the prenuptial agreement included two bank accounts, three investment accounts,
three parcels of real property, a medical business and all of its assets, interest in a
vehicle, and a precious metal company account. Tavakoli listed values for only four
of those assets and did not include his business and real property, which are
presumably the most valuable assets. Nevertheless, Tavakoli conceded that those
accounts had a value of over $120,000, and that his business yielded a profit of
approximately $150,000 per year. There was no evidence to suggest that Tavakoli’s
premarital assets no longer existed (although he testified that his investment accounts
were held by a different entity following a merger), and he points to no evidence
establishing the value of those assets. And we perceive no abuse of discretion in the
characterization of the Vancouver real property as Tavakoli’s separate property, since
his post-separation transfer of those properties to a trust was a transparent effort to
reduce assets that could be distributed. See In re Marriage of Kaseburg, 126 Wn.
App. 546, 556, 108 P.3d 1278 (2005) (while court has no ability to distribute an asset
no longer possessed at the time of trial, it may properly consider waste, concealment,
or other improper conduct).
It is evident from the record that the trial court considered all of the
circumstances before it, including the parties’ ages, their skills and backgrounds, the
length of the marriage, and the support (totaling approximately $26,000) and property
7 No. 88030-6-I
($10,000) distributed to Vuth while the dissolution was pending. Although Tavakoli
complains that the court failed to consider his financial needs in retirement, he did not
testify about retirement plans or present evidence of future projected income and
expenses. No evidence substantiates the claim that the property distribution will
compromise Tavakoli’s retirement. And as to Tavakoli’s repeated claim of entitlement
to a credit for Vuth’s alleged conversion of property while he had no access to the
marital home and for funds he allegedly loaned to Vuth’s brother during the marriage,
the trial court, as trier of fact, rejected these claims as unsupported by the evidence
and found Vuth’s testimony more credible than Tavakoli’s. We will not weigh the
evidence or assess credibility differently. DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 48.
Tavakoli fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in distributing
the parties’ property.
B. Spousal Support
Challenging the award of spousal support, Tavakoli argues that (1) Vuth failed
to establish that her income was insufficient to meet her expenses, (2) the trial court
failed to consider various ways Vuth could supplement her income, (3) the court did
not consider Tavakoli’s ability to pay, (4) no authority authorized or required the court
to take into account Vuth’s career preference, (5) insufficient evidence supports the
estimated amount to attend cosmetology school, and (6) the award of maintenance
violates public policy because it “forces hardworking professionals to enter retirement
as paupers” and provides “enormous windfalls” to younger spouses. Again, we
disagree as to each of these arguments.
8 No. 88030-6-I
Under RCW 26.09.090, the statute that governs spousal maintenance, the
amount and duration of such maintenance must be just in light of the relevant factors.
In re Marriage of Condie, 15 Wn. App. 2d 449, 470, 475 P.3d 993 (2020). The non-
exhaustive list of factors includes: the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance; the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to find
employment; the standard of living established during the marriage; the duration of
the marriage; the age, condition, and financial obligations of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet
their own needs and financial obligations. RCW 26.09.090(1)(a-f). Maintenance is
designed to be a “flexible tool” to equalize the parties’ standard of living “for an
appropriate period of time,” and “[u]ltimately, the court’s paramount concern must be
the parties’ economic conditions postdissolution.” In re Marriage of Wilcox, 3 Wn.3d
507, 521, 553 P.3d 614 (2024); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wn.2d 168, 178-79, 677
P.2d 152 (1984). At the same time, there is no “mandate for trial courts to predict the
future, divide assets with mathematical precision, or guarantee future equality.” In re
Marriage of Kaplan, 4 Wn. App. 2d 466, 476-77, 421 P.3d 1046 (2018). Spousal
support constitutes an abuse of discretion only where it is not based on a fair
consideration of the statutory factors. Wilcox, Wn.3d at 521.
The trial court explicitly considered each of the statutory factors on the record.
In doing so, the court addressed Vuth’s financial resources, including all amounts
awarded pretrial and evidence of Vuth’s earnings between May 2022 and March 2023
showing, on average, 35-hour work weeks at an hourly rate of between $15.50 and
$17.50. There was evidence of Vuth’s expenses through the testimony of her former
9 No. 88030-6-I
neighbor, who paid Vuth’s bills and provided significant and regular financial
assistance to Vuth to meet her expenses. The court considered evidence that Vuth’s
prior work history included employment involving hair and makeup and that Vuth’s
former neighbor helped her research local cosmetology programs, learned that the
cost was “upwards” of $18,000, and that most guarantee work upon completion.
The thrust of most of Tavakoli’s arguments is that the trial court should have
weighed or interpreted the evidence differently to reach a different conclusion about
the necessity and feasibility of spousal support. Such arguments fail to appreciate
that our review is deferential to the trial court’s fundamental role as fact finder. “Where
there is conflicting evidence, it is not the role of the appellate court to weigh and
evaluate the evidence.” Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 66 Wn. App. 510, 526, 832
P.2d 537 (1992). For instance, Tavakoli argues that a short-term marriage cannot
support an award of “long term maintenance.” But duration is only one factor, and
whether or not the award in this case qualifies as “long-term” maintenance is
debatable.
Tavakoli views Vuth’s current earnings as sufficient to meet her expenses
because, according to his calculation, she earns, on average, $23 dollars per month
above her regular expenses and could work more hours. In Tavakoli’s opinion, Vuth
has “more than enough resources to support herself” because she earns, at least,
minimum wage income, which is “good enough for hundreds of thousands of American
citizens.” And, he contends that Vuth is not entitled to pursue “any job she names” at
his expense. Tavakoli’s position assumes that Vuth does not require health insurance,
health care, transportation, internet service, or any discretionary income and ignores
10 No. 88030-6-I
the reality of the substantial financial assistance regularly provided to Vuth. Although
Tavakoli speculates that Vuth can return to Cambodia and has a variety of means at
her disposal to increase her income, the trial court concluded that vocational training
in a field that aligns with her background and interests is consistent with the goals of
RCW 26.09.090 and the best option to establish a financially sustainable long-term
career. Tavakoli cannot show that no reasonable judge would have reached this
conclusion. See Landry, 103 Wn.2d at 810.
Tavakoli also appears to challenge the evidentiary basis for the former
neighbor’s testimony and sufficiency of the evidence establishing Vuth’s income and
expenses, but he points to no objection below. As to Tavakoli’s complaint that the trial
court did not adequately investigate his ability to pay, he again points to no evidence
that would have allowed the court to precisely determine his income and value of his
available assets. There was evidence before the court that Tavakoli had 32 years of
experience as a board-certified physician, owned a cosmetic surgery practice, and
continued to practice. And the evidence included Tavakoli’s concession regarding the
approximate yearly profit of his medical practice, historical evidence of a salary from
his practice between 2018 and 2020, and copies of paystubs for five months of 2021
showing part-time hours and a $90 hourly rate of pay. But again, conspicuously
absent was evidence of the current value of his business, the value of his real property,
current value of all financial assets, and current income from all sources.
Tavakoli fails to establish that the trial court did not fairly consider the statutory
factors in setting spousal maintenance or that its decision amounts to an abuse of
discretion.
11 No. 88030-6-I
C. Attorney Fees on Motion for Reconsideration
Lastly, Tavakoli challenges the trial court’s award of attorney fees totaling
$2,640 to Vuth in connection with the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Tavakoli
claims the court failed to identify a basis for the fee award or the method of calculation
and did not assess the parties’ relative need and ability to pay. Tavakoli maintains
that denial of a motion does not, by itself, justify awarding fees. We again disagree
with these assertions.
Courts have “continuing equitable jurisdiction” in family law matters that allows
them “to grant whatever relief the facts warrant.” In re Marriage of Farmer, 172 Wn.2d
616, 625, 259 P.3d 256 (2011). The trial court’s equitable power includes the power
to sanction a party for any action that makes the proceedings unduly difficult and
costly. See In re Marriage of Bobbitt, 135 Wn. App. 8, 30, 144 P.3d 306 (2006); In re
Marriage of Foley, 84 Wn. App. 839, 846, 930 P.2d 929 (1997); In re Marriage of
Greenlee, 65 Wn. App. 703, 708, 829 P.2d 1120 (1992). A party challenging an
attorney fee award in a family law proceeding must demonstrate abuse of discretion.
In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 873, 56 P.3d 993 (2002).
The record reflects that Vuth sought attorney fees because the motion for
reconsideration was not well grounded in fact or law. And Vuth’s response to the
motion set forth the basis for the amount of fees requested, including the attorney’s
experience, hourly rate, and time spent responding to the motion. The court’s 5-page
order denying the motion addresses Tavakoli’s reliance on CR 55, although the court
did not enter a default order, and his failure to identify specific grounds for relief under
CR 59 and CR 60. It is evident that the trial court agreed that the motion was frivolous
12 No. 88030-6-I
and the amount of fees requested was reasonable and appropriate. The fee award
did not simply follow from the denial of Tavakoli’s motion, and we cannot say that the
court abused its discretion or lacked a tenable basis for awarding fees.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: