Medina 268030 v. Shinn

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: August 27, 2024
• Docket: 4:21-cv-00204
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Dominic Alfred Medina, No. CV-21-00204-TUC-JGZ

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Ryan Thornell,

13 Defendant. 14 Plaintiff Dominic Alfred Medina, proceeding pro se, filed this prisoner civil rights 15 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) On September 29, 2023, the Court granted 16 in part and denied in part Defendant Ryan Thornell’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 17 (Doc. 67 at 13.) In the Order, the Court stated its intent to enter sua sponte summary 18 judgment on the merits in favor of Thornell and provided both Medina and Thornell an 19 opportunity to respond. (Id.) Medina filed his response on December 1, 2023. (Doc. 72.) 20 Thornell did not file a response. Having considered Medina’s response, the Court will not 21 enter summary judgment in favor of Defendant Thornell. Rather, the Court will grant 22 Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 23 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDRUAL HISTORY 24 The Court’s September 29, 2023 Order details the factual and procedural history of 25 this case. (Doc. 67.) The facts relevant to the present issue are as follows. 26 In January 2013, the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) validated Plaintiff 27 Dominic Alfred Medina (Medina) as a member of the New Mexican Mafia under Security 28 Threat Group (STG) policy. (Doc. 67 at 4.) Medina was accepted into the Step-Down 1 Program three years later in 2016. (Id. at 4-5.) The Step-Down Program permits validated 2 STG members in maximum custody to show ADC staff that they are no longer involved 3 with their STG by gradually removing themselves from STG activities. (Id. at 3.) While 4 validated STG members are housed in maximum custody, the Step-Down Program 5 provides an opportunity to be transferred to less restrictive close custody. (Id.) Medina 6 reached Phase V of the Step-Down Program and was placed in close custody. (Id. at 5.) 7 Phase V is the final phase of the Program and is an indefinite period of monitoring 8 for Step-Down inmates. (Doc. 38-1 at 34.) At any point in the Step-Down Program, ADC 9 has the authority to remove an inmate from the Program if they commit certain violations. 10 (Doc. 67 at 3.) These include violations involving cell phones and cell phone accessories. 11 (Id.) Under DO 806, before ADC removes an inmate from Phase IV or V, ADC must 12 provide them with (1) notice of a hearing and ten days to prepare a defense; (2) a hearing; 13 and (3) the opportunity to appeal the decision and result of the hearing. (Id.) 14 From August 2019 to December 2020, Medina incurred three disciplinary violations: Medina could not produce a urine sample in the allotted time, Medina was 15 observed in possession of a cell phone, and a SIM card was found concealed in Medina’s 16 cell wall. (Id. at 5.) For each of these violations, Medina was afforded notice and a hearing. 17 (Doc. 38-1 at 42, 52, 59.) 18 On December 29, 2020, Special Security Unit (SSU) Statewide Coordinator C. 19 Reyna formally recommended to M. Basturo, Lieutenant Arizona State Prison Complex 20 (SPC)-Tucson/SSU Coordinator, that Medina be “revoked” from the Step-Down Program 21 because the three disciplinary violations met the criteria for revocation. (Doc. 38 at ¶ 24.) 22 Medina was removed from close custody and returned to maximum custody at the 23 ASPC Eyman-Browning Unit on January 11, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 56.) 24 On January 14, 2021, three days after Medina’s removal from close custody, ADC 25 completed a classification review of Medina’s custody assignment. (Doc. 67 at 5.) 26 According to the Notice of Hearing and Inmate Rights (Proposed Maximum Custody 27 Placement) form, Medina was provided notice of his custody redetermination hearing on 28 January 14 and initialed next to a check-marked box that he was waiving his right to 48- 1 hour notice of hearing. (Doc. 38-1 at 69-70.) A hearing was conducted the same day. (Id.) 2 The “Rationale for placement” section of the form stated: 3 [Medina] is triggering for STG change and now scores 65,49 (Max, 5). Inmate Medina . . . is a validated STG (Arizona Mexican Mafia.) [sic.] 4 Inmate Medina . . . has been revocated and removed from the STG Step 5 Down Program. 6 (Id. at 69.) Medina’s three disciplinary violations are not mentioned. According to the 7 Maximum Custody Placement Recommendation/Approval form, Medina was present for 8 the hearing but did not submit a written statement or request witnesses. (Id. at 67-68.) The 9 “[e]vidence relied on” section simply states “STG.” (Id.) Medina’s reclassification was 10 approved. (Id.) 11 Medina administratively appealed ADC’s failure to provide him with the reasoning 12 for his change in status, notice, and a hearing prior to his removal from close custody and 13 transfer to maximum custody. (Id. at 77-81.) He submitted an Informal Complaint and a 14 Formal Grievance. (Doc. 67 at 5.) ADC returned the grievance unprocessed, stating 15 Medina used the incorrect grievance form and could not make complaints about his 16 classification with a standard DO 802 grievance. (Id.) On March 5, Medina submitted a 17 Grievance Appeal. (Id. at 6.) ADC returned the appeal unprocessed because it was untimely 18 and incorrectly submitted. (Id.) 19 Despite rejecting his appeals, ADC served Medina with a second Notice of Hearing 20 on March 5, 2021, regarding his proposed maximum custody placement. (Doc. 38-1 at 73.) 21 After “TRIGGER: MAX CUSTODY REVIEW,” the “Rationale for placement” section 22 now stated: RECOMMENDING THAT THIS INMATE STAY @ MAX DUE TO HIS 23 STG VALIDATION, AS PER POLICY. I/M HAS NO ESCAPE HISTORY. 24 HE IS PROGRAMING WITHOUT ANY REPORTED NEGATIVE BEHAVIORS. INMATE HAS RECEIVED THREE MAJORS IN THE 25 PAST TWO YEARS. 26 (Id.) A second maximum custody placement hearing took place on March 8, 2021, almost 27 two months after Medina had been placed in maximum custody. (Doc. 67 at 6.) At the 28 second hearing, Medina received notice that he was being transferred to maximum custody 1 because of the three disciplinary violations. (Doc. 72.) Medina was present for the hearing, 2 submitted a written statement, and requested witnesses. (Id.) Medina’s maximum custody 3 placement was approved a second time. (Id. at 74-75.) 4 On May 14, 2021, Medina filed a complaint in this Court alleging that the 5 Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights and his Fourteenth Amendment right to 6 due process by removing him from the Step-Down Program and placing him in maximum 7 custody on January 11, 2021, without proper notice and a hearing. (Doc. 1.) On screening 8 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated a Fourteenth 9 Amendment due process claim against Defendant Shinn in his official capacity and an 10 Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim against Shinn in his official capacity. 11 (Doc. 7.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Id.) 12 Four months later, on September 10, 2021, Medina renounced his STG membership 13 and debriefed according to policy. (Doc. 67 at 6.) ADC accepted Medina’s debrief. (Id. at 14 87.) On March 10, 2022, Defendant Thornell moved for summary judgment asserting 15 that Medina’s due process claim was moot and that he did not exhaust his administrative 16 remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. 37 at 8.) On September 29, 2022, the Court dismissed 17 Medina’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim because Plaintiff failed to 18 properly exhaust his available administrative remedies as to that claim. (Doc. 67 at 10-11.) 19 The Court otherwise denied the Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that Defendant 20 did not meet his burden at summary judgment to establish that Medina failed to exhaust 21 his remedies as to the due process claim and did not demonstrate that the claim was moot. 22 (Id. at 11.) The Court determined, however, that summary judgment may be appropriate 23 on the ground that no additional process could have prevented Medina’s transfer to 24 maximum custody. (Id. at 12.) The Court ordered further briefing as to whether summary 25 judgment was appropriate on this ground. The Court specifically instructed Medina to 26 include in his response to the Court’s directive: “(1) how ADC providing him with due 27 process for his transfer to maximum custody could have prevented his transfer; (2) what 28 facts essential to his claim are disputed; and (3) whether Medina disputes any of the four 1 facts1 listed by the Court.” (Id. at 11-13.) 2 In Medina’s response to the Court, he does not dispute any facts, but argues that the 3 lack of notice and a hearing prior to his transfer to maximum custody increased the risk of 4 ADC erroneously placing him in maximum custody. (Doc. 72 at 2.) 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 7 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 9 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 10 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 11 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A genuine dispute 12 exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 13 nonmoving party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit 14 under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 15 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 16 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 17 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. In reviewing the evidence, the court 18 need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “Only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court 20 21 22 1 The facts were: • Medina was a validated STG member, (Docs. 38 ¶ 21; 52 at 1–2); 23 • ADC policy requires the placement of validated STG members in maximum custody, (Docs. 38-1 at 26; 52 at 1–2); 24 • If an inmate in the Step-Down Program commits a major disciplinary 25 violation, ADC may remove the inmate from the Program, (See Doc. 38-1 at 29, 34–35); and 26 • Medina committed three disciplinary violations, including at least one 27 major disciplinary violation: the concealment of a SIM card in his cell wall, (see Docs. 38 ¶ 24; 38-1 at 74; 53 at 2). 28 (Doc. 67 at 12.) 1 in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 2 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998). 3 A movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against a party who fails to make 4 a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 5 and on which that party will bear the burden of proof of at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 6 In Celotex, the Supreme Court explained: “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine 7 issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential 8 element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The 9 moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ because the nonmoving party 10 has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to 11 which she has the burden of proof.” Id. at 322-23. 12 III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 13 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government 14 from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of the law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. To analyze a procedural due process claim, the court must 15 engage in a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether an individual was 16 deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. United States v. 101 17 Houseco, LLC., 22. F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022). Second, the court must examine whether 18 that deprivation was accompanied by sufficient procedural protections. Id. Having 19 reviewed Medina’s response, the Court concludes that Medina was entitled to notice and 20 hearing before he was transferred to maximum custody, which ADC did not provide. 21 Therefore, the Court will allow Medina’s claim to proceed. 22 i. Medina’s Liberty Interest 23 Medina has a liberty interest in avoiding a return to maximum custody. Though the 24 constitution does not recognize a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse 25 conditions of confinement, an inmate has a liberty interest when such a transfer “imposes 26 an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidences of 27 prison life.” See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005); Meachum v. Fano, 427 28 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 471 (1995). In this case, there is no 1 dispute that Plaintiff was subjected to conditions which constituted an atypical and 2 significant hardship when he was moved to maximum security housing. 3 In Johnson v. Ryan, the plaintiff was a validated STG member participating in the 4 Step-Down Program. 55 F.4th 1167, 1177 (9th Cir. 2022). ADC staff searched his 5 belongings and found gang paraphernalia. Id. The plaintiff was terminated from the 6 Program without receiving an explanation from ADC. Id. The plaintiff brought suit 7 asserting that ADC’s failure to provide him with adequate notice and a hearing violated his 8 Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right. Id. at 1179. Although the court concluded that 9 the plaintiff did not have a protected liberty interest in continued participation in the Step- 10 Down Program, the court reiterated that he did have “a protected liberty interest in avoiding 11 a return to maximum custody.” Id. at 1197-98, 1201. Like the plaintiff in Johnson, Medina 12 has a protected liberty interest in avoiding a return to maximum custody from close 13 custody. Medina is therefore entitled to proper procedural protections before ADC may 14 deprive him of the interest. ii. Sufficiency of Process 15 Because placement in maximum security segregation units implicates a liberty 16 interest requiring due process protections, to satisfy the due process procedural 17 requirement, the government must provide prisoners with “written notice of the factual 18 basis for the placement” and “an opportunity to be heard” prior to transfer. Wilkinson, 545 19 U.S. at 225-27; see also Mendoza v. Shinn, 2023 WL 5951890 at *10 (D. Ariz. Sept. 13, 20 2023) (denying the ADC’s motion for summary judgment because inmate did not receive 21 notice and a hearing until one month after he was transferred to maximum security 22 custody); see also Padilla v. Shinn, 2023 WL 6539895, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2023) 23 (denying summary judgment because Plaintiff was “entitled to due process procedures 24 before he was moved to maximum custody” and it was “undisputed that Plaintiff did not 25 receive [a hearing] until after he commenced this litigation”). 26 Medina was transferred to the Browning Unit, maximum security custody, on 27 January 11, 2021. (Doc. 38 at ¶ 56). Medina did not receive a maximum custody placement 28 hearing before he was returned to maximum custody. (Doc. 1 at 8). ADC provided Medina 1 with notice and a hearing on January 14, 2021, three days after his placement in maximum 2 custody. (Doc. 38-1 at 67-70). 3 The first notice provided to Medina on January 14, 2021 was not constitutionally 4 sufficient to satisfy the due process procedures Medina was entitled to. A Notice of Hearing 5 form that states the prisoner is being transferred to maximum custody because he was “an 6 active validated security threat group inmate” is insufficient to apprise prisoner of the 7 reason for his reassignment. Johnson, 55 F.4th at 1200. Such notice does “not propose a 8 change in his status, only a continuation of his status.” Id. The Notice of Hearing provided 9 to Medina stated that the rationale for his transfer was that he was a validated STG inmate. 10 (Doc. 38-1 at 69.) The “Evidence relied on” section states only “STG.” Medina was not 11 given a meaningful notice of the reason for his transfer from close custody to maximum 12 custody so as to enable him to prepare a defense to the proposed transfer. 13 On March 8, 2021, Medina finally received sufficient notice and a second maximum 14 custody placement hearing. (Doc. 67 at 6.) However, like the January 14 notice and hearing, this occurred after Medina was transferred to maximum custody. (Id.) 15 Postdeprivation procedures may provide adequate due process for deprivations of 16 liberty in limited circumstances. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990) (“In 17 situations where a predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty 18 interest at sake . . . or where the State is truly unable to anticipate and prevent a random 19 deprivation of a liberty interest, postdeprivation remedies might satisfy due process”). But 20 here, the January 14, 2021 hearing, held three days after Medina was transferred to the 21 Browning unit, did not cure the due process violation because ADC did not provide Medina 22 with notice of the reason for transfer to maximum security custody. Johnson, 55 F.4th at 23 1201. The March 8, 2021 hearing did not cure the due process violation because two 24 months had passed. There is no evidence to suggest that providing Medina with a custody 25 redesignation hearing prior to his transfer was overly burdensome or unforeseeable. On 26 these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Medina did not receive the 27 constitutionally required due process before he was transferred to maximum custody. 28 // 1 IV. VIABILITY OF CLAIM 2 At screening, the Court found that Medina pled Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 3 official capacity claims against Defendant Shinn.2 (Doc. 7 at 5.) The Court concluded that 4 the claims arose from Shinn’s implementation of policies that denied procedural due 5 process to Medina, resulting in his placement in unconstitutional conditions of 6 confinement. (Id. at 3.) The Court dismissed Medina’s personal capacity claims as 7 superfluous. (Id.) A year later, in Johnson v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner 8 may state a due process claim against correctional employees in their individual capacities 9 for denying the prisoner notice of the factual basis for his transition to maximum custody 10 and an opportunity to present a rebuttal. 55 F.4th 1167, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022). Based on the 11 Ninth Circuit ruling, the Court will grant Medina’s request for declaratory relief under 12 Thornell’s official capacity and give Medina the opportunity to amend his complaint to 13 include personal capacity claims against the former defendants.3 14 Medina’s request for injunctive relief is unworkable and moot. His request is best understood as four separate requests: first, “immediate placement back in Phase 5 [of the 15 16

17 2 In the Summary Judgment Order, the Court substituted Defendant Thornell in place of Defendant Shinn due to Shinn’s retirement as ADC Director and Thornell’s appointment 18 as his successor. (Doc. 67 at 1.) The Court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim. (Doc. 19 67 at 13.)

20 3 A plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages against a state official sued in their official 21 capacity. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment protects states from being sued for damages in federal court). “A 22 suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but 23 … against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Id. A plaintiff may maintain a lawsuit against state officials in their official capacity for 24 prospective declaratory and injunctive relief because, under the doctrine set forth in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment “does not … bar actions for 25 prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities 26 for their alleged violations of federal law.” Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). Because Medina cannot recover damages as a matter 27 of law against Thornell in his official capacity, the Court will only consider injunctive and 28 declaratory relief. 1 Step-Down Program]”; second, immediate placement back in close custody; third, removal 2 of the label that Medina “pose[s] a threat to the safety, security, and orderly operation of 3 the institution”; and finally, that each prison official involved in the alleged wrongdoing 4 be terminated from their position. (Doc. 1 at 34.) According to the record, Medina 5 debriefed on September 10, 2021, and his debriefing was accepted by ADC on December 6 7, 2021. (Doc. 67 at 6.) The Step-Down Program and debriefing are “mutually exclusive” 7 according to ADC officials. (Doc. 37 at 7.) Since Medina has debriefed, he cannot be 8 returned to the Step-Down Program and his first injunctive request cannot be fulfilled by 9 the Court. (Id.) Regarding his second request, as per ADC policy in DO 806, Medina was 10 transferred from maximum custody to close custody after debriefing. (Doc. 38-1 at 27.) 11 Prisoners’ injunctive claims for relief regarding the facility where they are incarcerated 12 become moot when the prisoner is no longer subject to those conditions. Dilley v. Gunn, 13 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, Medina’s second request is moot because 14 he is no longer in maximum custody. In respect to his third and fourth requests regarding his security label and the termination of prison officials from their employment, the Court 15 cannot manage the administration of the prison in this way. Armstrong v. Brown, 768 F.3d 16 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a court may “provide guidance and set clear 17 objectives, but it may not attempt to micromanage prison administration”). It is not clear 18 what injunctive relief could be fashioned regarding Medina’s claim. Accordingly, 19 Medina’s claim for injunctive relief is dismissed. 20 Medina is entitled to declaratory relief under his official capacity claim against 21 Thornell. Medina requests that the court declare “that defendant’s acts, policies, and 22 practices described herein and complained of … violated [Medina’s] constitutional rights 23 and the U.S. const[titution]… by depriving [Medina] of [his] liberty interest and procedural 24 due process protections.” (Doc. 1 at 34.) Under Johnson, ADC violated Medina’s due 25 process protections by failing to provide him with notice and a hearing before transferring 26 him to maximum custody. 55 F.4th 1167, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022). 27 Medina cannot recover monetary or injunctive relief under his official capacity 28 claim against Thornell, but Medina is entitled to declaratory relief under the claim. || Additionally, Medina may now allege personal capacity claims against the Defendants. V. AMENDMENT 3 In the Screening Order, the Court stated that “Plaintiff's claims are properly 4 construed as brought against the Defendants in their official capacities only.” (Doc. 7 at 3.) > Considering the Court of Appeals’ decision in Johnson, Medina may be able to amend his 6 Complaint to state a claim against former Defendants for their individual participation in the violation of Medina’s due process rights. In Johnson, the Court of Appeals made clear 8 that individuals who were personally involved in the denial of due process may be liable in their individual capacities. Johnson, 55 F.4th 1167, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, 10 the Court will allow Medina to amend his Complaint solely to assert additional Fourteenth i Amendment due process claims against former Defendants who were personally involved 12 in the denial of due process. Medina must specifically allege each Defendant’s involvement 13 in the denial of due process. Aside from his existing official capacity claim and anticipated individual capacity Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, Medina may not raise any IS other claims in his amended complaint. 16 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Medina’s request for declaratory relief is granted. 18 IT IS ORDERED that within 30 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file 19 an Amended Complaint to assert Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against 20 former Defendants who were personally involved in the denial of due process and may be 71 liable in their individual capacities. 22 Dated this 26th day of August, 2024. 23 24 .

6 /, Jenn fer G. Zi United States District Judge 27 28

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