Medicraft v. State of Washington

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 5, 2022
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01263
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE

7 NO. 2:21-cv-1263 JAMES MEDICRAFT, et al., 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER ADOPTING PART AND REJECTING IN PART REPORT AND 9 v. RECOMMANDATION

10 STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants. 11 12

13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of U.S. 15 Magistrate Judge Michelle Peterson. Dkt. No. 87. The R&R recommends that the Court grant the 16 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Derek Leuzzi (“Leuzzi”) and Jane Doe Leuzzi 17 (collectively, “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 61. Having considered the briefs filed in support of and 18 opposition to the Motion to Dismiss; the Report and Recommendation; the Plaintiffs’ Objection 19 and Defendants’ Response thereto; and the remainder of the record and relevant case law, the 20 Court finds and rules as follows. 21 22 23

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25 2 Plaintiffs James and Shaylee Medicraft and their five children filed this lawsuit against the 3 State of Washington and numerous individual defendants, including Department of Children, 4 Youth, and Families (“DCYF”) social workers Tanessa Sanchez and Elizabeth Sterbick and, 5 relevant to the instant motion, Assistant Attorney General Derek Leuzzi, counsel for DCYF. 6 Among other things, Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 an infringement of their 7 constitutional right to the “care, custody, and control of their children,” arising from Defendants’ 8 alleged actions in connection with dependency proceedings concerning the five minor Medicraft 9 children. Sec. Am. Compl., (“SAC”), Dkt. No. 55, ¶ 1. Those proceedings began in early 2019 10 and culminated in the children being removed from their parents’ custody on December 6, 2019, 11 pursuant to an Order Placing Children in Shelter Care, issued by Judge Mafe Rajul, King County

12 Superior Court, Juvenile Department. See Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. BB at 164-167. 13 Plaintiffs have claimed that while in state custody, the children were subjected to abusive 14 treatment, including being forced to spend nights in DCYF vehicles and offices, held in locked 15 empty rooms, and exposed to assault by other children and DCYF agents. SAC ¶¶ 59, 65-66, 75, 16 83-84. On October 28, 2020, King County Superior Court Judge Susan Amini issued an Order 17 Dismissing Dependency, ordering that the children be returned to their parents. Compl., Ex. A. 18 The family is currently residing in South Carolina. SAC, ¶¶ 2 & 3. 19 Generally speaking, the allegations against Defendant Leuzzi are related to actions taken 20 in his role as counsel for DCYF in the Medicraft child dependency proceedings. More 21 specifically, the Court gleans from the Second Amended Complaint the following allegations

22 relevant to the instant motion. Defendant Leuzzi allegedly: (1) drafted and induced DCYF social 23

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25 2 to appear for a February 6, 2019 court appearance in New York State, SAC, ¶¶ 31-34; (2) filed a 3 sworn declaration falsely stating that Mrs. Medicraft “reportedly” has a history of drug and/or 4 alcohol abuse and/or mental health issues, and had been ordered by a court to undergo chemical 5 dependency treatment, id., ¶¶ 41-42; (3) “without basis” sought court orders to medicate the 6 children, id., ¶ 47; (4) misrepresented a history of domestic violence, id. ¶ 44; and (5) “without 7 basis, sought to deprive Mr. Medicraft of visitation rights.” Id. ¶ 45. The SAC contains other 8 vague and generalized allegations against Leuzzi, including that he “failed to follow the law, 9 working to remove the children without an imminent threat and without a court order,” and, 10 “acting in an investigative role, met with social workers to plan the removal of the children.” Id. ¶ 11 43, 35. Leuzzi is named in two causes of action: (1) for a deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. §

12 1983, id., Tenth Cause of Action, ¶¶ 220-30; and (2) for conspiracy to fabricate false information 13 about the Medicraft parents. Id., Twenty-third Cause of Action, ¶¶ 290-91. 14 The Leuzzi Defendants moved for dismissal of all claims against them, under Federal 15 Rule 12(b)(6), claiming that Leuzzi is entitled to the absolute immunity afforded prosecutors 16 under certain circumstances or, in the alternative, to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims. 17 Plaintiffs opposed the motion. The R&R recommends that the Court find that Leuzzi is entitled to 18 absolute immunity for all of the actions alleged in the SAC, and that he should be dismissed from 19 this case. Defendants filed Objections to the R&R; Plaintiffs filed a Response to those Objections. 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

22 On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed as a 23

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25 2 cognizable theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). In ruling 3 on the motion, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe the 4 complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cnty., 487 5 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). 6 Federal Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain only “a short and plain 7 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Supreme Court has 8 interpreted this rule to mean that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 9 above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The 10 allegations in the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 11 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

12 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 13 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 14 misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks 15 for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 16 U.S. at 556). 17 Well-pled allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true, but a court is not required to 18 accept legal conclusions couched as facts, unwarranted deductions, or unreasonable inferences. 19 See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 20 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). 21

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25 2 1. The Law of Absolute Immunity 3 Leuzzi argues that he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity in connection with all 4 of the conduct alleged in this lawsuit. At common law, the actions of judges, prosecutors, and 5 other officials that were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” 6 have been afforded absolute immunity from suit. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 7 Courts have extended the doctrine to attorneys acting on behalf of the state in certain civil 8 proceedings and to social workers, reasoning that “the initiation and pursuit of child-dependency 9 proceedings [are] prosecutorial in nature and warrant absolute immunity on that basis.” Miller v. 10 Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Torres v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046, 1051 11 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding absolute immunity may apply in civil forfeiture context, as Supreme

12 Court “has extended the reasoning of Imbler to agency officials ‘performing certain functions 13 analogous to those of a prosecutor’”) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978)). 14 Absolute immunity is available, however, only where the “‘activity or function’ ... was 15 part and parcel of presenting the state’s case as a generic advocate.” Cox v. Dept. of Soc. & Health 16 Servs., 913 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hardwick v. Cty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 17 1115 (9th Cir. 2017)). In particular, actions taken “during or to initiate [dependency] 18 proceedings” are protected by absolute immunity. See Chen v. D’Amico, 428 F. Supp. 3d 483, 502 19 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing Miller, 335 F.3d at 898) (noting that “the critical decision to institute 20 proceedings to make a child a ward of the state is functionally similar to the prosecutorial 21 institution of a criminal proceeding”); see also Zayas v. Walton, 2022 WL 1468997, at *4 (W.D.

22 Wash. May 10, 2022) (“An assistant attorney general acting as legal counsel for the Department 23

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25 2 functions and is entitled to immunity for actions in connection with initiating and pursuing child 3 dependency proceedings.”) (citing Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 4 504 (3d Cir. 1997) (attorney representing a state child services agency is “entitled to absolute 5 immunity for all of [the attorney’s] quasi prosecutorial activities while representing [the agency] 6 in connection with [a child’s] dependency proceedings[.]”). 7 It follows, therefore, that in determining whether absolute immunity applies, courts are to 8 focus on the “activities” of which the defendant is accused, and on “the nature of the function 9 performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004 10 (2001) (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)). Thus, “a prosecutor is entitled to 11 absolute immunity for acts taken “in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for

12 trial, and which occur in his role as an advocate for the State.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126. Those 13 same officials are not entitled to absolute immunity, however, “when they perform investigatory 14 or administrative functions, or are essentially functioning as police officers or detectives.” Waggy 15 v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 710–11 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 16 “In determining immunity, we accept the allegations of respondent’s complaint as true,” 17 and “[t]he burden is on the official claiming absolute immunity to identify the common-law 18 counterpart to the function that the official asserts is shielded by absolute immunity.” Kalina, 522 19 U.S. at 122 (citation omitted); Miller, 335 F.3d at 897 (citing Antoine, 508 U.S. at 432). “The 20 presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government 21 officials in the exercise of their duties.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 n. 4

22 (1993). 23

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25 Actions 2 As indicated above, courts should determine whether immunity applies to each alleged 3 action giving rise to a plaintiff’s claims. Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1008. The Court accordingly 4 analyzes each of Plaintiffs’ allegations related to Leuzzi individually, as follows. 5 a. October 28, 2019 Declaration (SAC ¶¶ 41-42) 6 In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege, “Defendant Leuzzi filed a 7 declaration on October 28, 2019, testifying that Mrs. Medicraft has a history of drug and/or 8 alcohol abuse and/or mental health issues,” and “further testified that Mrs. Medicraft had been 9 ordered by a court to undergo chemical dependency treatment.” SAC ¶¶ 41-42. The declaration 10 was submitted as part of the State’s Motion for Order Authorizing Release of Mrs. Medicraft’s 11 health records, filed several weeks prior to the dependency proceedings. Plaintiffs claim that 12 “Leuzzi had no truthful basis for making this sworn statement.” Id.1 13 The Court concludes that Leuzzi is entitled to absolute immunity from liability related to 14 these alleged actions. The Supreme Court has “held that absolute immunity applied to a 15 prosecutor’s ‘appearance in court in support of an application for a search warrant and the 16 presentation of evidence at that hearing.’” Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1009 (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 17 U.S. 478, 492 (1991)). The Court reasoned that “[t]he immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the 18 19 1 The R&R recommends dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims based on these allegations, essentially concluding that the 20 allegations are insufficient under Federal Rule 8 and Iqbal. R&R at 8 (“Plaintiffs’ allegations that AAG Leuzzi submitted a false declaration or testimony are devoid of any further factual detail demonstrating the plausibility of 21 such claims—especially in light of Plaintiffs’ submission of other DCYF representative declarations utilized in the dependency proceeding with their pleadings.”). As noted above, however, “[i]n determining immunity, we accept the allegations of respondent’s complaint as true.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 122. Plaintiffs have provided the exact date of 22 the alleged declaration and a fairly specific description of the subject matter of the allegedly false testimony. This “short and plain statement” is sufficient to support a plausible inference under Iqbal and Federal Rule 8 that Leuzzi 23 performed the actions of which he is accused.

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25 2 their duties: to protect the judicial process.” Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1007 (citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 3 485). This reasoning applies to the sworn “declaration” at issue here. 4 While Leuzzi signed the statements “under penalty of perjury,” the “declaration” is 5 actually embedded within the State’s motion, and a closer reading of the declaration reveals that it 6 is in essence a “presentation of evidence,” entitled to absolute immunity under Burns and its 7 progeny. The statements Leuzzi made are not those of a fact witness, but of an attorney 8 “preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial . . . in the course of his role as an 9 advocate for the State.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126. As the declaration states, “[w]ithout complete 10 information regarding the status of the mother’s participation, compliance, progress in treatment 11 and prognosis, the court will not have sufficient information on which to address the issues before

12 it in the upcoming dependency trial.” Oct. 28, 2019 Mot. and Decl. for Order, Decl. of Nathan 13 Arnold, Ex. B at 2-3. 14 The equivocal language of the declaration further supports the conclusion that Leuzzi’s 15 statements are not his own, as a fact witness’s would be, but are those of the State. For example, 16 the declaration states “Shaylee Medicraft has reportedly received medical/mental health and 17 chemical dependency treatment from Therapeutic Health Services . . . The above-mentioned 18 institution(s) may have possession, custody and control of the records, filed, and documents 19 pertaining to Shaylee Medicraft. . . Shaylee Medicraft may have been previously ordered to sign 20 release to the Department for this information.” Id. (emphases added); compare Waggy v. 21 Spokane Cty., 594 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 2010) (“a prosecutor sheds absolute immunity when

22 she acts as a ‘complaining witness’ by certifying that the facts alleged within an affidavit are 23

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25 2 Accordingly, Leuzzi’s statements are distinguishable from the true fact testimony of 3 declarations in which a prosecutor “personally vouched for the truth of the facts set forth in the 4 certification under penalty of perjury,” for which courts have denied absolute immunity. Kalina, 5 522 U.S. at 121, 130; see also Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 844–45 (9th Cir. 6 2016) (“[T]he district court erred in concluding that [district attorney defendant] is entitled to 7 absolute immunity for presenting a false statement in a declaration supporting her application for 8 the subpoena duces tecum” where “declaration states particular facts under penalty of perjury.”). 9 To deny Leuzzi immunity for his statements because they were placed in the format of a 10 declaration—when the same statements, had they been contained within the motion itself, would 11 clearly enjoy absolute immunity—would be elevating form over substance. Where, as here, the

12 statements made are so “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the [] process,” they give 13 rise to absolute immunity. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. 14 b. Sterbick and Sanchez Declarations 15 Plaintiffs have alleged that Leuzzi “intentionally fabricated” certain “false sworn 16 statements” in declarations signed by other Defendants in this case, and submitted those 17 declarations to the court in the dependency proceedings. SAC, ¶ 34; see generally SAC, ¶¶ 22-34. 18 The declarations in question include that of Elizabeth Sterbick, a DCYF social worker who, 19 Plaintiffs claim, “signed a declaration which Mr. Leuzzi wrote for her, opining in support of the 20 removal petition [Leuzzi] filed, that the children ‘are no longer safe in the care of their mother and 21 require emergent and immediate removal.’” Pls.’ Resp. at 11 (citing Dkt. No. 1-1 at 156, 221–23,

22 256). The Court is also able to discern, though Plaintiffs provide less detail, a claim that Leuzzi 23

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25 2 social worker, Tanessa Sanchez. See Sanchez Decl., Dkt. No. 1-1, 158-62. Leuzzi argues that he 3 is entitled to absolute immunity for claims made in connection with these declarations. 4 The Court agrees. As Plaintiffs themselves aver, the Sterbick and Sanchez declarations 5 were filed “in support of the removal petition,” inarguably initiating a court proceeding. See SAC, 6 ¶¶ 22-34 (“The Department used false sworn statements under penalty of perjury in court 7 proceedings to justify taking and/or keeping the children from their home.”). These declarations 8 consequently fall squarely within the category of actions that are protected by an absolute 9 immunity. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 896 (“[T]he initiation and pursuit of child-dependency 10 proceedings [are] prosecutorial in nature and warrant[] absolute immunity on that basis.”) (citing 11 Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dept. Soc. Srvs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.1987)). The Supreme

12 Court has expressly acknowledged the “absolute immunity of prosecutors and other attorneys for 13 eliciting false or defamatory testimony from witnesses or for making false or defamatory 14 statements during, and related to, judicial proceedings.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 15 270 (1993) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1991)). Thus even assuming as true 16 Plaintiffs’ allegation that these declarations contained “willfully fabricated evidence,” Leuzzi 17 cannot be held liable for claims made in connection with them. 18 The allegedly fabricated testimony in the Sterbick and Sanchez declarations is 19 distinguishable from that in Milstein, in which the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant 20 prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity for a declaration that allegedly contained 21 “knowingly obtained false statements.” Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011. The defendant in Milstein

22 created that declaration before the institution of judicial proceedings, and was therefore acting in 23

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25 2 the grand jury was empaneled, before Milstein was arrested, and it must necessarily have occurred 3 before the existence of probable cause.”) (citations omitted). Here, the declarations were not used 4 in the course of an investigation, but were submitted to the King County Superior Court, Juvenile 5 Department under the caption “In Re Dependency Of” the five Medicraft children, in the course 6 of the judicial proceedings. Leuzzi is therefore entitled to absolute immunity from, and dismissal 7 of, any claims based upon his efforts in preparing and submitting these two declarations. 8 c. Remaining Allegations, Including that Leuzzi: (1) Misrepresented a History of Domestic Violence; (2) Made Attempts to Revoke Mr. Medicraft’s Visitation Rights; and (3) Sought 9 Court Orders to Medicate the Children

10 Plaintiffs also allege that AAG Leuzzi “misrepresented a history of domestic violence,” 11 “sought to deprive Mr. Medicraft of visitation rights,” and “sought court orders to medicate the 12 Children.” SAC ¶¶ 44, 45, 47. Plaintiffs make several other vague allegations against Leuzzi, 13 claiming that he, “acting in an investigative role, met with social workers to plan the removal of 14 the children,” and that he “failed to follow the law, working to remove the children without an 15 imminent threat and without a court order.” Id., ¶¶ 35, 43. Neither Plaintiffs nor Leuzzi has 16 provided the Court with additional facts or evidence (other than what the Court has already 17 discussed, above) in support of any these allegations, or in support of Leuzzi’s claim to immunity 18 from liability based upon them. 19 This makes difficult any meaningful analysis of Leuzzi’s entitlement to absolute 20 immunity, which as noted is based not on the title or even the role of the defendant claiming the 21 protection, but on the nature and context of the actions forming the basis of the claims against 22 him. In the absence of any details that would help the Court discern under what circumstances 23

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25 2 Medicraft’s visitation rights or medicate the children, the Court cannot determine whether or not 3 he is entitled to absolute immunity. Following the procedure approved by the Ninth Circuit in 4 Miller v. Gammie, therefore, the Court defers a ruling on whether Leuzzi is entitled to absolute 5 immunity for these alleged actions “until the nature of the functions the defendant[] allegedly 6 performed [is] sufficiently outlined to permit the court to apply” the law concerning the absolute 7 immunity doctrine. 335 F.3d at 899. Defendants may refile a motion for dismissal (under Federal 8 Rules 12(b)(6) or 56, as they deem applicable) if and when they obtain in discovery sufficient 9 grounds to do so. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts in part the Report and Recommendation of

12 Magistrate Judge Peterson as follows: 13 (1) Defendant Leuzzi is absolutely immune from liability related to his alleged actions in 14 connection with the drafting and submission of the October 28, 2019 declaration, and absolutely 15 immune from liability related to the Sterbick and Sanchez declarations, and claims based on these 16 alleged actions are dismissed; 17 (2) the Court defers ruling on the question of Leuzzi’s absolute immunity from liability 18 based on the remainder of the allegations against him in the Second Amended Complaint, until 19 the actions he is alleged to have committed and grounds for claiming immunity are “sufficiently 20 outlined” to allow the Court to determine whether such actions are protected by absolute 21 immunity.

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25 2 A 3 4 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein U.S. District Court Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION