MD Residential I, LLC v. First Mercury Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 23, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-21517
StatusUnknown

This text of MD Residential I, LLC v. First Mercury Insurance Company (MD Residential I, LLC v. First Mercury Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MD Residential I, LLC v. First Mercury Insurance Company, (S.D. Fla. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-21517-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

MD RESIDENTIAL I, LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FIRST MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants. ________________________________________/

ORDER REMANDING CASE THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a sua sponte review of the record. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case, it must be remanded to the state court. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) and McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-183 (1936)). “Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Herskowitz v. Reid, 187 F. App’x 911, 912-13 (11th Cir. 2006) (A “district court may act sua sponte to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.”). When performing this inquiry, “all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Yusefzadeh v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 365 F.3d 1244, 1245 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Burns v Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994)). “The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court’s competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the parties. Otherwise,

a party could work a wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction and give courts power the Congress denied them.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410 (quoting Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000-01 (11th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, “once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.” Id. Defendant Gemini Insurance Company (“Gemini”) filed a Notice of Removal, ECF No. [1] (“Notice”), on May 17, 2022. The Notice is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, seeking removal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, of an action filed in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida entitled MD Residential I, LLC v. First Mercury Insurance Company, Case No. 2021-018991-CA-01. Defendants First Mercury Insurance

Company (“First Mercury”) and United Specialty Insurance Company (“USIC”) consented to removal. See id. at 7. On August 22, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Two Plaintiffs, to Drop Two Defendants, and to Add Two Policies at Issue, ECF No. [35] (“Motion for Leave”). In pertinent part, the Motion for Leave sought to add as plaintiffs, MD Parking I, LLC (“MDPI”) and MD Parking II, LLC (“MDPII”) (together, “MDP Plaintiffs”), to drop Gemini and First Mercury as defendants, and to assert claims for relief with respect to two additional insurance policies. See id.; ECF No. [35-1]. Defendants did not oppose Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave. Upon review, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request, and directed Plaintiffs to separately re-file the Amended Complaint. See ECF No. [36]. “As a general matter, an amended pleading supersedes the former pleading; the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader’s averments against

his adversary.” Pintando v. Miami-Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dresdner Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG in Hamburg v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted)). Indeed, “when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 167 (2007). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, but do not allege a specific basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. The Amended Complaint asserts that “the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest, costs and attorneys’ fees, within the jurisdictional limits of this Court.” ECF No. [39] ¶ 4. As such, the Court assumes that Plaintiffs are relying on the Court’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. With regard to diversity jurisdiction,

“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). With respect to the citizenships of the parties, the Amended Complaint alleges that “MDI, MDIII, MDIV, MDPI, and MDPII (the “Insureds”) are Florida limited liability companies with their principal places of business located in Miami- Dade County, FL.” ECF No. [39] ¶ 2. The Amended Complaint further alleges that “USIC is a foreign profit corporation with its principal place of business located in Texas.” Id. ¶ 3. These allegations, however, are insufficient to properly allege the citizenships of the Insureds, such that the Court may conclude that there is complete diversity in this case. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) (subject matter jurisdiction exists only where there is complete diversity; all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants), abrogated on other grounds by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).

As the Eleventh Circuit has held on numerous occasions, “[f]or the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction, a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen.” Flintlock Constr. Servs. v. Well-Come Holdings, LLC, 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hertz Corp. v. Friend
559 U.S. 77 (Supreme Court, 2010)
University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co.
168 F.3d 405 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
292 F.3d 1334 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Yusefzadeh v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP
365 F.3d 1244 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C.
374 F.3d 1020 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager
463 F.3d 1210 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Pintando v. Miami-Dade Housing Agency
501 F.3d 1241 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
298 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1936)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Rockwell International Corp. v. United States
549 U.S. 457 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Jacqueline Burns v. Windsor Insurance Co.
31 F.3d 1092 (Eleventh Circuit, 1994)
Herskowitz v. Reid
187 F. App'x 911 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
MD Residential I, LLC v. First Mercury Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/md-residential-i-llc-v-first-mercury-insurance-company-flsd-2022.