McVeigh v. International Travelers Assur. Co.

101 S.W.2d 644
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 12, 1936
DocketNo. 12069
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 101 S.W.2d 644 (McVeigh v. International Travelers Assur. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McVeigh v. International Travelers Assur. Co., 101 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinions

LOONEY, Justice.

Mrs. Bessie McVeigh, widow of Townsend A. McVeigh, sued the International Travelers Assurance Company to recover on an accident policy insuring the deceased, alleging, among other things: “That heretofore, towit, on or about the 17th day of April, 1932, the said Townsend A. McVeigh met with an accident, in that he accidentally fell in the bathroom of his home in the City of Dallas, Texas, as hereinafter [645]*645more fully alleged, whereby he sustained serious injuries to his abdomen, the organs of the abdominal cavity and to his spine, which injuries within ninety days of said accident, to wit, on or about the 4th day of May, 1932, resulted fatally to the said Townsend A. McVeigh directly, independently and exclusively of all other causes. ■ * * ⅜ that on or about Sunday night, April 17th, 1932, while at his said home, taking a shower bath in the bath tub and while standing in the bath tub the said Townsend McVeigh, now deceased, accidentally slipped and fell from the bath tub with great force and violence backward to the tile floor below, striking the floor with his head, back and abdomen and did then and there injure and rupture his appendix, severely damaging,, aggravating and injuring his appendix, causing the same to rupture and burst, which in turn produced a condition in the said Townsend A. McVeigh's body, known as peritonitis; that plaintiff was in another room in said house, and, hearing the impact of said fall rushed to her husband’s assistance and found him on the bath room floor in a helpless position, unable to rise; that plaintiff’s said husband did then and there immediately suffer pain in his back, side and abdomen; that he refused to eat, and suffered continuous pain until the following Wednesday, April 20, 1932, when he was taken violently ill; that he was immediately taken to a hospital where he was operated upon on said date for traumatic appendicitis from the natural effects of which he died on May 4, 1932, and which was the direct and natural cause of his death.”

The policy was alleged to have been executed by defendant, International Travelers Assurance Company, was attached to plaintiff’s petition as an exhibit, but purportedly was executed by International Travelers Association; however, no plea of non est factum was filed by the defendant. The insuring clause of the policy is against “loss resulting from bodily injuries effected directly, independently and exclusively, of all other causes through accidental means.” At the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence, defendant moved for a peremptory instruction, which was granted, judgment thereon was entered that plaintiff take nothing, from which she appealed.

The first question presented is this: Was there a fatal variance, between allegation and proof? The policy alleged to have been executed by the defendant, attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s petition, and introduced in evidence, without objection, purportedly was executed, not by defendant, International ' Travelers Assurance Company, but by the International Travelers Association.

The doctrine seems to be well settled that, in the absence of a plea of non est factum, an instrument upon which a pleading is based, alleged to have been executed by the party sought to be held, is admissible in evidence without proof of its execution, and is binding on such party, although upon its face the instrument purports to have been executed by another. See Bradford v. Taylor, 61 Tex. 508; City Water Works v. White, 61 Tex. 536, 539; Harris v. Wheeler (Tex.Civ.App.) 255 S.W. 206, 209; Thomason v. Berry (Tex.Com.App.) 276 S.W. 185, 186.

In City Water Works v. White, supra, speaking for the Supreme Court, Judge Stayton said: “That the instrument is ambiguous, and does not clearly purport to be the act of the defendant, does not render it any the less an ‘instrument in writing upon which any pleading is founded in whole or in part, and charged to have been executed by him (the defendant) or by his authority.’ In a number of cases in which the instrument on its face did not clearly appear to be the act of the person who sought to show that it was not executed by him or by his authority, it has been held that the person setting up such defense must do so by an answer verified by his affidavit. Drew v. Harrison, 12 Tex. [279] 280; Reid v. Reid, 11 Tex. [585] 591; Persons v. Frost & Co., 25 Tex. Supp. [129] 130; Prince v. Thompson, 21 Tex. 480; Sessums v. Henry, 38 Tex. [37] 41; Ferguson v. Wood, 23 Tex. 177; Lewis v. Lowery, 31 Tex. 663; May v. Pollard, 28 Tex. [677] 678. If the statute in terms referred only to such instruments as on their face purport to be the act of the person by whom or by whose authority such instruments are alleged to have been executed, then a different rule might be applied. * * * It may be that the statute which requires the plea by which the execution of an instrument sued on is put in issue to be verified by affidavit, in reason ought to apply only to such instruments as on their face clearly import to be the act of the party; but this was a matter for the consideration of the legislature, and not for the judiciary.”

As .the policy sued upon was attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s petition, [646]*646we do not think a variance between allegation and proof could exist. Longley v. Caruthers, 64 Tex. 287, 288; Varn v. Arnold Hat Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 124 S.W. 693, 694; Abilene, etc., Co. v. Southwestern, etc., Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 185 S.W. 356, 362; Freiberg, etc., v. Magale, 70 Tex. 116, 7 S.W. 684; Beham v. Ghio, 75 Tex. 87, 12 S.W. 996.

In Longley v. Caruthers, supra, Chief Justice Willie, speaking for the Supreme Court, said: “The instrument sued on having been attached to the petition as an exhibit, there could be no variance between the allegation and the proof when it was offered in evidence. ‘This is upon the ground that the instrument thus made a part of the petition, and filed with it for the inspection of the defendant, must control and cure any misdescription of it in the body of the petition.’ Pyron v. Grinder, 25 Tex.Supp. 159; Spencer v. McCarty, 46 Tex. 213.”

However, because of admissions in its pleading, the defendant is in no position to deny that the policy sued upon is its contract. In a special plea seeking to avoid the payment of attorney fees, defendant alleged that, while the policy was issued by the International Travelers Association, defendant had reinsured the risk “assumed and bound itself to pay and discharge all liability of the International Travelers Association under the policy attempted to be sued upon, and/or any other policy written by the International Travelers Association.”

Early in our judicial history the doctrine was announced, and has persisted, that, “If one party expressly avers or confesses a material fact omitted on the other side, the omission is cured. It may thus be made to appear from the pleadings on both sides that the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment, although his own pleading, taken by itself, is insufficient. Hence, it may be seen that, although the plaintiff committed the first fault, the defendant has remedied it, and cannot now complain. See Hill v, George, 5 Tex. [87] 89, 90.” To the same effect see Grimes v. Hagood, 19 Tex. 246, 247; Bosse v. Cadwallader, 86 Tex. 336, 24 S.W. 798; Willson v. Crawford, 61 Tex.Civ.App. 580, 130 S.W. 227, 230; Chapman v. Mooney (Tex.Civ.App.) 257 S.W. 1106, 1108; Wyatt & Wingo v. White (Tex.Com.App.) 228 S.W. 154, 156; Amsler v. Cavitt (Tex.Civ.App.) 271 S.W. 139, 140; Lafield v. Maryland Casualty Co., 119 Tex. 466, 33 S.W.(2d) 187, 188; Caulk v. Anderson, 120 Tex. 253, 37 S.W.(2d) 1008.

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101 S.W.2d 644, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcveigh-v-international-travelers-assur-co-texapp-1936.