Langford v. El Paso Baking Co.

1 S.W.2d 476
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 8, 1927
DocketNo. 2092.
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 1 S.W.2d 476 (Langford v. El Paso Baking Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Langford v. El Paso Baking Co., 1 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Ct. App. 1927).

Opinion

HIGGINS, J.

This is an action by Lang-ford against the El Paso Baking Company to recover damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by appellant in a collision on Texas street in El Paso, Tex., between a Eord car driven by appellant and a Hudson sedan owned by E. R. Cole, manager of ap-pellee, and driven by Dale Jackson, an employee of appellee. At the close of the evidence a peremptory charge in the defendant’s favor was given. This is the only error assigned.

The collision occurred about 5:15 p. m. December 24, 1926. Plaintiff was operating a filling station on the south side of Texas street on the northeast corner of the block, at the intersection of Texas and Palm streets. He drove his car out of the filling station on the west side thereof, going directly or diagonally to the north side of Texas, intending to go west upon Texas street. Just as he reached the north side of Texas street and his car facing west, it was struck on its south side by the Hudson sedan driven by Jackson, going east. It was alleged _thafc Jackson, in violation of law,- was driving 40 miles an hour and upon the left side of the street, which caused the injuries. Defendant denied that Jackson, at the time, was acting in the scope of his employment or in furtherance of its business. It also pleaded contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff in entering Texas street from the south and crossing directly to the north side of the street instead of going east to the intersection of Palm street and there turning north and thence west, as the ordinances of the city required him to do when he entered Texas street at the point he did, intending to go west.

The evidence sustains the allegations of negligence pleaded by plaintiff and that same proximately caused the injury. It also shows that plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se in violating the ordinances of the city above referred to, but it is questionable whether such negligence on his part can be held, as a matter of law, to have been a concurring proximate cause of the injury. It is unnecessary to consider this phase of the case, for we are of the opinion the peremptory charge was properly given, for the reason that in the state of the evidence reasonable minds cannot differ in the conclusion that, at the time of the collision, Dale Jackson was not acting in the scope of his employment by the defendant nor in furtherance of its business.

Defendant ws engaged in baking bread in El Paso, its bread being known as “Merit bread.” It did not sell at retail except stale bread, which it would sell to those who called for same at its place of business. The only deliveries it made was of its fresh bread in wholesale lots.

E. R. Cole, defendant’s manager, testified:

“I remember the occasion of the accident out here on Texas street in December. Dale Jackson was employed by the El Paso Baking Company at that time. There was no transaction at that time with reference to taking bread anywhere for the bakery. Dale Jackson come in and asked to borrow one of the roadsters or cars to take some bread home for one of the ladies in the office, and some Christmas packages, and I refused it. Miss Dowell was *477 working foil the baking company at that time, and so was Dale Jackson. Miss Dowell had bought some stale bread and some fresh bread from the company. She had been in the habit of buying stale bread from the company, and used it to feed a dog and cat. On this evening we are speaking of, she had, as previously, bought some of this stale bread. Onr company never makes deliveries of stale bread. Miss Dowell had bought the bread and paid for it, the transaction was closed, and we were through with it. Something was said by Dale Jackson about using one of the company wagons to make a delivery to her. I judge Dale had been working for the company about four months at that time; he was shipping clerk. He checks bread out to the drivers and puts up all country shipments. The only deliveries he makes are to the post office and express company early in the morning. His duties consist of checking bread and making deliveries to the express office and post office. Dale was not on duty and working at the particular time of this transaction. Dale asked me for permission to use one of the trucks to take the bread and packages for Miss Dowell to her home, and I refused to let him use the company equipment, and told him, if he had to go out, to use my personal car. That was an independent transaction on behalf of Dale Jackson and Miss Dowell. I just told him he could use my car if he wanted to take it out. That was the sum and substance of the transaction with reference to delivering the bread. Dale Jackson was not representing me in delivering the bread, and I had no interest in the delivery of it. I gave him no directions or instructions with reference to the delivery. In about ten minutes I got a telephone call from Dale. He said, T have wrecked your car.’ I then jumped in the roadster I had there and went to 2228 East Texas, where I found my car wrecked and Mr. Langford’s. I arrived there just as the police stopped. I had my sales manager with me, and Dale was piekingi up bread and putting on the running board. I went to see if he was hurt; he was scared to death, that is all, and I took him to Mr. Lang-ford’s filling station. Mr. Langford was sitting in a chair, something like he is now, leaning back, with a cut over his right eye. I asked him how bad he was hurt. He said he didn’t know; he was seared pretty bad. I said, “Let me call a doctor;’ he says ‘No; I don’t need a doctor;’ I said, ‘Well, you better have a doctor, you may be hurt worse than you think;’ he says ‘I am not hurt but a cut over my eye; I don’t need a doctor.’ I stood around to see if I could get witnesses that seen the accident. I only found one; no one else had seen it. I got that boy’s name and address, and went and talked to the police, and we made an examination; then I went back to the plant. * * *

“Dale Jackson was not performing any business for the baking company in taking my Hudson automobile to deliver this stale bread. Dale’s hours for work at the bakery were different hours, different nights. Last Christmas Eve I believe Dale came to work about 10 o’clock p. m. Friday night, and was off at noon Saturday. Saturday was the 24th of December, 1926. He worked two shifts that night, part of one and the whole of another. He was off at 12 o’clock the next morning. He just come in about 4 o’clock that afternoon, I believe it was Christmas Eve, and there was several of the boys there. During Saturday evening lots of them come by there that don’t have anywhere to go. His folks weren’t here, and he usually come over and talked with salesmen or something. He was not on duty at that time, and was not working for the bakery company at that time. He had been home all afternoon. For making deliveries, the baking company has two three-quarter ton Whites, and seven one-ton Fords, one three-quarter ton Ford light delivery, and one Ford roadster. All those are company cars, and are used for delivering bread. We do not sell bread retail, only stale bread, and we do not make any deliveries to private individuals. Our company does a wholesale business, and we sell to groceries and restaurants. At the time Dale Jackson asked me for the use of a company truck, there were two trucks, light delivery, and the Ford roadster there, and I refused him permission to use one of the company trucks. My reason for doing so was because we don’t use company trucks for personal business.

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