McNamara v. Central Marine Service, Inc.

507 So. 2d 207
Supreme Court of Louisiana·Decided May 18, 1987·No. 87-C-0030·Published·Cited by 37 cases

Opinion

507 So.2d 207 (1987)

Shirley McNAMARA, Secretary of the Department of Revenue and Taxation, State of Louisiana
v.
CENTRAL MARINE SERVICE, INC.

No. 87-C-0030.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 18, 1987.
Rehearing Denied June 18, 1987.

*208 Marlon V. Harrison, Baton Rouge, for applicant.

Robert Casey, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegré, Baton Rouge, for respondent.

CALOGERO, Justice.

Pertinent to this case, the Louisiana Sales and Use Tax Statute[1] exempted "materials, equipment and machinery which enter into and become component parts of ships, vessels, including commercial fishing vessels, or barges, of fifty tons load displacement and over, built in Louisiana" and "the gross proceeds from the sale of such ships, vessels, or barges when sold by the builder thereof."[2] The issue here is whether this exemption applies to materials, equipment and machinery which do not enter into and become component parts during construction of the vessels, but rather which replace original components of vessels and barges of the requisite size, owned and operated in intrastate commerce by defendant-respondent Central Marine Service, Inc.

The Louisiana Department of Revenue and Taxation filed suit for sales taxes (plus statutory and legal interest) on transactions occurring between January 1, 1975 and November 30, 1977.[3] The trial court ruled that Central Marine was not entitled to an exemption from the sales tax. The court of appeal reversed, ruling that these transactions come within the exemption provided by La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 47:305.1(A) (West 1970 & Supp.1987). McNamara v. Central Marine Service, Inc., 498 So.2d 783 (La.App.1986). The Department applied for a writ of review, which this Court granted. 501 So.2d 764 (1987). We reverse.

For the reasons discussed below, we determine that the exemption applies only to the materials, equipment, and machinery which enter into and become component parts during construction of ships, vessels, and barges of the requisite size. Thus, Central Marine is not entitled to exemption from the sales tax on materials, equipment and machinery which replace original components of its vessels and barges.

La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 47:302 and 47:321 (West 1970 & Supp.1987) impose a tax of three percent "upon the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage for use or consumption in this state, of each item or article of tangible personal property." The statute defines tangible personal property as "personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched, or is in any other manner perceptible to the senses." Id. 47:301(16). Thus, the replacement parts in this case would be subject to the tax unless section 305.1(A) exempts such transactions.

In interpreting the sales tax statute, we start with the premise that a statute which imposes a tax should be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Cocreham, 317 So.2d 605, 610 (La.1975). However, this case involves an exemption from taxation, and exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer. Exemptions are an exceptional privilege which must be expressly and clearly conferred in plain terms. Vulcan Foundry, Inc. v. McNamara, 414 So.2d 1193, 1197 (La.1982); Ethyl Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 351 So.2d 1290, 1293 (La.App.1977), writ denied, 353 So.2d 1035 (La.1978) (citing Mattingly v. Vial, 193 La. 1, 190 So. 313 (1939) and Meyers v. Flournoy, 209 La. 812, 25 So.2d 601, 603 (1946)).

*209 In this case we must determine the intent of the Legislature and the scope of the exemption granted by La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 47:305.1(A). "The universal and most effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when its expressions are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which induced the Legislature to enact it." La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 18 (West 1952). Section 305.1 was added to the Louisiana Sales and Use Tax Statute by 1959 La.Acts No. 51. The exemption was created to relieve Louisiana shipyards of a competitive disadvantage with shipyards in neighboring states. We must keep in mind the general purpose and object of the law and give the statute a reasonable interpretation that will effect that purpose. J.M. Brown Construction Co. v. D & M Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 275 So.2d 401 (La.1973).

Central Marine argues that the language of section 305.1(A) clearly confers an exemption upon the transactions at issue in this case.[4] It argues that on its face the statute exempts "sales of materials, equipment and machinery which enter into and become component parts of ships, vessels,... or barges," that this language does not limit the exemption to "original" component parts of such vessels. That argument relies upon a narrow focus on the language of the statute. The meaning of a statutory provision is to be determined by looking at the statute in its entirety. Tri-Parish Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Eunice, 343 So.2d 1121, 1123 (La.App.), writ denied, 346 So.2d 206 (La.1977); Legros v. Conner, 212 So.2d 177, 180 (La.App.1968). Furthermore, in interpreting different sections of the Revised Statutes, the court "must give effect to each statutory provision within its proper scope, reconciling ... the various statutory sections as being simultaneous expressions of the legislative will." Bryant v. Long, 180 So.2d 22, 26 (La.App. 1965) (citing Hall v. Rosteet, 247 La. 45, 169 So.2d 903 (La.1964)). Consequently, we must look at more than simply the first phrase of section 305.1(A) in resolving the issue in this case.

The other portion of section 305.1(A) which is relevant to the proper interpretation of the exemption is the following: The exemption applies to "materials, equipment and machinery which enter into and become component parts of ships, vessels, ... or barges, ... built in Louisiana."[5] And those words "built in Louisiana" in section 305.1(A) are immediately succeeded by the exemption for the "gross proceeds from the sales of such ships when sold by the builder" thereof, the use of these words such and builder tying the latter exemption to vessels built in Louisiana. This language suggests that subsection A is directed to component parts on newly built vessels.

*210 Also, there was an independent provision, section 305.1(C),[6] passed as part of the very act creating the exemption pertinent to this case (Act No. 51 of 1959), wherein it was stated that "[t]he provisions of [section 305.1] do not apply to drilling equipment ... unless such equipment is built for exclusive use outside of the state." (Emphasis added.) The exception in subsection C to the exemptions in subsections A and B thus refers to equipment built for certain use, lending further support to the inference that section 305.1 in its entirety was meant to apply to the construction of vessels.

Furthermore, when the Louisiana Legislature passed House Concurrent Resolution No. 233[7]

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McNamara v. Central Marine Service, Inc., 507 So. 2d 207 (La. 1987).

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