CALLISTER, Justice.
This is an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Appellants appeal from a verdict of “no cause of action” and contend that the lower court erred in its instructions to the jury.
Appellants are the driver and occupants of a passenger car. The respondents are the drivers and owners of two semi-trailer trucks.
The accident happened about 1:45 a. m. on the morning of December 15, 1956, on a straight stretch of U. S. Highway 40 and SO near the Salt Lake and Tooele County boundary. The highway at that point runs in a northeasterly direction, it is approximately 33 feet wide, hard surfaced and has almost no shoulder. The weather was clear and the road was dry. Prior to the accident three large trailer-trucks were parked along this highway facing east toward Salt Lake City and spaced approximately 150 feet from each other. Unit No. 1 had developed lighting difficulties and had stopped at the side of the highway to make repairs. Unit No. 2, driven by respondent Alvin Underwood and owned by respondent Joseph Johnson, passed Unit No. 1, observed its difficulty, parked about 150 feet ahead and the driver returned to give assistance. Unit No. 2 was parked with all four wheels on the highway, allegedly with all of its lights off. While repairs were being made, Unit No. 3, also a large semitrailer truck, drove by Units Nos. 1 and 2 and parked from 100 to 175 feet ahead of Unit No. 2 facing eastward with all wheels on the pavement and all of its lights on. Unit No. 3 was driven by respondent H. E. Woolf and was owned by respondent North American Van Lines.
While the trucks were thus parked appellant William Whittaker, driving a Nash automobile carrying the other appellants as passengers, passed Unit No. 1 and then observed Unit No. 2 blocking the road. Being unable to pass without going over the center line and after observing the lights of approaching vehicles and the blinker and rear lights of Unit No. 3, Whittaker stopped behind Unit No. 2 and waited for the oncoming traffic to' clear. ' His automobile stopped so that the left side of his car was slightly to the left of the left side of Unit No. 2. While parked in this position Whit-taker noticed in his rear view mirror the [403]*403approach of a speeding pickup truck. He pressed his brakes hard to light the bright red rear lights of his car and he also turned on his turn signal light. The pickup truck continued coming until it crashed into the rear of the Nash automobile, pushing it forward into and partially under the left rear end of Unit No. 2. The car was completely wrecked and the occupants were severely injured.
At the pretrial conference the court held the driver of the pickup negligent as a matter of law and the driver, person in charge and the owner of the pickup truck settled all claims against them prior to trial and therefore are not now parties to this action.
The question of the liability of the respondents was tried before a jury in April, 1958, and it returned a “no cause of action” verdict.
Appellants claim that the court erred in its instructions to the jury and specifically cite as error the instruction pertaining to the negligence of Nancy Dillingham, driver of the pickup truck.
The court’s instruction was as follows:
“You are instructed that the driver of the pickup truck was negligent as a matter of law, and if you find that she observed the hazards, if any of the stopped vehicles upon the highway or under the circumstances should have observed said vehicles, but because of her negligence failed to do so in time to avoid said accident, then you are instructed that the negligence on her part was the sole proximate cause of the collision, and your verdict must be in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action.”
The issue before this court is whether the above instruction had the effect of taking away from the jury any question of concurrent contributory negligence on the part of the respondents and thereby directed the verdict in their favor.
This court speaking to the problem of when an independent intervening negligent act becomes a sole proximate cause recently stated the following in the Hill-yard case:1
“In applying the test of foreseeability to situations where a negligently created pre-existing condition combines with a later act of negligence causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clear-cut distinction between two classes of cases. The first situation is where one has negligently created a dangerous condition (such as parking the truck) and a later actor observed, or circumstances are such that he could not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it. The second situation involves conduct of a [404]*404later intervening actor who negligently-failed to observe the dangerous condition until it was too late to avoid it. In regard to the first situation it is held as a matter of law that the later intervening act does interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial actor.”
It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that one who approaches a dangerous condition, created by the negligence of another, and either sees it, or circumstances are such that one must see it in time to avoid that danger, and fails to do so, becomes the sole proximate cause of any damage or injury caused thereby.
The Hillyard case stated further:
“The distinction is basically one between a situation in which the second actor has sufficient time, after being charged with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid' it, and one in which the second actor negligently becomes confronted with an emergency situation.”
It appears to us that the instant case belongs to the situation where the second actor had sufficient time after being charged with knowledge of the- hazard, to avoid it. The Hillyard case represented a situation of emergency where a driver approached a dangerous scene (a parked truck) which was obstructed from view and remained so until just before the impact. The driver did not, nor could he have observed the emergency situation before it was upon him.
The facts of the instant case are distinguishable from those of the Hillyard case. It does not appear from the evidence that the situation was of the type that one would normally not discover until it was too late. The Nash car was sitting in plain sight as (Nancy Dillingham) the driver of the pickup truck approached. It was the Nash car, stopped on the highway with which she collided. The appellants not only admit, but claim that the tail lights were lighted on their car and that the left rear signal light was flashing. The weather was clear and visibility was good. The evidence showed ' that Unit No. 1 was parked on the shoulder of the road so that Whittaker, sitting in the car, saw in the rear view mirror the approach of the pickup truck before it reached Unit No. 1. There could not then have been a trap created. The driver of the pickup saw, or can be charged with seeing the flashing signal and tail lights of the Nash automobile in sufficient time to have avoided a collision.
The trial court correctly applied the principle set forth in the Hillyard case by telling the jury in the complained of Instruction No. 27 that:
“ * * * if you find that she (Nancy Dillingham) observed the hazards [405]
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CALLISTER, Justice.
This is an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Appellants appeal from a verdict of “no cause of action” and contend that the lower court erred in its instructions to the jury.
Appellants are the driver and occupants of a passenger car. The respondents are the drivers and owners of two semi-trailer trucks.
The accident happened about 1:45 a. m. on the morning of December 15, 1956, on a straight stretch of U. S. Highway 40 and SO near the Salt Lake and Tooele County boundary. The highway at that point runs in a northeasterly direction, it is approximately 33 feet wide, hard surfaced and has almost no shoulder. The weather was clear and the road was dry. Prior to the accident three large trailer-trucks were parked along this highway facing east toward Salt Lake City and spaced approximately 150 feet from each other. Unit No. 1 had developed lighting difficulties and had stopped at the side of the highway to make repairs. Unit No. 2, driven by respondent Alvin Underwood and owned by respondent Joseph Johnson, passed Unit No. 1, observed its difficulty, parked about 150 feet ahead and the driver returned to give assistance. Unit No. 2 was parked with all four wheels on the highway, allegedly with all of its lights off. While repairs were being made, Unit No. 3, also a large semitrailer truck, drove by Units Nos. 1 and 2 and parked from 100 to 175 feet ahead of Unit No. 2 facing eastward with all wheels on the pavement and all of its lights on. Unit No. 3 was driven by respondent H. E. Woolf and was owned by respondent North American Van Lines.
While the trucks were thus parked appellant William Whittaker, driving a Nash automobile carrying the other appellants as passengers, passed Unit No. 1 and then observed Unit No. 2 blocking the road. Being unable to pass without going over the center line and after observing the lights of approaching vehicles and the blinker and rear lights of Unit No. 3, Whittaker stopped behind Unit No. 2 and waited for the oncoming traffic to' clear. ' His automobile stopped so that the left side of his car was slightly to the left of the left side of Unit No. 2. While parked in this position Whit-taker noticed in his rear view mirror the [403]*403approach of a speeding pickup truck. He pressed his brakes hard to light the bright red rear lights of his car and he also turned on his turn signal light. The pickup truck continued coming until it crashed into the rear of the Nash automobile, pushing it forward into and partially under the left rear end of Unit No. 2. The car was completely wrecked and the occupants were severely injured.
At the pretrial conference the court held the driver of the pickup negligent as a matter of law and the driver, person in charge and the owner of the pickup truck settled all claims against them prior to trial and therefore are not now parties to this action.
The question of the liability of the respondents was tried before a jury in April, 1958, and it returned a “no cause of action” verdict.
Appellants claim that the court erred in its instructions to the jury and specifically cite as error the instruction pertaining to the negligence of Nancy Dillingham, driver of the pickup truck.
The court’s instruction was as follows:
“You are instructed that the driver of the pickup truck was negligent as a matter of law, and if you find that she observed the hazards, if any of the stopped vehicles upon the highway or under the circumstances should have observed said vehicles, but because of her negligence failed to do so in time to avoid said accident, then you are instructed that the negligence on her part was the sole proximate cause of the collision, and your verdict must be in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action.”
The issue before this court is whether the above instruction had the effect of taking away from the jury any question of concurrent contributory negligence on the part of the respondents and thereby directed the verdict in their favor.
This court speaking to the problem of when an independent intervening negligent act becomes a sole proximate cause recently stated the following in the Hill-yard case:1
“In applying the test of foreseeability to situations where a negligently created pre-existing condition combines with a later act of negligence causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clear-cut distinction between two classes of cases. The first situation is where one has negligently created a dangerous condition (such as parking the truck) and a later actor observed, or circumstances are such that he could not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it. The second situation involves conduct of a [404]*404later intervening actor who negligently-failed to observe the dangerous condition until it was too late to avoid it. In regard to the first situation it is held as a matter of law that the later intervening act does interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial actor.”
It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that one who approaches a dangerous condition, created by the negligence of another, and either sees it, or circumstances are such that one must see it in time to avoid that danger, and fails to do so, becomes the sole proximate cause of any damage or injury caused thereby.
The Hillyard case stated further:
“The distinction is basically one between a situation in which the second actor has sufficient time, after being charged with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid' it, and one in which the second actor negligently becomes confronted with an emergency situation.”
It appears to us that the instant case belongs to the situation where the second actor had sufficient time after being charged with knowledge of the- hazard, to avoid it. The Hillyard case represented a situation of emergency where a driver approached a dangerous scene (a parked truck) which was obstructed from view and remained so until just before the impact. The driver did not, nor could he have observed the emergency situation before it was upon him.
The facts of the instant case are distinguishable from those of the Hillyard case. It does not appear from the evidence that the situation was of the type that one would normally not discover until it was too late. The Nash car was sitting in plain sight as (Nancy Dillingham) the driver of the pickup truck approached. It was the Nash car, stopped on the highway with which she collided. The appellants not only admit, but claim that the tail lights were lighted on their car and that the left rear signal light was flashing. The weather was clear and visibility was good. The evidence showed ' that Unit No. 1 was parked on the shoulder of the road so that Whittaker, sitting in the car, saw in the rear view mirror the approach of the pickup truck before it reached Unit No. 1. There could not then have been a trap created. The driver of the pickup saw, or can be charged with seeing the flashing signal and tail lights of the Nash automobile in sufficient time to have avoided a collision.
The trial court correctly applied the principle set forth in the Hillyard case by telling the jury in the complained of Instruction No. 27 that:
“ * * * if you find that she (Nancy Dillingham) observed the hazards [405]*405* * * of the stopped vehicles * * * or under the circumstances should have observed said vehicles, but because of her negligence failed to do so in time to avoid said accident, * * * then negligence on her part was the sole proximate cause of the collision.”
Appellants did not claim nor prove that the driver of the pickup truck was confronted with an emergency situation so therefore the issue rightfully went to the jury under the above instruction to determine whether or not she observed the hazard or should have observed the hazard. Absent an emergency situation, Nancy Dillingham’s failure to observe and negligently colliding with the appellant became the sole proximate cause of the collision. We are of the opinion that the complained of instruction was proper.
The appellant further complains of the trial court’s refusal to give other requested instructions. After careful consideration of the trial court’s instructions we are of the opinion that the basic issues were fairly and intelligibly presented to the jury for its determination.2 The court also correctly refused to instruct the jury on the failure of the respondents to put out flares.
The verdict of the jury should not be disturbed. Costs to respondents.
CROCKETT, C. J., and HENRIOD and McDonough, jj, concur.