[464]*464NEWMAN, J.
In this filiation action, ORS 109.124 et seq, petitioner appeals a summary judgment that declared that he has no parental rights as to the child that respondent, an unmarried woman, conceived by artificial insemination with petitioner’s semen. Respondent contested petitioner’s action to be declared the child’s father. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Petitioner assigns as errors that the court granted respondent’s motion and denied his motion. The court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact, that ORS 109.239 bars petitioner from obtaining parental rights and that, as applied to him, it is constitutional. We reverse.
To qualify under the filiation statute as an initiating party and be declared a father, see ORS 109.125(e) and ORS 109.155, petitioner must show that ORS 109.239 does not bar him. It is undisputed that, with respondent’s knowledge, petitioner voluntarily gave his semen to her and that she inseminated herself without the supervision of a physician. The child was conceived as a result of the insemination. Petitioner and respondent were acquainted, but were not married to each other or to anyone else. Petitioner pleaded, and respondent denied in her answer, that he gave his semen to her in reliance on an agreement with her that he “would remain active” in the child’s life and “participate in all important decisions concerning the child” and that he would have visitation rights one weekend each month and for six consecutive weeks each summer. Petitioner also pleaded, and respondent also denied in her answer, that he is ready, willing and able to accept the same responsibility for the support, education, maintenance and care of the child and for pregnancy related expenses as he would have if the child were born in lawful wedlock.
Five days before the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, petitioner served affidavits. They described the agreement and asserted that petitioner and respondent made it before he donated his semen, that he gave his semen in reliance on it and that he is ready, willing and able to undertake the responsibilities for the support, education, maintenance and care of the child as if it were born to him in marriage or as a result of sexual intercourse between him and respondent. Respondent did not file counteraffidavits. At the hearing, the court orally allowed respondent’s motion and denied petitioner’s.
[465]*465On April 22, petitioner moved for reconsideration. In support of his motion, his counsel submitted an affidavit:
“I appeared before the Court on April 13,1987, at 1:30 P.M., the hour set for hearing on the cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The [court] announced that [it] had not received petitioner’s response to the respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Affidavits filed in support of petitioner’s response, or petitioner’s Memorandum of law. I advised the Court that the said documents had been placed in the United States mail at Portland, Oregon on April 8, 1987. Respondent’s counsel * * * stated that his copies of the documents had been received at his office and he reviewed them the morning of April 13, 1987. At the time of the hearing, I provided the Court additional copies of petitioner’s Response, Affidavits and Memorandum. * * *
“Respondent’s counsel stated that there was an issue of fact in that his clients would dispute that there was an agreement between petitioner and respondent as was alleged in the Petition for Filiation and in the Affidavits filed by petitioner. I stated that if respondent disputed the facts alleged by petitioner, then petitioner demanded a jury trial to determine the facts.”
On May 18, the court heard arguments on the motion to reconsider. The court entered a judgment on May 27 and an amended judgment on June 8 that each granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment and denied petitioner’s. Each judgment recited that the court had considered the “affidavits filed in support of the motions.” Petitioner appeals from the amended judgment.
The statute respecting artificial insemination, Oregon Laws 1977, chapter 686 (the act), is codified at ORS 109.239 to ORS 109.247, ORS 677.355 to ORS 677.370 and ORS 677.990(1) and (3).1 ORS 109.239 (section 5 of the act) [466]*466provides:
“If the donor of semen used in artificial insemination is not the mother’s husband:
“(1) Such donor shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to a child born as a result of the artificial insemination; and
“(2) A child born as a result of the artificial insemination shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to the donor.”
Petitioner argues that the legislature did not intend that ORS [467]*467109.239 apply to bar him, because (1) the artificial insemination occurred without the intercession of a physician, (2) he is not an anonymous donor, (3) respondent is unmarried, (4) he gave respondent his semen in reliance on an agreement that they made that he would have parental rights and (5) he wishes to undertake the responsibilities of fatherhood. He also argues that if, as applied to him, ORS 109.239 deprives him of parental rights, it violates Article I, sections 10 and 20, of the Oregon Constitution, the Due Process arid Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal constitutional right of privacy.
Respondent responds that she did not make the agreement with him but that, in any event, it is immaterial whether she did because, even if she made the agreement, he has no parental rights under the act. She also asserts that the act, as applied to petitioner, is constitutional.
We hold that ORS 109.239 applies to petitioner. Although the act does not define “donor,” it is clear that a donor is a man who gives his semen for the purpose of artificial insemination. Petitioner is a donor, even though a physician or a person under his supervision did not perform the insemination, respondent knew that petitioner was the source of the semen when she used it and she was unmarried.
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[464]*464NEWMAN, J.
In this filiation action, ORS 109.124 et seq, petitioner appeals a summary judgment that declared that he has no parental rights as to the child that respondent, an unmarried woman, conceived by artificial insemination with petitioner’s semen. Respondent contested petitioner’s action to be declared the child’s father. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Petitioner assigns as errors that the court granted respondent’s motion and denied his motion. The court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact, that ORS 109.239 bars petitioner from obtaining parental rights and that, as applied to him, it is constitutional. We reverse.
To qualify under the filiation statute as an initiating party and be declared a father, see ORS 109.125(e) and ORS 109.155, petitioner must show that ORS 109.239 does not bar him. It is undisputed that, with respondent’s knowledge, petitioner voluntarily gave his semen to her and that she inseminated herself without the supervision of a physician. The child was conceived as a result of the insemination. Petitioner and respondent were acquainted, but were not married to each other or to anyone else. Petitioner pleaded, and respondent denied in her answer, that he gave his semen to her in reliance on an agreement with her that he “would remain active” in the child’s life and “participate in all important decisions concerning the child” and that he would have visitation rights one weekend each month and for six consecutive weeks each summer. Petitioner also pleaded, and respondent also denied in her answer, that he is ready, willing and able to accept the same responsibility for the support, education, maintenance and care of the child and for pregnancy related expenses as he would have if the child were born in lawful wedlock.
Five days before the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, petitioner served affidavits. They described the agreement and asserted that petitioner and respondent made it before he donated his semen, that he gave his semen in reliance on it and that he is ready, willing and able to undertake the responsibilities for the support, education, maintenance and care of the child as if it were born to him in marriage or as a result of sexual intercourse between him and respondent. Respondent did not file counteraffidavits. At the hearing, the court orally allowed respondent’s motion and denied petitioner’s.
[465]*465On April 22, petitioner moved for reconsideration. In support of his motion, his counsel submitted an affidavit:
“I appeared before the Court on April 13,1987, at 1:30 P.M., the hour set for hearing on the cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The [court] announced that [it] had not received petitioner’s response to the respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Affidavits filed in support of petitioner’s response, or petitioner’s Memorandum of law. I advised the Court that the said documents had been placed in the United States mail at Portland, Oregon on April 8, 1987. Respondent’s counsel * * * stated that his copies of the documents had been received at his office and he reviewed them the morning of April 13, 1987. At the time of the hearing, I provided the Court additional copies of petitioner’s Response, Affidavits and Memorandum. * * *
“Respondent’s counsel stated that there was an issue of fact in that his clients would dispute that there was an agreement between petitioner and respondent as was alleged in the Petition for Filiation and in the Affidavits filed by petitioner. I stated that if respondent disputed the facts alleged by petitioner, then petitioner demanded a jury trial to determine the facts.”
On May 18, the court heard arguments on the motion to reconsider. The court entered a judgment on May 27 and an amended judgment on June 8 that each granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment and denied petitioner’s. Each judgment recited that the court had considered the “affidavits filed in support of the motions.” Petitioner appeals from the amended judgment.
The statute respecting artificial insemination, Oregon Laws 1977, chapter 686 (the act), is codified at ORS 109.239 to ORS 109.247, ORS 677.355 to ORS 677.370 and ORS 677.990(1) and (3).1 ORS 109.239 (section 5 of the act) [466]*466provides:
“If the donor of semen used in artificial insemination is not the mother’s husband:
“(1) Such donor shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to a child born as a result of the artificial insemination; and
“(2) A child born as a result of the artificial insemination shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to the donor.”
Petitioner argues that the legislature did not intend that ORS [467]*467109.239 apply to bar him, because (1) the artificial insemination occurred without the intercession of a physician, (2) he is not an anonymous donor, (3) respondent is unmarried, (4) he gave respondent his semen in reliance on an agreement that they made that he would have parental rights and (5) he wishes to undertake the responsibilities of fatherhood. He also argues that if, as applied to him, ORS 109.239 deprives him of parental rights, it violates Article I, sections 10 and 20, of the Oregon Constitution, the Due Process arid Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal constitutional right of privacy.
Respondent responds that she did not make the agreement with him but that, in any event, it is immaterial whether she did because, even if she made the agreement, he has no parental rights under the act. She also asserts that the act, as applied to petitioner, is constitutional.
We hold that ORS 109.239 applies to petitioner. Although the act does not define “donor,” it is clear that a donor is a man who gives his semen for the purpose of artificial insemination. Petitioner is a donor, even though a physician or a person under his supervision did not perform the insemination, respondent knew that petitioner was the source of the semen when she used it and she was unmarried. Although ORS 677.360 (section 2 of the act) states that “[o]nly licensed physicians and persons under their supervision may select artificial insemination donors and perform artificial insemination,” ORS 677.355 (section 1 of the act) defines “artificial insemination” without reference to whether a physician performs the insemination. Moreover, ORS 677.990(3) (section 8 of the act) only means that, if a woman artificially inseminates herself without a physician’s supervision, she commits a class C misdemeanor. Furthermore, a man who gives his semen for the purpose of artificial insemination is a donor, even though the woman who uses it is unmarried. See ORS 677.365(1) (section 3(1) of the act).
We cannot say that the legislature intended that a man who gives his semen for the purpose of artificial insemination is not a donor simply because he is not anonymous—that is, he is known to the woman as the semen producer. The legitimate purposes of the act are: (1) to allow married couples to have children, even though the husband is [468]*468infertile, impotent or ill; (2) to allow an unmarried woman to conceive and bear a child without sexual intercourse; (3) to resolve potential disputes about parental rights and responsibilities: that is, (a) the mother’s husband, if he consents, is father of the child and (b) an unmarried mother is freed of any claims by the donor of parental rights; (4) to encourage men to donate semen by protecting them against any claims by the mother or the child; and (5) to legitimate the child and give it rights against the mother’s husband, if he consents to the insemination. To achieve those purposes, the act bars a donor from the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood. It would be inconsistent with the purposes of the act if a donor were not barred simply because he was known to the mother at the time of conception as the semen producer. Additionally, the act, by its terms, does not limit the application of ORS 109.239 to anonymous donors.
Furthermore, ORS 109.239 bars petitioner from rights and responsibilities of fatherhood, even if respondent had agreed with him before he gave her his semen that he would have these rights and responsibilities and he gave his semen in reliance on that agreement. Again, ORS 109.239 contains no qualifying language.2 It is unambiguous. By its terms, it bars petitioner. We cannot rewrite the act.
Petitioner asserts, however, that ORS 109.230 makes the agreement enforceable:
“Any contract between the mother and father of a child born out of wedlock is a legal contract, and the admission by the father of his fatherhood of the child is sufficient consideration to support the contract.”
The legislature, however, enacted ORS 109.230 before it enacted the act. Petitioner, as a donor under ORS 109.239, is not a “father” under ORS 109.230.
Accordingly, we must determine if ORS 109.239, as applied to petitioner, is constitutional. If it is, any dispute over [469]*469the existence or nature of the agreement would not be material. We turn first to the state constitutional issues. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 666 P2d 1316 (1983). Respondent asserts that ORS 109.239, as applied to him, violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution.3 It is not disputed that, if petitioner and respondent had mutually agreed that he should have the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood and, in reliance thereon, he gave her his semen by sexual intercourse, the legislature could not declare that he has no claim to be the father. Whether a male impregnates a woman by artificial insemination or by sexual intercourse, however, is not a distinction based on an immutable characteristic. A classification between males that bars some and not others from claiming to be a father, depending dn how the male’s semen is placed in an unmarried woman, will not violate Article I, section 20, if the classification has a rational foundation in the light of the statute’s purpose. See Van Daam v. Hegstrom, 88 Or App 40, 43, 744 P2d 269 (1987). Even if petitioner and respondent agreed that he have the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood and, in reliance thereon, he had donated his semen, there is a rational connection between ORS 109.239, if applied to bar his fatherhood, and the purposes of the act.
Petitioner also argues that ORS 109.239 violates Article I, section 20, because it gives respondent, an unmarried female, parental rights that it denies to petitioner, an unmarried male. He emphasizes that an unmarried male who donates semen does not have the rights of a father, but an unmarried woman who receives the sperm and conceives and bears the child is not deprived of the rights of a mother. A statute that gives a privilege to women while denying it to men is inherently suspect and subject to strict scrutiny, unless the classification (1) is based on specific biological differences between men and women and (2) is rationally related to the purposes of the statute. See Hewitt v. SAIF, 294 Or 33, 46, 653 P2d 970 (1982). Here, the classification of unmarried males and unmarried females is based on biological differences [470]*470between men and women. Only a male could contribute the sperm to accomplish conception; only a female could conceive and bear the child. Furthermore, the classification is rationally related to the purposes of the act and facilitates the use of artificial insemination by an unmarried woman.
ORS 109.239, as applied to petitioner, also does not violate Article I, section 10. The statute does not deny to him a remedy for an injury to his person other than, as noted below, to deny to him due process. Article I, section 10, is not a guarantee of due process. See Cole v. Dept. of Revenue, 294 Or 188, 191, 655 P2d 171 (1982); Maddox v. Clac. Co. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 293 Or 27, 34 n 7, 643 P2d 1253 (1982); see also Hilton v. MVD, 93 Or App 388, 393, 762 P2d 1030 (1988), aff’d on different grounds 308 Or 150 (1989); Linde, “Without Due Process,” 49 Or L Rev 125, 136-138 (1970).
We turn to petitioner’s federal constitutional claims. We hold that ORS 109.239, as applied to petitioner, will violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if he can establish that he and respondent agreed that he should have the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood and in reliance thereon he donated his semen. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 US 248, 103 S Ct 2985, 77 L Ed 2d 614 (1983), the court discussed the significance to the man’s rights and responsibilities of fatherhood of the biological connection between the man and the child. There, the issue was whether the unmarried father, whose child was conceived by sexual intercourse, had to have notice and an opportunity to be heard before the child could be adopted by others. Under New York law, an unmarried father would not receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in the adoption proceeding, unless he had asserted the rights and responsibilities of a father in a manner that New York law prescribed. The court stated:
“When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, * * * his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. * * * But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. * * *
“The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he [471]*471grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interest lie.” 463 US at 261.
In Lehr, the biological father had not complied with the New York statute, and the court held that he was not entitled to notice and hearing. Lehr indicates, however, that, under the Due Process Clause, a state may not place an absolute bar to a biological father’s efforts to assert the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood. Here, petitioner has the biological connection with respondent’s child, although it is the result of artificial insemination, not sexual intercourse. He has complied with the procedural requirements to bring this filiation action. If he can prove the facts that he asserts in his affidavits, he clearly has “grasped the opportunity” to “participate in the rearing of his child.” Lehr v. Robertson, supra, 463 US at 261, 262; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 92 S Ct 1208, 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972);4 compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US_, 109 S Ct 2333, 105 L Ed 2d 91 (1989). Yet ORS 109.239 places an absolute bar to his assertion of the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood.5
[472]*472The Due Process Clause can afford no different protection to petitioner as the biological father because the child was conceived by artificial insemination rather than by sexual intercourse, providing that he can prove the facts that he asserts in his affidavits. The constitutionality of ORS 109.239, as applied to petitioner, turns on whether he can establish those facts. There are, therefore, genuine issues of material facts respecting the existence and nature of the agreement. The court erred when it granted summary judgment to respondent.6
The court did not err, however, when it denied summary judgment to petitioner. Although petitioner’s affidavits describe the agreement and respondent did not file counter-affidavits, she did not have an adequate opportunity to respond before the court hearing on April 13, 1987. See ORCP 47C. When the court reconsidered the motions on May 18, petitioner’s attorney had timely filed an affidavit that stated that respondent disputed that there was an agreement as alleged in the petition and in petitioner’s affidavits.
Reversed and remanded.