McElroy v. Department of Corrections

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 3, 2025
Docket4:25-cv-00314
StatusUnknown

This text of McElroy v. Department of Corrections (McElroy v. Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McElroy v. Department of Corrections, (N.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LATWAHN J. MCELROY, Case No. 25-cv-00314-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA 9 v. PAUPERIS SHOULD NOT BE DENIED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); 10 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et DENYING REQUESTS FOR ORDER al., TO SHOW CAUSE AND TEMPORARY 11 RESTRAINING ORDER Defendants. 12 Re: Dkt. Nos. 2, 5, 11

13 14 Plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant 15 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause 16 why his request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 2, should not be denied pursuant 17 to the three strikes provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915; and DENIES Plaintiff’s requests to 18 show cause and for a temporary restraining order, Dkt. Nos. 5, 11. 19 DISCUSSION 20 I. Order to Show Cause Why In Forma Pauperis Status Should Not Be Denied 21 A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 22 This action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”) which 23 became effective on April 26, 1996. The PLRA provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil 24 action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, i.e., may not proceed in forma pauperis, “if the prisoner has, on 3 25 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action . . . in a 26 court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 27 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 1 In determining whether a prior dismissal counts as a strike, the Court “should look to the 2 substance of the dismissed lawsuit, and not to how the district court labelled or styled the 3 dismissal.” Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Harris I”) (internal quotations 4 marks and citation omitted). To be counted as a strike, a case must be dismissed in its entirety as 5 frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim. Id. at 674. For purposes of a dismissal that 6 may be counted under Section 1915(g), the Ninth Circuit gives this guidance: The phrase “fails to 7 state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 8 Procedure 12(b)(6) and apparently means the same thing. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 9 (9th Cir. 2005) ( “Andrews I”). A case “is frivolous if it is ‘of little weight or importance: having 10 no basis in law or fact.’” Id. (citation omitted). “A case is malicious if it was filed with the 11 ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Id. (citation omitted). 12 When the district court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim and grants leave to 13 amend, and the plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal counts as a strike 14 under § 1915(g). Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Harris II”). 15 “[R]epeated and knowing violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s ‘short and 16 plain statement’ requirement are strikes as ‘fail[ures] to state a claim,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), when 17 the opportunity to correct the pleadings has been afforded and there has been no modification 18 within a reasonable time.” Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013). Complaints 19 can run afoul of Rule 8(a) by (1) saying “too little,” that is, by failing to meet the Iqbal pleading 20 threshold, or (2) saying “too much.” Id. at 1108-10. “Prolix, confusing complaints . . . impose 21 unfair burdens on litigants and judges” and therefore can be properly dismissed under Rule 8. 22 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1179–80 (9th Cir. 1996). 23 A dismissal based on immunity does not constitute a strike because § 1915(g) omits the 24 immunity language as a ground for a strike. Harris I, 935 F.3d at 675. There are rare cases where 25 immunity may be so clear on the face of the complaint that dismissal may qualify as a strike for 26 failure to state a claim, or where immunity is so obvious that the suit is frivolous and dismissal 27 counts as a strike. Id. at 676. “But these are exceptional cases where the affirmative defense is 1 complaint. Such will rarely be the case with immunity-based defenses.” Id.; see Ray v. Lara, 31 2 F.4th 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2022) (dismissal on basis of prosecutorial immunity for contents of 3 government’s appellate brief constituted strike). 4 “Not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike under § 1915(g). Rather, § 1915(g) should 5 be used to deny a prisoner’s IFP status only when, after careful evaluation of the order dismissing 6 an action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was 7 dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 8 1121. A district court is not required to announce in an order that its dismissal constitutes a strike 9 under Section 1915(g) for that dismissal to later count as a strike. Id. at 1119 n.8. 10 A dismissal based solely on a finding that the plaintiff previously incurred at least three 11 strikes, without any additional finding that the action is itself frivolous, malicious or fails to state a 12 claim, does not count as an additional strike under § 1915(g). El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 13 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). 14 The plain language of the imminent danger clause in Section 1915(g) indicates that 15 “imminent danger” is to be assessed at the time of filing of the complaint. See Andrews v. 16 Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). The conditions that existed at 17 some earlier or later time are not relevant. Id. at 1053 & n.5 (post-filing transfer of prisoner out of 18 prison at which danger allegedly existed may have mooted request for injunctive relief against 19 alleged danger, but did not affect Section 1915(g) analysis). “[T]he imminent danger exception to 20 the PLRA three-strikes provision requires a nexus between the alleged imminent danger and the 21 violations of law alleged in the complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2022). The 22 court “should not make an overly detailed inquiry into whether the allegations qualify for the 23 [imminent danger] exception.” Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1055. It is sufficient if the complaint 24 “makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 25 at the time of filing.” Id. 26 The Ninth Circuit requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of 27 Section 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear 1 him. Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120.

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Related

United States v. Massachusetts
493 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2007)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Eric Knapp v. Hogan
738 F.3d 1106 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Andrews v. King
398 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Jason Lee Harris v. J. Kenneth Mangum
863 F.3d 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Tommie Harris v. K. Harris
935 F.3d 670 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)

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McElroy v. Department of Corrections, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcelroy-v-department-of-corrections-cand-2025.